The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions

Public Choice

Volumn 94, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 67-83

  Dow, Jay K ^a   Endersby, James W ^a   Menifield, Charles E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032331664     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017942115014     Document Type: Article

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