Don't give me your tired, your poor: Conflicted immigrant stories and welfare reform

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 159-182

  Hing, Bill Ong ^a,b  

^a Immigrant Legal Resource Center   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 0032342516     PISSN: 00178039     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (157)

1. Correspondence from the Congressional Budget Office to Senator Pete Domenici, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, August 1, 1996. indicates that the immigrant exclusions account for over 44% of the total $53.4 billion savings package. See Charles Wheeler & Josh Bernstein, Welfare Bill Impacts Immigrants the Hardest 1 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
2. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193. § 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (1996).
3. See Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1 (citing Correspondence from Congressional Budget Office to Senator Pete Domenici, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee).
4. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
6. Then-White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, asked, "Will [the Republican-controlled Congress] seek to make welfare reform work by providing jobs for those who want to make the transformation from welfare to work, or will they continue to use welfare reform as an excuse for hurting legal immigrants?" Presidential Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, Address at the National Press Club Luncheon (Nov. 22, 1996), in FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File; see also Marc Lacey & Sam Fulwood III, Clinton, Senate Haggle over Immigration; Legislation: White House Appears to be Near Gaining Consensus on Provisions Affecting Legal Residents; Senator Simpson Calls Pressure 'Blackmail,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, at 13; Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Made in America: A Vicious and Vindictive Immigration Bill, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File.
7. Then-White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, asked, "Will [the Republican-controlled Congress] seek to make welfare reform work by providing jobs for those who want to make the transformation from welfare to work, or will they continue to use welfare reform as an excuse for hurting legal immigrants?" Presidential Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, Address at the National Press Club Luncheon (Nov. 22, 1996), in FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File; see also Marc Lacey & Sam Fulwood III, Clinton, Senate Haggle over Immigration; Legislation: White House Appears to be Near Gaining Consensus on Provisions Affecting Legal Residents; Senator Simpson Calls Pressure 'Blackmail,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, at 13; Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Made in America: A Vicious and Vindictive Immigration Bill, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File.
8. Then-White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, asked, "Will [the Republican-controlled Congress] seek to make welfare reform work by providing jobs for those who want to make the transformation from welfare to work, or will they continue to use welfare reform as an excuse for hurting legal immigrants?" Presidential Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, Address at the National Press Club Luncheon (Nov. 22, 1996), in FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File; see also Marc Lacey & Sam Fulwood III, Clinton, Senate Haggle over Immigration; Legislation: White House Appears to be Near Gaining Consensus on Provisions Affecting Legal Residents; Senator Simpson Calls Pressure 'Blackmail,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1996, at 13; Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Made in America: A Vicious and Vindictive Immigration Bill, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File.
9. See John Heilemann, Welfare Bill Leaps Into The Dark But With No Way Back, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 5, 1996, at B5.
10. See Balanced Budget Act Restores Immigrant Eligibility for Certain Public Benefits, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1290 (1997).
11. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
12. The Emma Lazarus poem inscribed on the Statue of Liberty has, since 1886, served as a message of hope, attraction, and invitation to the downtrodden throughout the world: Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
13. See BILL ONG HING, To BE AN AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION 76-101 (1997); see also infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
14. See BILL ONG HING, To BE AN AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION 76-101 (1997); see also infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
15. See HING, supra note 11, at 44-75; see also infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
16. Due to the concentration of the author's research, this analysis focuses upon issues affecting the Asian American immigrant population. This concentration was quite relevant to the broader welfare reform debate; many proponents of eliminating welfare benefits focused on alleged abuse by elderly Asian immigrants. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
17. The immigration laws do not recognize economic refugees; to qualify for refugee status, a person must fear persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994).
18. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
19. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
20. See Charles Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictions on Public Benefits: The Full Impact Remains Uncertain, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 36, 1245 (1996); Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1.
21. See Charles Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictions on Public Benefits: The Full Impact Remains Uncertain, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 36, 1245 (1996); Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1.
22. See Wheeler, supra note 17, at 1246-47.
23. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Supreme Court used strict scrutiny in holding that states could not deny welfare benefits to resident aliens while granting such benefits to citizens. In contrast, in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court applied a deferential standard of review in holding that Congress may condition an alien's eligibility for participation in the federal Medicare program on admission for permanent residence and continuous residence in the United States for five years; disparate treatment of aliens and citizens for federal benefits was permissible. Thus, if a state elects to deny locally funded benefits to lawful immigrants while granting the same benefits to citizens pursuant to the authority of this portion of the Act, the constitutionality of the action will hinge on whether the federal authorization is sufficient to distinguish Graham.
24. See Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3.
25. See § 400 of the Act, 110 Stat. at 2260; Elise Armacost, Seeking Work at the Welfare Office, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 25, 1996 at 3F; Welfare Reform; Now it's the Legislature's Challenge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at 36A; Welfare Reform Plans are Flawed, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 29, 1996, at A8. For a general critique of these justifications, see Francis Fox Piven, Welfare and the Transformation of Electoral Politics, DISSENT, Fall 1996, at 61.
26. See § 400 of the Act, 110 Stat. at 2260; Elise Armacost, Seeking Work at the Welfare Office, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 25, 1996 at 3F; Welfare Reform; Now it's the Legislature's Challenge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at 36A; Welfare Reform Plans are Flawed, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 29, 1996, at A8. For a general critique of these justifications, see Francis Fox Piven, Welfare and the Transformation of Electoral Politics, DISSENT, Fall 1996, at 61.
27. See § 400 of the Act, 110 Stat. at 2260; Elise Armacost, Seeking Work at the Welfare Office, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 25, 1996 at 3F; Welfare Reform; Now it's the Legislature's Challenge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at 36A; Welfare Reform Plans are Flawed, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 29, 1996, at A8. For a general critique of these justifications, see Francis Fox Piven, Welfare and the Transformation of Electoral Politics, DISSENT, Fall 1996, at 61.
28. See § 400 of the Act, 110 Stat. at 2260; Elise Armacost, Seeking Work at the Welfare Office, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 25, 1996 at 3F; Welfare Reform; Now it's the Legislature's Challenge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at 36A; Welfare Reform Plans are Flawed, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 29, 1996, at A8. For a general critique of these justifications, see Francis Fox Piven, Welfare and the Transformation of Electoral Politics, DISSENT, Fall 1996, at 61.
29. See § 400 of the Act, 110 Stat. at 2260; Elise Armacost, Seeking Work at the Welfare Office, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 25, 1996 at 3F; Welfare Reform; Now it's the Legislature's Challenge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at 36A; Welfare Reform Plans are Flawed, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 29, 1996, at A8. For a general critique of these justifications, see Francis Fox Piven, Welfare and the Transformation of Electoral Politics, DISSENT, Fall 1996, at 61.
30. See Lewis, supra note 6; Panetta, supra note 6.
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
32. See id.
33. In the Act, the terms "qualified" and "not qualified" demarcate these two groups of immigrants. Lawful permanent residents (sometimes referred to as "green card holders") form the largest group of "qualified" immigrants, a category that also includes refugees; persons "paroled" or permitted into the United States for at least a year; and individuals granted political asylum, withholding of deportation, or conditional entrant status. See Act § 431(b), 110 Stat. at 2274.
34. See Act § § 402(a)(1), (3), 110 Stat. at 2262, 2264. SSI provides monthly cash grants to low-income persons who are aged, blind, or disabled. Food stamps are vouchers, redeemable for food at participating vendors.
35. See Wheeler, supra note 17. at 1248.
36. See id.
37. See Act § 402(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 2262-64.
38. "Entry" will likely be defined as including the granting of lawful immigrant status to persons who have already been in the United States, thereby prolonging their ineligibility period by postponing the date at which the five-year clock begins. This would be consistent with the definition of "entry" in prior versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. "Federal means-tested public benefit[s]" will likely include Medicaid, SSI, food stamps, and certain social services block grant funds. The Act explicitly exempts a number of programs from the term "Federal means-tested public benefit[s]." See Act § 403(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2266-67. States use Title XX block grants for a variety of purposes, including child care, programs to combat family violence, and in-home care for disabled persons.
39. See Act § § 403(b)(1),(2), 403(d), 110 Stat. at 2265-66, 2266-67.
40. The list includes non-emergency Medicaid, Title XX social services block grants, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the state block grant program which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). See Act § 402(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2264.
41. See Act § 402(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 2264-65.
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (Supp. II 1996).
43. See 8 U.S.C. § § 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), 1183a(a) (Supp. II 1996).
44. While the Act makes numerous changes regarding the treatment of sponsors, a change in "sponsor-deeming" affects the access of legal immigrants to public benefits and the access of those abroad to the possibility of immigration. In order to qualify for a means-tested public benefit, the applicant must be income-eligible; in other words, the applicant's income must fall below a certain level. This level is typically set at the poverty line or at a figure slightly above the poverty line. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(b) (1996). Sponsor-deeming, however, counts not only the immigrant's income, but also the income of the sponsor and the sponsor's spouse when determining an immigrant's need, or eligibility for benefits.
45. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND WELFARE REFORM IMMIGRANT RESTRICTIONS (H.R. 3734) (1996).
46. See id.
47. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 421 (a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2270 (1996).
48. See Act § 422, 110 Stat. at 2271.
49. See Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2. The definition of a "qualified alien" is found in section 431(b) of the Act, 110 Stat. at 2274. Undocumented immigrants, and individuals who overstayed a nonimmigrant visa (e.g., tourist or student) or who entered the country without inspection or with fraudulent documents, form a large portion of the unqualified group. Although Mexicans and Central Americans may constitute the largest group of the undocumented alien population in the United States, large numbers of the undocumented population are from Europe and Asia who entered on nonimmigrant visas and overstayed their exit date. In New York State, the three major groups of undocumented immigrants are from Ecuador, Italy, and Poland, followed by Dominicans, Colombians, Haitians, and Jamaicans. The state has slightly more undocumented Israelis than Chinese. See Deborah Sontag, Study Sees Illegal Aliens in New Light, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 2, 1993, at B1.
50. This includes individuals in valid nonimmigrant status (e.g., tourists, students, temporary workers, foreign government representatives), those who have applied for certain status (e.g., asylum, cancellation of deportation, registry, adjustment of status to permanent residence), and those granted deferred action, family unity, temporary protected status, or an order of supervision. See Act § 431(b), 110 Stat. at 2274. Descriptions of nonimmigrant alien categories are contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Asylum provisions are in 8 U.S.C. § § 1101(a)(42), 1158(a) (Supp. II 1996). "Cancellation of deportation" or "of removal" refers to forms of relief outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229B (Supp. II 1996). "Registry" is a remedy for undocumented immigrants who have been longtime residents of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). "Adjustment of status" is the procedure whereby a person may apply for lawful permanent residence status in the United States based on a qualifying family or employment situation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). "Deferred action" refers to prosecutorial discretion on the part of INS officials to allow an alien to remain in the United States for an indefinite period of time. See BILL ONG HING, HANDLING IMMIGRATION CASES 407-09 (1995). "Temporary protected status" may be granted to aliens who have fled to the United States because of ongoing armed conflict or natural disaster in their native country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). "An order of supervision" is granted to an alien whose deportation can not be effectuated because no country will accept the person. See HING, supra, at 363.
51. Section 401(c)(1) of the Act. 110 Stat. at 2262, defines "Federal public benefit" as: (A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated fuhds of the United States; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, post-secondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States.
52. Included in the PRUCOL category were immigrants granted deferred action or Family unity, applicants for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence, and undocumented immigrants whom the INS allowed to remain in the country for humanitarian or other reasons in spite of their undocumented status. See Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618 (1997); 42 C.F.R. § 435.408 (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1996).
53. See Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3.
54. See id.
55. See Leslie Berestein, Finding a Voice Through Citizenship; Immigration: Aspiring Citizens Study About the Civil War and American Independence; Many are Elderly, Fearing Loss of Benefits, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 3, 1997, at A6; Patricia Callahan, Reform Swamps INS; Many Chase Citizenship to Keep Benefits, DENVER POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at A1.
56. See Leslie Berestein, Finding a Voice Through Citizenship; Immigration: Aspiring Citizens Study About the Civil War and American Independence; Many are Elderly, Fearing Loss of Benefits, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 3, 1997, at A6; Patricia Callahan, Reform Swamps INS; Many Chase Citizenship to Keep Benefits, DENVER POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at A1.
57. See Wheeler & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1.
58. See Sandra Hernandez, Citizens in Waiting: Would-Be Americans Unfairly Put On Hold, L.A. WEEKLY, Aug. 1, 1997, at 19; Prescription for the INS: Speed and Civility Too, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at B4.
59. See Sandra Hernandez, Citizens in Waiting: Would-Be Americans Unfairly Put On Hold, L.A. WEEKLY, Aug. 1, 1997, at 19; Prescription for the INS: Speed and Civility Too, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at B4.
60. Depending on the jurisdiction, local cash assistance programs may be called General Assistance, General Relief, Poor Relief, or Home Relief.
61. See Carol Morello, Welfare Reform Blamed in Suicides of Immigrants, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 1, 1997, at A34.
62. For example, an intern at the San Francisco Department of Social Services suggested that, under the rules created by the first round of welfare reform, elderly immigrants or refugees previously receiving SSI in San Francisco would have been shifted to General Assistance. The total monthly GA payments in San Francisco of $345 would be less than half of their prior assistance package, consisting of SSI payments ($650-about $470 from federal funds and the rest from the state) and the in-kind value of Food stamps ($110). The $345 would not have been sufficient to meet the rent payments tor even a modest apartment in the city. San Francisco provides the highest level of GA assistance of any county in California. GA payments in other Counties, such as Alameda and San Diego, are as low as $212 per month. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Blazer, Intern, San Francisco Department of Social Services (Nov. 12, 1996).
63. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5561, 111 Stat. 251, 638 (1997).
64. See Balanced Budget Act Restores Immigrant Eligibility for Certain Public Benefits, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1290, 1290 (1997).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. California's current taxing system makes it extremely difficult for counties and cities to compensate for cuts in federal and state funding. Any tax increase requires a two-thirds vote. See HING, supra note 11, at 111.
69. THe examples are numerous. See. e.g., Robert Rector, Welfare Reform and the Death of Marriage, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at A20; Charles Murray, Keeping Priorities Straight on Welfare Reform. SOCIETY, July-Aug., 1996. at 10.
70. THe examples are numerous. See. e.g., Robert Rector, Welfare Reform and the Death of Marriage, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at A20; Charles Murray, Keeping Priorities Straight on Welfare Reform. SOCIETY, July-Aug., 1996. at 10.
71. The report noted that in 1994, some 738,000 lawful resident aliens were receiving SSI, compared to 127,900 in 1982; the majority of these were elderly. See Use of Supplemental Security Income and Other Welfare Programs by Immigrants: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104 Cong. 2 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Robert Rector, senior policy analyst, The Heritage Foundation). Rector argued that "the total cost of SSI and Medicaid benefits for elderly non-citizen immigrants will amount to over $328 billion over the next 10 years. Annual SSI and Medicaid benefits for these individuals will reach over $67 billion per year in 2004." Id.
72. See Hearings, supra note 60 (statement of Norman Matloff, professor, University of California at Davis).
73. See Hearings, supra note 60 (statement of Robert Rector, senior policy analyst, The Heritage Foundation).
74. See id.
75. Ramon G. McLeod, Elderly Immigrants Swell Welfare Rolls; Bitter Debate Over Eligibility, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1996, at Al (quoting Dan Stein, executive director, Federation for American Immigration Reform).
76. Terry Tang, Editorial, An Unprecedented Attack on a Helpless Population, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996. at B4.
77. Morello, supra note 51, at A34.
78. Nancy Weaver Teichert. Son 's Love Leads Dad to Citizenship, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 14, 1997, at B1.
79. See Janet Hook, Wilson Adds Voice to Call for Aid for Some Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A1; Panetta, supra note 6. However, some hardened policy-makers were not moved by these accounts. Congressman E. Clay Shaw, chair of the House Human Resources Subcommittee and a "prime architect" of the welfare reform legislation, would bar future benefits for any immigrant currently in the country who becomes disabled. When asked what such immigrants should do, Shaw replied, "I guess they can go home if they don't like what they have here." Another Kind of Cruelty, FRESNO BEE, June 6, 1997, at B6. Anti-immigrant commentators were not willing to take the blame for foreseeable hardships innocent immigrants would suffer as a result of a ban: Cutting off welfare for legal immigrants will impose many hardships on innocent people. Children will lose food stamps if mommy or daddy gets laid off. Hard-working, tax-paying legal immigrants could lose disability benefits if they are injured on the job. But they are the victims of a persistent liberal failing: Liberals create these well-intentioned programs and then do not police them against abuse. When the inevitable backlash comes, the innocent suffer for the sins of the rapacious guilty and for the neglect of the liberals who ignored the abuses. Lars-Erik Nelson, Don't Create Programs and then Ignore Abuses, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 17, 1997, at 11B.
80. See Janet Hook, Wilson Adds Voice to Call for Aid for Some Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A1; Panetta, supra note 6. However, some hardened policy-makers were not moved by these accounts. Congressman E. Clay Shaw, chair of the House Human Resources Subcommittee and a "prime architect" of the welfare reform legislation, would bar future benefits for any immigrant currently in the country who becomes disabled. When asked what such immigrants should do, Shaw replied, "I guess they can go home if they don't like what they have here." Another Kind of Cruelty, FRESNO BEE, June 6, 1997, at B6. Anti-immigrant commentators were not willing to take the blame for foreseeable hardships innocent immigrants would suffer as a result of a ban: Cutting off welfare for legal immigrants will impose many hardships on innocent people. Children will lose food stamps if mommy or daddy gets laid off. Hard-working, tax-paying legal immigrants could lose disability benefits if they are injured on the job. But they are the victims of a persistent liberal failing: Liberals create these well-intentioned programs and then do not police them against abuse. When the inevitable backlash comes, the innocent suffer for the sins of the rapacious guilty and for the neglect of the liberals who ignored the abuses. Lars-Erik Nelson, Don't Create Programs and then Ignore Abuses, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 17, 1997, at 11B.
81. See Janet Hook, Wilson Adds Voice to Call for Aid for Some Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A1; Panetta, supra note 6. However, some hardened policy-makers were not moved by these accounts. Congressman E. Clay Shaw, chair of the House Human Resources Subcommittee and a "prime architect" of the welfare reform legislation, would bar future benefits for any immigrant currently in the country who becomes disabled. When asked what such immigrants should do, Shaw replied, "I guess they can go home if they don't like what they have here." Another Kind of Cruelty, FRESNO BEE, June 6, 1997, at B6. Anti-immigrant commentators were not willing to take the blame for foreseeable hardships innocent immigrants would suffer as a result of a ban: Cutting off welfare for legal immigrants will impose many hardships on innocent people. Children will lose food stamps if mommy or daddy gets laid off. Hard-working, tax-paying legal immigrants could lose disability benefits if they are injured on the job. But they are the victims of a persistent liberal failing: Liberals create these well-intentioned programs and then do not police them against abuse. When the inevitable backlash comes, the innocent suffer for the sins of the rapacious guilty and for the neglect of the liberals who ignored the abuses. Lars-Erik Nelson, Don't Create Programs and then Ignore Abuses, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 17, 1997, at 11B.
82. See Janet Hook, Wilson Adds Voice to Call for Aid for Some Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A1; Panetta, supra note 6. However, some hardened policy-makers were not moved by these accounts. Congressman E. Clay Shaw, chair of the House Human Resources Subcommittee and a "prime architect" of the welfare reform legislation, would bar future benefits for any immigrant currently in the country who becomes disabled. When asked what such immigrants should do, Shaw replied, "I guess they can go home if they don't like what they have here." Another Kind of Cruelty, FRESNO BEE, June 6, 1997, at B6. Anti-immigrant commentators were not willing to take the blame for foreseeable hardships innocent immigrants would suffer as a result of a ban: Cutting off welfare for legal immigrants will impose many hardships on innocent people. Children will lose food stamps if mommy or daddy gets laid off. Hard-working, tax-paying legal immigrants could lose disability benefits if they are injured on the job. But they are the victims of a persistent liberal failing: Liberals create these well-intentioned programs and then do not police them against abuse. When the inevitable backlash comes, the innocent suffer for the sins of the rapacious guilty and for the neglect of the liberals who ignored the abuses. Lars-Erik Nelson, Don't Create Programs and then Ignore Abuses, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 17, 1997, at 11B.
83. See Donald Huddle, The Costs of Immigration, CARRYING CAPACITY NETWORK, July, 1993, at 5-10.
84. Close review of Huddle's findings reveals that they are misleadingly presented and based on questionable assumptions. First, the 42.8% immigrant poverty figure is not an absolute percentage of the immigrant population, but merely an incremental percentage over natives. See id. at 9-10. Even using Huddle's figures, this difference is really only 5.4%. Likewise, Huddle uses a misleading and unclear calculation in concluding that immigrants are 13.5% more likely to receive public assistance, and that they receive 44.2% more public assistance dollars than natives. He finds that heads of households in immigrant families are more likely to receive public assistance than are natives (5.9% instead of 5.2%) which yields his 13.5% figure. See id. at 5-9. In reality, however, this difference is only 0.7%, and thus the probability of an immigrant receiving public assistance is nearly identical. The Urban Institute has noted flaws in Huddle's claim that immigrants receive 44.2% more public assistance dollars than natives, because he overestimated service costs for recent legal immigrants, applied irrelevant school attendance rates to determine educational costs, and used a national average for Medicaid payments as a measure for immigrants who are younger than the average population. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, URBAN INST., IMMIGRANTS AND TAXES: A REAPPRAISAL OF HUDDLE'S "THE COST OF IMMIGRANTS" 4-8 (1994). Huddle's estimation of the probability of immigrant public assistance is particularly troubling. According to his report, the probability of immigrant public assistance was based on a national rate adjusted by an "estimation of the extent of variation in immigration rates from the overall rate" of public assistance receipt. Huddle, supra note 69, at 5. As the origins of the adjustment figure are not identified, it is likely Huddle's own calculation. While sometimes one has no alternative but to make such calculations, the margin of error is quite high, and should be acknowledged. In fact, because these estimates are what economists would call "point" estimates, little statistical significance is generally attached to them, and one should hesitate to use them as a basis for policy-making. The Huddle Report also contains factual errors. The undocumented population is typically not eligible for the fourteen benefits programs cited in Huddle's calculation for assistance received by undocumented aliens. See id. at 5. He also incorrectly includes federal, state, and local programs in calculating costs for amnestied aliens, despite their ineligibility for many of these programs. See id. at 11.
85. LEIF JENSEN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE UTILIZATION, 183-84 (1989).
86. Jensen, a sociologist and anthropologist, analyzed immigrants' poverty levels and public assistance utilization by looking at Public Use Sample (PUS) data from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 censuses. PUS data are large stratified samples of housing units enumerated in the U.S. Census that contain sociodemographic information on the housing units and each person residing within them. As many households as possible, but no more than 10,000, were sought among the following groups: foreign Asian, foreign Hispanic, foreign black, other foreign, native Asian, native Hispanic, native black, and other native. See id. at 37-38. Public assistance utilization was defined as income derived from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), general assistance, and Supplemental Security Income ISSI). See id. at 39. For the definition and measurement of poverty, Jensen used both an absolute and a relative measure. Absolute poverty, which is widely used in government and research documents, "places the poverty threshold at the annual income needed to maintain a minimally acceptable standard of living. Families are defined as poor if their Post-transfer annual income is less than the absolute poverty threshold." Id. at 39. Whereas absolute poverty relates income to a minimum standard, relative poverty relates income to average income in the population. The former reflects whether people do not have enough to get by, the latter, whether people have much less than average. See id. at 39-41. Jensen's relative measure defines a household as poor if its total income is less than 44% of the median nonnegative household income of whites. See id. at 41. Jensen identified an immigrant family as one in which the head of the household was foreign-born. Jensen included refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented workers in the category of immigrants. See id. at 33. Jensen used relatively rigorous research techniques to determine the incidence of both absolute and relative poverty among immigrants. See id. at 69-107. One problem is that his data would now be regarded as fairly old (i.e., does not really measure the "new" immigration subsequent to the 1980 census), and there is evidence of an increase in public assistance utilization over the years. See id. at 106, 141, 145, 176-77. Also, by combining much of the data, especially mixing together refugees with other immigrants, Jensen produces some misleading findings, as refugees are the only major non-native population eligible to participate broadly in the nation's welfare state from the date of entry.
87. See id. at 146. Analyzing by race, Jensen found that recent black immigrants were not less likely, recent Asian immigrants (combined) were more likely, and recent white and Hispanic immigrants were less likely to receive welfare than their native counterparts. See id. at 141-45.
88. "Absolute poverty among U.S. families declined precipitously during the 1960s, but this decline was far less impressive among immigrant families." Id. at 66. In fact, poverty increased among immigrant families between 1969 and 1979, probably because of an increase among post-1965 immigrants. See id. at 40-41, 105. This growing poverty rate was driven in great measure by an increase among recent white immigrant families, rebutting the assertion that the declining economic status of succeeding waves of immigrants is largely due to the changing racial composition of immigrants. Breaking down the data by race, significant increase in absolute poverty was indicated for white and black recent immigrant families, but not Latino and Asian recent immigrant families. See id. at 66-67.
89. A comparison between 1969 and 1979 groups that had been in the country the same amount of time revealed that recent immigrants in 1979 were no more likely than their counterparts in 1969 to receive assistance. There were a few exceptions to this generalization. Recent Asian immigrants in 1979 were much more likely than recent Asian immigrants in 1969 to receive assistance, due in part to the influx of Southeast Asian refugees in the post-1975 period. Recent black immigrants were also disproportionately more likely to receive welfare than their 1969 counterparts. See id. at 141, 145.
90. See id. at 145. This decline in the receipt of welfare by recent Latino immigrants was observed through 1990 by Urban Institute researchers. See Michael Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigrants and Welfare: New Myths, New Realities (1993) (Urban Inst.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Fix & Passel, Immigrants and Welfare].
91. An Urban Institute study concluded that participation by immigrants arriving in the past ten years is lower than is commonly believed. The 1990 Census indicates that the share of recent immigrants (i.e., arriving between 1980 and 1990) using public assistance (defined here as AFDC, SSI, and General Assistance) is 4.7%, slightly higher than the 4.2% rate for natives. But they separated the foreign-born into those from "refugee countries" (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Albania, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R., and Cuba) and all others, and found that 15.6% of those from refugee countries were receiving welfare. On the other hand, only 2.8% of immigrants entering from non-refugee sending countries during the 1980s were reported to be using public benefits in 1989, much lower than the welfare participation rate of natives (4.2%). See Fix & Passel, Immigrants and Welfare, supra note 76, at 4-5. Another Urban Institute report found that while immigrants use welfare at slightly higher rates than natives, non-native use is concentrated among two groups: elderly immigrants and refugees. There is also substantial overlap between elderly and refugee benefits use, as refugees account for 27% of immigrants over 65 who receive public benefits. Welfare use among working-age immigrants (18-64) who did not enter as refugees is about the same as for natives. See Michael Fix et al., The Use of SSI and Other Welfare Programs by Immigrants (1993) (Urban Inst.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Fix et al., Use of SSI]. While elderly Asian Pacific immigrants maintain a higher-than-average welfare use, they have an extremely lower-than-average rate of social security use, suggesting that many were ineligible for benefits at an age that enabled them to earn social security credits as workers. See Larry Hajime Shinagawa, The Impaci of Immigration on the Demography of Asian Pacific Americans, in REFRAMING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 58, 80-81 (Bill Ong Hing & Ronald Lee eds., 1996).
92. An Urban Institute study concluded that participation by immigrants arriving in the past ten years is lower than is commonly believed. The 1990 Census indicates that the share of recent immigrants (i.e., arriving between 1980 and 1990) using public assistance (defined here as AFDC, SSI, and General Assistance) is 4.7%, slightly higher than the 4.2% rate for natives. But they separated the foreign-born into those from "refugee countries" (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Albania, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R., and Cuba) and all others, and found that 15.6% of those from refugee countries were receiving welfare. On the other hand, only 2.8% of immigrants entering from non-refugee sending countries during the 1980s were reported to be using public benefits in 1989, much lower than the welfare participation rate of natives (4.2%). See Fix & Passel, Immigrants and Welfare, supra note 76, at 4-5. Another Urban Institute report found that while immigrants use welfare at slightly higher rates than natives, non-native use is concentrated among two groups: elderly immigrants and refugees. There is also substantial overlap between elderly and refugee benefits use, as refugees account for 27% of immigrants over 65 who receive public benefits. Welfare use among working-age immigrants (18-64) who did not enter as refugees is about the same as for natives. See Michael Fix et al., The Use of SSI and Other Welfare Programs by Immigrants (1993) (Urban Inst.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Fix et al., Use of SSI]. While elderly Asian Pacific immigrants maintain a higher-than-average welfare use, they have an extremely lower-than-average rate of social security use, suggesting that many were ineligible for benefits at an age that enabled them to earn social security credits as workers. See Larry Hajime Shinagawa, The Impaci of Immigration on the Demography of Asian Pacific Americans, in REFRAMING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 58, 80-81 (Bill Ong Hing & Ronald Lee eds., 1996).
93. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Albania, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R., and Cuba. See Fix & Passel, Immigrants and Welfare, supra note 76, at 4-5.
94. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 233 (1986); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 124, 156-58 (1989).
95. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 233 (1986); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 124, 156-58 (1989).
96. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended principally in 8 U.S.C.).
97. 8. U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. II 1996).
98. See HING, supra note 42, at 295-96; BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 127 (1993); Peter Y. Hong, Refugees Caught Between Current, Former Policy; Welfare: Thousands of Califor"ians from Asia, Former Soviet Union Face Loss of Benefits Under Reform Law, L.A. TIMES. Sept. 22. 1996, at A1.
99. See HING, supra note 42, at 295-96; BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 127 (1993); Peter Y. Hong, Refugees Caught Between Current, Former Policy; Welfare: Thousands of Califor"ians from Asia, Former Soviet Union Face Loss of Benefits Under Reform Law, L.A. TIMES. Sept. 22. 1996, at A1.
100. See HING, supra note 42, at 295-96; BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at 127 (1993); Peter Y. Hong, Refugees Caught Between Current, Former Policy; Welfare: Thousands of Califor"ians from Asia, Former Soviet Union Face Loss of Benefits Under Reform Law, L.A. TIMES. Sept. 22. 1996, at A1.
101. See Hong, supra note 82, at A1.
102. See Thomas MaCurdy & Margaret O'Brien-Strain, The Extent of Welfare Participation by Asian Immigrants 36 (Jan. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). These researchers compared welfare use by Asian Pacific American families to that of other U.S. families and disaggregated the Asian immigrant data into groups from Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and the Philippines. See id. at 37.
103. See id. at 36.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Gov. Wilson Signs Order Halting Benefits for Undocumented Aliens, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1187 (1996). See also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (1996) (stating that it is the policy of the United States that public benefits not be an incentive to immigrate).
107. Most immigrants who came to the United States after 1970 from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the Soviet Union are refugees as are many from Iran . . . . Many refugees were elderly or disabled upon their arrival, especially those from war-torn Southeast Asia . . . . The large number of Soviet refugees arrived through an aggressive U.S. policy that withheld favorable trade terms from the Soviet Union as long as it restricted Jewish emigration. Soviet emigration to the United States rose to 370,000 in 1990 from 2,000 in 1986. Hong, supra note 82, at A1. The number of immigrants from "refugee countries" on SSI contrasts with other large immigrant groups. Chinese and Filipinos, relatively few of whom are refugees, are easily the largest Asian immigrant groups. The size of both the Chinese and Filipino communities, which have long histories of immigration to the United States, expanded rapidly after 1965. There are eight times as many Chinese American senior citizens as Vietnamese 65 or older, according to the 1990 census. Filipinos 65 or older outnumber Vietnamese seniors 6 to 1. But Vietnamese still outnumber Chinese and Filipinos among non-citizens on SSI in California, reflecting the high need for assistance among groups made up largely of refugees. Id. More Vietnamese get SSI due to disability than for being aged, which is not true of Filipinos or Chinese. See id. The numbers further suggest that refugees tend to rely on SSI because they cannot collect Social Security: Only 22% of Vietnamese noncitizens over 65 receive Social Security benefits, according to the 1990 census, compared with 46% of elderly Chinese and 42% of Filipinos over 65 . . . . Refugees who arrive in the United States unable to work because they are disabled or elderly cannot collect Social Security benefits, which are built up through payroll deductions, and therefore have to rely on SSI. Id.
108. See id.
109. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 79, at 229; SIMON, supra note 79, at 124, 156-58.
110. See JULIAN L. SIMON, CATO INST. & NAT'L IMMIGR. FORUM. IMMIGRATION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTS 39-42 (1995); Rebecca L. Clark & Jeffrey S. Passel, How Much Do Immigrants Pay In Taxes? Evidence from Los Angeles County (Aug. 1993) (Urban Inst.) (unpublished working paper, on file with author).
111. See JULIAN L. SIMON, CATO INST. & NAT'L IMMIGR. FORUM. IMMIGRATION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTS 39-42 (1995); Rebecca L. Clark & Jeffrey S. Passel, How Much Do Immigrants Pay In Taxes? Evidence from Los Angeles County (Aug. 1993) (Urban Inst.) (unpublished working paper, on file with author).
112. For example, a 1993 Los Angeles County study analyzed the fiscal effects of four groups: recent legal immigrants, amnesty immigrants, undocumented workers, and the citizen children of the undocumented. The researchers found that the net cost of these immigrants to the county was $808 million per year, as they paid only $139 million in taxes to the county while accounting for 30.9% of county services. The report also acknowledged, however, that the groups paid $4.3 billion in total taxes, although the federal government received most of that revenue. See HING, supra note 58, at 81. Interestingly, an Urban institute study that reviewed the L.A. County report actually found that the county overstated costs of immigrants and the tax revenues were understated! See id. at 82-83. Furthermore, the County did not attempt to calculate the contributions of immigrants in terms of tax revenue generated by immigrant-owned businesses and indirect benefits of immigration through economic growth. See id. at 84.
113. See SIMON, supra note 79, at 218-20.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 218-22.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY 10 (1993). See also GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS 82 (1990); SIMON, supra note 92, at 218-19.
119. See THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY 10 (1993). See also GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS 82 (1990); SIMON, supra note 92, at 218-19.
120. See THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY 10 (1993). See also GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS 82 (1990); SIMON, supra note 92, at 218-19.
121. See RICHARD VEDDER ET AL., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE INST., IMMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: NEW EVIDENCE 7-10 (1994) [hereinafter VEDDER ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT]. To test for the relationship between immigrant presence and unemployment, the researchers incorporated into their model a variable measuring the estimated percentage of the total U.S. resident population that was foreign born for each year. Then using an ordinary regression procedure, they ascertained the relationship between immigration (and other control variables) and unemployment. After running regressions from several perspectives, they could not find "any statistically meaningful positive relationship between immigration and unemployment." Id. at 14. See generally RICHARD D. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 31-52 (1993) for the details of their basic labor market model.
122. See RICHARD VEDDER ET AL., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE INST., IMMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: NEW EVIDENCE 7-10 (1994) [hereinafter VEDDER ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT]. To test for the relationship between immigrant presence and unemployment, the researchers incorporated into their model a variable measuring the estimated percentage of the total U.S. resident population that was foreign born for each year. Then using an ordinary regression procedure, they ascertained the relationship between immigration (and other control variables) and unemployment. After running regressions from several perspectives, they could not find "any statistically meaningful positive relationship between immigration and unemployment." Id. at 14. See generally RICHARD D. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 31-52 (1993) for the details of their basic labor market model.
123. See VEDDER ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, supra note 100, at 10-15.
124. See id. at 13.
125. See id. The 10 states with the highest unemployment were West Virginia, Michigan, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Alaska, Kentucky, Ohio, Arkansas, and Illinois. The 10 states with the lowest unemployment were New Hampshire, Nebraska, South Dakota, Hawaii, Connecticut, Kansas, Vermont, Virginia, North Dakota, and Massachusetts. The 10 states with the largest proportion of immigrants were California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Illinois. The 10 states with the lowest proportion of immigrants were Mississippi, Kentucky, West Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, South Dakota, South Carolina, Iowa, and Missouri. See id. at 12-13. Critics might wonder whether the causal relationship between high immigration and low unemployment could work in the other direction-namely, whether high unemployment states simply attract fewer immigrants. Several studies have discounted this interpretation, however. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altoni & David Card, The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives, in IMMIGRATION, TRADE, AND THE LABOR MARKET 221 (John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1991); ROBERT J. LALONDE & ROBERT H. TOPEL, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF MIGRANTS 53 (Center for the Study of the Econ. and the State, Univ. of Chicago, Working Paper No. 96, 1994). Other research, comparing between high-immigration cities (i.e., Miami, New York, San Antonio, Houston, and Los Angeles) and low-immigration cities (i.e., Dayton, Memphis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and Birmingham) shows that while the number of whitecollar workers tended to increase with immigration, the number of blue-collar workers declined. See Robert Walker et al.. Linked Migration Systems: Immigration and Internal Labor Flows in the United States, 68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234 (1992). This finding suggests that the decline in wages for working-class natives is spread by internal migration throughout the nation. Thus, a comparison of wage levels alone in high- and low-immigration areas would understate, or perhaps miss entirely, the effects of immigration, which are national. This work at least forces us to raise the question - perhaps unanswerable - of whether the physical presence of immigrants, rather than wage and job competition, causes People to move.
126. See id. The 10 states with the highest unemployment were West Virginia, Michigan, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Alaska, Kentucky, Ohio, Arkansas, and Illinois. The 10 states with the lowest unemployment were New Hampshire, Nebraska, South Dakota, Hawaii, Connecticut, Kansas, Vermont, Virginia, North Dakota, and Massachusetts. The 10 states with the largest proportion of immigrants were California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Illinois. The 10 states with the lowest proportion of immigrants were Mississippi, Kentucky, West Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, South Dakota, South Carolina, Iowa, and Missouri. See id. at 12-13. Critics might wonder whether the causal relationship between high immigration and low unemployment could work in the other direction-namely, whether high unemployment states simply attract fewer immigrants. Several studies have discounted this interpretation, however. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altoni & David Card, The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives, in IMMIGRATION, TRADE, AND THE LABOR MARKET 221 (John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1991); ROBERT J. LALONDE & ROBERT H. TOPEL, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF MIGRANTS 53 (Center for the Study of the Econ. and the State, Univ. of Chicago, Working Paper No. 96, 1994). Other research, comparing between high-immigration cities (i.e., Miami, New York, San Antonio, Houston, and Los Angeles) and low-immigration cities (i.e., Dayton, Memphis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and Birmingham) shows that while the number of whitecollar workers tended to increase with immigration, the number of blue-collar workers declined. See Robert Walker et al.. Linked Migration Systems: Immigration and Internal Labor Flows in the United States, 68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234 (1992). This finding suggests that the decline in wages for working-class natives is spread by internal migration throughout the nation. Thus, a comparison of wage levels alone in high- and low-immigration areas would understate, or perhaps miss entirely, the effects of immigration, which are national. This work at least forces us to raise the question - perhaps unanswerable - of whether the physical presence of immigrants, rather than wage and job competition, causes People to move.
127. See id. The 10 states with the highest unemployment were West Virginia, Michigan, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Alaska, Kentucky, Ohio, Arkansas, and Illinois. The 10 states with the lowest unemployment were New Hampshire, Nebraska, South Dakota, Hawaii, Connecticut, Kansas, Vermont, Virginia, North Dakota, and Massachusetts. The 10 states with the largest proportion of immigrants were California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Illinois. The 10 states with the lowest proportion of immigrants were Mississippi, Kentucky, West Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, South Dakota, South Carolina, Iowa, and Missouri. See id. at 12-13. Critics might wonder whether the causal relationship between high immigration and low unemployment could work in the other direction-namely, whether high unemployment states simply attract fewer immigrants. Several studies have discounted this interpretation, however. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altoni & David Card, The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives, in IMMIGRATION, TRADE, AND THE LABOR MARKET 221 (John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1991); ROBERT J. LALONDE & ROBERT H. TOPEL, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF MIGRANTS 53 (Center for the Study of the Econ. and the State, Univ. of Chicago, Working Paper No. 96, 1994). Other research, comparing between high-immigration cities (i.e., Miami, New York, San Antonio, Houston, and Los Angeles) and low-immigration cities (i.e., Dayton, Memphis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and Birmingham) shows that while the number of whitecollar workers tended to increase with immigration, the number of blue-collar workers declined. See Robert Walker et al.. Linked Migration Systems: Immigration and Internal Labor Flows in the United States, 68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234 (1992). This finding suggests that the decline in wages for working-class natives is spread by internal migration throughout the nation. Thus, a comparison of wage levels alone in high- and low-immigration areas would understate, or perhaps miss entirely, the effects of immigration, which are national. This work at least forces us to raise the question - perhaps unanswerable - of whether the physical presence of immigrants, rather than wage and job competition, causes People to move.
128. See SIMON, supra note 92, at 225.
129. MuLLER, supra note 99, at 143.
130. See VEDDER ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, supra note 100, at 14-15.
131. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 79, at 233.
132. See id. Cf. Ronald Lee, Race-Ethnicity and Social Security Transfers: Who Gains and Who Loses? 13 (May 16, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
133. See Fix et al., Use of SSI, supra note 77.
134. See id. at 3-5.
135. See id. at 2.
136. See id. at 4.
137. See id.
138. See HING, supra note 42, at 123; 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994).
139. The ban may be avoided eventually if the immigrant becomes a U.S. citizen through naturalization. But this option takes at least five years, see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (1994), and is difficult for many elderly immigrants to attain because of the English literacy requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
140. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § § 401-404, 411, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261-67, 2268-69 (1996).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1994) (setting out qualifications for receipt of SSI).
142. Recent elderly immigrants generally have not worked enough in the United States to qualify for elderly Social Security benefits. See Fix et al., Use of SSI, supra note 77, at 4.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1994).
144. See id.
145. The State of Florida and the City of New York are among the parties that have pending challenges to the constitutionality of the welfare reform legislation. See Ben Q. Limb, Welfare Reform Act is Misguided; Legal Immigrants Used as Political Scapegoats, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1997, at S3; Mike Clary, Florida Becomes First State to Sue Over Welfare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at 14.
146. The State of Florida and the City of New York are among the parties that have pending challenges to the constitutionality of the welfare reform legislation. See Ben Q. Limb, Welfare Reform Act is Misguided; Legal Immigrants Used as Political Scapegoats, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1997, at S3; Mike Clary, Florida Becomes First State to Sue Over Welfare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at 14.
147. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND (1955); LABOR IMMIGRATION UNDER CAPITALISM: ASIAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WORLD WAR II (Lucie Cheng & Edna Bonacich eds., 1984); Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615 (1981).
148. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND (1955); LABOR IMMIGRATION UNDER CAPITALISM: ASIAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WORLD
149. See Lopez, supra note 122, at 644-48.
150. See id. at 639-67.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 667-70.
153. See id. at 639-70.
154. See MaCurdy & O'Brien-Strain, supra note 84, at 36.
155. See Shinagawa, supra note 77.
156. See Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey With an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158, 158-61 (Warren F. Schwanz ed., 1995).
157. See HING, supra note 11, at 129-45.