Elections in double-member districts with nonseparable voter preferences

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 89-110

  Lacy, Dean ^a   Niou, Emerson M S ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Equilibrium; Nonseparable preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032345961     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692898010001004     Document Type: Article

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