Weberian patrimonialism and imperial Chinese history

Theory and Society

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 83-102

  Eisenberg, Andrew ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032340547     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006866930343     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Max Weber, Economy and Society, trans. and ed. Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 375-384, 1006-1010.
2. Ibid., 1013.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 956.
5. Ibid., 1047-1051.
6. Ibid., 1052.
7. Ibid., 1028-1029.
8. Brad Reed, in a discussion of Ch'ing period county yamen administrative jurisdictions with regard to the duties of clerks and runners, noted that because most of them were not officially salaried, or were simply grossly underpaid, their livelihoods depended on non-formal fees. (See Reed, "Money and Justice: Clerks, Runners and the Magistrate's Court in Late Imperial Sichuan," Modern China 21/3 (1995). In this regard, legal cases were particularly remunerative. Thus, the jurisdictions exercised by the various bureaus within the yamen over particular types of legal cases were often hotly disputed. Reed notes that "Given the income producing potential of legal cases it is hardly surprising that the jurisdictional claims of clerks and runners frequently resulted in turf wars within the yamen . . ." (Reed, 350-351). Jurisdictions and fees were considered "proprietary rights" (Reed, 346) that had to be defended, and if possible, expanded.
9. Weber, Economy & Society, 1030.
10. Ibid., 1049.
11. Ibid., 956.
12. Susan Mann has published a monograph that adroitly utilizes the Weberian concept of "liturgy" in discussing commercial tax policy from the Ch'ing period through the mid-twentieth century. See Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). Prasenjit Duara's concept of "brokerage" to describe aspects of imperial-local relations in the late imperial period is very similar to Weber's concept of liturgical services. See Duara, Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 51-53.
13. Susan Mann has published a monograph that adroitly utilizes the Weberian concept of "liturgy" in discussing commercial tax policy from the Ch'ing period through the mid-twentieth century. See Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). Prasenjit Duara's concept of "brokerage" to describe aspects of imperial-local relations in the late imperial period is very similar to Weber's concept of liturgical services. See Duara, Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 51-53.
14. Pierre Etienne-Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 314-317.
15. Donald N. Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 159.
16. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180-1201. Weber's complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160-162, and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1150-1151. Kalberg (p. 1151) specifically denies that Weber's concept of rationalization was related to a "unilinear evolutionary process." Indeed, Weber's neo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a "radical perspectivism" (Kalberg "Max Weber's Types of Rationality," 1155: also see Zaret for the methodological insights, "From Weber to Parsons," 1181-1188). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recent monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24-25).
17. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180-1201. Weber's complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160-162, and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1150-1151. Kalberg (p. 1151) specifically denies that Weber's concept of rationalization was related to a "unilinear evolutionary process." Indeed, Weber's neo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a "radical perspectivism" (Kalberg "Max Weber's Types of Rationality," 1155: also see Zaret for the methodological insights, "From Weber to Parsons," 1181-1188). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recent monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24-25).
18. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180-1201. Weber's complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160-162, and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1150-1151. Kalberg (p. 1151) specifically denies that Weber's concept of rationalization was related to a "unilinear evolutionary process." Indeed, Weber's neo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a "radical perspectivism" (Kalberg "Max Weber's Types of Rationality," 1155: also see Zaret for the methodological insights, "From Weber to Parsons," 1181-1188). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recent monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24-25).
19. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180-1201. Weber's complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160-162, and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1150-1151. Kalberg (p. 1151) specifically denies that Weber's concept of rationalization was related to a "unilinear evolutionary process." Indeed, Weber's neo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a "radical perspectivism" (Kalberg "Max Weber's Types of Rationality," 1155: also see Zaret for the methodological insights, "From Weber to Parsons," 1181-1188). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recent monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24-25).
20. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180-1201. Weber's complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160-162, and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1150-1151. Kalberg (p. 1151) specifically denies that Weber's concept of rationalization was related to a "unilinear evolutionary process." Indeed, Weber's neo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a "radical perspectivism" (Kalberg "Max Weber's Types of Rationality," 1155: also see Zaret for the methodological insights, "From Weber to Parsons," 1181-1188). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recent monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24-25).
21. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, "From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180-1201. Weber's complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160-162, and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1150-1151. Kalberg (p. 1151) specifically denies that Weber's concept of rationalization was related to a "unilinear evolutionary process." Indeed, Weber's neo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a "radical perspectivism" (Kalberg "Max Weber's Types of Rationality," 1155: also see Zaret for the methodological insights, "From Weber to Parsons," 1181-1188). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recent monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24-25).
22. Weber, Economy & Society, 810.
23. The edited volume by Philip C. C. Huang and Kathryn Bernhardt, Civil Law in Qing and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), provides a stimulating discussion of late imperial civil law. For a misconstrued attack by Huang on Weber's understanding of civil adjudication, see page 147 in this volume.
24. Weber, Economy & Society, 976-978. Also, Weber, Religion of China, 102, 148-149. In Weber's Religion of China, 102-103, he includes a specific comparison with the English common-law tradition.
25. Weber, Economy & Society, 976-978. Also, Weber, Religion of China, 102, 148-149. In Weber's Religion of China, 102-103, he includes a specific comparison with the English common-law tradition.
26. Weber, Economy & Society, 976-978. Also, Weber, Religion of China, 102, 148-149. In Weber's Religion of China, 102-103, he includes a specific comparison with the English common-law tradition.
27. Weber, Economy & Society, 976, 978, respectively.
28. Ibid., 818.
29. This tradition is discussed in the context of the late imperial period by Judith M. Boltz, "Not by the Seal of Office Alone: New Weapons in the Battle with the Supernatural," in Patricia B. Ebrey and Peter N. Gregory, editors, Religion and Society in T'ang and Sung China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 241-305.
30. See Philip C. C. Huang's discussion in "Between Imperial Mediation and Formal Adjudication: The Third Realm of Qing Justice," Modern China 19/2 (1993): 251-298.
31. Mark A. Allee argues this point very clearly. See his. "Code, Culture, and Custom: Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a Nineteenth Century County Court," in Huang and Bernhardt, editors, Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, 124-125.
32. Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), 387-388.
33. Weber, Economy & Society, 844-845.
34. See Rowe, Hankow - Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889, vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). This is somewhat ironic since Rowe's book was specifically designed to debunk the Weberian position. The detailed discussion of nineteenth-century Hankow, however, actually lends support to Weber's hypotheses (particularly with regard to the issue of guild liturgies) illustrating the extraordinary flexibility and adaptability of the patrimonial polity (in particular, see Rowe, Hankow, 285-288).
35. See Rowe, Hankow - Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889, vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). This is somewhat ironic since Rowe's book was specifically designed to debunk the Weberian position. The detailed discussion of nineteenth-century Hankow, however, actually lends support to Weber's hypotheses (particularly with regard to the issue of guild liturgies) illustrating the extraordinary flexibility and adaptability of the patrimonial polity (in particular, see Rowe, Hankow, 285-288).
36. Gary G. Hamilton, "Patriarchalism in Imperial China and Western Europe - A Revision of Weber's Sociology of Domination," Theory and Society 13/3 (1984): 393-425.
37. A clear distinction between patriarchalism and patrimonialism is also made by Wolfgang Schluchter. Schluchter explicitly identifies the former with kinship polities and the latter with imperium, or the creation of differentiated political functions on a territory-wide basis. In terms of historical precedents, this process has necessitated the severe alteration or complete destruction of the pre-existing kinship polity. See Schluchter. The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 119.
38. Stephen Kalberg notes that despite overlapping values, as far as the ideal typical constructs are concerned "Weber's models hypothesize that patriarchal, feudal, and patrimonial types of rulership remain in relationships of strict opposition to one another. . . " See Kalberg, Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 106.
39. For the Shang period, see K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 158-259. Also his, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 127. For the Western Chou period see Tu cheng-sheng, Chou-tai ch'eng-pang (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1979). Mark Lewis has argued that such kinship organizations dominated society and politics from the 700s through 500s B.C. (the onset of the Warring States Period). See his Sanctioned Violence in Early China, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1-52. While Lewis does not specifically discuss the concept of patrimonialism, one can clearly understand from his presentation that the emergence of the competitive Warring States Period polities after the 500s B.C. represented the first experimental appearances of regionally centered patrimonial regimes (see particularly pages 9-10, 53-96).
40. For the Shang period, see K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 158-259. Also his, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 127. For the Western Chou period see Tu cheng-sheng, Chou-tai ch'eng-pang (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1979). Mark Lewis has argued that such kinship organizations dominated society and politics from the 700s through 500s B.C. (the onset of the Warring States Period). See his Sanctioned Violence in Early China, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1-52. While Lewis does not specifically discuss the concept of patrimonialism, one can clearly understand from his presentation that the emergence of the competitive Warring States Period polities after the 500s B.C. represented the first experimental appearances of regionally centered patrimonial regimes (see particularly pages 9-10, 53-96).
41. For the Shang period, see K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 158-259. Also his, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 127. For the Western Chou period see Tu cheng-sheng, Chou-tai ch'eng-pang (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1979). Mark Lewis has argued that such kinship organizations dominated society and politics from the 700s through 500s B.C. (the onset of the Warring States Period). See his Sanctioned Violence in Early China, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1-52. While Lewis does not specifically discuss the concept of patrimonialism, one can clearly understand from his presentation that the emergence of the competitive Warring States Period polities after the 500s B.C. represented the first experimental appearances of regionally centered patrimonial regimes (see particularly pages 9-10, 53-96).
42. For the Shang period, see K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 158-259. Also his, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 127. For the Western Chou period see Tu cheng-sheng, Chou-tai ch'eng-pang (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1979). Mark Lewis has argued that such kinship organizations dominated society and politics from the 700s through 500s B.C. (the onset of the Warring States Period). See his Sanctioned Violence in Early China, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1-52. While Lewis does not specifically discuss the concept of patrimonialism, one can clearly understand from his presentation that the emergence of the competitive Warring States Period polities after the 500s B.C. represented the first experimental appearances of regionally centered patrimonial regimes (see particularly pages 9-10, 53-96).
43. See Kalberg's discussion of Weber's contextual sociology and the multi-causal orientation in his, Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology, 39-78.
44. A striking example of shifting terms of discussion occurs on page 418 where Hamilton suddenly, and in a somewhat indirect fashion, notifies the reader that, in fact, his entire argument applies only to the Late Imperial Period of Chinese history (c. 1000-1900)
45. Ray Huang, Taxation in Sixteenth Century Ming China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 45.
46. For a similar sort of discussion see John H. Kautsky, The Politics of Aristocratic Empires (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 80-81. G. W. Skinner's discussion of the inferred rationale behind the structure of the Ch'ing dynasty administrative system in China also lends credence to the overwhelmingly "realpolitik" perspective of the regime. Skinner argues that defense/internal security and revenue extraction concerns dictated the patterned arrangement of the various administrative units. See Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 301-346.
47. For a similar sort of discussion see John H. Kautsky, The Politics of Aristocratic Empires (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 80-81. G. W. Skinner's discussion of the inferred rationale behind the structure of the Ch'ing dynasty administrative system in China also lends credence to the overwhelmingly "realpolitik" perspective of the regime. Skinner argues that defense/internal security and revenue extraction concerns dictated the patterned arrangement of the various administrative units. See Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 301-346.
48. See Owen Lattimore's discussion of broad territorial frontier zones and peoples who were capable of autonomous political action that could tilt the balance of power between neighboring patrimonial regimes in his Studies in Frontier History (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 165-166, 469-491.
49. G. W. Skinner's address on patterns in Chinese history strongly correlated regionally based economic surges over time to both the shifting location of the imperial capital and to regionally tailored imperial political policies. See Skinner, "Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History," Journal of Asian Studies 44/2 (1985): 281-284.
50. Regardless of the varying size of the variety of formal administrative units that were developed and experimented with over the course of time, a major goal of the China-based patrimonial regime was fragmentation and duplication of authority at all subordinate administrative levels. See Elizabeth Endicott-West's discussion of the Mongol "darughaci" in her Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Ray Huang's work on the sixteenth-century Ming financial system describes in great detail a purposely fragmented revenue system. See Huang, Taxation in Sixteenth Century Ming China. In an interesting comment regarding the failure of the late Ch'ing New Army experiment, Edward McCord noted that the organizational fragmentation that plagued the military system was a conscious policy designed to prevent military usurpations. See McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 18. Finally, Prasenjit Duara notes that, "State involution does not occur where the state seeks a restricted role, as in traditional China, and where efficiency is not in itself an absolute value." Duara, Culture, Power and the State, 75.
51. Regardless of the varying size of the variety of formal administrative units that were developed and experimented with over the course of time, a major goal of the China-based patrimonial regime was fragmentation and duplication of authority at all subordinate administrative levels. See Elizabeth Endicott-West's discussion of the Mongol "darughaci" in her Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Ray Huang's work on the sixteenth-century Ming financial system describes in great detail a purposely fragmented revenue system. See Huang, Taxation in Sixteenth Century Ming China. In an interesting comment regarding the failure of the late Ch'ing New Army experiment, Edward McCord noted that the organizational fragmentation that plagued the military system was a conscious policy designed to prevent military usurpations. See McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 18. Finally, Prasenjit Duara notes that, "State involution does not occur where the state seeks a restricted role, as in traditional China, and where efficiency is not in itself an absolute value." Duara, Culture, Power and the State, 75.
52. Regardless of the varying size of the variety of formal administrative units that were developed and experimented with over the course of time, a major goal of the China-based patrimonial regime was fragmentation and duplication of authority at all subordinate administrative levels. See Elizabeth Endicott-West's discussion of the Mongol "darughaci" in her Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Ray Huang's work on the sixteenth-century Ming financial system describes in great detail a purposely fragmented revenue system. See Huang, Taxation in Sixteenth Century Ming China. In an interesting comment regarding the failure of the late Ch'ing New Army experiment, Edward McCord noted that the organizational fragmentation that plagued the military system was a conscious policy designed to prevent military usurpations. See McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 18. Finally, Prasenjit Duara notes that, "State involution does not occur where the state seeks a restricted role, as in traditional China, and where efficiency is not in itself an absolute value." Duara, Culture, Power and the State, 75.
53. The concept of a disjunctive imperial polity has been articulated by Owen Lattimore in his Studies in Frontier History, 480-481; and Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers: Social Forces in Medieval China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 3-12.
54. The concept of a disjunctive imperial polity has been articulated by Owen Lattimore in his Studies in Frontier History, 480-481; and Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers: Social Forces in Medieval China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 3-12.
55. In this regard, see Benjamin Elman, "Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examination in Late Imperial China," Journal of Asian Studies 50/1 (1991): 7-28.
56. Prasenjit Duara discusses Ch'ing cooptation of the Kuan-ti cults and temples in his Culture, Power and the State, 139-148. James L. Watson offers a similar discussion of imperial actions toward a preexisting popular cult along the Southeast Coast of China in his "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou (Empress of Heaven) Along the South China Coast," in D. Johnson, A. Nathan, and E. Rawski, editors, Popular Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). In his most recent monograph Duara reiterates this understanding of the tendency for the Chinese imperial regime to use cultural brokerage techniques as a means of stabilizing and legitimizing imperial rule compared to the more absolutizing, if not destructive policies of the modern state. See Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 97.
57. Prasenjit Duara discusses Ch'ing cooptation of the Kuan-ti cults and temples in his Culture, Power and the State, 139-148. James L. Watson offers a similar discussion of imperial actions toward a preexisting popular cult along the Southeast Coast of China in his "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou (Empress of Heaven) Along the South China Coast," in D. Johnson, A. Nathan, and E. Rawski, editors, Popular Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). In his most recent monograph Duara reiterates this understanding of the tendency for the Chinese imperial regime to use cultural brokerage techniques as a means of stabilizing and legitimizing imperial rule compared to the more absolutizing, if not destructive policies of the modern state. See Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 97.
58. Prasenjit Duara discusses Ch'ing cooptation of the Kuan-ti cults and temples in his Culture, Power and the State, 139-148. James L. Watson offers a similar discussion of imperial actions toward a preexisting popular cult along the Southeast Coast of China in his "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou (Empress of Heaven) Along the South China Coast," in D. Johnson, A. Nathan, and E. Rawski, editors, Popular Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). In his most recent monograph Duara reiterates this understanding of the tendency for the Chinese imperial regime to use cultural brokerage techniques as a means of stabilizing and legitimizing imperial rule compared to the more absolutizing, if not destructive policies of the modern state. See Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 97.
59. How far and how fast Chinese society changed at any given time is highly variable. Patricia Ebrey noted with regard to the issue of patriarchy in Chinese society that, "Although all historians today reject the vision of a "changeless" China, we should not over-compensate for past failings and deny that, in comparison to other major civilizations, Chinese history is marked by some rather remarkable continuities and a tendency to an equilibrium after some deviation." Ebrey goes on to apply this idea to continuities in basic cosmological principles and to the "regular returns to a monarchical-bureaucratic form of government." See Ebrey, The Inner Quarters -Marriage and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Sung Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19931, 271. Ebrey's statement is a bit strong, particularly the hint at an inherent systems equilibrium with regard to patterns in Chinese history. A milder restatement of this position would simply acknowledge the relatively stable parameters for change in state and society provided by the patrimonial mode of domination.