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Volumn 66, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 235-296

What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression

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EID: 0032350114     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (30)

References (403)
  • 1
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    • Two Wilson Hearings before Senate Committee on Defense Appointments
    • Jan. 24
    • Wilson made this statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearing to the position of Secretary of Defense. See Excerpts from Two Wilson Hearings Before Senate Committee on Defense Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1953, at 8.
    • (1953) N.Y. Times , pp. 8
  • 2
    • 0003759668 scopus 로고
    • Cf. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 3 (1991) ("Classical political economy purported to develop rules for evaluating a legal regime's justice or fairness without regard to how its wealth happened to be distributed. As a political and legal doctrine, classicism identified the best regime as the one that maximized total wealth.")
    • (1991) Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 , pp. 3
    • Hovenkamp, H.1
  • 3
    • 1542767633 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
  • 5
    • 0642357069 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982) (asserting that corporate speech is undeserving of protection because it "does not derive from the values or political commitments of any individuals"); see also infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text
    • See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982) (asserting that corporate speech is undeserving of protection because it "does not derive from the values or political commitments of any individuals"); see also infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
    • Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's the Value of Free Speech
    • Baker, C.E.1
  • 6
    • 1542767626 scopus 로고
    • 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294-95
    • See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294-95 (1981); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1382-83 (1979); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 576-77, 584 (1991).
    • (1981) Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights under the First Amendment
    • Brudney, V.1
  • 8
    • 1542452760 scopus 로고
    • 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 576-77, 584
    • See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294-95 (1981); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1382-83 (1979); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 576-77, 584 (1991).
    • (1991) Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech
    • Shelledy, D.1
  • 9
    • 1542767632 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 126-149, 196-196 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 126-149, 196-196 and accompanying text.
  • 10
    • 1542452758 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
    • 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
  • 11
    • 1542662295 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 777; infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text
    • See id. at 777; infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
  • 12
    • 84865902696 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("Corporations . . . contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to foster." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    • See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("Corporations . . . contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to foster." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  • 13
    • 0642265124 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 507 U.S.
    • See, e.g, id. at 8-9 (holding that a corporate newsletter receives the full protection of the First Amendment); infra notes 43-43 and accompanying text. In the context of commercial speech protection, it should be noted, the Court routinely has extended First Amendment protection to corporations without any discussion of the point. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 657-60 (1980). Traditionally, however, such protection has been at a somewhat reduced level. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 422;
    • Discovery Network , pp. 422
  • 14
    • 1542661356 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 447 U.S.
    • Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
    • Central Hudson , pp. 563
  • 15
    • 1542452629 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-60 (1990); infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-60 (1990); infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
  • 16
    • 0005401534 scopus 로고
    • See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 219 (1989) (asserting that corporate political speech is unprotected because the "speech cannot be attributed to the choice of a free agent"); Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (defining corporate speech as "institutional speech," undeserving of First Amendment protection because it lacks a speaker); infra notes 126-130, 170-172 and accompanying text.
    • (1989) Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech , pp. 219
    • Baker, C.E.1
  • 17
    • 1542453763 scopus 로고
    • 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739
    • See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 219 (1989) (asserting that corporate political speech is unprotected because the "speech cannot be attributed to the choice of a free agent"); Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (defining corporate speech as "institutional speech," undeserving of First Amendment protection because it lacks a speaker); infra notes 126-130, 170-172 and accompanying text.
    • (1995) Institutional Speech
    • Bezanson, R.P.1
  • 18
    • 0010747832 scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 179-84 (1986); OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 15-16 (1996); infra notes 340-354 and accompanying text.
    • (1986) Rights, Persons, and Organizations , pp. 179-184
    • Dan-Cohen, M.1
  • 19
    • 0040512020 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • infra notes 340-354 and accompanying text
    • See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 179-84 (1986); OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 15-16 (1996); infra notes 340-354 and accompanying text.
    • (1996) Liberalism Divided , pp. 15-16
    • Fiss, O.1
  • 20
    • 1542452740 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Brudney, supra note 6, at 268
    • See Brudney, supra note 6, at 268.
  • 21
    • 1542557287 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 231-354 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 231-354 and accompanying text.
  • 22
    • 1542557286 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 83-230 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 83-230 and accompanying text.
  • 23
    • 1542452737 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 131-149 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 131-149 and accompanying text.
  • 24
    • 1542452748 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 149-151 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
  • 25
    • 1542452727 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 126-151 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 126-151 and accompanying text.
  • 26
    • 1542767616 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 151-179 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 151-179 and accompanying text.
  • 27
    • 1542452743 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
  • 28
    • 1542767614 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
  • 29
    • 1542452764 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 205-196 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 205-196 and accompanying text.
  • 30
    • 0004048289 scopus 로고
    • The concept is drawn, by analogy, from JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
    • (1971) A Theory of Justice , pp. 136-142
    • Rawls, J.1
  • 32
    • 1542557299 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See infra notes 355-370 and accompanying text. It should be noted that although this critique may well be appropriate when applied to academic attacks on corporate speech's protection, it would be difficult to suggest that many of the current members of the Supreme Court are guilty of ulterior, left-wing ideological motivations for their hesitancy to extend full protection to corporate speech. In light of this fact, the inescapable conclusion we reach is that the Court's approach is wholly defenseless, even on ulterior ideological motivations, and can therefore be attributed simply to an insensitivity to important free speech values. See infra notes 210-230 and accompanying text.
  • 33
    • 1542767629 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (striking down a restriction on posting "For Sale" signs); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down a state law requiring newspapers to print replies to editorials); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (striking down an injunction against newspaper publication of government documents); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959) (finding unconstitutional the denial of a permit to show a nonobscene movie); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240, 251 (1936) (striking down a state law requiring a license tax on all publishers, including corporations, that had publications with circulations over 20,000).
  • 34
    • 1542662287 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784 (1978); infra Part I.A.1
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784 (1978); infra Part I.A.1.
  • 35
    • 1542557302 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
    • 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
  • 36
    • 1542557303 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 768. The statute also provided that no question submitted to voters dealing with taxation could materially affect the corporation. See id.
    • Id. at 768. The statute also provided that no question submitted to voters dealing with taxation could materially affect the corporation. See id.
  • 37
    • 1542452757 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 778, 784
    • See id. at 778, 784.
  • 38
    • 1542557306 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 769
    • See id. at 769.
  • 39
    • 1542767630 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 777
    • Id. at 777.
  • 40
    • 1542452762 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 41
    • 1542662290 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 783
    • Id. at 783.
  • 42
    • 1542662291 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 785; see also id. at 784 (noting that it is impermissible to prohibit speech based on the identity of the speaker's interests)
    • Id. at 785; see also id. at 784 (noting that it is impermissible to prohibit speech based on the identity of the speaker's interests).
  • 43
    • 1542452759 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 789-90. The Court also rejected the state's paternalistic belief that it had to suppress advocacy that might persuade the voters. See id. at 791-92 & n.31
    • See id. at 789-90. The Court also rejected the state's paternalistic belief that it had to suppress advocacy that might persuade the voters. See id. at 791-92 & n.31.
  • 44
    • 1542452761 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 791 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
    • Id. at 791 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • 45
    • 1542662293 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 792-93
    • See id. at 792-93.
  • 46
    • 1542662289 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 793
    • See id. at 793.
  • 47
    • 1542662288 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion)
    • 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
  • 48
    • 84865892986 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 5-6. The utility company had long distributed its own monthly newsletter called "Progress" with its monthly statements. See id. at 5
    • See id. at 5-6. The utility company had long distributed its own monthly newsletter called "Progress" with its monthly statements. See id. at 5.
  • 49
    • 1542452735 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 6
    • See id. at 6.
  • 50
    • 1542767622 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 8
    • See id. at 8.
  • 51
    • 1542452742 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 52
    • 1542557285 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 12
    • See id. at 12.
  • 53
    • 1542557298 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 13
    • See id. at 13.
  • 54
    • 1542452744 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 18. The Court relied on this point in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)in which the Court struck down a state law granting a right-of-reply to newspaper editorials. See id. at 258. The Court emphasized that First Amendment concerns, such as protection from forced speech, applied to all corporations, not only the institutional press. See id.
    • See id. at 18. The Court relied on this point in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Court struck down a state law granting a right-of-reply to newspaper editorials. See id. at 258. The Court emphasized that First Amendment concerns, such as protection from forced speech, applied to all corporations, not only the institutional press. See id.
  • 55
    • 1542557292 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 479 U.S. 238 (1986)
    • 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
  • 56
    • 84865889454 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 241. MCFL was incorporated as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation to perform educational, political, and other activities to "foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn." Id. (citation omitted)
    • See id. at 241. MCFL was incorporated as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation to perform educational, political, and other activities to "foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn." Id. (citation omitted).
  • 57
    • 1542662280 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 58
    • 1542452749 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 243-44
    • See id. at 243-44.
  • 59
    • 1542662283 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 252
    • Id. at 252.
  • 60
    • 1542767624 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 254
    • See id. at 254.
  • 61
    • 1542557289 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 255; see also id. at 254 (noting the disincentive for organizations to engage in political speech)
    • Id. at 255; see also id. at 254 (noting the disincentive for organizations to engage in political speech).
  • 62
    • 1542557291 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 257-58
    • See id. at 257-58.
  • 63
    • 1542557301 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 259
    • See id. at 259.
  • 64
    • 1542767621 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 65
    • 1542662284 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 241
    • See id. at 241.
  • 66
    • 1542452753 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 263
    • Id. at 263.
  • 67
    • 1542662286 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 263-64
    • See id. at 263-64.
  • 68
    • 1542452752 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
    • 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
  • 69
    • 1542662285 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 656
    • See id. at 656.
  • 70
    • 1542557297 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 714 (appendix to opinion of Kennedy, J., dissenting)
    • See id. at 714 (appendix to opinion of Kennedy, J., dissenting).
  • 71
    • 1542452756 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 654-55
    • See id. at 654-55.
  • 72
    • 1542767618 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 657
    • See id. at 657.
  • 73
    • 1542767620 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 74
    • 1542767625 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 658
    • See id. at 658.
  • 75
    • 84865892983 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 660; see also id. at 666 (describing the state's interest in "eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests'")
    • Id. at 660; see also id. at 666 (describing the state's interest in "eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests'").
  • 76
    • 1542557305 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 658-59
    • See id. at 658-59.
  • 77
    • 1542662282 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 660
    • See id. at 660.
  • 78
    • 1542452746 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 79
    • 1542452747 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 661
    • See id. at 661.
  • 80
    • 1542557295 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 662
    • See id. at 662.
  • 81
    • 1542452750 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 662-63
    • See id. at 662-63.
  • 82
    • 1542662281 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 663
    • See id. at 663.
  • 84
    • 84985337969 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521
    • See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (emphasizing the value of free speech in checking abuse of power in a democratic society).
    • The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory
    • Blasi, V.1
  • 85
    • 1542557290 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 538-43.
    • See id. at 538-43.
  • 86
    • 0642326331 scopus 로고
    • 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-50
    • See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1985) (positing a "pathological perspective" to adjudicating First Amendment disputes that protects the integrity of "core" speech from societal intolerance).
    • (1985) The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment
    • Blasi, V.1
  • 87
    • 1542662279 scopus 로고
    • 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 618, 621, 627
    • See generally Martin H. Redish, The Role of Pathology in First Amendment Theory: A Skeptical Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 618, 621, 627 (1988) (rejecting Blasi's pathological perspective and explaining that the decision whether to protect speech is related to the values served by free speech).
    • (1988) The Role of Pathology in First Amendment Theory: A Skeptical Examination
    • Redish, M.H.1
  • 88
    • 1542767617 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 627
    • Id. at 627.
  • 89
    • 84865892980 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1
    • The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
  • 90
    • 1542452626 scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 13, at 3 (focusing on the liberty value that free speech protection fosters); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1963) (recognizing a combination of four values that free speech fosters); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 (recognizing how free speech benefits the democratic process).
    • (1963) Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment , pp. 3
    • Emerson, T.I.1
  • 91
    • 0039097850 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263
    • See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 13, at 3 (focusing on the liberty value that free speech protection fosters); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1963) (recognizing a combination of four values that free speech fosters); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 (recognizing how free speech benefits the democratic process).
    • The First Amendment is an Absolute
    • Meiklejohn, A.1
  • 93
    • 1542662276 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 21
    • Id. at 21.
  • 94
    • 1542452736 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 22
    • See id. at 22.
  • 95
    • 0040607483 scopus 로고
    • 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25
    • For criticism of the self-realization theory, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (noting that the benefits of self-realization do not distinguish speech from other freedoms); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 312 (highlighting the lack of predictability in using the self-realization principle to foster free speech protection).
    • (1971) Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems
    • Bork, R.H.1
  • 96
    • 1542662277 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 312
    • For criticism of the self-realization theory, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (noting that the benefits of self-realization do not distinguish speech from other freedoms); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 312 (highlighting the lack of predictability in using the self-realization principle to foster free speech protection).
    • Codifying the First Amendment
    • Schauer, F.1
  • 97
    • 0040267387 scopus 로고
    • Oxford Univ. Press
    • See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1960) (asserting that freedom of speech originated from self-government); Bork, supra note 89, at 26 (stating that speech functions to deal with politics and government).
    • (1965) Political Freedom , pp. 27
    • Meiklejohn, A.1
  • 98
    • 1542662273 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • One of the key arguments used against corporate speech protection is that corporations are incapable of personal self-realization. Under a communitarian model, however, even if true, this factor would be irrelevant because corporate speech is consistent with the democratic political process. See infra notes 113-113 and accompanying text.
  • 99
    • 0000445322 scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., C. B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 51 (1977) ("Democracy would . . . make people more active, more energetic . . . ."); Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 285, 288 (1966) ("The most distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis on individual participation in the development of public policy . . . . [A]bove all else they were concerned with human development, the opportunities which existed in political activity to realize the untapped potentials of men . . . .").
    • (1977) The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy , pp. 51
    • Macpherson, C.B.1
  • 100
    • 0000445322 scopus 로고
    • 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 285, 288
    • See, e.g., C. B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 51 (1977) ("Democracy would . . . make people more active, more energetic . . . ."); Jack L. Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 285, 288 (1966) ("The most distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis on individual participation in the development of public policy . . . . [A]bove all else they were concerned with human development, the opportunities which existed in political activity to realize the untapped potentials of men . . . .").
    • (1966) A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy
    • Walker, J.L.1
  • 101
    • 1542557283 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • For a more detailed explanation of this intersection, see REDISH, supra note 86, at 22-26
    • For a more detailed explanation of this intersection, see REDISH, supra note 86, at 22-26.
  • 102
    • 1542452628 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 103
    • 1542557192 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 92
    • See supra note 92.
  • 104
    • 1542452630 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 263
    • See Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 263.
  • 105
    • 1542767503 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 92
    • See supra note 92.
  • 106
    • 1542662161 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
  • 107
    • 84865892981 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172-73 (noting that "economic distress can bring down a government")
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172-73 (noting that "economic distress can bring down a government").
  • 109
    • 0004099892 scopus 로고
    • See id. at 201 (recognizing that "corporate activity has broad social and political ramifications"); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 162 (1970) (recognizing the "idea that the corporation's utility served the general economy"); LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 175 (viewing businesses as performing "indispensable" functions).
    • (1970) The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States , pp. 162
    • Hurst, J.W.1
  • 110
    • 1542557195 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 1 and accompanying text
    • See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
  • 111
    • 1542452631 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 58-59 (arguing that performing socially useful and responsible functions legitimizes corporations' use of the facilities that the law provides)
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 58-59 (arguing that performing socially useful and responsible functions legitimizes corporations' use of the facilities that the law provides).
  • 112
    • 0003952377 scopus 로고
    • PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE 80 (1967). Professor Bachrach cites United States Steel Corporation's response to the civil rights struggle in Birmingham in 1963: "Under pressure, it declared its neutrality and thus was forced to admit to itself and to the nation that it is a separate political institution." Id.
    • (1967) The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique , pp. 80
    • Bachrach, P.1
  • 113
    • 1542452627 scopus 로고
    • ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 60 (1954); see also id. at 181 (asserting that "the corporation, almost against its will, has been compelled to assume in appreciable part the role of conscience-carrier of twentieth-century American society").
    • (1954) The 20TH Century Capitalist Revolution , pp. 60
    • Berle Jr., A.A.1
  • 115
    • 1542662160 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-21
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-21.
  • 116
    • 1542767508 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • FISS, supra note 14, at 10
    • FISS, supra note 14, at 10.
  • 117
    • 1542767505 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., S. 5148, 104th Cong. § 671 (1995) (discussing a later-rejected proposal on punitive damages); H.R. 161, 104th Cong. (1995) (discussing a later-rejected proposal to reform product liability law); 21 C.F.R. § 897.1-.34 (1997) (regulating the sale, distribution, advertising, and labeling of tobacco).
  • 118
    • 0347549167 scopus 로고
    • 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 231-33
    • See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 231-33 (1983) (distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech and emphasizing the unique risks inherent in viewpoint-based restrictions); see also infra notes 355-370 and accompanying text. It should be emphasized that Professor Lindblom did not purport to draw First Amendment implications from his observation. Professor Fiss, however, does appear to do so. See FISS, supra note 14, at 10-12.
    • (1983) Content Regulation and the First Amendment
    • Stone, G.R.1
  • 119
    • 0005247962 scopus 로고
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 178-79. Actually, Professor Lindblom emphasizes business officials' role in public policy. See id. at 179. Because the official does not necessarily speak or act on the corporation's behalf, however, we can extend Lindblom's idea to the corporation. Cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 63-64 (1995) (explaining that regulation of officials' speech creates First Amendment concerns because such speech is seen as the individual manager's speech); Manuel F. Cohen, The Corporation within the Community, in THE CORPORATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 28, 34 (Edward J. Bander ed., 1975) (address to the Economic Club of Detroit) (noting that the "corporation as an institution is, in fact, invested with political powers").
    • (1995) The Corporation and the Constitution , pp. 63-64
    • Butler, H.N.1    Ribstein, L.E.2
  • 120
    • 1542452625 scopus 로고
    • The Corporation within the Community
    • Edward J. Bander ed.
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 178-79. Actually, Professor Lindblom emphasizes business officials' role in public policy. See id. at 179. Because the official does not necessarily speak or act on the corporation's behalf, however, we can extend Lindblom's idea to the corporation. Cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 63-64 (1995) (explaining that regulation of officials' speech creates First Amendment concerns because such speech is seen as the individual manager's speech); Manuel F. Cohen, The Corporation within the Community, in THE CORPORATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 28, 34 (Edward J. Bander ed., 1975) (address to the Economic Club of Detroit) (noting that the "corporation as an institution is, in fact, invested with political powers").
    • (1975) The Corporation in a Democratic Society , pp. 28
    • Cohen, M.F.1
  • 121
    • 1542452728 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 694 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the significance of the fact that private associations owning and operating much of the state's business believe that a particular candidate is important to the state's prosperity)
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 694 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the significance of the fact that private associations owning and operating much of the state's business believe that a particular candidate is important to the state's prosperity).
  • 122
    • 1542557282 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255-56 (stating that the First Amendment dictates absolute protection of expression that aids the citizenry in making governing choices)
    • Cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255-56 (stating that the First Amendment dictates absolute protection of expression that aids the citizenry in making governing choices).
  • 123
    • 1542452731 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172
    • LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172.
  • 124
    • 1542452732 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (plurality opinion) (asserting that speech damaging to a corporation's reputation is unwarranting of special protection)
    • See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (plurality opinion) (asserting that speech damaging to a corporation's reputation is unwarranting of special protection).
  • 125
    • 1542557284 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 162
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 162.
  • 126
    • 1542662270 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1984) (adopting a district court finding that the corporation was a public figure) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)); see also Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying a three-part analysis to determine whether a corporation is a public or private figure). But see Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753 (plurality opinion) (treating action involving a plaintiff corporation as governed by the standards for a private individual)
    • See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1984) (adopting a district court finding that the corporation was a public figure) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)); see also Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying a three-part analysis to determine whether a corporation is a public or private figure). But see Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753 (plurality opinion) (treating action involving a plaintiff corporation as governed by the standards for a private individual).
  • 127
    • 84865889452 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (setting the fault standard for a suit by a public official). The Court later extended this standard to so-called "public figures." See Curtis Publ'g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974) (noting that a majority of Justices in Curtis Publishing agreed that the New York Times test applies to public figures as well as public officials)
    • New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (setting the fault standard for a suit by a public official). The Court later extended this standard to so-called "public figures." See Curtis Publ'g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974) (noting that a majority of Justices in Curtis Publishing agreed that the New York Times test applies to public figures as well as public officials).
  • 128
    • 1542767608 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270
    • New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
  • 129
    • 84865894061 scopus 로고
    • The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure": Nailing the Jellyfish
    • See Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure": Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35, 85 (1982) (asserting that "[f]ew would dispute . . . that a Ford Motor Company or an IBM command at least the same name recognition" as most public figures); Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1167, 1172 (1995) ("[A] corporation that has become a 'household name' in the relevant community will be deemed an 'all purpose' public figure . . . .").
    • (1982) Iowa L. Rev. , vol.68 , pp. 35
    • Fetzer, P.N.1
  • 130
    • 1542662251 scopus 로고
    • The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff
    • See Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure": Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35, 85 (1982) (asserting that "[f]ew would dispute . . . that a Ford Motor Company or an IBM command at least the same name recognition" as most public figures); Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1167, 1172 (1995) ("[A] corporation that has become a 'household name' in the relevant community will be deemed an 'all purpose' public figure . . . .").
    • (1995) St. Louis U. L.J. , vol.39 , pp. 1167
    • Redlich, N.1
  • 131
    • 1542662271 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
    • 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
  • 132
    • 84865889453 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 344. The second reason for the distinction between public and private plaintiffs in Gertz was the fact that public officials and public figures voluntarily had sought to enter the public eye and thus ran the risk of closer public scrutiny and possible defamation. See id. at 345; see also Redlich, supra note 120, at 1173 (noting that advertising may "thrust" a corporation into some controversy).
    • Id. at 344. The second reason for the distinction between public and private plaintiffs in Gertz was the fact that public officials and public figures voluntarily had sought to enter the public eye and thus ran the risk of closer public scrutiny and possible defamation. See id. at 345; see also Redlich, supra note 120, at 1173 (noting that advertising may "thrust" a corporation into some controversy).
  • 133
    • 84865889449 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Fetzer, supra note 120, at 54. This ability to respond to a falsehood is derived from the decision in Bellotti and the expansive protection given to commercial speech. See id. at 54-55; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (holding that mailing contraceptive advertisements is "clearly protected by the First Amendment"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (reasoning that commercial speech is protected because it "furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information"); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the flow of price information on prescription drugs is not protected by the First Amendment)
    • Fetzer, supra note 120, at 54. This ability to respond to a falsehood is derived from the decision in Bellotti and the expansive protection given to commercial speech. See id. at 54-55; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (holding that mailing contraceptive advertisements is "clearly protected by the First Amendment"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980) (reasoning that commercial speech is protected because it "furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information"); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the flow of price information on prescription drugs is not protected by the First Amendment).
  • 134
    • 84865889450 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1360 (arguing that corporations possess "the constitutional rights necessary to protect their business[es]"); cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the vast difference between political campaigns and other speech)
    • See O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1360 (arguing that corporations possess "the constitutional rights necessary to protect their business[es]"); cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the vast difference between political campaigns and other speech).
  • 135
    • 1542452632 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172-75; supra notes 113-105 and accompanying text
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 172-75; supra notes 113-105 and accompanying text.
  • 136
    • 84865889451 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See generally BAKER, supra note 13, at 219 (arguing that corporate speech "does not depend on either individual or collective visions about what humanity should be" and "need not reflect anyone's substantive political views"); Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739 (asserting that "institutional speech . . . has nothing to do with liberty and no necessary relationship to freedom")
    • See generally BAKER, supra note 13, at 219 (arguing that corporate speech "does not depend on either individual or collective visions about what humanity should be" and "need not reflect anyone's substantive political views"); Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739 (asserting that "institutional speech . . . has nothing to do with liberty and no necessary relationship to freedom").
  • 137
    • 84865892979 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See BAKER, supra note 13, at 218 (arguing that "business considerations may dictate the content of the company's political speech")
    • See BAKER, supra note 13, at 218 (arguing that "business considerations may dictate the content of the company's political speech").
  • 138
    • 1542767507 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 219; Bezanson, supra note 13, at 755-56
    • See id. at 219; Bezanson, supra note 13, at 755-56.
  • 139
    • 1542452638 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bezanson, supra note 13, at 779
    • Bezanson, supra note 13, at 779.
  • 140
    • 1542557197 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • For a detailed critique, see REDISH, supra note 86, at 29-36
    • For a detailed critique, see REDISH, supra note 86, at 29-36.
  • 141
    • 84865892974 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that forced disclosure of the association's membership list would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association); id. at 460 ("[I]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.")
    • See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that forced disclosure of the association's membership list would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association); id. at 460 ("[I]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
  • 143
    • 1542452636 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 129; see also id. at 140-41 (discussing the link between the existence of political and other civil associations)
    • Id. at 129; see also id. at 140-41 (discussing the link between the existence of political and other civil associations).
  • 144
    • 84865889443 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 140-41; see also id. at 130 (describing the American view of association as "the only means they have of acting")
    • See id. at 140-41; see also id. at 130 (describing the American view of association as "the only means they have of acting").
  • 145
    • 1542452635 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 20; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 20; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
  • 146
    • 84865902685 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 32 (describing the corporation as historically "a useful instrument of regular business.")
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 32 (describing the corporation as historically "a useful instrument of regular business.").
  • 147
    • 1542662163 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 129 (noting that almost all Americans took part in commercial and manufacturing companies)
    • Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 129 (noting that almost all Americans took part in commercial and manufacturing companies).
  • 148
    • 0039361806 scopus 로고
    • According to one commentator, the Jacksonian period was marked by "the transfer of economic primacy from an old and conservative merchant class to a newer, more aggressive, and more numerous body of business men and speculators of all sorts." BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1970), reprinted in CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 216, 218 (Allen F. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds., 1984). Hammond notes that the period "produced a dazzling democratic expansion experienced nowhere else," and that "the Jacksonian revolution signified that a nation of democrats was tired of being governed, however well, by gentlemen from Virginia and Massachusetts." Id. at 217. Jacksonianism, he states, "opened economic advantages to those who had not previously had them." Id.
    • (1970) Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War
    • Hammond, B.1
  • 149
    • 1542767604 scopus 로고
    • Allen F. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds.
    • According to one commentator, the Jacksonian period was marked by "the transfer of economic primacy from an old and conservative merchant class to a newer, more aggressive, and more numerous body of business men and speculators of all sorts." BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR (1970), reprinted in CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 216, 218 (Allen F. Davis & Harold D. Woodman eds., 1984). Hammond notes that the period "produced a dazzling democratic expansion experienced nowhere else," and that "the Jacksonian revolution signified that a nation of democrats was tired of being governed, however well, by gentlemen from Virginia and Massachusetts." Id. at 217. Jacksonianism, he states, "opened economic advantages to those who had not previously had them." Id.
    • (1984) Conflict and Consensus in Early American History , pp. 216
  • 150
    • 8344269886 scopus 로고
    • RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855, at 256 (1982). According to Professor Hovenkamp, [c]lassical political economy in the United States is a Jacksonian phenomenon . . . . Andrew Jackson was an entrepreneurial president. His terms of office -or, in political economic terms, his regime - stood for economic growth, unobstructed by "artificial" constraints. The two greatest classical legal institutions in the United States - the modern business corporation and the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process - are both distinctively Jacksonian products. The modern business corporation had its origin in the general corporation acts, one of the most important legal accomplishments of a regime bent on democratizing and deregulating American business. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 2 (emphasis added).
    • (1982) The Origins of the American Business Corporation , pp. 1784-1855
    • Seavoy, R.E.1
  • 151
    • 1542452639 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • HURST, supra note 101, at 32
    • HURST, supra note 101, at 32.
  • 152
    • 84865888254 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id; see also SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 256 (arguing that general incorporation laws "helped equalize the opportunities to get rich")
    • Id; see also SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 256 (arguing that general incorporation laws "helped equalize the opportunities to get rich").
  • 153
    • 1542767605 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 120 (citing the common example of the New York constitutional convention of 1846); see also SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 255 (noting that Connecticut was the first state to adopt a policy of granting charters to any legitimate business)
    • See HURST, supra note 101, at 120 (citing the common example of the New York constitutional convention of 1846); see also SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 255 (noting that Connecticut was the first state to adopt a policy of granting charters to any legitimate business).
  • 154
    • 84865902684 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • HURST, supra note 101, at 120; see also id. at 32 (noting that the "individualistic egalitarian objection passed out of [the] Jacksonian [arguments] against corporations"). Professor Hovenkamp asserted that [t]o be a classicist was to be opposed to state intervention on behalf of the rich and the politically powerful. Classicism achieved its popularity in the United States in a political movement, Jacksonianism, that was heavily supported by society's disfavored classes. The issues were not welfare and subsidized education. Rather, they were special corporate charters or licenses that gave unique privileges to engage in business to certain favored people, while denying access to others. When Federalists intervened in the market, the immediate beneficiaries were generally people of property
    • HURST, supra note 101, at 120; see also id. at 32 (noting that the "individualistic egalitarian objection passed out of [the] Jacksonian [arguments] against corporations"). Professor Hovenkamp asserted that [t]o be a classicist was to be opposed to state intervention on behalf of the rich and the politically powerful. Classicism achieved its popularity in the United States in a political movement, Jacksonianism, that was heavily supported by society's disfavored classes. The issues were not welfare and subsidized education. Rather, they were special corporate charters or licenses that gave unique privileges to engage in business to certain favored people, while denying access to others. When Federalists intervened in the market, the immediate beneficiaries were generally people of property.
  • 155
    • 1542452640 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 4
    • HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 4.
  • 156
    • 84865891208 scopus 로고
    • The "Responsible" Corporation: Benefactor or Monopolist?
    • Nov.
    • Milton Friedman & Eli Goldston, The "Responsible" Corporation: Benefactor or Monopolist?, FORTUNE, Nov. 1973, at 56, reprinted in THE CORPORATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 43, 44 (statement of Goldston).
    • (1973) Fortune , pp. 56
    • Friedman, M.1    Goldston, E.2
  • 157
    • 1542662166 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 111
    • Milton Friedman & Eli Goldston, The "Responsible" Corporation: Benefactor or Monopolist?, FORTUNE, Nov. 1973, at 56, reprinted in THE CORPORATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 43, 44 (statement of Goldston).
  • 158
    • 84865888253 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. (statement of Goldston) (describing large publicly held corporations as "social aggregations of talent"); cf. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (noting that "corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose")
    • See id. (statement of Goldston) (describing large publicly held corporations as "social aggregations of talent"); cf. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (noting that "corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose").
  • 159
    • 1542767603 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 131-32 (reasoning that individuals gain power and independence from the ability to form associations)
    • Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 131-32 (reasoning that individuals gain power and independence from the ability to form associations).
  • 160
    • 84865902683 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy . . . is undeniably enhanced by group association . . . .")
    • See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy . . . is undeniably enhanced by group association . . . .").
  • 161
    • 1542767602 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (describing the common trust fund concept)
    • See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (describing the common trust fund concept).
  • 162
    • 1542767509 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460
    • See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 161-62 (1983) (asserting that organizations represent the mass of individuals who rarely can provide a powerful voice on their own); Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 79 (1995) ("[A]ssociations are essentially amplifiers . . . or in any event communicators, of individual expressive interests . . . ."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1991) (arguing that individuals speak through organizations knowing that their "views will gain greatly in audibility").
  • 163
    • 0003704541 scopus 로고
    • See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 161-62 (1983) (asserting that organizations represent the mass of individuals who rarely can provide a powerful voice on their own); Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 79 (1995) ("[A]ssociations are essentially amplifiers . . . or in any event communicators, of individual expressive interests . . . ."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1991) (arguing that individuals speak through organizations knowing that their "views will gain greatly in audibility").
    • (1983) When Government Speaks , pp. 161-162
    • Yudof, M.G.1
  • 164
    • 1542557191 scopus 로고
    • Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment
    • See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 161-62 (1983) (asserting that organizations represent the mass of individuals who rarely can provide a powerful voice on their own); Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 79 (1995) ("[A]ssociations are essentially amplifiers . . . or in any event communicators, of individual expressive interests . . . ."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1991) (arguing that individuals speak through organizations knowing that their "views will gain greatly in audibility").
    • (1995) WM. & Mary Bill Rts. J. , vol.4 , pp. 1
    • Brudney, V.1
  • 165
    • 84928438875 scopus 로고
    • Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State
    • See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 161-62 (1983) (asserting that organizations represent the mass of individuals who rarely can provide a powerful voice on their own); Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 79 (1995) ("[A]ssociations are essentially amplifiers . . . or in any event communicators, of individual expressive interests . . . ."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1991) (arguing that individuals speak through organizations knowing that their "views will gain greatly in audibility").
    • (1991) Cal. L. Rev. , vol.79 , pp. 1229
    • Dan-Cohen, M.1
  • 166
    • 1542452642 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 19-22
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 19-22.
  • 167
    • 1542557200 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • But see supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text
    • But see supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.
  • 168
    • 1542662165 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text; see also Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57 (describing how the enjoyment of art, literature, and education cultivates citizens' values, independence, and wisdom); id. at 263 (arguing that novels, dramas, paintings, and poems enhance people's ability to vote)
    • See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text; see also Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57 (describing how the enjoyment of art, literature, and education cultivates citizens' values, independence, and wisdom); id. at 263 (arguing that novels, dramas, paintings, and poems enhance people's ability to vote).
  • 169
    • 84865888252 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • REDISH, supra note 86, at 30; see id. at 50; see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27 (arguing that the result will be "ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good" if citizens must decide an issue with less than complete information)
    • REDISH, supra note 86, at 30; see id. at 50; see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27 (arguing that the result will be "ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good" if citizens must decide an issue with less than complete information).
  • 170
    • 0346703553 scopus 로고
    • Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression
    • See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 371 (1991) (arguing that "freedom of expression is designed to protect the autonomy of potential listeners").
    • (1991) Colum. L. Rev. , vol.91 , pp. 334
    • Strauss, D.A.1
  • 171
    • 1542452643 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 26; see id. ("It does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even give assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to do so."). This is not to endorse entirely this aspect of Professor Meiklejohn's theory because in many ways his theory is too limiting, most notably in his argument that the same message should not be repeated, see id., and his limitation of speech protection only to public, or political, speech. See id. at 83; REDISH, supra note 86, at 14-15 (critiquing the Meiklejohnian approach).
  • 172
    • 1542767512 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255
    • Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255.
  • 173
    • 84865889442 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.; see also id. at 263 (arguing that the "judgment-making of the people must be self-educated in the ways of freedom")
    • Id.; see also id. at 263 (arguing that the "judgment-making of the people must be self-educated in the ways of freedom").
  • 174
    • 1542557279 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27; see also Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57 (arguing that the spreading of information and ideas must be unabridged)
    • MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27; see also Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57 (arguing that the spreading of information and ideas must be unabridged).
  • 175
    • 1542662267 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27; Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57
    • See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 27; Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 256-57.
  • 176
    • 0347584539 scopus 로고
    • 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 17, 30-31 & n.58
    • Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that "[i]t is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them."); Burt Neuborne, Speech, Technology, and the Emergence of a Tricameral Media: You Can't Tell the Players Without a Scorecard, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 17, 30-31 & n.58 (1994) (stating that "[e]ntire categories of speech arose where the principal justification for First Amendment protection was the hearer's right to know," including corporate and commercial speech); Strauss, supra note
    • (1994) Speech, Technology, and the Emergence of a Tricameral Media: You Can't Tell the Players Without a Scorecard
    • Neuborne, B.1
  • 177
    • 84865889438 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • at 371 ("[F]reedom of expression is designed to protect the autonomy of potential listeners . . . .")
    • at 371 ("[F]reedom of expression is designed to protect the autonomy of potential listeners . . . .").
  • 178
    • 1542767510 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving information."); see also DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 109 (arguing that business corporations have a right to speak derived from the public's right to listen); Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1245 (protecting corporate speech because the corporation is a "source of communication to which the public is entitled to listen"); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 571 (arguing that corporate speech can add to the "limited range of views given widespread dissemination").
  • 179
    • 1542662159 scopus 로고
    • 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 641
    • First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 706 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting the suggestion that government has an interest in shaping debate by insulating the electorate from certain views); id. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The premise of our system is that there is no such thing as too much speech . . . ."). But see J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 641 (1982) (arguing that Bellotti "paid only lip service to the rights of listeners" and really was more concerned with protecting "the privileged few who can spend unlimited amounts of money to purchase political effectiveness").
    • (1982) Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?
    • Wright, J.S.1
  • 180
    • 1542767511 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)
    • City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994).
  • 181
    • 0009944778 scopus 로고
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 (stating that the people in a democracy "may consider . . . the source and credibility of the advocate"); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 235 (1992) ("The effectiveness of speech is often connected to the identity of the speaker."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that listeners will consider the "self-interested and probably uncongenial source" in evaluating a message); YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161 (arguing that sources of information must have "high claims to legitimacy in the public mind"); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 65. ("Many listeners find that the identity of the source affects the worth or at least their evaluation of the speech."); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1456-57 (1990) (arguing that a listener may be more skeptical of a claim made by a business corporation than by an objective observer).
    • (1992) Free Speech in an Open Society , pp. 235
    • Smolla, R.A.1
  • 182
    • 1542767588 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 65.
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 (stating that the people in a democracy "may consider . . . the source and credibility of the advocate"); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 235 (1992) ("The effectiveness of speech is often connected to the identity of the speaker."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that listeners will consider the "self-interested and probably uncongenial source" in evaluating a message); YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161 (arguing that sources of information must have "high claims to legitimacy in the public mind"); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 65. ("Many listeners find that the identity of the source affects the worth or at least their evaluation of the speech."); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1456-57 (1990) (arguing that a listener may be more skeptical of a claim made by a business corporation than by an objective observer).
    • Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses
    • Baker, C.E.1
  • 183
    • 0642357148 scopus 로고
    • 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1456-57
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92 (stating that the people in a democracy "may consider . . . the source and credibility of the advocate"); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 235 (1992) ("The effectiveness of speech is often connected to the identity of the speaker."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that listeners will consider the "self-interested and probably uncongenial source" in evaluating a message); YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161 (arguing that sources of information must have "high claims to legitimacy in the public mind"); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 65. ("Many listeners find that the identity of the source affects the worth or at least their evaluation of the speech."); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1456-57 (1990) (arguing that a listener may be more skeptical of a claim made by a business corporation than by an objective observer).
    • (1990) Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech
    • Redish, M.H.1
  • 184
    • 1542662175 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56-57. "A sign advocating 'Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom window . . . ." Id. at 56.
  • 185
    • 1542662174 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18 ("Certainly there are voters . . . who would be as interested in hearing appellants' views on a graduated tax as the views of media corporations that might be less knowledgeable on the subject."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "corporations . . . [may] have unique views of vital importance to the electorate" that should not be muted); cf. Redish, supra note 164, at 1456-57 (describing different, more skeptical reactions to a statement when coming from a business corporation).
  • 186
    • 1542557204 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that listeners will consider the corporate source of the message and might find it uncongenial).
  • 187
    • 1542767516 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 305-354 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 305-354 and accompanying text.
  • 188
    • 1542557206 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
    • New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
  • 189
    • 1542662269 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Baker, supra note 164, at 73; Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739; see also id. at 740 (calling the First Amendment the "guarantee of individual freedom to speak"). But see Meiklejohn, supra note 85, at 255 ("The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.'").
  • 190
    • 1542452646 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739
    • See Bezanson, supra note 13, at 739.
  • 191
    • 1542662170 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Baker, supra note 164, at 73 ("[W]ithout speakers, listeners' autonomy is irrelevant. . . . [T]he listener's desire to hear something seldom gives her the right to hear it unless some speaker has both the right (or bureaucratically defined duty) and desire to talk."); id. at 78 (arguing that "listener autonomy offers very little protection without prior invocation of speaker autonomy"); Brudney, supra note 149, at 68 ("If there exists a right to hear, it is only the right to hear what others can and wish to say."); id. at 72-73 (arguing that where no speaker exists, "the audience has lost nothing to which it is entitled"); Brudney, supra note 6, at 247 (arguing that the listener's interests are not independent of the speaker's ability and desire to speak).
  • 192
    • 1542662168 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See supra note 43 and accompanying text; cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (recognizing a First Amendment right against governmentally-compelled speech); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34, 642 (1943) (holding a compulsory flag salute unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
  • 193
    • 1542767515 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
  • 194
    • 1542662169 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Baker, supra note 164, at 78 (citations omitted)
    • Baker, supra note 164, at 78 (citations omitted).
  • 195
    • 1542662172 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (stating that decisions about what expressions to make, hear, or adopt rest with each individual), aff'd after remand, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (upholding flag burning as protected speech, because although national unity is a proper official end, the government may not achieve this end by arresting those who express disagreement); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (rejecting the "outrageousness" standard as the boundary of actionable political speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric.").
  • 196
    • 1542767523 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Redish, supra note 164, at 1435 (discussing the "epistemological humility" concept); Redish & Lippman, supra note 26, at 281 (connecting the Court's prohibition of viewpoint regulation with the construct of epistemological humility).
  • 197
    • 1542452719 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • BAKER, supra note 13, at 55
    • BAKER, supra note 13, at 55.
  • 198
    • 1542452725 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Baker, supra note 164, at 78-79
    • See Baker, supra note 164, at 78-79.
  • 199
    • 1542557278 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
  • 200
    • 1542452723 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Blasi, supra note 79, at 527
    • See Blasi, supra note 79, at 527.
  • 201
    • 1542557209 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.").
  • 202
    • 1542557210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Blasi, supra note 79, at 527
    • Blasi, supra note 79, at 527.
  • 203
    • 1542557208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 204
    • 1542662178 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 541
    • Id. at 541.
  • 206
    • 1542662181 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfleld ed., 2d ed. 1966)
    • THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfleld ed., 2d ed. 1966).
  • 207
    • 1542452651 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id
    • Id.
  • 208
    • 1542452647 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 462
    • See Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 462.
  • 209
    • 1542662183 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Compare Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 476 (arguing that separation of powers must operate before one branch has acquired an undue amount of power), with Blasi, supra note 79, at 541 (calling for "well-organized, well-financed, professional critics to serve as a counterforce . . . to pass judgment on the actions of government").
  • 210
    • 1542662207 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • For a detailed critique of Professor Blasi's explication of the checking function, see REDISH, supra note 86, at 41-45.
  • 211
    • 1542767532 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Blasi, supra note 79, at 538
    • Blasi, supra note 79, at 538.
  • 212
    • 1542662208 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 173
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 173.
  • 213
    • 84865902681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161; see also id. (stating that checking institutions must be "establishment organizations," with "high claims to legitimacy in the public mind")
    • YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161; see also id. (stating that checking institutions must be "establishment organizations," with "high claims to legitimacy in the public mind").
  • 214
    • 1542767530 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Blasi, supra note 79, at 541
    • Blasi, supra note 79, at 541.
  • 215
    • 84865902680 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161; Shelledy, supra note 6, at 573 (arguing that the "existence of distinct corporate views and the ability of corporations to compete with government and press for public attention support the conclusion that corporate speech can enrich public debate")
    • See YUDOF, supra note 149, at 161; Shelledy, supra note 6, at 573 (arguing that the "existence of distinct corporate views and the ability of corporations to compete with government and press for public attention support the conclusion that corporate speech can enrich public debate").
  • 216
    • 1542767527 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 133; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693-94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting larger passage of de Tocqueville's argument)
    • TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 132, at 133; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693-94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting larger passage of de Tocqueville's argument).
  • 217
    • 84865892969 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Shelledy, supra note 6, at 571 ("[C]ompetition among three loud voices will provide a more diverse discourse than a debate dominated by two . . . ."); cf. Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 463 (describing the separation of powers in which each of the three branches possesses the tools to restrict the other two in a prophylactic manner)
    • See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 571 ("[C]ompetition among three loud voices will provide a more diverse discourse than a debate dominated by two . . . ."); cf. Redish & Cisar, supra note 186, at 463 (describing the separation of powers in which each of the three branches possesses the tools to restrict the other two in a prophylactic manner).
  • 218
    • 1542557199 scopus 로고
    • 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 585
    • See BAKER, supra note 13, at 231-33 ("[T]he role of the press in exposing abuses of power is likely to be central . . . ."); Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 585 (1979) (arguing that the ability to be an independent check on government is "unique to the press"); id. at 592 ("[T]he press is the only institution that can serve on a continuing basis as an open eye of the public . . . ."); Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 735 (1977) (asserting that the press is a "check on government that no other institution could provide").
    • (1979) The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press
    • Abrams, F.1
  • 219
    • 1542662167 scopus 로고
    • 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 735
    • See BAKER, supra note 13, at 231-33 ("[T]he role of the press in exposing abuses of power is likely to be central . . . ."); Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 585 (1979) (arguing that the ability to be an independent check on government is "unique to the press"); id. at 592 ("[T]he press is the only institution that can serve on a continuing basis as an open eye of the public . . . ."); Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 735 (1977) (asserting that the press is a "check on government that no other institution could provide").
    • (1977) The New Free Press Guarantee
    • Bezanson, R.P.1
  • 220
    • 1542767529 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782-83 (1978); see also Abrams, supra note 199, at 587 (arguing that recognizing the press's unique role and status is not inconsistent with granting broad First Amendment protections to others)
    • First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782-83 (1978); see also Abrams, supra note 199, at 587 (arguing that recognizing the press's unique role and status is not inconsistent with granting broad First Amendment protections to others).
  • 221
    • 1542452673 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18.
  • 223
    • 1542452722 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • YUDOF, supra note 149, at 37
    • YUDOF, supra note 149, at 37.
  • 224
    • 1542557201 scopus 로고
    • 69 IND. L.J. 689, 708-09
    • See Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 708-09 (1994) (noting that during the first month of the war's coverage, Nightline failed to feature any guest who opposed the government's actions). Political scientist Benjamin Page has documented this charge. His empirical study demonstrates that the actual level of opposition to the war was never accurately reflected in either news or editorial coverage. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES?: MASS MEDIA IN MODERN DEMOCRACY 26-37 (1996).
    • (1994) The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle
    • Shiffrin, S.1
  • 225
    • 0003491190 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 708-09 (1994) (noting that during the first month of the war's coverage, Nightline failed to feature any guest who opposed the government's actions). Political scientist Benjamin Page has documented this charge. His empirical study demonstrates that the actual level of opposition to the war was never accurately reflected in either news or editorial coverage. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES?: MASS MEDIA IN MODERN DEMOCRACY 26-37 (1996).
    • (1996) Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy , pp. 26-37
    • Page, B.I.1
  • 227
    • 84865892970 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • YUDOF, supra note 149, at 164 ("[I]t is incumbent upon the courts to cultivate the ability of all institutions to counter government and one another.")
    • Cf. YUDOF, supra note 149, at 164 ("[I]t is incumbent upon the courts to cultivate the ability of all institutions to counter government and one another.").
  • 228
    • 1542662184 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4
    • See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (allowing defendants to challenge improper custodial interrogation procedures as violative of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Another example is the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4 (stating that, in arguing a statute's overbreadth, "claimant is asserting his own right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law, though naturally the claim is not one which depends on the privileged character of his own conduct" (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    • Overbreadth
    • Monaghan, H.P.1
  • 229
    • 1542452671 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (allowing, but rejecting on the merits, a corporation's challenge to the 1964 Civil Rights Act on Commerce Clause grounds)
    • See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (allowing, but rejecting on the merits, a corporation's challenge to the 1964 Civil Rights Act on Commerce Clause grounds).
  • 230
    • 1542767550 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (allowing a corporation to present a procedural due process challenge to the fixing of maximum rates chargeable without an independent judicial determination)
    • See, e.g., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920) (allowing a corporation to present a procedural due process challenge to the fixing of maximum rates chargeable without an independent judicial determination).
  • 231
    • 1542557277 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (recognizing a right to possess obscene materials in the home)
    • Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (recognizing a right to possess obscene materials in the home).
  • 232
    • 84865888251 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • REDISH, supra note 86, at 47; Strauss, supra note 154, at 355-56; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515-16 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the First Amendment rejects any attempt to keep people "ignorant in order to manipulate their choices")
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 47; Strauss, supra note 154, at 355-56; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515-16 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the First Amendment rejects any attempt to keep people "ignorant in order to manipulate their choices").
  • 233
    • 84865892966 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-36 (1992) (striking down a law that allowed higher permit fees for speech likely to arouse public hostility); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (placing the burden on unwilling listeners to "avert[] their eyes" to avoid objectionable or offensive speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe . . . ."); Stone, supra note 110, at 214-15 & n.98 (citing cases in arguing that the First Amendment does not permit government to prohibit unpopular views)
    • Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-36 (1992) (striking down a law that allowed higher permit fees for speech likely to arouse public hostility); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (placing the burden on unwilling listeners to "avert[] their eyes" to avoid objectionable or offensive speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe . . . ."); Stone, supra note 110, at 214-15 & n.98 (citing cases in arguing that the First Amendment does not permit government to prohibit unpopular views).
  • 235
    • 84865902677 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) ("The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.")
    • Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) ("The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.").
  • 236
    • 1542557232 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
    • Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
  • 237
    • 84865902678 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60; see also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (expressing concern over the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth")
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60; see also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (expressing concern over the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth").
  • 238
    • 1542452698 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 21
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 661; see also Paul S. Edwards, Defining Political Corruption: The Supreme Court's Role, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 21 (1996) (arguing that the Austin Court's view of corruption may be understood as reflecting a Rawlsian view of political equality according to which corporations should not be permitted to control the course of public debate).
    • (1996) Defining Political Corruption: The Supreme Court's Role
    • Edwards, P.S.1
  • 239
    • 1542767598 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Austin, 494 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that insulating voters from access to ideas is incompatible with the First Amendment); see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 113 (arguing that decreasing the flow of available information undermines important First Amendment values)
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that insulating voters from access to ideas is incompatible with the First Amendment); see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 113 (arguing that decreasing the flow of available information undermines important First Amendment values).
  • 240
    • 1542452675 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
    • Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
  • 242
    • 1542767528 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 283
    • L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 283; see also id. (illustrating that unpopular "mass speech" reaches a wider audience and thus is potentially more effective than unpopular speech on a soapbox).
    • Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment
    • Powe Jr., L.A.1
  • 243
    • 1542452721 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strauss, supra note 154, at 334
    • See Strauss, supra note 154, at 334.
  • 244
    • 84865892967 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • id.; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it . . . .")
    • See id.; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it . . . .").
  • 245
    • 1542557234 scopus 로고
    • 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 519
    • David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 519 (1988); see also id. at 542-43 (discussing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the idea that the First Amendment "outlaws a paternalist[ic] approach to the messages a person may receive"); Stone, supra note 110, at 212 ("The Court has long embraced an 'antipaternalistic' understanding of the first amendment."). This anti-paternalism concept is clearest in the Court's commercial speech cases. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996) (rejecting a restriction on liquor price advertising designed to "keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good"); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (searching for an "alternative to this highly paternalistic approach" of banning advertisements). For a discussion of the paternalistic and antipaternalistic strains in commercial speech, see Redish, supra note 213, at 611-12 (discussing commercial speech decisions upholding an antipaternalistic view of the First Amendment).
    • (1988) Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism
    • Shapiro, D.L.1
  • 246
    • 84865889434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strauss, supra note 154, at 335; see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 47 (arguing that because the government may not determine what life-affecting decisions an individual can make, it cannot suppress the information on which those decisions are based); Stone, supra note 110, at 213 ("The point, rather, is that the government ordinarily may not restrict the expression of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information because it does not trust its citizens to make wise or desirable decisions . . . .")
    • Strauss, supra note 154, at 335; see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 47 (arguing that because the government may not determine what life-affecting decisions an individual can make, it cannot suppress the information on which those decisions are based); Stone, supra note 110, at 213 ("The point, rather, is that the government ordinarily may not restrict the expression of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information because it does not trust its citizens to make wise or desirable decisions . . . .").
  • 247
    • 1542662210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Redish, supra note 213, at 636
    • Redish, supra note 213, at 636.
  • 248
    • 1542662209 scopus 로고
    • 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 949
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (restricting corporate speech because "the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas" (citation omitted)); see also Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935, 949 (1993) (suggesting that "resources have more explanatory power than truth in determining which propositions a population will accept and which it will reject"); Wright, supra note 162, at 638 (stating that government regulation is necessary "so that the wealthiest voices may not dominate the debate by the strength of their dollars rather than their ideas").
    • (1993) The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle
    • Schauer, F.1
  • 249
    • 0347645925 scopus 로고
    • 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412
    • See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412 (1986) (noting that opportunities for speech are "limited . . . by our capacity to digest or process information"); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575-76 (arguing that "selective reception of messages" limits the amount of information that individuals can process, thus enabling the wealthy advocate's views to exert greater influence).
    • (1986) Free Speech and Social Structure
    • Fiss, O.M.1
  • 250
    • 1542662215 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
  • 251
    • 1542557237 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that speech is effective only to the extent it strikes someone as true)
    • Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that speech is effective only to the extent it strikes someone as true).
  • 252
    • 1542452718 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
  • 253
    • 1542557230 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
  • 254
    • 0013530546 scopus 로고
    • 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550
    • Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 (1988) ("[I]n their capacity as political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their private interest . . . .").
    • (1988) Beyond the Republican Revival
    • Sunstein, C.R.1
  • 255
    • 1542557235 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 1564-65
    • See id. at 1564-65.
  • 256
    • 1542662216 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (arguing that, although relevant for tort liability, motive is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes).
  • 257
    • 1542662219 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Redish, supra note 164, at 1456-57; supra notes 163-163 and accompanying text; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that corporate advocacy's effectiveness is impacted by considering the "invariably self-interested and probably uncongenial source").
  • 258
    • 1542557238 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 92 and accompanying text
    • See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
  • 259
    • 1542767551 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury . . . ."). Other constitutional requirements are that the injury be "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct" and that judicial relief likely will redress the injury. See id. at 751.
  • 260
    • 1542662217 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464; 472 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • 261
    • 0005400482 scopus 로고
    • 2d ed.
    • See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56 (2d ed. 1994); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions"). Compare Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 309 (1979) (expressing concern for existence of the "ideological plaintiff"), with Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1708-09 (1980) (suggesting a rule that grants standing to those who are part of an "institution with a continuing concern for the relevant substantive law"). Note, however, that even under Dean Tushnet's more relaxed standing rule, some personal interest for some issue or area of the law remains necessary.
    • (1994) Federal Jurisdiction , pp. 56
    • Chemerinsky, E.1
  • 262
    • 84865890704 scopus 로고
    • 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 309
    • See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56 (2d ed. 1994); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions"). Compare Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 309 (1979) (expressing concern for existence of the "ideological plaintiff"), with Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1708-09 (1980) (suggesting a rule that grants standing to those who are part of an "institution with a continuing concern for the relevant substantive law"). Note, however, that even under Dean Tushnet's more relaxed standing rule, some personal interest for some issue or area of the law remains necessary.
    • (1979) The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement
    • Brilmayer, L.1
  • 263
    • 1542557236 scopus 로고
    • 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1708-09
    • See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56 (2d ed. 1994); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions"). Compare Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 309 (1979) (expressing concern for existence of the "ideological plaintiff"), with Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1708-09 (1980) (suggesting a rule that grants standing to those who are part of an "institution with a continuing concern for the relevant substantive law"). Note, however, that even under Dean Tushnet's more relaxed standing rule, some personal interest for some issue or area of the law remains necessary.
    • (1980) The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer
    • Tushnet, M.V.1
  • 264
    • 1542557233 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978)
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978).
  • 265
    • 1542662214 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 108-09 (discussing the argument that shareholders are forced to contribute to the expression of views they do not hold); Brudney, supra note 6, at 247 ("A's right to receive information does not require the state to permit B to steal from C the funds that alone will enable B to make the communication."); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("State surely has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not wish to contribute to the [corporation's] political message."); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the overriding governmental interest in "assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree").
  • 266
    • 1542452677 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra note 273 and accompanying text
    • See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
  • 267
    • 1542767552 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120 (1991) (rejecting selective application of state's compelling interest); infra notes 275-275 and accompanying text.
  • 268
    • 1542452670 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 173 and accompanying text
    • See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
  • 269
    • 1542452713 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 238; see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 814 (White, J., dissenting) ("States have always been free to adopt measures designed to further rights protected by the Constitution even when not compelled to do so."); id. at 813-14 (discussing cases protecting individuals from forced speech).
  • 270
    • 1542767553 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 242 and accompanying text
    • See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
  • 271
    • 1542767600 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 670 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for protecting shareholders if the issue does not materially affect business of the corporation).
  • 272
    • 1542662252 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986); see also supra notes 58-58 and accompanying text.
  • 273
    • 1542452715 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • MCFL, 479 U.S. at 260-61
    • MCFL, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
  • 274
    • 1542662213 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 263
    • Id. at 263.
  • 275
    • 1542557241 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See id. at 263-64 (describing three features of such political organizations); see also BAKER, supra note 13, at 220 (arguing that modern corporations are not oriented towards "associative value goals"); Bezanson, supra note 13, at 778-81 (distinguishing types of organizations based on the degree of connection between its members and the corporate statements); Brudney, supra note 149, at 74 (distinguishing business corporations from other voluntary associations); Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1248 (distinguishing the type of speech rights held by business corporations as opposed to other organizations).
  • 276
    • 1542767554 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1365-66 (describing the "associational rationale" for protecting some corporate speech); see also Brudney, supra note 149, at 75 (describing individuals who join organizations in order to support their advocacy activities).
  • 277
    • 1542767555 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-42 (explaining the corporate purpose)
    • See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-42 (explaining the corporate purpose).
  • 278
    • 1542662244 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Cf. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 & n.3 (1997) (providing an example that fruit growers share the same basic aim as government-controlled advertising campaign - namely, increasing sales - even though they might differ over specific strategies as to how to accomplish that goal).
  • 279
    • 1542557239 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 239; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 687 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Would it be any more upsetting to a shareholder of General Motors that it endorsed the election of Henry Wallace (to stay comfortably in the past) than it would be to a member of the [ACLU] that it endorsed the election of George Wallace?"). But see Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1249 (arguing that members maintain affiliation with expressive organizations precisely because of the communicative activity and despite potential disparity between the organization's views and the individual's views on some issues).
  • 280
    • 1542662221 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down an ordinance banning racially motivated hate speech).
  • 281
    • 1542767557 scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LANDMARK R.A.V. CASE 96 (1994) (describing People for the American Way's positions supporting the hate speech ordinance but opposing efforts to ban violent rap songs); see also id. at 199-200 (discussing the positions of the ACLU, which had defended the Nazis' right to march in Skokie, Illinois: lukewarm opposition to the hate speech ordinance and support for sentence enhancement for racially motivated crimes).
    • (1994) Beyond the Burning Cross: The First Amendment and the Landmark R.A.V. Case , pp. 96
    • Cleary, E.J.1
  • 282
    • 1542767558 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Friedman & Goldston, supra note 144, at 44; see also supra 131-150 and accompanying text.
  • 283
    • 1542767559 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Brudney, supra note 149, at 58-60 (discussing the need to protect individual shareholders).
  • 284
    • 1542767592 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 268; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (noting a state interest in ensuring that "citizens are not forced to choose between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up investment opportunities").
  • 285
    • 1542662248 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (requiring that expenditures for political expression be financed from dues "paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas"); Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972) (holding that political funds must be separate from union dues and must indicate their political purpose); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961) (denying unions, "over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes").
  • 286
    • 1542452716 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Abood, 431 U.S. at 212 (requiring union-shop and "service charge" by nonmembers); Street, 367 U.S. at 746-47 (providing an example of federal law permitting union-shop agreements).
  • 287
    • 1542662247 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260 (1986) (distinguishing union cases from corporations); Cohen, supra note 111, at 33 ("Individuals are increasingly dependent upon memberships and participation in organizations such as labor unions . . . to practice their trades . . . .").
  • 288
    • 1542662249 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 111, at 65; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 687 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that selling stock "does not ordinarily involve the severe psychic trauma or economic disaster that Justice Brennan's opinion suggests").
  • 289
    • 1542557272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 111, at 65-66; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("General Motors, after all, will risk a stockholder suit if it makes a political endorsement that is not plausibly tied to its ability to make money for its shareholders.").
  • 290
    • 1542662246 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 n.34 (1978); cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that "[o]ne need not become a member of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce or the Sierra Club in order to earn a living").
  • 291
    • 1542767590 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Brudney, supra note 6, at 270 ("[T]he freedom to refrain from working is not equally as exercisable as the freedom to refrain from investing . . . .").
  • 292
    • 1542662242 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • But see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that employees in the union cases were free to seek other employment); Brudney, supra note 6, at 270 (arguing that the "freedom of investors to go elsewhere would be costly, if not wholly illusory").
  • 293
    • 1542452679 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 108-09
    • See DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 108-09.
  • 294
    • 1542662220 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 109
    • See id. at 109.
  • 295
    • 1542557242 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Obviously an individual is free to reach a private agreement with the businessman stating that the businessman not use the loan for his fascist speech. Likewise, one can employ private shareholder agreements to restrict the corporation's speech. Neither implicates the First Amendment because the government does not compel the restriction. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 111, at 65 (arguing that such private contracts restricting corporate speech "do not raise significant First Amendment concerns").
  • 296
    • 84865892962 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686-87 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[M]anagement may take any action that is ultimately in accord with what the majority . . . of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a profit."); cf. Fred D. Baldwin, Conflicting Interests 3-4 (1984) (discussing corporate governance reform and the controversy surrounding the "proper relation between private business interests and other social concerns")
    • Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686-87 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[M]anagement may take any action that is ultimately in accord with what the majority . . . of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a profit."); cf. Fred D. Baldwin, Conflicting Interests 3-4 (1984) (discussing corporate governance reform and the controversy surrounding the "proper relation between private business interests and other social concerns").
  • 297
    • 1542662222 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 111, at 59-60
    • See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 111, at 59-60.
  • 298
    • 84865902670 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The Court invalidated New York's "Son of Sam" law, which required anyone convicted of a crime to surrender to the state, and then to the victim or victim's family, any income earned from books relating to the crime. See id. at 123
    • 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The Court invalidated New York's "Son of Sam" law, which required anyone convicted of a crime to surrender to the state, and then to the victim or victim's family, any income earned from books relating to the crime. See id. at 123.
  • 299
    • 84865902671 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 116 (classifying law as "content-based")
    • See id. at 116 (classifying law as "content-based").
  • 300
    • 1542767564 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The weaker version, from the majority opinion, is that such a direct burden is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring of the law. See id. at 120-21. The majority opinion recognized a compelling state interest in compensating crime victims but held that the statute was not narrowly tailored as required by strict scrutiny. See id. at 120-23
    • See id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The weaker version, from the majority opinion, is that such a direct burden is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring of the law. See id. at 120-21. The majority opinion recognized a compelling state interest in compensating crime victims but held that the statute was not narrowly tailored as required by strict scrutiny. See id. at 120-23.
  • 301
    • 1542662223 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 812 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Brudney, supra note 6, at 256-57 (discussing how political science and economic theory justify state interest as compelling)
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 812 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Brudney, supra note 6, at 256-57 (discussing how political science and economic theory justify state interest as compelling).
  • 302
    • 84865902673 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95 n.34 (stating that no one has explained "why the dissenting shareholder's wishes are entitled to such greater solicitude in this context than in many others where equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made")
    • See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95 n.34 (stating that no one has explained "why the dissenting shareholder's wishes are entitled to such greater solicitude in this context than in many others where equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made").
  • 303
    • 1542767565 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 173 and accompanying text
    • See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
  • 304
    • 1542662245 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
  • 305
    • 1542557269 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 676-77 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Neuborne, supra note 160, at 31 (noting that there is no metric to determine who wins when the interests of speaker and listener diverge)
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 676-77 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Neuborne, supra note 160, at 31 (noting that there is no metric to determine who wins when the interests of speaker and listener diverge).
  • 306
    • 84865902674 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 42 ("The doctrine that a corporation is a constitutional person meant that the corporation's directors or managers had the power to assert the corporation's constitutional claims. The far less cited corollary was that the shareholders lacked standing to assert these rights.")
    • See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 42 ("The doctrine that a corporation is a constitutional person meant that the corporation's directors or managers had the power to assert the corporation's constitutional claims. The far less cited corollary was that the shareholders lacked standing to assert these rights.").
  • 307
    • 1542703731 scopus 로고
    • See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL ' 1.01 (1991) (discussing the distinction between the corporate entity and individual shareholders for purposes of liability).
    • (1991) Piercing the Corporate Veil ' 1.01
    • Presser, S.B.1
  • 308
    • 1542557244 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
  • 309
    • 84865888244 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Court, in fact, recently has construed broadly the "common view" concept. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1997)
    • The Court, in fact, recently has construed broadly the "common view" concept. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1997).
  • 310
    • 84865892961 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 n.34 (1978) (expressing concern that the majority will be completely silenced because a "hypothetical minority might object")
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 n.34 (1978) (expressing concern that the majority will be completely silenced because a "hypothetical minority might object").
  • 311
    • 1542452683 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 794
    • See id. at 794.
  • 312
    • 1542662225 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 240 (1977)
    • See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 240 (1977).
  • 313
    • 84865889432 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Brudney, supra note 6, at 271 (discussing "least restrictive means" of furthering compelling state interest). But see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that such a refund system is unworkable for corporations and does not solve the problem of investors who are deterred from investing)
    • See Brudney, supra note 6, at 271 (discussing "least restrictive means" of furthering compelling state interest). But see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 818 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that such a refund system is unworkable for corporations and does not solve the problem of investors who are deterred from investing).
  • 314
    • 1542557245 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (holding that the law is narrowly tailored because it eliminates distortion of wealth while allowing corporate views to be expressed); id. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the law is not an "across-the-board prohibition on political participation by corporations"); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 238 (distinguishing the "mere segregation requirement" of Austin from the "flat ban" of Bellotti); Brudney, supra note 6, at 272 (suggesting a segregated fund as an acceptable alternative); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 577 (arguing in favor of restrictions that "leave some outlet for corporate points of view," as did the segregated fund in Austin). 292 See SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 236-37; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 681 n.* (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Just as political speech by [John D. Rockefeller's] association is not speech by John D. Rockefeller, so also speech by a corporate PAC . . . is not speech by the corporation itself."); BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 111, at 63-64 ("[P]olitical speech by managers of publicly held firms can generally be considered the expression of the individual managers from whom the speech originates . . . .").
  • 315
    • 84865892958 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 108 (arguing that individuals cannot produce speech that is "irreducibly 'corporate' in nature")
    • See Austin, 494 U.S. at 709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 108 (arguing that individuals cannot produce speech that is "irreducibly 'corporate' in nature").
  • 316
    • 1542557246 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • According to Hurst, Corporation law early favored business arrangements which centralized decision making, gave it considerable assurance of tenure, and armed it for vigorous maneuver. Shareholder decisions, it was soon established, should normally be by simple majority. Active management should be concentrated in a board of directors; stockholders did not have owners' rights over the particular assets of a going corporate enterprise; unless exhibiting gross abuse of power or breach of faith, directors' decisions governed the regular course of the business. [Furthermore, corporate law] favored strong central direction of pooled assets; capacity for indefinite life, uninterrupted by change of shareholders . . . . A board of directors must do its business as a body, not as individuals. HURST, supra note 101, at 25.
  • 317
    • 84865889427 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 243-44; see also O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1362 (arguing that the corporation must assert its rights "in connection with a form of expression that is a part of the corporation's business")
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 243-44; see also O'Kelley, supra note 6, at 1362 (arguing that the corporation must assert its rights "in connection with a form of expression that is a part of the corporation's business").
  • 318
    • 84865892959 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Brudney, supra note 6, at 254; see also BALDWIN, supra note 273, at 112 (discussing a different suggestion for a unanimity requirement). Note, of course, that this would virtually halt all corporate operations because any individual or group could purchase a veto in the form of one share of stock. See id. at 112; Brudney, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that a unanimous shareholder requirement for corporate political speech "would effectively prohibit political speech by the corporation")
    • See Brudney, supra note 6, at 254; see also BALDWIN, supra note 273, at 112 (discussing a different suggestion for a unanimity requirement). Note, of course, that this would virtually halt all corporate operations because any individual or group could purchase a veto in the form of one share of stock. See id. at 112; Brudney, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that a unanimous shareholder requirement for corporate political speech "would effectively prohibit political speech by the corporation").
  • 319
    • 1542452686 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 254
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 254.
  • 320
    • 1542452685 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
  • 321
    • 1542452684 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding law prohibiting burning of draft cards)
    • 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding law prohibiting burning of draft cards).
  • 322
    • 84865889428 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 376-77. The Court reasoned that [G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377. Professor Stone refers to this as a "no gratuitous inhibition approach." Stone, supra note 110, at 190-91 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted)
    • See id. at 376-77. The Court reasoned that [G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377. Professor Stone refers to this as a "no gratuitous inhibition approach." Stone, supra note 110, at 190-91 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • 323
    • 84865892960 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • But see REDISH, supra note 86, at 100-01 (describing O'Brien as the "most troubling illustration of the Court's modern approach to content-neutral restrictions"). The Court has continued to employ the O'Brien test. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1183 (1997) (upholding "must-carry provisions" under the intermediate scrutiny standard announced in O'Brien); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding a public indecency statute valid under O'Brien, "despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity"); id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the plurality opinion's use of the O'Brien test to determine the required degree of First Amendment protection)
    • But see REDISH, supra note 86, at 100-01 (describing O'Brien as the "most troubling illustration of the Court's modern approach to content-neutral restrictions"). The Court has continued to employ the O'Brien test. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1183 (1997) (upholding "must-carry provisions" under the intermediate scrutiny standard announced in O'Brien); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding a public indecency statute valid under O'Brien, "despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity"); id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the plurality opinion's use of the O'Brien test to determine the required degree of First Amendment protection).
  • 324
    • 1542662228 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 244
    • Brudney, supra note 6, at 244.
  • 325
    • 84865889429 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 785 (rejecting legislature's requirement that corporation "stick to business")
    • See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 785 (rejecting legislature's requirement that corporation "stick to business").
  • 326
    • 1542662229 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
  • 327
    • 84865902666 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1245-46 (criticizing the Bellotti Court for rejecting the concern that "corporate wealth and power may be used to 'drown out other points of view'" (citation omitted)); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575 ("[W]ealth gives some advocates exposure to more voters and thereby gives them an opportunity to persuade a larger part of the electorate . . . as a result of selective reception of messages . . . ."); Wright, supra note 162, at 637 ("Unchecked political expenditures . . . may drown opposing beliefs . . . .")
    • See Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1245-46 (criticizing the Bellotti Court for rejecting the concern that "corporate wealth and power may be used to 'drown out other points of view'" (citation omitted)); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575 ("[W]ealth gives some advocates exposure to more voters and thereby gives them an opportunity to persuade a larger part of the electorate . . . as a result of selective reception of messages . . . ."); Wright, supra note 162, at 637 ("Unchecked political expenditures . . . may drown opposing beliefs . . . .").
  • 328
    • 84865892954 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Wright, supra note 162, at 637 ("Limiting the amount that wealthy interests may spend to publicize their views enhances the self-expression of individual citizens . . . furthering the values of freedom of speech.")
    • See Wright, supra note 162, at 637 ("Limiting the amount that wealthy interests may spend to publicize their views enhances the self-expression of individual citizens . . . furthering the values of freedom of speech.").
  • 329
    • 84865888243 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 237 ("proportional leveling"); Powe, supra note 221, at 267 ("enhancement")
    • SMOLLA, supra note 164, at 237 ("proportional leveling"); Powe, supra note 221, at 267 ("enhancement").
  • 330
    • 84865892956 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause's dictate of "one person, one vote")
    • Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause's dictate of "one person, one vote").
  • 331
    • 1542452688 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Wright, supra note 162, at 610, 642
    • See Wright, supra note 162, at 610, 642.
  • 332
    • 1542662232 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Sunstein, supra note 233, at 1552
    • Sunstein, supra note 233, at 1552.
  • 334
    • 1542452690 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)
    • Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
  • 335
    • 1542452691 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Redish & Lippman, supra note 26, at 282 (classifying viewpoint regulation as "inherently boundless").
  • 336
    • 1542557248 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • A governmentally provided right of access conceivably could give rise to problems of compelled speech. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
  • 337
    • 1542557249 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Perhaps one could argue that a speaker's prior success and public notoriety - no matter how unrelated to her expression's subject - conceivably might provide a listener with a distinct rational basis for giving that speaker's expression greater weight. Even if one were to accept such reasoning, one could fashion a similar argument about wealth's advantages: the very fact that the speaker has had the ingenuity to access or retain such financial resources arguably may provide greater legitimacy to the speech, at least in certain recipients' minds.
  • 338
    • 1542452692 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally §§ 26 U.S.C. 2001, 2010 (1994) (establishing rules for taxes and tax credits on estates).
  • 339
    • 84865889421 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. § 501 (exempting certain corporations from taxation)
    • See id. § 501 (exempting certain corporations from taxation).
  • 340
    • 1542662230 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
  • 341
    • 1542452693 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
  • 342
    • 1542767571 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); see FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (arguing that resources make a corporation formidable "even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas"). For a discussion of the invalidity of reducing speech to be proportionate with its popular support, see supra notes 210-220 and accompanying text.
  • 343
    • 1542767573 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Wright, supra note 162, at 631; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 660-61 ("Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections . . . and present[s] the potential for distorting the political process."); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 ("Th[e] concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 239 (arguing that equality of speech is a legitimate goal, but the state should not be selective by limiting corporations without limiting the speech of others); id. at 235 (arguing that restricting corporate speech alone cannot achieve political equality).
  • 344
    • 1542557253 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 20-21 (arguing for a theory of the First Amendment based on the ideal of "deliberative democracy," including a commitment to equality and diversity of views); Wright, supra note 162, at 636 ("[T]he truth-producing capacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if some are allowed to monopolize the marketplace by wielding excessive financial resources.").
  • 345
    • 1542557254 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)
    • 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
  • 346
    • 1542662243 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 238 (suggesting it is improper to restrict only the speech of wealthy corporations but not of wealthy individuals).
  • 347
    • 1542452696 scopus 로고
    • First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1280
    • See Powe, supra note 221, at 275 (noting the privilege of wealth in purchasing more of a consumption item - media advertisements); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1280 (1986) (arguing that the power to purchase access to the media is "not a fair test of either an argument's truth or its innate popular appeal" (citation omitted)); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575 ("[W]ealth gives some advocates exposure to more voters . . . ."); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1976) (arguing that money is merely the idea's intensity, not the idea itself); id. at 1019 n.70 ("[J]ust as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so the volume of dollars may be limited, without violating the First Amendment.").
    • (1986) Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment
    • Schneider, C.E.1
  • 348
    • 1542767567 scopus 로고
    • 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1019
    • See Powe, supra note 221, at 275 (noting the privilege of wealth in purchasing more of a consumption item - media advertisements); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1280 (1986) (arguing that the power to purchase access to the media is "not a fair test of either an argument's truth or its innate popular appeal" (citation omitted)); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575 ("[W]ealth gives some advocates exposure to more voters . . . ."); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1976) (arguing that money is merely the idea's intensity, not the idea itself); id. at 1019 n.70 ("[J]ust as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so the volume of dollars may be limited, without violating the First Amendment.").
    • (1976) Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?
    • Skelly Wright, J.1
  • 349
    • 1542557251 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Bezanson, supra note 13, at 778 ("[D]ominant economic power has at best an uncertain relationship to persuasion of the electorate through advertisements . . . ."); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574 ("[I]t is not so readily apparent how a corporation's advocacy could exert an influence on elections that exceeds public support for its ideas."); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporate advocacy will be accepted only to the degree that the message strikes voters as true).
  • 350
    • 1542767570 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Wright, supra note 162, at 623
    • Wright, supra note 162, at 623.
  • 351
    • 1542662233 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 623-24
    • See id. at 623-24.
  • 352
    • 1542662227 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 624-25
    • Id. at 624-25.
  • 353
    • 1542557255 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 625
    • Id. at 625.
  • 354
    • 1542452701 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 355
    • 1542767572 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text
    • See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574; supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
  • 356
    • 1542557258 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see also Shelledy, supra note 6, at 574 ("[W]e must generally assume that speech affects voting behavior only when it persuades . . . .").
  • 357
    • 1542767593 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Wright, supra note 162, at 632
    • Wright, supra note 162, at 632.
  • 358
    • 1542662236 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Karst, supra note 311, at 21-23. This theory, based on the Court's decision in Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972), in which the Court struck down a law permitting all picketing except labor picketing outside a school, provides a strong theoretical justification for the First Amendment's content distinction. See REDISH, supra note 86, at 110.
  • 359
    • 1542557268 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Karst, supra note 311, at 29; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (stating that the First Amendment requires "an equality of status in the field of ideas" and that all viewpoints be heard equally (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
  • 360
    • 1542452695 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 311-313 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 311-313 and accompanying text.
  • 361
    • 1542767577 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Karst, supra note 311, at 28
    • Karst, supra note 311, at 28.
  • 362
    • 1542557257 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 35
    • See id. at 35.
  • 363
    • 1542452699 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • FISS, supra note 14, at 15
    • FISS, supra note 14, at 15.
  • 364
    • 1542767587 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 15-16
    • Id. at 15-16.
  • 365
    • 1542452707 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 16
    • Id. at 16.
  • 366
    • 1542767581 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • DAN-COHEN, supra note 14, at 109 (citation omitted); see Dan-Cohen, supra note 149, at 1245-46 (criticizing the Bellotti Court for rejecting this argument); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 576 ("[C]oncentrated wealth may enable corporations to reduce the likelihood that individual voices will be heard . . . ."); Wright, supra note 162, at 625 ("Regardless of their message, [corporations] simply drown out their opponents when they have the wherewithal to outspend them by margins of up to fifty to one."); id. at 637 ("Unchecked political expenditures . . . may drown opposing beliefs . . . .").
  • 367
    • 1542767589 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 311-339 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 311-339 and accompanying text.
  • 368
    • 1542452710 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Powe, supra note 221, at 280 (noting the absence of proof that counterspeech to economically powerful interests' expression will not be forthcoming).
  • 369
    • 1542767591 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 706 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven were we to assume that some record support . . . would make a constitutional difference . . . [t]he majority provides only conjecture."); Shelledy, supra note 6, at 576-77 (requiring record evidence or legislative findings that corporate speech was dominating and therefore impoverishing public debate, and arguing that such evidence was lacking in both Bellotti and Austin). 347 See FISS, supra note 14, at 15 (asserting that "in politics, scarcity is the rule").
  • 370
    • 1542767582 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575
    • See Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575.
  • 371
    • 1542767585 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 372
    • 1542452711 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • These proposals, of course, raise their own First Amendment issues, which are beyond this Article's scope.
  • 373
    • 1542557267 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Shelledy, supra note 6, at 575-76; see also Fiss, supra note 228, at 1412 (noting that opportunities for speech are limited "by our capacity to digest or process information"); Schneider, supra note 325, at 1283 (noting that the Bellotti statute restricted only media advertisements, which present no information at all).
  • 374
    • 1542557265 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 315-315 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 315-315 and accompanying text.
  • 375
    • 1542767583 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 340-347 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 340-347 and accompanying text.
  • 376
    • 1542452708 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text; see also REDISH, supra note 86, at 21-22 (arguing that free speech fosters self-realization by promoting the development of one's "uniquely human faculties" and by facilitating one's ability to make life-affecting decisions); Wright, supra note 325, at 1020 ("The play of ideas, the sifting of good ideas from bad, of truth from falsehood, of justice from injustice - all these are essential parts of our system as well.").
  • 377
    • 1542767584 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Schauer, supra note 227, at 938 (providing an example of alcohol and tobacco industries opposing "encroaching restrictions or outright prohibitions on advertising their products"); Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 689-90 (discussing the conservative position taken by corporations).
  • 378
    • 1542662238 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (plurality opinion)
    • See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (plurality opinion).
  • 379
    • 0346680888 scopus 로고
    • Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment
    • J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383.
    • (1990) DUKE L.J. , vol.375 , pp. 383
    • Balkin, J.M.1
  • 380
    • 1542767576 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 701 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Redish, supra note 164, at 1449-50 (describing a "supposedly politically neutral free speech theory").
  • 381
    • 1542557256 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Balkin, supra note 357, at 384; see Schauer, supra note 227, at 942 (discussing the "noticeable rightward movement in the political center of gravity of free speech argumentation").
  • 382
    • 1542767574 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 689
    • Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 689.
  • 383
    • 1542452697 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See Schauer, supra note 227, at 955 (noting the "affinity between economic libertarians, most of whom vote Republican, and the principle of free speech"); Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 712 (noting that it is "relevant that the [corporate] owners of the press are largely conservative" and that it is natural for their speech "to reflect their general view"); Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 253, 259 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (noting that "nominally independent expenditures are made with a heavy tilt toward the right wing"); see also FISS, supra note 14, at 10-11 (assuming that allowing unlimited speech of economically powerful interests will "impoverish rather than enrich public debate"); LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-21 (expressing concern over the principle of "circularity," i.e., that the very corporate interests that the state is supposed to regulate dominate the political agenda); Wright, supra note 162, at 636 (assuming that the expression of economically powerful interests will be dominated by lies, half-truths, and innuendos). Professor Fiss openly advocates the use of viewpoint-based discrimination to determine the First Amendment's reach when he argues that the "program advanced by Ralph Nader and other consumer advocates might have a First Amendment basis, because in fighting 'agency capture' we might be increasing the independence of the state from the market and thus enhancing its capacity to correct for the constraints that social structure imposes on public debate." FISS, supra note 14, at 44.
  • 384
    • 1542662240 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Tushnet, supra note 361, at 260
    • Tushnet, supra note 361, at 260.
  • 385
    • 1542767579 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 719
    • See Shiffrin, supra note 204, at 719.
  • 386
    • 1542452702 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id
    • Id.
  • 387
    • 84865889419 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See 21 C.F.R. § 897.1-.34 (1997) (establishing regulations applicable to the tobacco industry)
    • See 21 C.F.R. § 897.1-.34 (1997) (establishing regulations applicable to the tobacco industry).
  • 388
    • 1542452706 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-06; supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text
    • See LINDBLOM, supra note 4, at 201-06; supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
  • 389
    • 1542662239 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Wright, supra note 162, at 636; see also Tushnet, supra note 361, at 257 (noting that the First Amendment normally is a vehicle to give power to the powerless).
  • 390
    • 1542557250 scopus 로고
    • Professor Shiffrin has argued that speakers in cases such as United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968), in which an individual burned a draft card to protest the war, and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978), in which comedian George Carlin made obscenity-laced social commentary, are at the center of constitutional protection. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 80-81 (1990).
    • (1990) The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance , pp. 80-81
    • Shiffrin, S.H.1
  • 391
    • 1542662241 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 311-339 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 311-339 and accompanying text.
  • 392
    • 1542452705 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Similar free speech problems inhere in the arguments of civic republican scholars such as Professor Sunstein, although he never singles out corporate speech for special negative treatment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 220, at 239. His theory relies on a belief, however, that "[d]ramatic differences in wealth and power are . . . inconsistent with the underlying premises of a republican polity," Sunstein, supra note 233, at 1552, combined with a general opposition to individuals acting in their private interests, see id. at 1550. Logically, this would eliminate the corporate speaker, which is often powerful and usually motivated by economic self-interest. This theory fails, because of the same problem of viewpoint bias, by suggesting the possibility of an objective common good that overrides individual self-interest. See Redish & Lippman, supra note 26, at 295. If we imagine a candidate with strong anti-corporate views, the result under Professor Sunstein's theory is that those who possess the most powerful incentive to support that candidate may speak in support, but those who oppose him - including corporations whose business might be harmed, a clear example of private interest - cannot voice their opposition.
  • 393
    • 1542452703 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 132-150 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 132-150 and accompanying text.
  • 394
    • 1542557263 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 151-179 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 151-179 and accompanying text.
  • 395
    • 1542557262 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 131, 249-259, 316-316 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 131, 249-259, 316-316 and accompanying text.
  • 396
    • 0347841617 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Government Subsidies and Free Expression
    • This does not mean, it should be emphasized, that in its own expression the government must be neutral among competing philosophies and ideas. See Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 565-66 (1996) (noting the constitutionality of
    • (1996) 80 Minn. L. Rev. , vol.543 , pp. 565-566
    • Redish, M.H.1    Kessler, D.I.2
  • 397
    • 1542452704 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 351-354 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 351-354 and accompanying text.
  • 398
    • 84865889420 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 50 (arguing that the individual needs "all possible information" in making life decisions)
    • See REDISH, supra note 86, at 50 (arguing that the individual needs "all possible information" in making life decisions).
  • 399
    • 1542557260 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 340-354 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 340-354 and accompanying text.
  • 400
    • 1542557261 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Although several commentators have argued that at some point the sum total of available expression could amount to an information overload on the populace, there exists neither empirical support for such a notion nor any workable means for determining whether such a point had ever been reached. See supra notes 345-345 and accompanying text.
  • 401
    • 1542452700 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See supra note 345 and accompanying text. One could say the same for the argument that corporate speech may interfere with the free speech rights of dissenting shareholders. See supra notes 288-288 and accompanying text.
  • 402
    • 1542767580 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982) (holding that a statute may be invalidated as overbroad when it "reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications"); Monaghan, supra note 207, at 4 (describing the overbreadth doctrine as protecting the plaintiffs right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law).
  • 403
    • 1542662237 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 324-324, 355-370 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 324-324, 355-370 and accompanying text.


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