Arbitrage, hedging, and financial innovation

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 739-755

  Dow, James ^a,b  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^b LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032359292     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/11.4.739     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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