A collision of principles? Free expression, racial equality and the prohibition of racist speech

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 445-471

  Gross, Kimberly A ^a   Kinder, Donald R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032347143     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123498000349     Document Type: Article

References (108)

1. John Stuart Mill, 'On Liberty', in Three Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951 [1859]), p. 27.
2. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
3. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
4. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
5. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
6. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
7. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
8. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
9. See, for example, Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991); James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989, first published in 1962); Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
10. George E. Marcus, John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse and Sandra L. Wood, With Malice Toward Some (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 3.
11. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, p. xi.
12. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13. Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 1.
14. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, p. 6.
15. For a more detailed presentation of these and related arguments, see, among others, Henry Louis Gates Jr, Anthony P. Griffin, Donald E. Lively, Robert C. Post, William B. Rubenstein and Nadine Strossen, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Kenneth L. Karst, 'Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups', University of Illinois Law Review, 1 (1990), 95-149; Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech; and Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
16. For a more detailed presentation of these and related arguments, see, among others, Henry Louis Gates Jr, Anthony P. Griffin, Donald E. Lively, Robert C. Post, William B. Rubenstein and Nadine Strossen, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Kenneth L. Karst, 'Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups', University of Illinois Law Review, 1 (1990), 95-149; Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech; and Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
17. For a more detailed presentation of these and related arguments, see, among others, Henry Louis Gates Jr, Anthony P. Griffin, Donald E. Lively, Robert C. Post, William B. Rubenstein and Nadine Strossen, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Kenneth L. Karst, 'Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups', University of Illinois Law Review, 1 (1990), 95-149; Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech; and Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
18. For a more detailed presentation of these and related arguments, see, among others, Henry Louis Gates Jr, Anthony P. Griffin, Donald E. Lively, Robert C. Post, William B. Rubenstein and Nadine Strossen, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Kenneth L. Karst, 'Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups', University of Illinois Law Review, 1 (1990), 95-149; Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech; and Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
19. Richard Delgado, 'Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling', in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, Words That Wound, pp. 89-110. For more on the harms of racist speech, see also Mari J. Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story', in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, Words That Wound, pp. 17-50; and the collection of essays edited by Laura Lederer and Richard Delgado, The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda and Pornography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
20. Richard Delgado, 'Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling', in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, Words That Wound, pp. 89-110. For more on the harms of racist speech, see also Mari J. Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story', in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, Words That Wound, pp. 17-50; and the collection of essays edited by Laura Lederer and Richard Delgado, The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda and Pornography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
21. Richard Delgado, 'Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling', in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, Words That Wound, pp. 89-110. For more on the harms of racist speech, see also Mari J. Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story', in Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado and Crenshaw, Words That Wound, pp. 17-50; and the collection of essays edited by Laura Lederer and Richard Delgado, The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda and Pornography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
22. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, p. 186.
23. Those who oppose restrictions on racist speech are not necessarily indifferent to the goal of equality or unsympathetic with the harms of racist speech. They may reject the idea that free speech and equality are antagonistic (allowing the Nazis to march in Skokie may cause pain, but that is the price of a system of free expression that ultimately benefits minorities), or they may worry about how restrictions, such as campus speech codes, have been applied in practice (see for example, Gates et al., Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex). Post addresses five potential harms of racist speech in making the case against restrictions (Post, Constitutional Domains, at pp. 291-331).
24. Those who oppose restrictions on racist speech are not necessarily indifferent to the goal of equality or unsympathetic with the harms of racist speech. They may reject the idea that free speech and equality are antagonistic (allowing the Nazis to march in Skokie may cause pain, but that is the price of a system of free expression that ultimately benefits minorities), or they may worry about how restrictions, such as campus speech codes, have been applied in practice (see for example, Gates et al., Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex). Post addresses five potential harms of racist speech in making the case against restrictions (Post, Constitutional Domains, at pp. 291-331).
25. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, p. 193.
26. Restrictions on racist speech are often seen as viewpoint based, and 'under current law there is the strongest of presumptions against viewpoint based restrictions on speech. These restrictions are almost automatically unconstitutional' (Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, p. 13). Yet later on (pp. 175-8) Sunstein offers several cases where viewpoint discrimination has been upheld, on grounds of grave potential harm, as in cigarette advertising on television.
27. R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, Minn, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
28. The R.A.V. decision was preceded by two federal court cases in which university 'speech codes' were declared unconstitutional: Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), and UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). While hate speech and racist speech are largely protected by the First Amendment, there are some limits. Enhanced penalties for hate crimes do not violate the first amendment (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476), and restrictions on speech in the workplace are presumably regulable under the Civil Rights Act. In the protection it affords hate speech and racist speech, American law is unusual. Most European nations, including those that otherwise treasure the principle and practice of free expression, prohibit speech offensive to racial, religious or ethnic groups. In the protection given to hate speech, the United States 'stands virtually alone', according to Human Rights Watch. On the treatment of hate speech in an international context, see Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech', and Sandra Coliver, ed., Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (London: ARTICLE 19 and University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 1992). Actually, this unusual 'tradition' in American law is not very old: the key cases were not decided until the 1920s. On this point, see Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), and Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech.
29. The R.A.V. decision was preceded by two federal court cases in which university 'speech codes' were declared unconstitutional: Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), and UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). While hate speech and racist speech are largely protected by the First Amendment, there are some limits. Enhanced penalties for hate crimes do not violate the first amendment (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476), and restrictions on speech in the workplace are presumably regulable under the Civil Rights Act. In the protection it affords hate speech and racist speech, American law is unusual. Most European nations, including those that otherwise treasure the principle and practice of free expression, prohibit speech offensive to racial, religious or ethnic groups. In the protection given to hate speech, the United States 'stands virtually alone', according to Human Rights Watch. On the treatment of hate speech in an international context, see Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech', and Sandra Coliver, ed., Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (London: ARTICLE 19 and University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 1992). Actually, this unusual 'tradition' in American law is not very old: the key cases were not decided until the 1920s. On this point, see Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), and Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech.
30. The R.A.V. decision was preceded by two federal court cases in which university 'speech codes' were declared unconstitutional: Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), and UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). While hate speech and racist speech are largely protected by the First Amendment, there are some limits. Enhanced penalties for hate crimes do not violate the first amendment (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476), and restrictions on speech in the workplace are presumably regulable under the Civil Rights Act. In the protection it affords hate speech and racist speech, American law is unusual. Most European nations, including those that otherwise treasure the principle and practice of free expression, prohibit speech offensive to racial, religious or ethnic groups. In the protection given to hate speech, the United States 'stands virtually alone', according to Human Rights Watch. On the treatment of hate speech in an international context, see Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech', and Sandra Coliver, ed., Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (London: ARTICLE 19 and University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 1992). Actually, this unusual 'tradition' in American law is not very old: the key cases were not decided until the 1920s. On this point, see Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), and Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech.
31. The contrast holds even though we defined racist speech broadly. Figure 1 is based on a NEXIS search for articles mentioning the three issues in the New York Times from 1985 to 1995. The counts presented there represent the total number of articles in a given year, averaged over 365 days. In measuring the attention given to hate speech we included all articles that mentioned the words 'hate speech', 'racist speech', 'speech codes' or 'hate crimes'. For the other two issues, 'abortion' and 'affirmative action' were the key words.
32. John Mueller, 'Trends in Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 52 (1988), 1-25, p. 21.
33. See, for example, Dennis Chong, 'How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 867-99; Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 416-40; Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, 'The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 268-307; Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
34. See, for example, Dennis Chong, 'How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 867-99; Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 416-40; Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, 'The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 268-307; Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
35. See, for example, Dennis Chong, 'How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 867-99; Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 416-40; Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, 'The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 268-307; Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
36. See, for example, Dennis Chong, 'How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 867-99; Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 416-40; Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, 'The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 268-307; Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
37. See, for example, Dennis Chong, 'How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 867-99; Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 416-40; Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, 'The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 268-307; Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
38. See Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), p. 562. Also, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Random House, 1944).
39. See Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), p. 562. Also, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Random House, 1944).
40. See Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), p. 562. Also, Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Random House, 1944).
41. Fiss, Liberalism Divided.
42. Douglas R. Rivers, 'Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 737-57.
43. Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 8.
44. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
45. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
46. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
47. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
48. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
49. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
50. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
51. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
52. See, e.g., Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement', Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 276-94; Herbert McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American Politics', American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 316-82; James A. Davis, 'Communism, Conformity, Cohorts and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-1973', American Journal of Sociology, 81 (1975), 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett and Allen J. Williams, Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); Paul M. Sniderman, Barbara K. Wolfinger, Diana C. Mutz and James E. Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties', in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31-57. Well, more education is almost always associated with greater tolerance: Sullivan Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, find that political tolerance has little to do with education. This may be because their procedure asks citizens to contemplate not just disagreeable groups but very disagreeable groups. While the well-educated are more prepared than the less well-educated to grant protection to run-of-the-mill objectionable speech and assembly perhaps they draw the line for extremist groups that practise intolerance themselves. On this point, see Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Lacari, 'Education and Political Tolerance', Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 (1989), 285-308.
53. Joe R. Feagin and Melvin P. Sikes, Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).
54. The 1990 sample was restricted to English-speaking adults living in households in the continental United States. Because the 1990 GSS follows a modular format - not all questions are posed to all respondents - the full sample is unavailable for most of the analysis we report here. Our effective n is roughly 800. For details on sample design and study administration, see James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith, The General Social Survey: Cumulative Codebook and Data File (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1990).
55. See Appendix A.
56. For purposes of scale creation, each of the twelve items was first coded on to the 0-1 interval, where 1 = tolerant and 0 = intolerant. Responses were then averaged. Respondents who failed to answer at least seven of the twelve questions or who failed to answer at least one question for each of the four groups were excluded from the scale.
57. White Americans are slightly more supportive of free expression in general than are black Americans (mean = 0.65 for whites and 0.59 for blacks).
58. For a similar conclusion, based on identical measures present in the 1984 GSS, see Bobo and Licari, 'Education and Political Tolerance'.
59. See Appendix B.
60. Respondents must have answered at least three of the five questions to be included in the scale.
61. Taken separately, black and white Americans do differ in the extent to which they support racial equality, with the mean for black Americans shifted towards the colour blind position (mean for whites - 0.22, for blacks - 0.10).
62. The relationship between education and principles reported in the text is sustained in both cases when we add other aspects of social background to the prediction equation. With the addition of variables measuring family income, region, religion, gender, age and race, the estimated effect of education remains substantial: predicting free expression, the unstandardized coefficient is 0.32 (s.e. = 0.04); predicting racial equality, the unstandardized coefficient is 0.13 (s.e. = 0.02).
63. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, p. 187.
64. Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech', p. 35.
65. Post, Constitutional Domains, p. 303.
66. The GSS questions ask respondents to extend speech rights to those who believe that 'whites are racially superior to all other races'. This formulation is consistent with the conventional understanding of racist speech, but there are of course other possibilities. Opinion might be quite different, for example, if respondents were asked about extending speech rights to black supremacists.
67. Although taken overall, blacks and whites do not differ in their opinions on prohibiting racist speech (by a t-test on means), blacks are more likely than whites to say that racist speech should definitely not be allowed: on allowing racists to hold a public meeting, 24.1 versus 16.2 per cent (chi-square with 1 d.f. = 5.10,p < 0.05); on allowing racists to publish books, 25.4 versus 13.8 per cent (chi-square with 1 d.f. = 11.1. p < 0.01).
68. See Michael Dawson, Behind the Mule (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), and Kinder and Sanders, Divided by Color.
69. See Michael Dawson, Behind the Mule (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), and Kinder and Sanders, Divided by Color.
70. Table 2 also shows that, once the effects due to free expression and racial equality are taken into account, the effects associated with race, small to begin with, disappear entirely. In contrast, the association between support for racist speech and education does not disappear. The coefficient for education is small in the case of allowing racists to hold a public meeting (B = 0.07, s.e. = 0.05), but appreciable and significant in the case of allowing racists to publish books (B = 0.16, s.e. = 0.05). That education makes a larger difference on publishing than on assembly seems intelligible (at least after the fact), and it is really the only noticeable difference across the two cases. Finally, Table 2 shows that gender does not have an independent effect on the regulation of racist speech, while region does: Southerners and Westerners are a bit more likely to allow racist speech than are those Americans who reside elsewhere. An earlier version of this equation included measures of religion as well. Because religion had no independent effect on tolerance for racist speech, and because religion did not influence the effects of other variables, we deleted it from further consideration.
71. This two-part conclusion - that opinions on racist speech are powerfully influenced by views on free expression and weakly influenced by views on racial equality - holds up in various other auxiliary tests. First, we repeated the regression analysis summarized in Table 2, this time in an effort to predict opinion on racist speech as assessed by the three questions embedded in the GSS free speech battery (see Appendix A). The questions ask whether racists should be permitted to speak, teach and have their books in public libraries. Free expression dominates racial equality on all three. The coefficients for free expression are: 0.76 (0.05), 0.76 (0.05) and 0.85 (0.05); the corresponding coefficients for racial equality are: 0.32 (0.08), 0.15 (0.09) and 0.24 (0.08). Secondly, when we re-estimated the regressions summarized in Table 2, first deleting free expression from the equation on the idea of giving racial equality a better chance to demonstrate its influence, the estimated effect due to racial equality actually declines (from - 0.13 to - 0.01 in the case of allowing racists to hold public meetings, and from - 0.11 to 0.02 in the case of permitting racists to publish books). And thirdly, the results hold up when we re-estimated Equation 1 using probit. For the purpose of this analysis, we eliminated the small middle category in the racist speech items ('can't choose', roughly forty cases); variables are otherwise the same. And the results are in all important respects the same. One small difference is that the effect due to racial equality is more securely different from zero in the probit results: for holding a meeting, B = 0.55, s.e. = 0.24, t = 2.29; for publishing books, B = 0.49, s.e. = 0.25, t = 1.96. Another small difference is that the effect of education remains significant in the probit analysis on the question of allowing racists to hold a meeting (B = 0.35, s.e. = 0.16, t = 2.16).
72. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
73. See, for example, Robert C. Luskin, 'Explaining Political Sophistication', Political Behavior, 12 (1990), 334-61; Russell W. Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Doris Graber, Processing the News (New York: Longman, 1984); Shawn W. Rosenberg, 'The Structure of Political Thinking', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 539-66.
74. See, for example, Robert C. Luskin, 'Explaining Political Sophistication', Political Behavior, 12 (1990), 334-61; Russell W. Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Doris Graber, Processing the News (New York: Longman, 1984); Shawn W. Rosenberg, 'The Structure of Political Thinking', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 539-66.
75. See, for example, Robert C. Luskin, 'Explaining Political Sophistication', Political Behavior, 12 (1990), 334-61; Russell W. Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Doris Graber, Processing the News (New York: Longman, 1984); Shawn W. Rosenberg, 'The Structure of Political Thinking', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 539-66.
76. See, for example, Robert C. Luskin, 'Explaining Political Sophistication', Political Behavior, 12 (1990), 334-61; Russell W. Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Doris Graber, Processing the News (New York: Longman, 1984); Shawn W. Rosenberg, 'The Structure of Political Thinking', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 539-66.
77. Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement'; and Bobo and Licari, 'Education and Political Tolerance'.
78. Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement'; and Bobo and Licari, 'Education and Political Tolerance'.
79. Robert L. Thorndike and George H. Gallup, 'Verbal Intelligence of the American Adult', Journal of General Psychology, 30 (1944), 75-85. For a contemporary analysis of these measures, see Duane F. Alwin, 'Family of Origin and Cohort Differences in Verbal Ability', American Sociological Review, 56 (1991), 625-38.
80. Robert L. Thorndike and George H. Gallup, 'Verbal Intelligence of the American Adult', Journal of General Psychology, 30 (1944), 75-85. For a contemporary analysis of these measures, see Duane F. Alwin, 'Family of Origin and Cohort Differences in Verbal Ability', American Sociological Review, 56 (1991), 625-38.
81. Because the vocabulary test did not appear on all forms of the 1990 survey, the number of cases available to this analysis is cut in half.
82. Mueller, 'Trends in Political Tolerance', p. 20.
83. See Mueller, 'Trends in Political Tolerance'; and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
84. See Mueller, 'Trends in Political Tolerance'; and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
85. Bernard R. Crick, Political Theory and Practice (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 64.
86. Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
87. Matthew K. Berent and Jon A. Krosnick, 'The Relation between Political Attitude Importance and Knowledge Structure', in Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw, eds, Political Judgment: Structure and Process (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 91-109; Philip Tetlock, 'Accountability and Complexity of Thought', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (1983), 74-83; Peter Suedfeld, Philip E. Tetlock and Siegfried Streufert, 'Conceptual/Integrative Complexity', in Charles P. Smith, ed., Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
88. Matthew K. Berent and Jon A. Krosnick, 'The Relation between Political Attitude Importance and Knowledge Structure', in Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw, eds, Political Judgment: Structure and Process (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 91-109; Philip Tetlock, 'Accountability and Complexity of Thought', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (1983), 74-83; Peter Suedfeld, Philip E. Tetlock and Siegfried Streufert, 'Conceptual/Integrative Complexity', in Charles P. Smith, ed., Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
89. Matthew K. Berent and Jon A. Krosnick, 'The Relation between Political Attitude Importance and Knowledge Structure', in Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw, eds, Political Judgment: Structure and Process (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 91-109; Philip Tetlock, 'Accountability and Complexity of Thought', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (1983), 74-83; Peter Suedfeld, Philip E. Tetlock and Siegfried Streufert, 'Conceptual/Integrative Complexity', in Charles P. Smith, ed., Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
90. Taking only education into account is sufficient to eliminate racial differences on racist speech.
91. Strossen shows that the free speech victories of civil libertarians have been used to protect speech proclaiming anti-racist, pro-civil rights messages: 'Time and again during the 1960s and 1970s, the ACLU and other civil rights groups were able to defend free speech rights for civil rights demonstrators by relying on the Terminiello decision.' See Nadine Strossen, 'Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?', in Gates et al., Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex, pp. 181-256, at p. 212. The latter refers, ironically, to a 1949 case in which the ACLU defended the right of Father Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest, to give a racist speech in Chicago. Likewise, Walker argues that under the First Amendment, the Court 'afforded the civil rights movement critical breathing room' (Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 11).
92. Strossen shows that the free speech victories of civil libertarians have been used to protect speech proclaiming anti-racist, pro-civil rights messages: 'Time and again during the 1960s and 1970s, the ACLU and other civil rights groups were able to defend free speech rights for civil rights demonstrators by relying on the Terminiello decision.' See Nadine Strossen, 'Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?', in Gates et al., Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex, pp. 181-256, at p. 212. The latter refers, ironically, to a 1949 case in which the ACLU defended the right of Father Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest, to give a racist speech in Chicago. Likewise, Walker argues that under the First Amendment, the Court 'afforded the civil rights movement critical breathing room' (Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 11).
93. See, e.g., Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties; Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement'; McClosky and Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance; and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy.
94. See, e.g., Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties; Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement'; McClosky and Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance; and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy.
95. See, e.g., Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties; Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement'; McClosky and Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance; and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy.
96. See, e.g., Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties; Prothro and Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement'; McClosky and Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance; and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy.
97. Mueller, 'Trends in Political Tolerance', p. 19.
98. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy; Chong, 'How People Think, Reason and Feel about Rights and Liberties'; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 80-100; Markus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood, With Malice Toward Some; and Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz and Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure'.
99. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy; Chong, 'How People Think, Reason and Feel about Rights and Liberties'; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 80-100; Markus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood, With Malice Toward Some; and Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz and Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure'.
100. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy; Chong, 'How People Think, Reason and Feel about Rights and Liberties'; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 80-100; Markus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood, With Malice Toward Some; and Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz and Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure'.
101. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy; Chong, 'How People Think, Reason and Feel about Rights and Liberties'; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 80-100; Markus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood, With Malice Toward Some; and Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz and Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure'.
102. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy; Chong, 'How People Think, Reason and Feel about Rights and Liberties'; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 80-100; Markus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Wood, With Malice Toward Some; and Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz and Wiley, 'Values Under Pressure'.
103. Laura Stoker, 'Political Value Judgments', in James Kuklinski, ed., Political Values and Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
104. Chong, 'How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties', p. 869. From this perspective, as from Stoker's results, it is too bad our survey items are limited to one kind of racist speech; too bad they do not also ask about the regulation of racist epithets.
105. Walker, Hate Speech, p. 11. This helps to explain why, although civil rights for racial minorities have been quite prominent over this period as well, racist speech has been defined as an issue of free expression rather than an issue of civil rights. Had it been framed as a civil rights issue earlier, we would expect the principle of racial equality to play a more prominent role in opinion on racist speech.
106. The late 1980s saw a resurgence of racist incidents on college campuses and in communities across the country. These incidents lent urgency to the debate over restricting hate speech among legal scholars and activists. Our evidence on public opinion comes from 1990, perhaps too soon to detect the consequences of this invigorated debate on the views of ordinary citizens.
107. Walker, Hate Speech, p. 14.
108. Mill, On Liberty, p. 28.