Three Positivism

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 78, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 791-810

  West, Robin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032336757     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699 (1998).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699 (1998).
3. Id. at 459, 78 B.U. L. REV. at 701.
4. Id. at 461, 78 B.U. L. REV. at 702.
5. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVENANCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (2d ed. 1970) (1861).
6. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Charles W. Everett ed., 1978) (1776).
7. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593-629 (1958).
8. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 1-429 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 139-64 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 654, 654-94 (1991).
11. See BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 3-273.
12. See Hart, supra note 7, at 594.
13. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 810 (1993).
14. See BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE 156-66, 173-79 (1988).
15. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 202-07 (1961); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at vii-xv (1977).
16. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 202-07 (1961); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at vii-xv (1977).
17. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS: THE AUTHORITY OF NARRATIVE COMMUNITIES (1982).
18. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS: THE AUTHORITY OF NARRATIVE COMMUNITIES (1982).
19. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS: THE AUTHORITY OF NARRATIVE COMMUNITIES (1982).
20. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1980).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1980).
22. See FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO, supra note 16.
23. See ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE AUTHORITY AND LAW 387-93 (1993).
24. But Cover sees that the implication of such a commitment to the positivism of law, while it may indeed free the outsider, citizen legal critic, seemingly restricts the interpretive power, and hence the felt moral options, of the insider judge. See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 193-256 (1975).
25. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
26. See id. at 7-12; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
27. See id. at 7-12; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
28. See HART, supra note 15, at 132-50; H.L.A. Hart, Diamonds and Strings: Holmes on the Common Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278, 278-85 (1983); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958).
29. See HART, supra note 15, at 132-50; H.L.A. Hart, Diamonds and Strings: Holmes on the Common Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278, 278-85 (1983); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958).
30. See HART, supra note 15, at 132-50; H.L.A. Hart, Diamonds and Strings: Holmes on the Common Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278, 278-85 (1983); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958).
31. See HART, supra note 15, at 141-44.
32. See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer 43 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
33. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 460, 78 B.U. L. REV. at 701.
34. See id. at 469-77, 78 B.U. L. REV, at 708-715.
35. See id. at 465-66, 78 B.U. L. REV. at 705-706.
36. See id. at 459, 78 B.U. L. REV. at 700 ("The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.").
37. See id. at 462, 463, 471, 78 B.U. L. REV. at 702, 703, 710.
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39. See generally Luban, supra note 25.
40. The exceptions are so few they can still be string-cited. See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1703 (1997); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
41. The exceptions are so few they can still be string-cited. See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1703 (1997); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
42. The exceptions are so few they can still be string-cited. See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1703 (1997); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
43. The exceptions are so few they can still be string-cited. See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1703 (1997); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
44. See Luban, supra note 25, at 43-44.
45. See HART, supra note 15, at 132-37.
46. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 696-98 (1980) (book review).
47. Those generations may, after all, assuming "sour grapes," have much less desire for a clean environment than we might project onto them, and if so, they may have every reason not to want us to paternalistically predetermine the desirability or undesirability of their soured world and limit their wealth accordingly. See Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENVT'L L. 2283, 2301-02 (1982).