Welfare state limits to globalization

Politics and Society

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 363-390

  Rieger, Elmar ^a   Leibfried, Stephan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032357933     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329298026003004     Document Type: Review

References (137)

1. For a first foray into the literature, see Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito. A Vision for the World Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Beate Kohler-Koch, "Politische Unverträglichkeiten von Globalisierung," in Globalisierung der Wirtschaft - Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, ed. Ulrich Steger (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995): 83-114; and Michael Zürn, "Jenseits der Staatlichkeit: Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung," Leviathan 20 (1992): 490-513. For a bibliography on the welfare state and globalization, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Globalization and the Western Welfare State: An Annotated Bibliography (Bremen: GAAC/SSRC/Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin with Centre for Social Policy, Bremen, and Centre for European Social Research, Mannheim, 1995). The pros and cons of globalization discussed among economists are illustrated by a contrast of the work and biography of Lester Thurow and Paul Krugman: "Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists" (The New York Times, Sunday, 16 February 1997, sec. 3: 1, 10, 11).
2. For a first foray into the literature, see Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito. A Vision for the World Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Beate Kohler-Koch, "Politische Unverträglichkeiten von Globalisierung," in Globalisierung der Wirtschaft - Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, ed. Ulrich Steger (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995): 83-114; and Michael Zürn, "Jenseits der Staatlichkeit: Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung," Leviathan 20 (1992): 490-513. For a bibliography on the welfare state and globalization, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Globalization and the Western Welfare State: An Annotated Bibliography (Bremen: GAAC/SSRC/Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin with Centre for Social Policy, Bremen, and Centre for European Social Research, Mannheim, 1995). The pros and cons of globalization discussed among economists are illustrated by a contrast of the work and biography of Lester Thurow and Paul Krugman: "Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists" (The New York Times, Sunday, 16 February 1997, sec. 3: 1, 10, 11).
3. For a first foray into the literature, see Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito. A Vision for the World Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Beate Kohler-Koch, "Politische Unverträglichkeiten von Globalisierung," in Globalisierung der Wirtschaft - Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, ed. Ulrich Steger (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995): 83-114; and Michael Zürn, "Jenseits der Staatlichkeit: Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung," Leviathan 20 (1992): 490-513. For a bibliography on the welfare state and globalization, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Globalization and the Western Welfare State: An Annotated Bibliography (Bremen: GAAC/SSRC/Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin with Centre for Social Policy, Bremen, and Centre for European Social Research, Mannheim, 1995). The pros and cons of globalization discussed among economists are illustrated by a contrast of the work and biography of Lester Thurow and Paul Krugman: "Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists" (The New York Times, Sunday, 16 February 1997, sec. 3: 1, 10, 11).
4. For a first foray into the literature, see Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito. A Vision for the World Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Beate Kohler-Koch, "Politische Unverträglichkeiten von Globalisierung," in Globalisierung der Wirtschaft - Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, ed. Ulrich Steger (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995): 83-114; and Michael Zürn, "Jenseits der Staatlichkeit: Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung," Leviathan 20 (1992): 490-513. For a bibliography on the welfare state and globalization, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Globalization and the Western Welfare State: An Annotated Bibliography (Bremen: GAAC/SSRC/Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin with Centre for Social Policy, Bremen, and Centre for European Social Research, Mannheim, 1995). The pros and cons of globalization discussed among economists are illustrated by a contrast of the work and biography of Lester Thurow and Paul Krugman: "Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists" (The New York Times, Sunday, 16 February 1997, sec. 3: 1, 10, 11).
5. For a first foray into the literature, see Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito. A Vision for the World Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Beate Kohler-Koch, "Politische Unverträglichkeiten von Globalisierung," in Globalisierung der Wirtschaft - Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, ed. Ulrich Steger (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995): 83-114; and Michael Zürn, "Jenseits der Staatlichkeit: Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung," Leviathan 20 (1992): 490-513. For a bibliography on the welfare state and globalization, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Globalization and the Western Welfare State: An Annotated Bibliography (Bremen: GAAC/SSRC/Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin with Centre for Social Policy, Bremen, and Centre for European Social Research, Mannheim, 1995). The pros and cons of globalization discussed among economists are illustrated by a contrast of the work and biography of Lester Thurow and Paul Krugman: "Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists" (The New York Times, Sunday, 16 February 1997, sec. 3: 1, 10, 11).
6. For a first foray into the literature, see Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito. A Vision for the World Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Beate Kohler-Koch, "Politische Unverträglichkeiten von Globalisierung," in Globalisierung der Wirtschaft - Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, ed. Ulrich Steger (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1995): 83-114; and Michael Zürn, "Jenseits der Staatlichkeit: Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung," Leviathan 20 (1992): 490-513. For a bibliography on the welfare state and globalization, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Globalization and the Western Welfare State: An Annotated Bibliography (Bremen: GAAC/SSRC/Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin with Centre for Social Policy, Bremen, and Centre for European Social Research, Mannheim, 1995). The pros and cons of globalization discussed among economists are illustrated by a contrast of the work and biography of Lester Thurow and Paul Krugman: "Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists" (The New York Times, Sunday, 16 February 1997, sec. 3: 1, 10, 11).
7. The most recent example is the Ecumenical Declaration of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Germany: Für eine Zukunft in Solidarität und Gerechtigkeit (1997), excerpted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1 March 1997): 8. This declaration is modeled on the 1986 declaration of the U.S. Catholic bishops, Economic Justice for All.
8. The most recent example is the Ecumenical Declaration of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Germany: Für eine Zukunft in Solidarität und Gerechtigkeit (1997), excerpted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1 March 1997): 8. This declaration is modeled on the 1986 declaration of the U.S. Catholic bishops, Economic Justice for All.
9. "Schutz der nationalen Arbeit" was the National Socialist legal term for such tendencies.
10. For example, Werner Maly, "Die Bedeutung der Sozialpolitik für unternehmerische Standortentscheidungen," in Internationalisierung von Wirtschaft und Politik: Handlungsspielräume der nationalen Sozialpolitik, ed. Winfried Schmähl and Herbert Rische (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997): 79-101; and Amity Shlaes, "Germany's Chained Economy," Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 109-24.
11. For example, Werner Maly, "Die Bedeutung der Sozialpolitik für unternehmerische Standortentscheidungen," in Internationalisierung von Wirtschaft und Politik: Handlungsspielräume der nationalen Sozialpolitik, ed. Winfried Schmähl and Herbert Rische (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997): 79-101; and Amity Shlaes, "Germany's Chained Economy," Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 109-24.
12. See Josef Wieland, "Sozialpartnerschaft, betriebliche Sozialpolitik und Unternehmenskultur: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse," Wittener Jahrbuch für ökonomische Literatur (1996): 143-60; and Michael Hüther, "Umbau der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme im Zeichen der Globalisierung," Zeitschrift for Wirtschaftspolitik 46 (1997): 193-214. For a contraposition see Heinz Lampert, "Voraussetzungen einer Sozialstaatsreform-kritische Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Diskussion über den Umbau des Sozialstaats," Jahrbücher für Nationalökonmie und Statistik 214 (1995): 513-31.
13. See Josef Wieland, "Sozialpartnerschaft, betriebliche Sozialpolitik und Unternehmenskultur: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse," Wittener Jahrbuch für ökonomische Literatur (1996): 143-60; and Michael Hüther, "Umbau der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme im Zeichen der Globalisierung," Zeitschrift for Wirtschaftspolitik 46 (1997): 193-214. For a contraposition see Heinz Lampert, "Voraussetzungen einer Sozialstaatsreform-kritische Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Diskussion über den Umbau des Sozialstaats," Jahrbücher für Nationalökonmie und Statistik 214 (1995): 513-31.
14. See Josef Wieland, "Sozialpartnerschaft, betriebliche Sozialpolitik und Unternehmenskultur: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse," Wittener Jahrbuch für ökonomische Literatur (1996): 143-60; and Michael Hüther, "Umbau der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme im Zeichen der Globalisierung," Zeitschrift for Wirtschaftspolitik 46 (1997): 193-214. For a contraposition see Heinz Lampert, "Voraussetzungen einer Sozialstaatsreform-kritische Anmerkungen zur aktuellen Diskussion über den Umbau des Sozialstaats," Jahrbücher für Nationalökonmie und Statistik 214 (1995): 513-31.
15. Obviously, this assessment is based mainly on the (Western) European experience. In this context one can also note that the predicament of the European Monetary Union seems quite similar: EMU is linked to domestic reforms in fiscal and budgetary affairs, which resulted in mutual hostage-taking and gridlock, rather than functioning as a means of external enforcement of internal reforms, as the heads of state had hoped at Maastricht. See Barry Eichengreen, EMU Up in the Air (Stanford, CA: Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, 1997).
16. See Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," World Politics 14 (1960/61): 267-99; and Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fond, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 1-26.
17. See Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," World Politics 14 (1960/61): 267-99; and Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fond, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 1-26.
18. The sheer volume of globalized financial transactions is often advanced as evidence of an unparalleled qualitative change. This is untenable in the historical context -not to mention the equally routine assertion of associated negative consequences for the autonomy of nation-states: Some measurements of the degree of financial integration in the world economy indicate that at the beginning of the twentieth century the world was more interconnected than at any subsequent time (including the 1990s, despite the trillions of dollars of daily currency movements). These measurements examine the behavior of saving and investment levels. Investment and savings were coordinated on a global level, with the result that a surplus of investment in one area or state (that is, a balance of payments current account deficit) could be smoothly financed by the export of surplus savings from another area. Even in the highly integrated 1980s and 1990s, such transfers were much more difficult and raised many more political eyebrows than in the golden era that preceded the First World War. (Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, 12)
19. See Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History: Myth and Paradoxes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Charles Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy 1500-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
20. See Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History: Myth and Paradoxes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Charles Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy 1500-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
21. See Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History: Myth and Paradoxes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Charles Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy 1500-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
22. See Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History: Myth and Paradoxes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Charles Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy 1500-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
23. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
24. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
25. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
26. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
27. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
28. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
29. Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1965 [1945]); Karl Deutsch, Nationenbildung - Nationalstaat - Integration (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Vol. XXI. Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and North America, ed. Donald Moggridge (London: Macmillan, 1983): 233-46; Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," Australian Outlook 11 (1957): 3-50; Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge and Company, 1942); and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Future of Private Enterprise in the Face of Modern Socialist Tendencies," History of Political Economy 7 (1975): 294-8.
30. This approach, however, cannot replace the analysis of actual structures and processes of the internationalization of trade, production, and investment. Here we try to argue for a particular view on possible interactions between welfare state structures on one hand and systems of foreign economic policy on the other.
31. Werner Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin: Georg Bondi, 1913): 368.
32. See Jeffrey Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, "The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview," in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 25-47.
33. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: Everyman's Library, 1973 [1821]): 81.
34. See Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): 5.
35. B. S. Frey, W. Pommerehne, F. Schneider, and G. Gilbert, "Consensus and Dissensus Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry," American Economic Review 74 (1984): 986-94.
36. See Irwin, Against the Tide, 53.
37. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980 [1945]): 27.
38. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987): 31-4, 46-50.
39. David Hume, "Of Money," in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1987 [1777]): 283-4 (emphasis added).
40. David Hume, "Of the Balance of Trade," in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1987 [1777]): 329-30 (emphasis added). This position is echoed in today's discussion about the resistance to globalization. Paul Krugman notes that it is wrong to blame global markets for those economic and social ills usually brought into a causal relationship with it. He points out that the facts unmistakably indicate domestic and particularly political causes (International Herald Tribune [20 February 1997]: 8). See also his Pop Internationalism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
41. David Hume, "Of the Balance of Trade," in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1987 [1777]): 329-30 (emphasis added). This position is echoed in today's discussion about the resistance to globalization. Paul Krugman notes that it is wrong to blame global markets for those economic and social ills usually brought into a causal relationship with it. He points out that the facts unmistakably indicate domestic and particularly political causes (International Herald Tribune [20 February 1997]: 8). See also his Pop Internationalism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
42. David Hume, "Of the Balance of Trade," in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1987 [1777]): 329-30 (emphasis added). This position is echoed in today's discussion about the resistance to globalization. Paul Krugman notes that it is wrong to blame global markets for those economic and social ills usually brought into a causal relationship with it. He points out that the facts unmistakably indicate domestic and particularly political causes (International Herald Tribune [20 February 1997]: 8). See also his Pop Internationalism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
43. This is especially true for the United States. See Irwin, Against the Tide, 160; and Alfred E. Eckes, Opening Up America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
44. This is especially true for the United States. See Irwin, Against the Tide, 160; and Alfred E. Eckes, Opening Up America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
45. For a return of this argument see William Greider in an article published in the International Herald Tribune (25 February 1997: 9). He argues that those people are right who no longer believe in the beneficial logic of comparative advantage and who now think that economic globalization is a zero-sum game producing losses and insecurity. For the counterargument see Paul Krugman: Economic growth in low-wage nations is in principle as likely to raise as to lower per capita income in high-wage countries; the actual effects have been negligible. In theory, there are some reasons for concern about the impact of Third World competition on the distribution (as opposed to the level) of income in the West.... (Pop Internationalism, 51f.) For a more detailed analysis see Krugman, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences," in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 327-77. For a broadly based comparative analysis of the consequences of global competition for employment and wages, see Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and for an economic evaluation of the relative importance of technological development versus international competition see Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin H. Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages: Levelling Wages Down? (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994).
46. For a return of this argument see William Greider in an article published in the International Herald Tribune (25 February 1997: 9). He argues that those people are right who no longer believe in the beneficial logic of comparative advantage and who now think that economic globalization is a zero-sum game producing losses and insecurity. For the counterargument see Paul Krugman: Economic growth in low-wage nations is in principle as likely to raise as to lower per capita income in high-wage countries; the actual effects have been negligible. In theory, there are some reasons for concern about the impact of Third World competition on the distribution (as opposed to the level) of income in the West.... (Pop Internationalism, 51f.) For a more detailed analysis see Krugman, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences," in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 327-77. For a broadly based comparative analysis of the consequences of global competition for employment and wages, see Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and for an economic evaluation of the relative importance of technological development versus international competition see Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin H. Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages: Levelling Wages Down? (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994).
47. For a return of this argument see William Greider in an article published in the International Herald Tribune (25 February 1997: 9). He argues that those people are right who no longer believe in the beneficial logic of comparative advantage and who now think that economic globalization is a zero-sum game producing losses and insecurity. For the counterargument see Paul Krugman: Economic growth in low-wage nations is in principle as likely to raise as to lower per capita income in high-wage countries; the actual effects have been negligible. In theory, there are some reasons for concern about the impact of Third World competition on the distribution (as opposed to the level) of income in the West.... (Pop Internationalism, 51f.) For a more detailed analysis see Krugman, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences," in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 327-77. For a broadly based comparative analysis of the consequences of global competition for employment and wages, see Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and for an economic evaluation of the relative importance of technological development versus international competition see Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin H. Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages: Levelling Wages Down? (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994).
48. For a return of this argument see William Greider in an article published in the International Herald Tribune (25 February 1997: 9). He argues that those people are right who no longer believe in the beneficial logic of comparative advantage and who now think that economic globalization is a zero-sum game producing losses and insecurity. For the counterargument see Paul Krugman: Economic growth in low-wage nations is in principle as likely to raise as to lower per capita income in high-wage countries; the actual effects have been negligible. In theory, there are some reasons for concern about the impact of Third World competition on the distribution (as opposed to the level) of income in the West.... (Pop Internationalism, 51f.) For a more detailed analysis see Krugman, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences," in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 327-77. For a broadly based comparative analysis of the consequences of global competition for employment and wages, see Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and for an economic evaluation of the relative importance of technological development versus international competition see Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin H. Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages: Levelling Wages Down? (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994).
49. For a return of this argument see William Greider in an article published in the International Herald Tribune (25 February 1997: 9). He argues that those people are right who no longer believe in the beneficial logic of comparative advantage and who now think that economic globalization is a zero-sum game producing losses and insecurity. For the counterargument see Paul Krugman: Economic growth in low-wage nations is in principle as likely to raise as to lower per capita income in high-wage countries; the actual effects have been negligible. In theory, there are some reasons for concern about the impact of Third World competition on the distribution (as opposed to the level) of income in the West.... (Pop Internationalism, 51f.) For a more detailed analysis see Krugman, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences," in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 327-77. For a broadly based comparative analysis of the consequences of global competition for employment and wages, see Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and for an economic evaluation of the relative importance of technological development versus international competition see Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin H. Kosters, eds., Trade and Wages: Levelling Wages Down? (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994).
50. Max Weber, "Argentinische Kolonistenwirthschaften," in Landarbeiterfrage, Nationalstaat und Volkswirtschaftspolitik: Schriften und Reden 1892-1899 (Tübingen: Mohr (Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Abt. I, Band 4, 1. Halbband), 1993 [1894]): 299.
51. In the context of his 1992 presidential campaign against Bill Clinton in the United States, Ross Perot argued against joining NAFTA, coining the slogan of the "great sucking sound" to describe the United States's loss of jobs to Mexico that he predicted would result from ratification of NAFTA; he was able to draw a substantial segment of protectionist voters to his candidacy. On the role of "social dumping" in the European integration context see Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, eds., European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
52. Weber was not alone in this judgment, but clearly within the mainstream of political economical thought of the time. See Hans Rosenberg, Große Depression und Bismarckzeit (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967): 78-82, 187-91.
53. Weber, "Argentinische Kolonistenwirthschaft," 303 (emphasis added).
54. Joseph Schumpeter expressed this best in a speech given in 1949: The best method of satisfying ourselves as to how far this process of disintegration of capitalist society has gone is to observe the extent to which its implications are being taken for granted both by the business class itself and by the large number of economists who feel themselves to be opposed to (one hundred percent) socialism and are in the habit of denying the existence of any tendency toward it. To speak of the latter only, they accept not only unquestioningly but also approvingly : (1) the various stabilization policies which are to prevent recessions or at least depressions, that is, a large amount of public management of business situations even if not the principle of full employment; (2) the "desirability of greater equality of incomes," rarely defining how far short of absolute equality they are prepared to go, and in connection with this the principle of redistributive taxation; (3) a rich assortment of regulative measures, frequently rationalized by antitrust slogans, as regard prices; (4) public control, though within a wide range of variation, over the labor and the money market; (5) indefinite extension of the sphere of wants that are, now or eventually, to be satisfied by public enterprise, either gratis or on some post-office principle; and (6) of course all types of security legislation. (Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy [New York: Harper and Row, 1950]: 418)
55. Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order, 66.
56. For a comparative analysis see Felix Somary, Wandlungen der Weltwirtschaft seit dem Kriege (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1929).
57. Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order, 61-2.
58. See Irwin, Against the Tide, 191.
59. Ibid., 195.
60. Ibid., 196.
61. John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," 236. The article was published in 1933 in England (The New Statesman) and in the United States (The Yale Review). Keynes began the article as follows: "I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an economic doctrine which a rational and an instructed person could not doubt but almost as a part of the moral law. I regarded departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage" (233).
62. John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," 236. The article was published in 1933 in England (The New Statesman) and in the United States (The Yale Review). Keynes began the article as follows: "I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an economic doctrine which a rational and an instructed person could not doubt but almost as a part of the moral law. I regarded departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage" (233).
63. John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," 236. The article was published in 1933 in England (The New Statesman) and in the United States (The Yale Review). Keynes began the article as follows: "I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an economic doctrine which a rational and an instructed person could not doubt but almost as a part of the moral law. I regarded departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage" (233).
64. Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector," 297-8.
65. For a study of the nationalization of the socialist workers' movement - earlier international in orientation because of its marginalization in national politics - see Franz Borkenau, Socialism, National or International (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1942).
66. Carr, Nationalism and After, 18.
67. See Carr, Nationalism and After, 22; and Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). The political history of U.S. immigration shows that early democratization and parliamentarization led to an early foreign economic policy focused on regulating labor markets by means of immigration control. See Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2d ed., 1982).
68. See Carr, Nationalism and After, 22; and Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). The political history of U.S. immigration shows that early democratization and parliamentarization led to an early foreign economic policy focused on regulating labor markets by means of immigration control. See Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2d ed., 1982).
69. See Carr, Nationalism and After, 22; and Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). The political history of U.S. immigration shows that early democratization and parliamentarization led to an early foreign economic policy focused on regulating labor markets by means of immigration control. See Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2d ed., 1982).
70. Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics (London: Macmillan, 1919): 309.
71. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 87.
72. We do not claim that the politics leading to the expansion of the welfare state after World War II can be explained in terms of conscious decisions to provide for an institutional foundation for a closer integration of world markets. We believe that the relationship between social policies and foreign economic policies is much more fruitfully analyzed in terms of unintended consequences.
73. See Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 51.
74. The same argument of a positive function of institutionally differentiated social policies for a turn toward free trade was advanced by Warner M. Corden in his analysis of the social origins of protectionism: The point is simply that intervention in trade may not be the best way of dealing with the various problems mentioned since they are all essentially caused by "domestic distortions" rather than "trade distortions." The best way may be to deal with them in some direct "first-best" way, and at the same time to allow trade to flow freely. (Trade Policy and Economic Welfare [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974]: 4)
75. See Hans-Werner Sinn, "Risiko als Produktionsfaktor," Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 201 (1986): 557-71; and idem., Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking (München: Center for Economic Studies, 1996, Working Papers no. 102).
76. See Hans-Werner Sinn, "Risiko als Produktionsfaktor," Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 201 (1986): 557-71; and idem., Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking (München: Center for Economic Studies, 1996, Working Papers no. 102).
77. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 79.
78. A quantitative study of state expenditures in 100 countries showed a general connection between economic openness and the size of the state budget: Contrary to what most economists would expect, the scope of government has been larger, not smaller, in economies taking greater advantage of world markets. Indeed, governments have expanded fastest in the most open economies. The evidence considered here suggests strongly that the reasons have to do with the risks of being exposed to shocks of external origin. Openness exerts the strongest influence on government consumption in economies which are subject to the greatest amounts of terms-of-trade risk. Governments appear to have sought to mitigate the exposure to external risk by increasing the share of domestic output which they consume. Of course, on a priori grounds, it is not altogether clear that a higher share of government consumption can stabilize incomes. But I have provided some evidence that the government sector can indeed be considered as the "safe" sector - in the empirically relevant sense - for the vast majority of countries. (Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? [Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996, Working Paper 5537]: 26) Also see idem., Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997). For similar evidence based on quantitative analysis see David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61.
79. A quantitative study of state expenditures in 100 countries showed a general connection between economic openness and the size of the state budget: Contrary to what most economists would expect, the scope of government has been larger, not smaller, in economies taking greater advantage of world markets. Indeed, governments have expanded fastest in the most open economies. The evidence considered here suggests strongly that the reasons have to do with the risks of being exposed to shocks of external origin. Openness exerts the strongest influence on government consumption in economies which are subject to the greatest amounts of terms-of-trade risk. Governments appear to have sought to mitigate the exposure to external risk by increasing the share of domestic output which they consume. Of course, on a priori grounds, it is not altogether clear that a higher share of government consumption can stabilize incomes. But I have provided some evidence that the government sector can indeed be considered as the "safe" sector - in the empirically relevant sense - for the vast majority of countries. (Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? [Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996, Working Paper 5537]: 26) Also see idem., Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997). For similar evidence based on quantitative analysis see David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61.
80. A quantitative study of state expenditures in 100 countries showed a general connection between economic openness and the size of the state budget: Contrary to what most economists would expect, the scope of government has been larger, not smaller, in economies taking greater advantage of world markets. Indeed, governments have expanded fastest in the most open economies. The evidence considered here suggests strongly that the reasons have to do with the risks of being exposed to shocks of external origin. Openness exerts the strongest influence on government consumption in economies which are subject to the greatest amounts of terms-of-trade risk. Governments appear to have sought to mitigate the exposure to external risk by increasing the share of domestic output which they consume. Of course, on a priori grounds, it is not altogether clear that a higher share of government consumption can stabilize incomes. But I have provided some evidence that the government sector can indeed be considered as the "safe" sector - in the empirically relevant sense - for the vast majority of countries. (Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? [Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996, Working Paper 5537]: 26) Also see idem., Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997). For similar evidence based on quantitative analysis see David Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61.
81. T. H. Marshall, Social Policy (London: Hutchinson, 1975): 15.
82. See Irwin, Against the Tide, 61.
83. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
84. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
85. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
86. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
87. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
88. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
89. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
90. Ibid., 183. This attempt at a Pareto-optimal solution to the distribution problems, which resulted from repealing the tariffs, was refined and formalized in welfare economics by Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 549-52; idem., "A Note on Tariffs and Terms of Trade," Economica 1 (1940): 377-80; and John R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Economic Journal 49 (1939): 696-712 and idem., "The Valuation of Social Income," Economica 7 (1940): 105-24. Tibor de Scitovsky criticized these works, since he saw Pareto-optimal solutions via the compensation of losers by the winners as a two-edged sword. After all, why shouldn't the beneficiaries of tariffs compensate the potential beneficiaries of free trade (the "losers" of tariff protection)? See "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 77-88. For an overview see Irwin, Against the Tide: 180-8; and on compensation strategies in economic theory see John S. Chipman, "Compensation Principle," in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1988): 524-31.
91. On the economic-historical context of this "Golden Age" and on the labor and social policy components of the social compact formulated in the 1950s, see Barry Eichengreen, "Institutions and Economic Growth after World War II," in Economic Growth Since 1945, eds. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 38-72.
92. Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," 15.
93. For a comprehensive account of the internal challenges see Franz-Xaver
94. For a corresponding study of U.K. and U.S. social policy developments in the 1980s, see Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State ? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For an extension of this analysis to additional countries see idem., "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (1996): 147-79.
95. For a corresponding study of U.K. and U.S. social policy developments in the 1980s, see Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State ? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For an extension of this analysis to additional countries see idem., "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (1996): 147-79.
96. See Jens Alber, Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik 1950-1983 (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989); Morris Janowitz, Social Control of the Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and M. Rainer Lepsius, "Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Klassen in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1979): 166-209.
97. See Jens Alber, Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik 1950-1983 (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989); Morris Janowitz, Social Control of the Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and M. Rainer Lepsius, "Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Klassen in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1979): 166-209.
98. See Jens Alber, Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik 1950-1983 (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989); Morris Janowitz, Social Control of the Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and M. Rainer Lepsius, "Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Klassen in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1979): 166-209.
99. For empirical evidence see Peter Flora, "From Industrial to Postindustrial Welfare State?" in The Advanced Industrial Societies in Disarray: What Are the Available Choices? (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, Institute of Social Science [Special Issue of the Annals of the Institute of Social Science], 1989): 149-62.
100. See Günther Schmid, "Beschäftigungswunder Niederlande? Ein Vergleich der Beschäftigungssysteme in den Niederlanden und in Deutschland," Leviathan 25 (1997): 302-37;
101. and Birgitta Wolff, Incentive-Compatible Change Management in a Welfare State: Asking the Right Questions in the German Standort-Debate (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for European Studies, 1997, Working Paper Series #6.4).
102. Between 1981 and 1996, the average quotient of government outlays on all levels to the nominal domestic product rose from 47 to 49 percent, while state debt - the quotient of gross obligations of all levels of government to gross domestic product - climbed from 44 to 76 percent. See Paul Bernd Spahn and Wolfgang Föttinger, "Fiskalische Disziplin und institutionelle Budgetkoordinierung: Internationale Erfahrungen und ihre Bedeutung für die Europäische Union," in Europäische Institutionenpolitik, eds. Thomas König, Elmar Rieger, and Hermann Schmitt (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997): 140-59.
103. Jutta Allmendinger and Thomas Hinz, "Occupational Careers Under Different Welfare Regimes: West Germany, Great Britain and Sweden," in The Dynamics of Modern Society: Poverty, Policy and Welfare, eds. Lutz Leisering and Robert Walker (Bristol: Policy Press, 1998): 61-82; Karl-Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller, "The State and the Structure of the Life Course," in Human Development and the life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Aage B. Sorensen, Franz L. Weinert, and L. R. Sherrod (Hillsdale, NJ: M. E. Sharpe, 1986): 217-45; idem., "Lebensverläufe im Wohlfahrtsstaat," in Handlungsspielräume: Untersuchungen zur Individualisierung und Institutionalisierung von Lebensverläufen in der Moderne, ed. Ansgar Weymann (Stuttgart: Enke, 1989): 41-60; Assar Lindbeck, "Consequences of the Advanced Welfare State," World Economy 11 (1988): 19-37; and idem., "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97 (1995): 477-94.
104. Jutta Allmendinger and Thomas Hinz, "Occupational Careers Under Different Welfare Regimes: West Germany, Great Britain and Sweden," in The Dynamics of Modern Society: Poverty, Policy and Welfare, eds. Lutz Leisering and Robert Walker (Bristol: Policy Press, 1998): 61-82; Karl-Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller, "The State and the Structure of the Life Course," in Human Development and the life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Aage B. Sorensen, Franz L. Weinert, and L. R. Sherrod (Hillsdale, NJ: M. E. Sharpe, 1986): 217-45; idem., "Lebensverläufe im Wohlfahrtsstaat," in Handlungsspielräume: Untersuchungen zur Individualisierung und Institutionalisierung von Lebensverläufen in der Moderne, ed. Ansgar Weymann (Stuttgart: Enke, 1989): 41-60; Assar Lindbeck, "Consequences of the Advanced Welfare State," World Economy 11 (1988): 19-37; and idem., "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97 (1995): 477-94.
105. Jutta Allmendinger and Thomas Hinz, "Occupational Careers Under Different Welfare Regimes: West Germany, Great Britain and Sweden," in The Dynamics of Modern Society: Poverty, Policy and Welfare, eds. Lutz Leisering and Robert Walker (Bristol: Policy Press, 1998): 61-82; Karl-Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller, "The State and the Structure of the Life Course," in Human Development and the life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Aage B. Sorensen, Franz L. Weinert, and L. R. Sherrod (Hillsdale, NJ: M. E. Sharpe, 1986): 217-45; idem., "Lebensverläufe im Wohlfahrtsstaat," in Handlungsspielräume: Untersuchungen zur Individualisierung und Institutionalisierung von Lebensverläufen in der Moderne, ed. Ansgar Weymann (Stuttgart: Enke, 1989): 41-60; Assar Lindbeck, "Consequences of the Advanced Welfare State," World Economy 11 (1988): 19-37; and idem., "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97 (1995): 477-94.
106. Jutta Allmendinger and Thomas Hinz, "Occupational Careers Under Different Welfare Regimes: West Germany, Great Britain and Sweden," in The Dynamics of Modern Society: Poverty, Policy and Welfare, eds. Lutz Leisering and Robert Walker (Bristol: Policy Press, 1998): 61-82; Karl-Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller, "The State and the Structure of the Life Course," in Human Development and the life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Aage B. Sorensen, Franz L. Weinert, and L. R. Sherrod (Hillsdale, NJ: M. E. Sharpe, 1986): 217-45; idem., "Lebensverläufe im Wohlfahrtsstaat," in Handlungsspielräume: Untersuchungen zur Individualisierung und Institutionalisierung von Lebensverläufen in der Moderne, ed. Ansgar Weymann (Stuttgart: Enke, 1989): 41-60; Assar Lindbeck, "Consequences of the Advanced Welfare State," World Economy 11 (1988): 19-37; and idem., "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97 (1995): 477-94.
107. Jutta Allmendinger and Thomas Hinz, "Occupational Careers Under Different Welfare Regimes: West Germany, Great Britain and Sweden," in The Dynamics of Modern Society: Poverty, Policy and Welfare, eds. Lutz Leisering and Robert Walker (Bristol: Policy Press, 1998): 61-82; Karl-Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller, "The State and the Structure of the Life Course," in Human Development and the life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Aage B. Sorensen, Franz L. Weinert, and L. R. Sherrod (Hillsdale, NJ: M. E. Sharpe, 1986): 217-45; idem., "Lebensverläufe im Wohlfahrtsstaat," in Handlungsspielräume: Untersuchungen zur Individualisierung und Institutionalisierung von Lebensverläufen in der Moderne, ed. Ansgar Weymann (Stuttgart: Enke, 1989): 41-60; Assar Lindbeck, "Consequences of the Advanced Welfare State," World Economy 11 (1988): 19-37; and idem., "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97 (1995): 477-94.
108. On the United States see Thomas Gebhardt, Ending Welfare as We Know It: Die US-amerikanische Sozialhilfereform 1993-1996 (Bremen: Universität Bremen, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997); Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, "Sozialpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts," in Das amerikanische Dilemma: Die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, eds. Herbert Dittgen and Michael Minkenberg (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996): 239-68; and Michael Wiseman, "Welfare Reform in the United States: A Background Paper," Housing Policy Debate 7 (1996): 1-54. On the contrasting German case, see Herbert Jacobs, Zwischen Mißbrauch und Arbeitspflicht - Die Diskussion um die Sozialhilfe und die Novellierungen des BSHG 1993 (Bremen: Universität, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997). In Germany, a "leaning" of the welfare state is discernible with means-and income-tested benefits. Germany's 1996 introduction of old-age nursing-care insurance, however, indicates how well entrenched the welfare state is, since this policy did not consider the imperatives of integration in the global market for German industry. On the failure of the United States's 1995 health insurance reform, proposed as a strategy to expand the welfare state, see Jacob Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
109. On the United States see Thomas Gebhardt, Ending Welfare as We Know It: Die US-amerikanische Sozialhilfereform 1993-1996 (Bremen: Universität Bremen, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997); Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, "Sozialpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts," in Das amerikanische Dilemma: Die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, eds. Herbert Dittgen and Michael Minkenberg (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996): 239-68; and Michael Wiseman, "Welfare Reform in the United States: A Background Paper," Housing Policy Debate 7 (1996): 1-54. On the contrasting German case, see Herbert Jacobs, Zwischen Mißbrauch und Arbeitspflicht - Die Diskussion um die Sozialhilfe und die Novellierungen des BSHG 1993 (Bremen: Universität, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997). In Germany, a "leaning" of the welfare state is discernible with means-and income-tested benefits. Germany's 1996 introduction of old-age nursing-care insurance, however, indicates how well entrenched the welfare state is, since this policy did not consider the imperatives of integration in the global market for German industry. On the failure of the United States's 1995 health insurance reform, proposed as a strategy to expand the welfare state, see Jacob Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
110. On the United States see Thomas Gebhardt, Ending Welfare as We Know It: Die US-amerikanische Sozialhilfereform 1993-1996 (Bremen: Universität Bremen, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997); Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, "Sozialpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts," in Das amerikanische Dilemma: Die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, eds. Herbert Dittgen and Michael Minkenberg (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996): 239-68; and Michael Wiseman, "Welfare Reform in the United States: A Background Paper," Housing Policy Debate 7 (1996): 1-54. On the contrasting German case, see Herbert Jacobs, Zwischen Mißbrauch und Arbeitspflicht - Die Diskussion um die Sozialhilfe und die Novellierungen des BSHG 1993 (Bremen: Universität, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997). In Germany, a "leaning" of the welfare state is discernible with means-and income-tested benefits. Germany's 1996 introduction of old-age nursing-care insurance, however, indicates how well entrenched the welfare state is, since this policy did not consider the imperatives of integration in the global market for German industry. On the failure of the United States's 1995 health insurance reform, proposed as a strategy to expand the welfare state, see Jacob Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
111. On the United States see Thomas Gebhardt, Ending Welfare as We Know It: Die US-amerikanische Sozialhilfereform 1993-1996 (Bremen: Universität Bremen, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997); Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, "Sozialpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts," in Das amerikanische Dilemma: Die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, eds. Herbert Dittgen and Michael Minkenberg (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996): 239-68; and Michael Wiseman, "Welfare Reform in the United States: A Background Paper," Housing Policy Debate 7 (1996): 1-54. On the contrasting German case, see Herbert Jacobs, Zwischen Mißbrauch und Arbeitspflicht - Die Diskussion um die Sozialhilfe und die Novellierungen des BSHG 1993 (Bremen: Universität, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997). In Germany, a "leaning" of the welfare state is discernible with means-and income-tested benefits. Germany's 1996 introduction of old-age nursing-care insurance, however, indicates how well entrenched the welfare state is, since this policy did not consider the imperatives of integration in the global market for German industry. On the failure of the United States's 1995 health insurance reform, proposed as a strategy to expand the welfare state, see Jacob Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
112. On the United States see Thomas Gebhardt, Ending Welfare as We Know It: Die US-amerikanische Sozialhilfereform 1993-1996 (Bremen: Universität Bremen, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997); Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, "Sozialpolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts," in Das amerikanische Dilemma: Die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, eds. Herbert Dittgen and Michael Minkenberg (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996): 239-68; and Michael Wiseman, "Welfare Reform in the United States: A Background Paper," Housing Policy Debate 7 (1996): 1-54. On the contrasting German case, see Herbert Jacobs, Zwischen Mißbrauch und Arbeitspflicht - Die Diskussion um die Sozialhilfe und die Novellierungen des BSHG 1993 (Bremen: Universität, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, 1997). In Germany, a "leaning" of the welfare state is discernible with means-and income-tested benefits. Germany's 1996 introduction of old-age nursing-care insurance, however, indicates how well entrenched the welfare state is, since this policy did not consider the imperatives of integration in the global market for German industry. On the failure of the United States's 1995 health insurance reform, proposed as a strategy to expand the welfare state, see Jacob Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
113. See John M. Broder, "Clinton Offers Workers Aid in Bid to Win Trade Battle," International Herald Tribune (7 November 1997): 3; William Pfaff, "Don't Forget That Globalization Creates Losers, Too," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 8; Jill Abramson and Steven Greenhouse, 'Trade Bill's Fate Underlines Labor's Muscle," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 3; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Plotting Politics on the New Globalization Graph," International Herald Tribune (14 November 1997): 8.
114. See John M. Broder, "Clinton Offers Workers Aid in Bid to Win Trade Battle," International Herald Tribune (7 November 1997): 3; William Pfaff, "Don't Forget That Globalization Creates Losers, Too," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 8; Jill Abramson and Steven Greenhouse, 'Trade Bill's Fate Underlines Labor's Muscle," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 3; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Plotting Politics on the New Globalization Graph," International Herald Tribune (14 November 1997): 8.
115. See John M. Broder, "Clinton Offers Workers Aid in Bid to Win Trade Battle," International Herald Tribune (7 November 1997): 3; William Pfaff, "Don't Forget That Globalization Creates Losers, Too," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 8; Jill Abramson and Steven Greenhouse, 'Trade Bill's Fate Underlines Labor's Muscle," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 3; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Plotting Politics on the New Globalization Graph," International Herald Tribune (14 November 1997): 8.
116. See John M. Broder, "Clinton Offers Workers Aid in Bid to Win Trade Battle," International Herald Tribune (7 November 1997): 3; William Pfaff, "Don't Forget That Globalization Creates Losers, Too," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 8; Jill Abramson and Steven Greenhouse, 'Trade Bill's Fate Underlines Labor's Muscle," International Herald Tribune (13 November 1997): 3; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Plotting Politics on the New Globalization Graph," International Herald Tribune (14 November 1997): 8.
117. Nassau Senior in 1828, quoted in Irwin, Against the Tide, 93.
118. On the relevant changes in the world currency system as a result of the development of welfare states after World War II, see Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): 188-91. For a perspective on the linkages between the welfare statism of the post-World War II period and the governance of international economic relations see John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order," International Organization 36 (1982): 379-415; and idem., "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11.
119. On the relevant changes in the world currency system as a result of the development of welfare states after World War II, see Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): 188-91. For a perspective on the linkages between the welfare statism of the post-World War II period and the governance of international economic relations see John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order," International Organization 36 (1982): 379-415; and idem., "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11.
120. On the relevant changes in the world currency system as a result of the development of welfare states after World War II, see Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): 188-91. For a perspective on the linkages between the welfare statism of the post-World War II period and the governance of international economic relations see John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order," International Organization 36 (1982): 379-415; and idem., "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11.
121. For an overview of the problems of fair trade and social clauses in trade policy, see Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis"; Brian Alexander Langille, "General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade Is Free Trade's Destiny)"; and Virginia A. Leary, "Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO; NAFTA, U.S. Laws)" the two last mentioned in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. II. Legal Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996 Brown et al. is in Vol. I). For a review of this work see Paul Krugman, "What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997): 113-20
122. For an overview of the problems of fair trade and social clauses in trade policy, see Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis"; Brian Alexander Langille, "General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade Is Free Trade's Destiny)"; and Virginia A. Leary, "Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO; NAFTA, U.S. Laws)" the two last mentioned in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. II. Legal Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996 Brown et al. is in Vol. I). For a review of this work see Paul Krugman, "What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997): 113-20
123. For an overview of the problems of fair trade and social clauses in trade policy, see Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis"; Brian Alexander Langille, "General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade Is Free Trade's Destiny)"; and Virginia A. Leary, "Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO; NAFTA, U.S. Laws)" the two last mentioned in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. II. Legal Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996 Brown et al. is in Vol. I). For a review of this work see Paul Krugman, "What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997): 113-20
124. For an overview of the problems of fair trade and social clauses in trade policy, see Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis"; Brian Alexander Langille, "General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade Is Free Trade's Destiny)"; and Virginia A. Leary, "Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO; NAFTA, U.S. Laws)" the two last mentioned in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. II. Legal Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996 Brown et al. is in Vol. I). For a review of this work see Paul Krugman, "What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997): 113-20
125. On the role of safeguard clauses, see Alan V. Deardorff, "Safeguard Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function," in Protection and Competition in International Trade: Essays in Honor of W. M. Corden, ed. Henry Kierzkowski (London: Blackwell, 1987): 22-40.
126. On the instruments and general tendency of neoprotectionism, see John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); John Gerard Ruggie, "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11; and Dominick Salvatore, ed., Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Max Corden's analysis Trade Policy and Economic Welfare has become a classic in this field.
127. On the instruments and general tendency of neoprotectionism, see John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); John Gerard Ruggie, "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11; and Dominick Salvatore, ed., Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Max Corden's analysis Trade Policy and Economic Welfare has become a classic in this field.
128. On the instruments and general tendency of neoprotectionism, see John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); John Gerard Ruggie, "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11; and Dominick Salvatore, ed., Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Max Corden's analysis Trade Policy and Economic Welfare has become a classic in this field.
129. On the instruments and general tendency of neoprotectionism, see John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); John Gerard Ruggie, "Trade, Protectionism and the Future of Welfare Capitalism," Journal of International Affairs 48 (1994): 1-11; and Dominick Salvatore, ed., Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Max Corden's analysis Trade Policy and Economic Welfare has become a classic in this field.
130. For research, the additional problem posed is to contrast the (historical) genesis of the functions of the welfare state for economic openness with their (present-day) role in guaranteeing that openness. The search for substitutive mechanisms has to consider that many instruments of national control over foreign economic policy that were still prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, such as control of capital mobility and exchange rates, would be much harder to reestablish today. Also, they would be much less effective and politically more risky in their consequences for the investment behavior of enterprises. See Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital; and idem., "Institutions and Economic Growth after World War II."
131. For research, the additional problem posed is to contrast the (historical) genesis of the functions of the welfare state for economic openness with their (present-day) role in guaranteeing that openness. The search for substitutive mechanisms has to consider that many instruments of national control over foreign economic policy that were still prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, such as control of capital mobility and exchange rates, would be much harder to reestablish today. Also, they would be much less effective and politically more risky in their consequences for the investment behavior of enterprises. See Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital; and idem., "Institutions and Economic Growth after World War II."
132. The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).
133. See, for example, Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
134. These characteristics seem to obtain in the United States, the NICs, and Japan.
135. This characteristic is especially pronounced in Germany. For a view on the microfoundations of the German socioeconomic system see David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Co-ordinated and Non-co-ordinated Market Economies," in Labour Relations and Economic Performance, eds. Renato Brunetta and Carlo Dell'Aringa (London: Macmillan and International Economic Association, 1990): 170-211. For a skeptical view on the integrative function of the German welfare state see Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, "Schwindet die integrative Funktion des Sozialstaats?" Berliner Journal für Soziologie 7 (1997): 5-19; and his Herausforderungen des Sozialstaates.
136. This characteristic is especially pronounced in Germany. For a view on the microfoundations of the German socioeconomic system see David Soskice, "Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Co-ordinated and Non-co-ordinated Market Economies," in Labour Relations and Economic Performance, eds. Renato Brunetta and Carlo Dell'Aringa (London: Macmillan and International Economic Association, 1990): 170-211. For a skeptical view on the integrative function of the German welfare state see Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, "Schwindet die integrative Funktion des Sozialstaats?" Berliner Journal für Soziologie 7 (1997): 5-19; and his Herausforderungen des Sozialstaates.
137. In the European Union, Germany (contribution-oriented) and Denmark (taxoriented) are usually contrasted. See Fritz J. Scharpf, "Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State," Journal of European Public Policy 4 (1997): 18-36.