Majoritarian logic

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 13-21

  Buchanan, J M ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dominance; Endogeneity; Majority; Pareto criterion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032349011     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004998431130     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Buchanan, J. M. (1959). Positive economics, welfare economics, and political economy. Journal of Law and Economics 2 (October): 124-138.
2. Buchanan, J. M. (1996a). Foundational concerns: A criticism of public choice theory. In J. Casas Pardo and F. Schneider (eds.), Current issues in public choice, 3-20, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
3. Buchanan, J. M. (1996b). Rule feasibility and rule dominance. Working paper. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.
4. Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
5. Frisch, R. (1959). On welfare theory and Pareto regions. International Economic Papers 9: 39-92.
6. Hennipman, P. (1982). Wicksell and Pareto: Their relationship in the theory of public finance. History of Political Economy 14 (1, Spring): 37-64.
7. Wicksell, K. (1896). Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen. Jena: Fischer.