When do small countries win tax wars?

Public Finance Review

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 327-361

  Eggert, Wolfgang ^a   Haufler, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032366384     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600403     Document Type: Article

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