Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 489-509

  Schouten, Maurice K D ^a   De Jong, Huib Looren ^b  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032337959     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089808573274     Document Type: Article

References (65)

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