Fairness and self-interest: An assessment

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 245-261

  Alvi, Eskander ^a  

^a WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032337776     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(99)80087-0     Document Type: Article

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