Nattering NATO negativism? Reasons why expansion may be a good thing

Review of International Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 43-67

  Ball, Christopher L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032331465     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210598000436     Document Type: Article

References (155)

1. New York Times, 9 Jul. 1997.
2. John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future' and Jack Snyder, 'Averting Anarchy in the New Europe', in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), The Cold War and After (Cambridge, 1993).
3. Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, 1993); Condeleezza Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times, 8 Jul. 1996; Michael Portillo, 'Give Nato the Tools to Finish its Job', The Times, 8 Jul. 1997.
4. Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, 1993); Condeleezza Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times, 8 Jul. 1996; Michael Portillo, 'Give Nato the Tools to Finish its Job', The Times, 8 Jul. 1997.
5. Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, 1993); Condeleezza Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times, 8 Jul. 1996; Michael Portillo, 'Give Nato the Tools to Finish its Job', The Times, 8 Jul. 1997.
6. Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, 1993); Condeleezza Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times, 8 Jul. 1996; Michael Portillo, 'Give Nato the Tools to Finish its Job', The Times, 8 Jul. 1997.
7. Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, 1993); Condeleezza Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times, 8 Jul. 1996; Michael Portillo, 'Give Nato the Tools to Finish its Job', The Times, 8 Jul. 1997.
8. Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a New NATO', Foreign Affairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., 'NATO Expansion: The Next Steps', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA, 1993); Condeleezza Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times, 8 Jul. 1996; Michael Portillo, 'Give Nato the Tools to Finish its Job', The Times, 8 Jul. 1997.
9. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
10. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
11. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
12. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
13. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
14. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
15. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York, 1996); Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York, 1996); Michael Brown, 'The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', Survival, 37:1 (Spring 1995); Charles Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', International Security, 18:1 (Summer 1993); Susan Eisenhower, 'Bear at Bay', The Spectator, 12 Jul. 1997, pp. 14-15; George F. Kennan, 'A Fateful Error', New York Times, 5 Feb 1997; Thomas L. Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better', New York Times, 6 Sept. 1997.
16. This article does not address the debate over whether the expansion of the alliance is a vital interest of the United States. My aim is to show how international relations theories dominant in US academic discussions apply, not to present a theory of US foreign policy.
17. 'Forgotten Victim of Chechnya: Russian Army', New York Times, 19 Jan. 1997. 'Russian Army May Be Close to Collapse, a Study Finds', New York Times, 15 Feb. 1997.
18. 'Forgotten Victim of Chechnya: Russian Army', New York Times, 19 Jan. 1997. 'Russian Army May Be Close to Collapse, a Study Finds', New York Times, 15 Feb. 1997.
19. See Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 36; Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better'.
20. See Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 36; Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better'.
21. See Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 36; Friedman, 'Bigger Isn't Better'.
22. I will examine more sophisticated versions of this argument below.
23. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 20 ; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 2; Steve Weber, 'Does NATO Have a Future?', in Beverly Crawford (ed.), The Future of European Security (Berkeley, CA, 1992), p. 361.
24. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 20 ; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 2; Steve Weber, 'Does NATO Have a Future?', in Beverly Crawford (ed.), The Future of European Security (Berkeley, CA, 1992), p. 361.
25. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 20 ; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 2; Steve Weber, 'Does NATO Have a Future?', in Beverly Crawford (ed.), The Future of European Security (Berkeley, CA, 1992), p. 361.
26. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 54; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 36-7.
27. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 54; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 36-7.
28. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 36-37; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 84.
29. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 36-37; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 84.
30. The Military Balance: 1995-1996 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 71-3.
31. Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow'; William Safire, 'NATO: Bigger is Better', New York Times 16 Dec. 1996.
32. Rice, 'Now, NATO Should Grow'; William Safire, 'NATO: Bigger is Better', New York Times 16 Dec. 1996.
33. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, 30:2 (Jan. 1978).
34. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 41-2; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 59; Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 7; Kennan, 'A Fateful Error'.
35. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 41-2; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 59; Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 7; Kennan, 'A Fateful Error'.
36. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 41-2; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 59; Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 7; Kennan, 'A Fateful Error'.
37. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 41-2; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 59; Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 7; Kennan, 'A Fateful Error'.
38. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', pp. 41-2; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 59; Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', p. 7; Kennan, 'A Fateful Error'.
39. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 49-51; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 84.; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 41.
40. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 49-51; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 84.; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 41.
41. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 49-51; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 84.; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 41.
42. For a discussion of Acheson's speech, see Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1974), pp. 146-7.
43. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 35; Michael Mandelbaum, 'Preserving the New Peace', Foreign Affairs, 74:3 (May/Jun. 1995).
44. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 35; Michael Mandelbaum, 'Preserving the New Peace', Foreign Affairs, 74:3 (May/Jun. 1995).
45. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, (Ithaca, NY, 1991), pp. 5-6.
46. Janice Gross Stein, 'Deterrence and Reassurance', in Philip Tetlock et al. (eds.), Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York, 1989), pp. 23, 29.
47. Ibid., p. 29.
48. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 60; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 42; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83.
49. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 60; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 42; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83.
50. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 60; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 42; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 83.
51. 'Russia is Selling Nuclear Reactors to India', New York Times, 6 Feb. 1997.
52. 'Russia's Surly Answer to NATO', The Economist, 1 Feb. 1997.
53. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address White House Press Office, 24 Jan. 1995.
54. The Economist, 1 Feb. 1997; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 42.
55. The Economist, 1 Feb. 1997; Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 42.
56. New York Times, 15 May 1997.
57. Edward L. Rowny, 'No Link to START 2', New York Times, 7 Aug. 1997. Rowny was the chief US negotiator for START I.
58. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 'Adaptation of the CFE Treaty', 2 Dec. 1996.
59. New York Times, 14 May 1997.
60. Ibid., 19 and 20 Feb. 1997.
61. On abandonment and entrapment, see Glenn Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', World Politics, 36 (Jun. 1984). On chain-ganging, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization, 44 (Spring 1990). I do not know anyone who argues this explicitly, but it is a possible danger.
62. On abandonment and entrapment, see Glenn Snyder, 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', World Politics, 36 (Jun. 1984). On chain-ganging, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization, 44 (Spring 1990). I do not know anyone who argues this explicitly, but it is a possible danger.
63. Glaser is concerned that NATO will be dragged into wars in the East, as he calls it, but he does not see chain-ganging as likely. See Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', pp. 10-18.
64. The democratic and liberal peace literature is premised upon this. Moreover, so is the rest of NATO. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York, 1996).
65. Defence Issues 11:89, 'NATO and a "Super" Partners in Europe?' Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Seminar on the Future of Defence Cooperation Around the Baltic Sea, Copenhagen, 24 Sept. 1996.
66. Defence Issues 11:89, 'NATO and a "Super" Partners in Europe?' Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Seminar on the Future of Defence Cooperation Around the Baltic Sea, Copenhagen, 24 Sept. 1996.
67. Defence Issues, 11:97, 'A Pragmatic U.S.-Russian Partnership?' Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the Military Academy of the Russian General Staff, Moscow, 17 Oct. 1996.
68. Defence Issues, 11:97, 'A Pragmatic U.S.-Russian Partnership?' Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the Military Academy of the Russian General Staff, Moscow, 17 Oct. 1996.
69. See the discussion below, 'Restraining effects on non-allied states'.
70. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, 1982), pp. 72-4; Robert Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, NY, 1989) pp. 206-9.
71. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York, 1982), pp. 72-4; Robert Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, NY, 1989) pp. 206-9.
72. See Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace', in Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), The Cold War and After; Hanns W. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', Foreign Affairs, 70 (Winter 1990/1). Thomas U. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', in Katzenstein (ed.), Culture of National Security.
73. See Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace', in Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), The Cold War and After; Hanns W. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', Foreign Affairs, 70 (Winter 1990/1). Thomas U. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', in Katzenstein (ed.), Culture of National Security.
74. See Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace', in Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.), The Cold War and After; Hanns W. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', Foreign Affairs, 70 (Winter 1990/1). Thomas U. Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', in Katzenstein (ed.), Culture of National Security.
75. See Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 167.
76. An essay focusing on interest could possibly answer this. The point here is that a non-normative theory of security does not offer an answer.
77. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 157, esp. n.2.
78. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', pp. 8-9; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 9; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 171.
79. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', pp. 8-9; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 9; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 171.
80. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', pp. 8-9; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 9; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, p. 171.
81. Ironically, Mandelbaum downplays the restraining role of the alliance for Central Europe given the failure of NATO to prevent the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus (Dawn of Peace, p. 52). Another limited NATO supporter disagrees, citing the restraints as crucial for western and southern European security. NATO prevented the conflict from escalating. See Weber, 'Does NATO Have a Future?', p. 379.
82. Ironically, Mandelbaum downplays the restraining role of the alliance for Central Europe given the failure of NATO to prevent the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus (Dawn of Peace, p. 52). Another limited NATO supporter disagrees, citing the restraints as crucial for western and southern European security. NATO prevented the conflict from escalating. See Weber, 'Does NATO Have a Future?', p. 379.
83. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', pp. 5, 9-10; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 1, esp. pp. 16, 19.
84. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best', pp. 5, 9-10; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, ch. 1, esp. pp. 16, 19.
85. See Asmus et al., 'NATO Expansion'; Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'NATO and the Have Not', Foreign Affairs, 75:6 (Nov./Dec. 1996).
86. See Asmus et al., 'NATO Expansion'; Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'NATO and the Have Not', Foreign Affairs, 75:6 (Nov./Dec. 1996).
87. See, e.g., 'Clinton's NATO: Keen on Growth, Murky on Mission', New York Times, 13 Jul. 1997.
88. While the advocates have moderate military visions for NATO, their reassurance measures do not focus sufficiently on NATO force reductions given Russia's currently weakened military. Instead, they argue for the current NATO status quo with the addition of some Central European forces. See Asmus et al., 'NATO Expansion', pp. 31-2.
89. For a representative sample, see 27 Nov. 1996 US Information Agency summary of foreign press commentaries from Central European states. 'Joining NATO: Central Europe Sees a Cure-all', New York Times, 11 Jun. 1997.
90. Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', International Security, 20:1 (Summer 1995).
91. On the risk of events getting out of hand, see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT, 1966), chs. 8 and 9, esp. pp. 52-55 on implicit commitments.
92. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', argues that it would be provocative to expand now.
93. New York Times, 24 Jan. 1997.
94. Data from SIPRI Yearbook 1996 (Oxford, 1996), p. 731.
95. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 'Adaptation', 2 Dec., 1996.
96. US Department of Defense, 1996 Annual Review.
97. Asmus et al., 'NATO Expansion', argue that current levels are adequate in term of combat vehicles and divisions (p. 30), but I argue that those levels should be lower if we believe that security is increased.
98. See, e.g., 'A Bigger NATO', The Economist, 12 Jul. 1997.
99. Kugler, Enlarging NATO, pp. 12-14.
100. Anti-expansionists often assume that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will be readily incorporated into the EU. But if the EU delays this and if their independent security efforts reduce this likelihood further, relations may deteriorate even further.
101. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future'.
102. Including Slovakia would be necessary to provide for geographic continuity among the members. Otherwise, Hungary would be separated from Poland and the Czech Republic. The Times, 7 Jul. 1997, criticizes the expansion for this reason.
103. Comments in Detroit, 23 Oct. 1996 (my italics).
104. Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'.
105. Ibid., p. 170.
106. See Asmus et al., 'What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?'
107. Richard K. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War?', International Security, 17:1 (Summer 1992), pp. 30-40.
108. The Economist, 8 Feb. 1997; New York Times, 27 Sept., 11 Oct., and 19 Dec. 1996 and 5 Jan. 1997.
109. The Economist, 8 Feb. 1997; New York Times, 27 Sept., 11 Oct., and 19 Dec. 1996 and 5 Jan. 1997.
110. The nature of threat estimates must be clearly specified. It is possible that Russian decision-makers make only qualitative assessments. So while a Central European alliance would be considered inherently weak, the potential for US and Western European participation in a Central European state's war with Russia is threatening, no matter what the actual force posture is. The point is that critics of NATO expansion have not been clear about which argument they are making or what evidence they have for either one.
111. Asmus et al., 'NATO Expansion', p. 9.
112. Brown, 'Flawed Logic', p. 37.
113. See New York Times, 23 and 24 Jan. 1997, p. A8.
114. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York, 1957); Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan (eds.), Military Force and American Society (New York, 1973).
115. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York, 1957); Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan (eds.), Military Force and American Society (New York, 1973).
116. 'America and Russia in a Changing World', address at Columbia University, 29 Oct., 1996.
117. See Pushkov, 'The Risk of Losing Russia'.
118. Kurt W. Bassuener, 'Russia's Concerns Aside, NATO Must Expand', letter, New York Times, 10 Feb. 1997; Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1997.
119. Kurt W. Bassuener, 'Russia's Concerns Aside, NATO Must Expand', letter, New York Times, 10 Feb. 1997; Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1997.
120. See Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 'What Kind of "Democracy" Is This?', New York Times, 4 Jan. 1997, p. 23.
121. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York, 1948/93), p. 5.
122. While the structure of the system drives the security dilemma, Kenneth Waltz argues that expansionist statesmen deluded themselves into thinking they can succeed despite the likely formation of a balancing alliance. See K. Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (eds.), The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, 1988).
123. K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979), p. 187. 'A dilemma cannot be solved.'
124. For a view that this is a central issue in international security theory in general, see Randall Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias', Security Studies, 5:3 (Spring 1996).
125. Ruggie, Winning the Peace, uses the term 'cooperative security; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, uses 'common security.' The terms are essentially interchangeable, although Ruggie's discussion is rooted more deeply in the work on security communities, while Mandelbaum focuses on defence dominance (ch. 5) and confidence-building (ch. 6). These ideas Ruggie would call part of 'cooperative balancing', the least advanced form of cooperative security, p. 103-6.
126. Ruggie, Winning the Peace, uses the term 'cooperative security; Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, uses 'common security.' The terms are essentially interchangeable, although Ruggie's discussion is rooted more deeply in the work on security communities, while Mandelbaum focuses on defence dominance (ch. 5) and confidence-building (ch. 6). These ideas Ruggie would call part of 'cooperative balancing', the least advanced form of cooperative security, p. 103-6.
127. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 50. Ruggie, Winning the Peace, pp. 85-8, 103.
128. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, p. 50. Ruggie, Winning the Peace, pp. 85-8, 103.
129. The Marshall Plan was launched in June 1947. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949. In his recent article, Ruggie notes the two-year difference, but argues that the Marshall Plan, not NATO, was the primary mechanism for achieving European security. See J. G. Ruggie, 'Consolidating NATO's European Pillar, Washington Quarterly, 20:1 (Winter 1997), p. 111.
130. See Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 106-7; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, pp. 88-9. Also Charles and Clifford Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16:1 (1991).
131. See Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 106-7; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, pp. 88-9. Also Charles and Clifford Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16:1 (1991).
132. See Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 106-7; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, pp. 88-9. Also Charles and Clifford Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security, 16:1 (1991).
133. Mandelbaum, Dawn of Peace, pp. 106-7.
134. Betts, 'Systems for Peace', pp. 27-8. See p. 21 for discussion of these proposals.
135. Ruggie, Winning the Peace, pp. 89-103.
136. See Robert Jervis, 'Security Regimes', International Organization, 36:2 (Spring 1982), esp. pp. 176-8.
137. For more detail on changes in Soviet thinking on these matters, see William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', International Security, 19:3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 110-15.
138. See Stein, 'Deterrence and Reassurance', p. 12.
139. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
140. Ibid., p. 9.
141. See Janice Lebow and Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ, 1994), pp. 317-19.
142. Stein, 'Deterrence and Reassurance', p. 9.
143. Ibid, p. 31.
144. Ibid., pp. 42-3.
145. Ibid., p. 50.
146. Ibid., pp. 52-6.
147. Defence Issues, 11:97.
148. Betts, 'Systems for Peace', for a discussion of concerts over collective security.
149. The figure is from Defence Issues, 11:97.
150. New York Times, 24 Jul. 1997.
151. Ibid., 19 Feb. 1997.
152. For an argument that US diplomacy can achieve some of these aims without NATO expansion, see Robert Jervis, 'Legacies of the Cold War', The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2:2 (Summer 1995).
153. For a discussion of Ukraine's nuclear behaviour, see Scott Sagan, 'Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?', International Security, 21:3 (Winter 1996/7), pp. 80-2.
154. See Financial Times, 25 Feb. 1997; New York Times, 15 May 1997.
155. See Financial Times, 25 Feb. 1997; New York Times, 15 May 1997.