Equilibrium dominance in experimental financial markets

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 189-232

  Cadsby, Charles Bram ^a   Frank, Murray ^b   Maksimovic, Vojislav ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032351171     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/11.1.189     Document Type: Article

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