Achieving capitalist solidarity: Collective action among Norwegian employers

Politics and Society

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 303-336

  Bowman, John R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032354854     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329298026003002     Document Type: Article

References (173)

1. From Smith: "We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbors and equals." (Quoted in Henry Phelps Brown, The Origins of Trade Union Power [Oxford: Clarendon, 1983]: 99) From Engels: "Capitalists are always organized... their small number, the fact that they constitute a particular class, their social and commercial relations make formal organization superfluous" (quoted in Gerald Friedman, "The Decline of Paternalism and the Making of the Employer Class: France, 1870-1914," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991]: 154).
2. From Smith: "We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbors and equals." (Quoted in Henry Phelps Brown, The Origins of Trade Union Power [Oxford: Clarendon, 1983]: 99) From Engels: "Capitalists are always organized... their small number, the fact that they constitute a particular class, their social and commercial relations make formal organization superfluous" (quoted in Gerald Friedman, "The Decline of Paternalism and the Making of the Employer Class: France, 1870-1914," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991]: 154).
3. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form," Political Power and Social Theory 1 (1980): 67-115.
4. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
5. Wolfgang Streeck, "The Uncertainties of Management in the Management of Uncertainty: Employers, Labor Relations and Industrial Adjustment in the 1980s," Work, Employment, and Society 1 (1987): 282.
6. John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
7. Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Introduction," in Tolliday and Zeitlin, eds., The Power to Manage: Employers and Industrial Relations in Comparative-Historical Perspective (London: Routledge, 1991): 22.
8. Kathleen Thelen, "Beyond Corporatism: Toward a New Framework for the Study of Labor in Advanced Capitalism," Comparative Politics 27 (1994): 110.
9. Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," in Wolfgang Streeck and Egon Matzner, eds., Beyond Keynesianism: The Socio-Economics of Production and Full Employment (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1991); Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
10. Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," in Wolfgang Streeck and Egon Matzner, eds., Beyond Keynesianism: The Socio-Economics of Production and Full Employment (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1991); Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
11. Michael Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," in Wolfgang Streeck and Egon Matzner, eds., Beyond Keynesianism: The Socio-Economics of Production and Full Employment (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1991); Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
12. Thelen, "Beyond Corporatism."
13. Peter Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden," World Politics 43 (1991): 513-44.
14. For instance, Tolliday and Zeitlin, eds., The Power to Manage; John P. Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., Employers Associations and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1984).
15. For instance, Tolliday and Zeitlin, eds., The Power to Manage; John P. Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., Employers Associations and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1984).
16. Walter Galenson, Labor in Norway (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949): 80.
17. Galenson, Labor in Norway, 80-1; Hans Otto Frøland, Intekkspolitikk og tarifforhandlinger som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt (Bergen: Norwegian Research Center in Organization and Management, 1989): 30; Paul Knutsen, Korporatisme og klassekamp (Oslo: Del Historisk-Filosofiske Fakultet, Universitet i Oslo, 1994): 9-10.
18. Galenson, Labor in Norway, 80-1; Hans Otto Frøland, Intekkspolitikk og tarifforhandlinger som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt (Bergen: Norwegian Research Center in Organization and Management, 1989): 30; Paul Knutsen, Korporatisme og klassekamp (Oslo: Del Historisk-Filosofiske Fakultet, Universitet i Oslo, 1994): 9-10.
19. Galenson, Labor in Norway, 80-1; Hans Otto Frøland, Intekkspolitikk og tarifforhandlinger som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt (Bergen: Norwegian Research Center in Organization and Management, 1989): 30; Paul Knutsen, Korporatisme og klassekamp (Oslo: Del Historisk-Filosofiske Fakultet, Universitet i Oslo, 1994): 9-10.
20. Paul Johnsen and Pat Joynt, "Industrial Relations in Norway: Past, Present, and Future," Journal of General Management 11 (1986): 59.
21. A more plausible position was articulated by an employer association strategist and is more consistent with my own findings: There is social pressure to show solidarity with the "business community" in Norway, but the strength of that pressure varies across industrial sectors and individual firms according to the level of cooperation exhibited by others and the costs and benefits of cooperation (interview with Olav Stene, Assistant Director, Strategy and Projects, NHO, Oslo, 22 October 1996).
22. Interview with Lars Aarvig, former vice director, NAF (Norwegian Employers Federation), Oslo, 6 December 1996.
23. For a more complete discussion of heterogeneity and collective action, see Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: 23-7.
24. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.
25. John R. Bowman, "Organisering i Arbeidsmarkedet: Utvilingen på arbeidsgiversiden," Søkelys på arbeidsmarkedet 14 (1996): 192. In fact, the largest employers organization in Norway is in the public sector - Kommunenes Sentralforbund (the Central Association of Local Governments) - which in 1995 employed 463,000 workers (Norges Offisielle Statistikk [NOS], Statistikk årbok 1996 [Oslo: Statistisk Sentrabyrå, 1996]: 171). In this article I discuss private sector associations only.
26. John R. Bowman, "Organisering i Arbeidsmarkedet: Utvilingen på arbeidsgiversiden," Søkelys på arbeidsmarkedet 14 (1996): 192. In fact, the largest employers organization in Norway is in the public sector - Kommunenes Sentralforbund (the Central Association of Local Governments) - which in 1995 employed 463,000 workers (Norges Offisielle Statistikk [NOS], Statistikk årbok 1996 [Oslo: Statistisk Sentrabyrå, 1996]: 171). In this article I discuss private sector associations only.
27. Interview with Thorstein Larsen, Director, Employers Division, Handels-og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon (HSH; Federation of Norwegian Commercial and Service Enterprises), Oslo, 6 December 1996; interview with Jostein Røsjø, Managing Director, Bankenes Arbeidsgiverforening (Norwegian Banks and Employers Association), Oslo, 6 December 1996. In 1995, members of the banking industry employers association, Bankenes Arbeidsgiverforening, employed 23,817 workers; members of Handels-og Servicenærings Hovedorganisasjon - the retail employers association -employed 85,000 workers; and members of NHO employed 360,000 workers (NOS, Statistikk årbok 1996, 171). There is some competition between NHO and HSH in the recruitment of members, particularly in the service sector and in branches where there is a close link between retail operations and production (e.g., bakeries and gasoline stations). In late 1997, competition between the two organizations took a slightly nasty turn when HSH's director wrote to the membership of the association of gasoline stations, asking them to reverse a decision by their association leadership to affiliate with NHO (Nœringslivets ukevis [28 November 1997]: 14). (I am grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for bringing this news item to my attention.) However, the two federations still cooperate closely in the area of wage negotiations.
28. Interview with Thorstein Larsen, Director, Employers Division, Handels-og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon (HSH; Federation of Norwegian Commercial and Service Enterprises), Oslo, 6 December 1996; interview with Jostein Røsjø, Managing Director, Bankenes Arbeidsgiverforening (Norwegian Banks and Employers Association), Oslo, 6 December 1996. In 1995, members of the banking industry employers association, Bankenes Arbeidsgiverforening, employed 23,817 workers; members of Handels-og Servicenærings Hovedorganisasjon - the retail employers association -employed 85,000 workers; and members of NHO employed 360,000 workers (NOS, Statistikk årbok 1996, 171). There is some competition between NHO and HSH in the recruitment of members, particularly in the service sector and in branches where there is a close link between retail operations and production (e.g., bakeries and gasoline stations). In late 1997, competition between the two organizations took a slightly nasty turn when HSH's director wrote to the membership of the association of gasoline stations, asking them to reverse a decision by their association leadership to affiliate with NHO (Nœringslivets ukevis [28 November 1997]: 14). (I am grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for bringing this news item to my attention.) However, the two federations still cooperate closely in the area of wage negotiations.
29. For a non-Norwegian audience, this abbreviation is less clumsy than the customary N.A.F., which Norwegians use to distinguish the employers federation from NAF, the Norwegian Automobile Association.
30. NAF originally was a federation of regionally based district associations, but by 1917, the principle of industrial representation had effectively supplanted that of geographic representation (Erling Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950 [Oslo: NAF, 1950]).
31. As of 1996, the number of NHO's constituent organizations was twenty-eight and falling, due to an NHO campaign to promote mergers among its member associations. The goal is a federation consisting of ten to twelve associations.
32. NHO data. The employment figures cited in this and the previous sentence are actually person-years, not actual employees.
33. In November 1997, several AF unions formed a new federation, Akademikerne. As of early 1998, its short-term status as a bargaining agent is unclear, however, since these unions are still bound by AF agreements. I am grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for making this information available to me.
34. Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke, Organisasjonsgraden på arbeidstakersiden 1956-1994 (Oslo: FAFO, 1995).
35. Frøland has demonstrated that the government also "coordinated" wage negotiations during the 1950s, but in a less public manner. See Hans Otto Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss gjennom korporativ konsert: Tariff-og intektspolitikk i LO-NAF området 1950-1965 (Trondheim: Historisk Institutt, Universitetet i Trondheim, 1994).
36. For English-language overviews of Norwegian industrial relations, see Galenson, Labor in Norway; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1998): 118-45; and Geir Høgsnes, Collective Wage Bargaining and the Impact of Norms of Fairness: An Analysis of the Norwegian Experience (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1994).
37. For English-language overviews of Norwegian industrial relations, see Galenson, Labor in Norway; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1998): 118-45; and Geir Høgsnes, Collective Wage Bargaining and the Impact of Norms of Fairness: An Analysis of the Norwegian Experience (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1994).
38. For English-language overviews of Norwegian industrial relations, see Galenson, Labor in Norway; Jon Erik Dølvik and Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke, "Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation," in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds., Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1998): 118-45; and Geir Høgsnes, Collective Wage Bargaining and the Impact of Norms of Fairness: An Analysis of the Norwegian Experience (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1994).
39. Unfortunately, NHO and the Norwegian government employ different industrial classification systems, so these data cannot be matched with the industry associations listed in Table 1.
40. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 67, 82.
41. Quoted in Frøde Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp." Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening og Mekaniske Verksteders Landsforenings politikk i perioden 1925 til 1931 (Bergen: Universitet i Bergen Hovedoppgave i Historie, 1985): 118.
42. Petersen, Norsk arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 665.
43. Bowman, "Organisering i arbeidsmarkedet," 188. This computation was based on NAF-NHO employment data, which, according to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke (NHO: medlemmer, organisasjonsgraden og tariffavtaler [Oslo: FAFO, 1996]: 9), actually computes full-time equivalent person-years [årsverk] rather than actual employees. Using his adjusted employment data, the decline in NAF-NHO during this period is from 35 percent to 30.9 percent. This downward trend apparently has been reversed in recent years. NHO membership expanded annually from 1995 through 1997 (Dagens Nœringsliv (29 December 1997): 5).
44. Bowman, "Organisering i arbeidsmarkedet," 188. This computation was based on NAF-NHO employment data, which, according to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke (NHO: medlemmer, organisasjonsgraden og tariffavtaler [Oslo: FAFO, 1996]: 9), actually computes full-time equivalent person-years [årsverk] rather than actual employees. Using his adjusted employment data, the decline in NAF-NHO during this period is from 35 percent to 30.9 percent. This downward trend apparently has been reversed in recent years. NHO membership expanded annually from 1995 through 1997 (Dagens Nœringsliv (29 December 1997): 5).
45. Bowman, "Organisering i arbeidsmarkedet," 188. This computation was based on NAF-NHO employment data, which, according to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke (NHO: medlemmer, organisasjonsgraden og tariffavtaler [Oslo: FAFO, 1996]: 9), actually computes full-time equivalent person-years [årsverk] rather than actual employees. Using his adjusted employment data, the decline in NAF-NHO during this period is from 35 percent to 30.9 percent. This downward trend apparently has been reversed in recent years. NHO membership expanded annually from 1995 through 1997 (Dagens Nœringsliv (29 December 1997): 5).
46. Edvard Bull, Norsk fagbevegelse (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1979): 82; Galenson, Labor in Norway, 184-5.
47. Edvard Bull, Norsk fagbevegelse (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1979): 82; Galenson, Labor in Norway, 184-5.
48. Interview with Helge Lødal, Executive Advisor, Strategy, NHO, Oslo, 17 October 1996.
49. NHO, En avslutning - og en begynnelse: Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1975-1988 (Oslo: NHO, 1989): 4.
50. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 90.
51. Interview with Karl Glad, Administrative Director, NHO, Oslo, 5 December 1996.
52. Collective agreements are distinguished between those that do permit firm-level wage negotiations and those that do not. The latter group, which covers about 30 percent of total NHO employment, includes transportation, shipping, hotels and restaurants, and oil production (interview with Britt Spilling, Chief Negotiator, NHO, Oslo, 18 December 1996).
53. Another reason why there is strong sentiment for centralized bargaining within NHO is the danger that an oil sector freed from central constraints would lead to wage inflation (interview with Olav Magnussen, Director, Economics and Statistics Section, NHO, 16 December 1996); Glad interview; Løvdal interview.
54. Interview with Arnt Hals, Manager, Baker Hansen, Oslo, 9 October 1996.
55. Interview with Harald Rysst, former Managing Director, Mekaniske Verksteders Landsforening (Association of the Metal Fabricating Industry), Oslo, 12 November 1996.
56. Interview with Steinar Opstad, Director, Small Business Section, NHO, Oslo, 24 September 1996; interview with Nils Ulvin, Director, Employer Division, Teknologibedriftenes Landsforening (Association of Enterprises in the Technology Industry), Oslo, 27 November 1996.
57. Interview with Eli Boran, Project Coordinator, Small Business Section, NHO, Oslo, 27 September 1996. These insurance savings are limited to the traditional handicraft industries and are connected to a large increase in insurance rates during the 1990s that was brought on by the privatization of the insurance industry, which was itself advocated by NHO. I am grateful to Harald Espeli for clarifying this point for me.
58. Interview with Inge Dolve, former director, Landsforeningen for Bygg og Anlegg (Building and Construction Industry Association), Oslo, 10 October 1996.
59. Boran interview.
60. Boran interview. The possibility that community ties may impede collective action is introduced by Rachel Ida Massey, "Impediments to Collective Action in a Small Community," Politics and Society 22 (1994): 421-34.
61. Løvdal interview.
62. Boran interview.
63. Interview with Tron Kleivane, Executive Advisor, Strategy, NHO, Oslo, October 1996.
64. Løvdal interview.
65. In December 1997, NHO and LO agreed that in NHO firms without a collective agreement, organized workers can request an agreement only if they represent at least 10 percent of the relevant workers. In firms that are covered by a collective agreement, workers must represent at least 30 percent of workers in order to demand a new agreement. The 10 percent rule reduces the likelihood that NHO membership will lead to unionization. The 30 percent rule greatly decreases the capacity of non-LO unions to win contracts in firms in the NHO-LO arena (Klassekampen [10 December 1997]). The basic agreement between LO and HSH, the independent trade sector employers association, states that unionized workers must represent 50 percent of covered workers before they can request a collective agreement. In this sector, where union density is low, employer association membership can thus help firms to resist unionization. I am grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for this information, as well as for drawing my attention to the Klassekampen article cited above.
66. Interview with Knut Flotthorp, Director, Wage and Employer Division, Grafiske Bedrifter Landsforeningen (Association of Graphics Industry Enterprises), Oslo, 15 November 1996. I am also grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for clarifying this point to me. For a statistical analysis of the relationship between firm-level unionization and employer association membership in Norway, see John R. Bowman and Trygve Gulbrandsen, "Arbeidsgiverorganisering i Norge," Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 38 (in press).
67. Stokke, NHO, 14-15.
68. NHO bylaws, published in NHO, Hvor kva hvem 1996: NHOs kalendar (Oslo: NHO, 1996).
69. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 87-90.
70. Ibid., 66-67.
71. Tone Mørkved, Fra lønnsnedlag til politisk lockout: Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening og Mekaniske Verksteders Landsforening under jernstriken og storlockouten 1923-24 (Trondheim: Hovedoppgave i Historie, Universitetet i Trondheim, 1978): 20.
72. Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 74-80; Mørkved, Fra lønnsnedlag til politisk lockout, 194-95
73. Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 74-80; Mørkved, Fra lønnsnedlag til politisk lockout, 194-95.
74. Interview with Olav Magnussen, Oslo, February 1994. Another former NAF official, Lars Aarvig, referred in an interview to "rumors" that the metal industry association supported the dissolution of NAF as a means to weaken the position of administrative director, as a result of dissatisfaction with Pål Kraby, who led the 1986 lockout (Aarvig interview).
75. Hals interview; Kleivane interview.
76. Flotthorp interview.
77. Boran interview; Hals interview.
78. I am grateful to Harald Espeli for providing this information.
79. Opstad interview.
80. Another major recent initiative was a series of conferences modeled on the U.S. White House Conference of Small Business, which involved regional meetings of small employers with the NHO leadership, and culminated in April 1996 in an assembly of small business representatives and parliamentary representatives. As a symbol of NHO clout, the meeting was chaired by the president of the Storting, the national parliament, who adjourned the legislature so that representatives could attend the NHO conference (Opstad interview).
81. Wolfgang Streeck, "Interest Heterogeneity and Organizing Capacity: Two Logics of Collective Action?" in Roland Czada and Adrienne Windhoff-Heritier, eds., Political Choice: Institutions, Rules, and the Limits of Rationality (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991): 161-97.
82. Interview with Erik Hoff, Director, International Employer Relations, NHO, Oslo, 18 December 1996.
83. Rysst interview.
84. As of early 1997, HSH had thirty-three sections, but in January 1998, it announced the formation of a new section that would represent the interests of small convenience stores. HSH's director, Anne Crete Ellingsen, also stated that HSH had plans to organize additional sections in the near future (Dagens Nœringsliv [5 January 1998]: 4). I am grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for bringing this news item to my attention.
85. Interview with Lars Ødegaard, former technical advisor, European Affairs and Trade Policy Section, NHO, Oslo, 9 November 1996.
86. Ulvin interview.
87. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 98-99.
88. Ibid., 100.
89. Interview with anonymous former NAF executive board member.
90. Flotthorp interview.
91. According to the terms of a recent revision of the basic agreement between LO and NHO, LO will have to give equal treatment to non-NHO firms and NHO firms during conflicts (NHO-LO, Protokoll fra forhandlingene om revisjon av Hovedavtale LO-NHO [Oslo: NHO-LO, 1997]).
92. Ulvin interview.
93. Flotthorp interview.
94. Høgsnes, Collective Wage Bargaining and the Impact of Norms, 603-23.
95. Marie Smith-Solbakken, Oljearbeiderkulturen: Historien om cowboyer og rebeller (Stavanger: Rogalandsforskning og Historisk Institutt, 1996): 263.
96. Quoted in ibid., 260.
97. NHO, En avslutning, 58.
98. Norway's average unemployment rate during the 1970-1995 was 3.0 percent, compared to 7.0 in Europe as a whole. Sweden's average unemployment rate during this period was 2.7 percent, but while Swedish unemployment averaged 9.1 percent during 1993-5, Norway's average rate during the same period was 5.4 percent (Asbjørn Rødseth, "Why Has Unemployment Been So Low in Norway? On the Potential of Macroeconomic Explanations," in Jon Erik Dølvik and Arvild H. Steen, eds., Making Solidarity Work? The Norwegian Labour Market Model in Transition [Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997]: 157); NOS, Statistisk årbok 1996, 416.
99. Norway's average unemployment rate during the 1970-1995 was 3.0 percent, compared to 7.0 in Europe as a whole. Sweden's average unemployment rate during this period was 2.7 percent, but while Swedish unemployment averaged 9.1 percent during 1993-5, Norway's average rate during the same period was 5.4 percent (Asbjørn Rødseth, "Why Has Unemployment Been So Low in Norway? On the Potential of Macroeconomic Explanations," in Jon Erik Dølvik and Arvild H. Steen, eds., Making Solidarity Work? The Norwegian Labour Market Model in Transition [Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997]: 157); NOS, Statistisk årbok 1996, 416.
100. Quoted in Erling Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1950-1975 (Oslo: NAF, 1975): 78.
101. Quoted in ibid.
102. NHO, En avslutning, 7.
103. Interview with Gunnar Flaat, Director, Negotiation and Wage Policy Section, NHO, Oslo, 2 October 1996.
104. Svein Dahl, Kleppepakkene: Feilgrep eller sunn fornuft? (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1989).
105. Aarvig interview. Aarvig recalled a meeting in which a metal firm announced a local wage increase, only to be told by one of the country's leading food manufacturers that the eventual consequence of such a local metal industry increase would be to drive the food firm out of business.
106. NHO, En avslutning, 23.
107. Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss; Dahl, Kleppepakkene.
108. Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss; Dahl, Kleppepakkene.
109. Quoted in Dahl, Kleppepakkene, 146.
110. Glad interview.
111. Løvdal interview.
112. In particular, the parties agree to a frame for local negotiations that contains four elements only: the firm's financial condition, labor productivity, the firm's future outlook, and the firm's competitiveness.
113. NHO, Tariff-90 nytt (Oslo: NHO, 1990).
114. Kleivaneinterview.
115. Løvdal interview.
116. Spilling interview; Løvdal interview; interview with Knut Sørlie, Assistant Director, European Affairs and Trade Policy Section, NHO, October 1996.
117. Løvdal interview.
118. Ibid.
119. Ødegaard interview.
120. Glad interview; Aarvig interview.
121. Ulvin interview.
122. Flaat interview.
123. It is commonly understood that the employers committed a disastrous tactical misjudgment by staging an "offensive" lockout in 1986, and it is unlikely that they will repeat their mistake in the future.
124. Spilling interview.
125. Ibid.
126. NHO bylaws, printed in Hvor hva hvem 1996: NHOs Kalendar.
127. Aarvig interview.
128. Løvdal interview.
129. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 233-4. Fines were assessed, but probably not collected, against several firms that reached independent agreements with workers during the 1924 lockout (Morkved, Fra lønnsnedlag, 122). The paper industry employers association was fined 150,000 kroner in 1920 for reaching a settlement with workers who were engaging in what NAF believed was an illegal strike (Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt: Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge, Vol. 3 [Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987]: 79). Lars Aarvig, a former NAF official and the principal author of the most recent volume of its official history, could recall only two other instances of recent fines besides the assessment against Norsk Hydro. In both cases, firms granted wage increases in violation of solidarity during a conflict (Aarvig interview).
130. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 233-4. Fines were assessed, but probably not collected, against several firms that reached independent agreements with workers during the 1924 lockout (Morkved, Fra lønnsnedlag, 122). The paper industry employers association was fined 150,000 kroner in 1920 for reaching a settlement with workers who were engaging in what NAF believed was an illegal strike (Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt: Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge, Vol. 3 [Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987]: 79). Lars Aarvig, a former NAF official and the principal author of the most recent volume of its official history, could recall only two other instances of recent fines besides the assessment against Norsk Hydro. In both cases, firms granted wage increases in violation of solidarity during a conflict (Aarvig interview).
131. Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 233-4. Fines were assessed, but probably not collected, against several firms that reached independent agreements with workers during the 1924 lockout (Morkved, Fra lønnsnedlag, 122). The paper industry employers association was fined 150,000 kroner in 1920 for reaching a settlement with workers who were engaging in what NAF believed was an illegal strike (Per Maurseth, Gjennom kriser til makt: Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge, Vol. 3 [Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987]: 79). Lars Aarvig, a former NAF official and the principal author of the most recent volume of its official history, could recall only two other instances of recent fines besides the assessment against Norsk Hydro. In both cases, firms granted wage increases in violation of solidarity during a conflict (Aarvig interview).
132. Mørkved, Fra lønnsnedlag, 122.
133. Norwegian employers have only rarely attempted other forms of coercion to secure cooperation during conflicts. On three occasions during NAF's early history, there is evidence that the organization mobilized blockades against noncooperating firms, all in the building industry (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 232; Arne Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening og storlockouten i 1931 [Oslo: Hovedoppgave, Universitetet i Oslo, Historisk Institutt, 1972]: 44). Organized employers have also tried to pressure nonmember firms into honoring NAF policy during conflicts. In 1931, NAF embarked on a campaign to publicize a list of nonmember firms who were willing to sign a statement pledging their support to NAF (Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening, 43). A few years earlier, in 1927, shipbuilders in Bergen sought the support of local banks to force nonmember firms to follow the NAF line. The banks agreed to "jawbone" their customers, but not to apply material sanctions (Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 404-5).
134. Norwegian employers have only rarely attempted other forms of coercion to secure cooperation during conflicts. On three occasions during NAF's early history, there is evidence that the organization mobilized blockades against noncooperating firms, all in the building industry (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 232; Arne Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening og storlockouten i 1931 [Oslo: Hovedoppgave, Universitetet i Oslo, Historisk Institutt, 1972]: 44). Organized employers have also tried to pressure nonmember firms into honoring NAF policy during conflicts. In 1931, NAF embarked on a campaign to publicize a list of nonmember firms who were willing to sign a statement pledging their support to NAF (Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening, 43). A few years earlier, in 1927, shipbuilders in Bergen sought the support of local banks to force nonmember firms to follow the NAF line. The banks agreed to "jawbone" their customers, but not to apply material sanctions (Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 404-5).
135. Norwegian employers have only rarely attempted other forms of coercion to secure cooperation during conflicts. On three occasions during NAF's early history, there is evidence that the organization mobilized blockades against noncooperating firms, all in the building industry (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 232; Arne Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening og storlockouten i 1931 [Oslo: Hovedoppgave, Universitetet i Oslo, Historisk Institutt, 1972]: 44). Organized employers have also tried to pressure nonmember firms into honoring NAF policy during conflicts. In 1931, NAF embarked on a campaign to publicize a list of nonmember firms who were willing to sign a statement pledging their support to NAF (Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening, 43). A few years earlier, in 1927, shipbuilders in Bergen sought the support of local banks to force nonmember firms to follow the NAF line. The banks agreed to "jawbone" their customers, but not to apply material sanctions (Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 404-5).
136. Norwegian employers have only rarely attempted other forms of coercion to secure cooperation during conflicts. On three occasions during NAF's early history, there is evidence that the organization mobilized blockades against noncooperating firms, all in the building industry (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950, 232; Arne Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening og storlockouten i 1931 [Oslo: Hovedoppgave, Universitetet i Oslo, Historisk Institutt, 1972]: 44). Organized employers have also tried to pressure nonmember firms into honoring NAF policy during conflicts. In 1931, NAF embarked on a campaign to publicize a list of nonmember firms who were willing to sign a statement pledging their support to NAF (Brovold, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening, 43). A few years earlier, in 1927, shipbuilders in Bergen sought the support of local banks to force nonmember firms to follow the NAF line. The banks agreed to "jawbone" their customers, but not to apply material sanctions (Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 404-5).
137. Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" 434-56.
138. Røsjø interview.
139. Larsen interview.
140. Odd Aukrust, PRIM I. A Model of the Price and Income Distribution of an Open Economy (Oslo: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970).
141. There are exceptions. In 1981 and 1996, public sector agreements were reached before private sector agreements. In 1981, this occurred as the result of a conscious strategy by LO to achieve retirement concessions in the more favorable environment of the public sector, thereby making it easier to gain the same policies in the private sector. In 1996, the public sector reached agreement before the leading private sector branches as the result of strikes in the metal and restaurant branches, which delayed the private sector negotiating process. I am grateful to Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke for clarifying this point.
142. I am grateful to Geir Høgsnes for bringing this letter to my attention. Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke informs me that such joint pronouncements are routine components of the environment of public sector bargaining.
143. The fact that centralized bargaining exists should not be taken for granted. The centralization of bargaining was an early NAF goal and throughout the NAF's history, it has used sympathy lockouts to cobble together agreements in separate industries. It has also tactically exploited the centralizing potential of compulsory mediation and arbitration (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950; Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" ; Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss. For a comparative analysis of the politics of centralization in Scandinavia, see Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In.")
144. The fact that centralized bargaining exists should not be taken for granted. The centralization of bargaining was an early NAF goal and throughout the NAF's history, it has used sympathy lockouts to cobble together agreements in separate industries. It has also tactically exploited the centralizing potential of compulsory mediation and arbitration (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950; Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" ; Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss. For a comparative analysis of the politics of centralization in Scandinavia, see Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In.")
145. The fact that centralized bargaining exists should not be taken for granted. The centralization of bargaining was an early NAF goal and throughout the NAF's history, it has used sympathy lockouts to cobble together agreements in separate industries. It has also tactically exploited the centralizing potential of compulsory mediation and arbitration (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950; Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" ; Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss. For a comparative analysis of the politics of centralization in Scandinavia, see Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In.")
146. The fact that centralized bargaining exists should not be taken for granted. The centralization of bargaining was an early NAF goal and throughout the NAF's history, it has used sympathy lockouts to cobble together agreements in separate industries. It has also tactically exploited the centralizing potential of compulsory mediation and arbitration (Petersen, Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening 1900-1950; Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp" ; Frøland, Korporativt kompromiss. For a comparative analysis of the politics of centralization in Scandinavia, see Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In.")
147. The choice of which of these bargaining frameworks will be employed rests traditionally with LO. NAF-NHO always prefers coordinated bargaining, since this tends to produce lower wage increases. In recent years, this preference has been shared by the LO leadership. In both 1996 and 1998, however, LO's leadership was unable to convince the rank and file members of its constituent unions to support coordinated bargaining, and negotiations proceeded on an industry-by-industry basis.
148. Kleivane interview.
149. Høgsnes, Collective Wage Bargaining, 339-40. During the interwar period, the question of which branch would lead negotiations was much less determinate and was an important dimension of NAF's tactical planning. The situation was complicated by the fact that wage agreements did not expire at the same time. By the early 1920s, there were two clusters of industries: the "spring branches," whose agreements expired at the end of March, and the "fall branches," whose agreements expired at the end of September. For an analysis of NAF strategy during the 1920s, see Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp."
150. Høgsnes, Collective Wage Bargaining, 339-40. During the interwar period, the question of which branch would lead negotiations was much less determinate and was an important dimension of NAF's tactical planning. The situation was complicated by the fact that wage agreements did not expire at the same time. By the early 1920s, there were two clusters of industries: the "spring branches," whose agreements expired at the end of March, and the "fall branches," whose agreements expired at the end of September. For an analysis of NAF strategy during the 1920s, see Sæland, En "gang maa vi ta en ordentlig kamp."
151. Ulvin interview.
152. Løvdal interview.
153. Ulvin interview.
154. Magnussen interview.
155. Ulvin interview.
156. Løvdal interview.
157. Ulvin interview.
158. Ibid.
159. Løvdal interview. These principles include the importance of involving top managers in negotiations, the importance of wages as a tool of competitive strategy, a preference for agreements that have fewer rules and cover a greater number of workers, and the recognition of foreign competition as a benchmark (Løvdal interview).
160. Streeck, "Interest Heterogeneity."
161. Ibid., 179-80.
162. Ibid., 185-86.
163. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action.
164. In fact, Streeck is well aware of this fact. In a chapter published during the same year as his critique of Offe and Wiesenthal, he emphasizes the collective goods aspects of job training (Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions").
165. See Richard Swedberg, "Markets as Social Structures," in Neil Smelser and Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) for a review of sociological accounts of the market. Interestingly, the notion that competition is impossible in the absence of a cooperative foundation seems to be prevalent at the Harvard Business School. See Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: Free Press, 1980): 17, 90; also Robert Kuttner, Everything for Sale (New York: Knopf, 1997): 205.
166. See Richard Swedberg, "Markets as Social Structures," in Neil Smelser and Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) for a review of sociological accounts of the market. Interestingly, the notion that competition is impossible in the absence of a cooperative foundation seems to be prevalent at the Harvard Business School. See Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: Free Press, 1980): 17, 90; also Robert Kuttner, Everything for Sale (New York: Knopf, 1997): 205.
167. See Richard Swedberg, "Markets as Social Structures," in Neil Smelser and Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) for a review of sociological accounts of the market. Interestingly, the notion that competition is impossible in the absence of a cooperative foundation seems to be prevalent at the Harvard Business School. See Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: Free Press, 1980): 17, 90; also Robert Kuttner, Everything for Sale (New York: Knopf, 1997): 205.
168. There are exceptions. For instance, a recent issue around which small business mobilized was opposition to a tax on employers. NHO had to dispatch its top economists to explain that the abolition of this tax would cause revenue shortfalls that inevitably would be made up through the imposition of other, more onerous taxes and fees (Opstad interview).
169. Glad interview.
170. Also, see Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action, 218.
171. Mark Granovetter, "Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis," Acta Sociologica 35 (1993): 6.
172. I have argued elsewhere (Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action, 14-15) that it was extremely unlikely that such strategies, which aim to transform prisoner's dilemma preferences into those of an assurance game, are likely to succeed among capitalists. Also see Sara Singleton and Michael Taylor, "The Communal Resource: Transaction Costs and the Solution of Collective Action Problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 194-214.
173. I have argued elsewhere (Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action, 14-15) that it was extremely unlikely that such strategies, which aim to transform prisoner's dilemma preferences into those of an assurance game, are likely to succeed among capitalists. Also see Sara Singleton and Michael Taylor, "The Communal Resource: Transaction Costs and the Solution of Collective Action Problems," Politics and Society 21 (1993): 194-214.