NATO expansion: 'A policy error of historic importance'

Review of International Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 23-42

  McCgwire, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032341571     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210598000230     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. Eminent and highly respected individuals made up this bipartisan group. The five senators included Sam Nunn, a long-standing expert on defence. Arthur Hartman and Jack Matlock, ambassadors to Moscow, 1981-7 and 1987-91, were among twelve signatories of that rank. Professors Richard Pipes and Marshal Shulman (former members of the National Security Council, but on opposite sides of the US debate on Soviet policy in the 1970-90 period) both signed the letter, as did Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and Paul Nitze, who was President Reagan's arms control supremo in the 1980s and a leading member of the hawkish 'Committee on the Present Danger' in the 1970s. Former NATO Assistant Secretary-General Philip Merrill and logistics chief Maj. Gen. Christian Patte were also among the signatories, as was Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the CIA.
2. A copy of the letter, dated 3 May 1995, was republished in the New York Review of Books, 21 May 1995, p. 75. (Six of the eighteen signatories subsequently signed the open letter in June 1997.) At this same period, Senator Richard G. Lugar (a proponent of enlargement) gave as his informed opinion that 'Russians . . . see United States policy on NATO enlargement as part of a larger shift in US policy designed to squeeze Russia out of Europe. In their minds, enlargement is linked to the US support for Bosnian Muslims, as well as the Ukraine. These moves have been seen as part of a larger strategic design to consolidate the geostrategic gains of the Cold War at Russia's expense.' NATO's Future: Problems, Threats, and US Interests (Washington, DC, 1995) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Hearings before the S/Cttee on European Affairs, 27 Apr. and 3 May 1995, p. 47.
3. A copy of the letter, dated 3 May 1995, was republished in the New York Review of Books, 21 May 1995, p. 75. (Six of the eighteen signatories subsequently signed the open letter in June 1997.) At this same period, Senator Richard G. Lugar (a proponent of enlargement) gave as his informed opinion that 'Russians . . . see United States policy on NATO enlargement as part of a larger shift in US policy designed to squeeze Russia out of Europe. In their minds, enlargement is linked to the US support for Bosnian Muslims, as well as the Ukraine. These moves have been seen as part of a larger strategic design to consolidate the geostrategic gains of the Cold War at Russia's expense.' NATO's Future: Problems, Threats, and US Interests (Washington, DC, 1995) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Hearings before the S/Cttee on European Affairs, 27 Apr. and 3 May 1995, p. 47.
4. Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books, 10 Aug. 1995, p. 27. The article reminded me of those in the Soviet Communist Party house organ Kommunist, where the losers in an internal debate were required to recant publicly by expounding the party line. For a recent justification of the Clinton administration's policy see Madeleine Albright, 'Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better', The Economist, 15 Feb. 1997.
5. Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books, 10 Aug. 1995, p. 27. The article reminded me of those in the Soviet Communist Party house organ Kommunist, where the losers in an internal debate were required to recant publicly by expounding the party line. For a recent justification of the Clinton administration's policy see Madeleine Albright, 'Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better', The Economist, 15 Feb. 1997.
6. At its June 1993 summit, the EU promised membership to these states, although no date was set. They were already Associate Partners in the WEU.
7. Strobe Talbott's meaning was spelt out in the Study on NATO Enlargement produced by NATO Headquarters in September 1995. The study was explicit that enlargement was intended to 'strengthen the effectiveness of the Alliance'.
8. Talbott, 'Why NATO Should Grow', p. 28, col. 1.
9. For an early critique of the rationale see Michael E. Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 1 (1995), pp. 36-40. See also Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996), pp. 45-65; Michael MccGwire, NATO Expansion and European Security, London Defence Study No. 37 (London, 1997), pp. 14-21.
10. For an early critique of the rationale see Michael E. Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 1 (1995), pp. 36-40. See also Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996), pp. 45-65; Michael MccGwire, NATO Expansion and European Security, London Defence Study No. 37 (London, 1997), pp. 14-21.
11. For an early critique of the rationale see Michael E. Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 1 (1995), pp. 36-40. See also Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996), pp. 45-65; Michael MccGwire, NATO Expansion and European Security, London Defence Study No. 37 (London, 1997), pp. 14-21.
12. Guardian, 7 Jul. 1997; The Times, 2 Jul. 1997. The New York Times, 12 Dec. 1996, was even more scathing: 'The administration has dressed up its plans with rhetoric about consolidating democracy and free markets in the lands of the Soviet empire, but it has yet to make a good case why a Cold War military alliance rather then the European Union is the best way to secure these aims.'
13. Guardian, 7 Jul. 1997; The Times, 2 Jul. 1997. The New York Times, 12 Dec. 1996, was even more scathing: 'The administration has dressed up its plans with rhetoric about consolidating democracy and free markets in the lands of the Soviet empire, but it has yet to make a good case why a Cold War military alliance rather then the European Union is the best way to secure these aims.'
14. NATO enlargement was one of the ten principles in Congressman Newt Gingrich's 'Contract with America'. The Republican landslide in November 1994 tilted the political balance decisively towards the radical right, which was both hostile to Russia and bitterly critical of Clinton's relationship with Boris Yeltsin. Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War (London, 1995), p. 67.
15. e.g., Richard Holbrooke (a leading proponent of enlargement), 'America: A European Power', Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 1995, p. 50. James Schlesinger (a former Secretary of Defense) is categorical that 'any [common security] order that excludes Russia would . . . carry with it the seeds of its own destruction' (publisher's blurb for Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace).
16. e.g., Richard Holbrooke (a leading proponent of enlargement), 'America: A European Power', Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 1995, p. 50. James Schlesinger (a former Secretary of Defense) is categorical that 'any [common security] order that excludes Russia would . . . carry with it the seeds of its own destruction' (publisher's blurb for Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace).
17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'A Plan for Europe', Foreign Affairs Jan./Feb. 1995, p. 34.
18. Jack Matlock, the US Ambassador in Moscow at the time, has said, 'we gave categorical assurances to Gorbachev back when the Soviet Union existed, that if a united Germany was able to stay in NATO, NATO would not be moved eastwards'. Quoted by Philip Zelikow, 'NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out', International Herald Tribune, 27 Jul. 1995.
19. The ethnic vote is very influential in Presidential elections because most of the (roughly) 20 million Americans of Central European origin are concentrated in fourteen key states, which have 194 Presidential electors, a third of the total. Those same fourteen states command only twenty-eight out of a total of one hundred votes in the Senate.
20. The text of the 'Founding Act' was agreed on 14 May 1997. On 16 May, the head of Russia's Security Council stated, 'It is my view that [ratification] is not [now] possible with the current Duma.' That same day, the Advisory Council on Foreign and Defense Relations warned that forcing a vote would lead to the treaty's rejection, which would in turn 'lead to an extremely dangerous situation [in] which implementation of all treaties on strategic nuclear arms between Moscow and Washington over the past ten years would look doubtful'. Disarmament and Diplomacy (June 1997), p. 43.
21. Marxist-Leninism was always explicit that the capitalist system was destined to fail and would be replaced by world socialism. But it spoke in terms of historical inevitability, of inexorable social forces, not of military conquest. Indeed, once the civil war was behind them, the Soviets consistently refuted the idea that war by itself caused revolution, or that revolution could be exported. Miliary forces were needed to defend socialist gains against attempts to reverse them.
22. The Turkish Straits were a partial exception. In the absence of an effective legal regime excluding warships of non-riparian powers, physical control of the Straits was the only certain way for Russia to prevent hostile maritime powers from concentrating their fleets at will, as they did in 1853-6, 1877-8, 1914, and 1918-21.
23. Which became California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.
24. In the Pacific, the war yielded the Philippines and Guam as spoils. It also justified the formal annexation of Hawaii and Wake Island, thus completing the 'lifeline' to China.
25. Some of these opportunities are outlined in Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC, 1987), pp. 354-5.
26. Ibid., pp. 15-20.
27. The British had already signalled de facto acceptance of Soviet claims to the Baltic States in 1942. Roy Douglas, From War to Cold War, 1942-48 (London, 1981), pp. 7-9, 188.
28. East European party chiefs had been told by Gorbachev in late 1986 that they could not expect Soviet military intervention to keep them in power. Michael MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security (Washington, DC, 1991), pp. 355-63.
29. Sir Rodric Braithwaite (former British Ambassador in Moscow) points out that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a failure not only of the Communist system, but of something much older: the Russian political and economic tradition evolved over many centuries. R. Braithwaite, 'Russia's Future Western Policy', in Robert D. Blackwill, Rodric Braithwaite, and Akiniko Tanaka, Engaging Russia (New York, 1995), p. 75. Jack Matlock (former US Ambassador) is adamant that the Soviet system cannot be rebuilt and that the Russian empire cannot be reconstituted. J. Matlock, 'The Russian Prospect', New York Review of Books, 29 Feb. 1996, p. 46.
30. Sir Rodric Braithwaite (former British Ambassador in Moscow) points out that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a failure not only of the Communist system, but of something much older: the Russian political and economic tradition evolved over many centuries. R. Braithwaite, 'Russia's Future Western Policy', in Robert D. Blackwill, Rodric Braithwaite, and Akiniko Tanaka, Engaging Russia (New York, 1995), p. 75. Jack Matlock (former US Ambassador) is adamant that the Soviet system cannot be rebuilt and that the Russian empire cannot be reconstituted. J. Matlock, 'The Russian Prospect', New York Review of Books, 29 Feb. 1996, p. 46.
31. See MccGwire, Perestroika, pp. 352-3.
32. The Black Sea provided the main route for Western intervention forces and supplies in 1918-21.
33. Robert D. Blackwill, 'Russia and the West', in Blackwill et al., Engaging Russia, p. 42.
34. In this specific context Douglas Hurd (former British Foreign Secretary) notes that 'spheres of influence exist; they will not be eliminated by resolutions from this or that body'. D. Hurd, 'Russian Reasons', Prospect, 22 (Aug./Sept. 1997), p. 13.
35. Lead editorial, The Times, 7 Jul. 1997.
36. 'The NATO enlargement debate is really a debate . . . over whether, when, and how to anchor the United States in Europe'. Senator Richard G. Lugar, in NATO's Future, p. 47.
37. Martin Walker, Guardian Weekly, 25 May and 6 Jul. 1997. Walker quotes from Clinton's public statements, but he also cites James Steinberg (Deputy National Security Advisor) as one of his sources.
38. Janne E. Nolan, 'Cooperative Security in the United States', in J. E. Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 508-11. She notes that only the liberal theory of isolationism advocates true disengagement, while the conservative isolationists accept intervention as necessary to impose American values. In practical terms, there is convergence between Pax Americana and conservative isolationism.
39. In March 1994, Senator Lugar declared that the US had 'to get over the idea that it was involved in a partnership with Moscow'. 'This is a tough rivalry', he insisted. Cox, US Foreign Policy, p. 63.
40. Principle I of the Final Act that established CSCE in 1975 recognizes the right to be a party to treaties of military alliance as a right inherent in sovereignty. However, the OSCE Code of Conduct also obligates the participating states 'not to strengthen their security at the expense of other states'. See John Borawski, 'The OSCE: In Search of Cooperative Security', Security Dialogue, 4 (1996), pp. 402-3.
41. At one stage (which leaked) the scenario for 'Sea Breeze' involved NATO and Ukrainian forces landing in Crimea to put down a separatist conflict, which was supported by a neighbouring state (read Russia). The final scenario involved a humanitarian relief mission in the face of an earthquake and armed unrest. The US (one ship - originally two - and marines) and Greece were the only non-Black Sea countries involved. Sunday Times, 16 Mar. 1997; International Herald Tribune, 20 Mar. 1997.
42. At one stage (which leaked) the scenario for 'Sea Breeze' involved NATO and Ukrainian forces landing in Crimea to put down a separatist conflict, which was supported by a neighbouring state (read Russia). The final scenario involved a humanitarian relief mission in the face of an earthquake and armed unrest. The US (one ship - originally two - and marines) and Greece were the only non-Black Sea countries involved. Sunday Times, 16 Mar. 1997; International Herald Tribune, 20 Mar. 1997.
43. It is irresponsible to pretend that, if Russia took coercive action against its immediate neighbours, NATO would respond in kind.
44. This would be comparable in some ways to the 1955 treaty between Austria and the four occupying powers, although that only forbade union with Germany. However, a condition of Soviet withdrawal was the Austrian 'Constitutional Law on Neutrality', which committed Austria to permanent neutrality.
45. Catherine Kelleher, 'Cooperative Security in Europe', in Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement, pp. 299-300.
46. See Jan Prawitz, 'A Nuclear-free Zone from the Baltic to the Black Sea', Security Dialogue, 2 (1996), pp. 227-8.
47. Assuming it encompassed the Baltic and the Black Sea, such an NFZ would distance Moscow and Berlin some 800 miles from the possible deployment of unfriendly nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the inclusion of both seas would encourage the development of special regimes for these areas, as has often been suggested in the past.
48. It has been estimated that the CEE arms market could be as much as $30bn over five years. 'NATO Expansion Means Market Expansion', Arms Sales Monitor, 35 (6 Aug. 1997), p. 4.
49. This policy was in force for more than two decades, only being reversed in early August 1997. Washington Post, cited in Guardian Weekly, 10 Aug. 1997.
50. The West persisted in this stance for four years, but at the First Review Conference on the CFE Treaty (held in May 1996), it finally agreed to some adjustment of Soviet force levels on 'the flanks'.
51. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 61. He points out that 'NATO expansion is, in the eyes of Russians in the 1990s, what the war guilt clause was for Germans in the 1930s: It reneges on the terms on which they believe the conflict with the West ended. It is a betrayal of the understanding they thought they had with their former enemies.'
52. Ibid., p. 60.
53. For a recent example see Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force, 'Statement of the Task Force', Russia, its Neighbours, and Enlarging NATO (May 1997).
54. In rebutting an assertion by the Soviet Ambassador that the US development of space-based weapons would lead to a build-up of Soviet offensive systems, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said that the Soviets, with time, would come to view the SDI as 'in our mutual interests'. Washington Post, 13 Apr. 1985. Earlier, Paul Nitze was reported as saying that the Reagan administration hoped that 'the Soviets will come to see the merits of our position - that it will serve their national interests as well as ours'. Washington Post, 10 Mar. 1985.
55. In rebutting an assertion by the Soviet Ambassador that the US development of space-based weapons would lead to a build-up of Soviet offensive systems, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said that the Soviets, with time, would come to view the SDI as 'in our mutual interests'. Washington Post, 13 Apr. 1985. Earlier, Paul Nitze was reported as saying that the Reagan administration hoped that 'the Soviets will come to see the merits of our position - that it will serve their national interests as well as ours'. Washington Post, 10 Mar. 1985.
56. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Cambridge, MA, 1965), p. 301. When Kennedy's emissary Walt Rostow visited Moscow in December 1960, Deputy Foreign Minister Vasiliy Kuznetsov expressed concern about the 'missile gap' issue in Kennedy's election. In 1959, US Strategic Air Command had 1,750 bombers and was beginning to develop ICBMs, at which time the Soviets lacked any effective means of delivering nuclear strikes on North America.
57. CFR Independent Task Force, 'Statement'.
58. Editorial, New York Times, 12 Dec. 1996.
59. For a pungent comment on how the three European powers were preoccupied with domestic concerns rather than the problems of security in Europe, see Blackwill, 'Russia and the West', pp. 32-4, 41. For an analysis of the shifting political interests of the European members of NATO that led to agreement on enlargement, see Michael E. Brown, 'In the Eye of the Storm' (forthcoming).
60. For a pungent comment on how the three European powers were preoccupied with domestic concerns rather than the problems of security in Europe, see Blackwill, 'Russia and the West', pp. 32-4, 41. For an analysis of the shifting political interests of the European members of NATO that led to agreement on enlargement, see Michael E. Brown, 'In the Eye of the Storm' (forthcoming).
61. 'A significant number - if not an outright majority - of . . . the [US] foreign policy establishment . . . is opposed, as is a growing number of senators.' Richard Cohen, International Herald Tribune, 9 Jul. 1997.
62. Brown, 'Eye of the Storm'.
63. If that were not so, the US Congress would long ago have cut off funding.
64. For example, two years before the Founding Act was signed, Robert Blackwill suggested as an alternative to the 16+1 formula, a 3+1 arrangement, the troika comprising the US, Britain/France/Germany (on a rotating basis), and one other member.
65. Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, Independent, 9 Jul. 1997. The opinion was first voiced by Ambassador Jonathan Dean in June 1995 and subsequently by George Kennan.