Between reform and revolution

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 300-383

  Kis, János ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032330227     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325498012002005     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Cf. B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven, 1992).
2. T. Garton Ash, "Refolution, the Springtime of Two Nations," The New York Review of Books (5 July 1989); and "Refolution in Hungary and Poland," ibid. (17 August 1989). (See also A. Arato, Revolution, Restauration and Legitimation (Working Papers, Center for the Study of Social Change, New School for Social Research, No. 156). The present paper relies in many respects on the analysis of Arato.
3. T. Garton Ash, "Refolution, the Springtime of Two Nations," The New York Review of Books (5 July 1989); and "Refolution in Hungary and Poland," ibid. (17 August 1989). (See also A. Arato, Revolution, Restauration and Legitimation (Working Papers, Center for the Study of Social Change, New School for Social Research, No. 156). The present paper relies in many respects on the analysis of Arato.
4. T. Garton Ash, "Refolution, the Springtime of Two Nations," The New York Review of Books (5 July 1989); and "Refolution in Hungary and Poland," ibid. (17 August 1989). (See also A. Arato, Revolution, Restauration and Legitimation (Working Papers, Center for the Study of Social Change, New School for Social Research, No. 156). The present paper relies in many respects on the analysis of Arato.
5. See S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 119f.
6. See Adam Michnik's seminal "New Evolutionism," in Letters from Prison (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
7. For the Polish discussions, see Adam Michnik's passionate articles from 1990 to 1991, in his Gondban a bohóc (The Fool in Worry) (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1996). For the Hungarian story, see the debate on the deadlock of constitution-making in the summer of 1996, in G. Hegyi, "Hirtelen halál" (Sudden Death), Népszava (9 July); M, Haraszti, "Horn Gyula kicsi puccsa" (The Little Coup of Gyula Horn), Népszabadság (11 July); and Kónya: "Stabilizálni kell a demokráciát" (Democracy in Need of Stabilization), Népszabadság (12 August)
8. For the Polish discussions, see Adam Michnik's passionate articles from 1990 to 1991, in his Gondban a bohóc (The Fool in Worry) (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1996). For the Hungarian story, see the debate on the deadlock of constitution-making in the summer of 1996, in G. Hegyi, "Hirtelen halál" (Sudden Death), Népszava (9 July); M, Haraszti, "Horn Gyula kicsi puccsa" (The Little Coup of Gyula Horn), Népszabadság (11 July); and Kónya: "Stabilizálni kell a demokráciát" (Democracy in Need of Stabilization), Népszabadság (12 August)
9. For the Polish discussions, see Adam Michnik's passionate articles from 1990 to 1991, in his Gondban a bohóc (The Fool in Worry) (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1996). For the Hungarian story, see the debate on the deadlock of constitution-making in the summer of 1996, in G. Hegyi, "Hirtelen halál" (Sudden Death), Népszava (9 July); M, Haraszti, "Horn Gyula kicsi puccsa" (The Little Coup of Gyula Horn), Népszabadság (11 July); and Kónya: "Stabilizálni kell a demokráciát" (Democracy in Need of Stabilization), Népszabadság (12 August)
10. For the Polish discussions, see Adam Michnik's passionate articles from 1990 to 1991, in his Gondban a bohóc (The Fool in Worry) (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1996). For the Hungarian story, see the debate on the deadlock of constitution-making in the summer of 1996, in G. Hegyi, "Hirtelen halál" (Sudden Death), Népszava (9 July); M, Haraszti, "Horn Gyula kicsi puccsa" (The Little Coup of Gyula Horn), Népszabadság (11 July); and Kónya: "Stabilizálni kell a demokráciát" (Democracy in Need of Stabilization), Népszabadság (12 August)
11. See, for example, on Elster, "Introduction," Elster, ed., The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1996), 11-16.
12. See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 111ff. In its decision, which struck down a law on retroactive political justice, the Hungarian Constitutional Court seems to have been relying on the Kelsen test of legal continuity. The court claimed that because the transition was completed through a legislative process that strictly abided by the standing legislative rules, the new regime was continuous with the old one, and the fact of continuity had decisive consequences for the issue of punishing perpetrators whose acts were not prosecuted under the laws of the previous regime. See Constitutional Court of the Hungarian Republic Resolution No. 11/1992, (III.5.) AB, in Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 1 (1994), 129-57. I think there are good reasons to strike down the law in question as unconstitutional, but I find this reasoning mistaken, as will be seen in the following paragraphs.
13. See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 111ff. In its decision, which struck down a law on retroactive political justice, the Hungarian Constitutional Court seems to have been relying on the Kelsen test of legal continuity. The court claimed that because the transition was completed through a legislative process that strictly abided by the standing legislative rules, the new regime was continuous with the old one, and the fact of continuity had decisive consequences for the issue of punishing perpetrators whose acts were not prosecuted under the laws of the previous regime. See Constitutional Court of the Hungarian Republic Resolution No. 11/1992, (III.5.) AB, in Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 1 (1994), 129-57. I think there are good reasons to strike down the law in question as unconstitutional, but I find this reasoning mistaken, as will be seen in the following paragraphs.
14. Again, this is Kelsen's view. See his The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), chap. 5.
15. J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 188f. J. Finnis, "Revolutions and Continuity of Law," in A.W.B. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1973).
16. J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 188f. J. Finnis, "Revolutions and Continuity of Law," in A.W.B. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1973).
17. See Kelsen, General Theory, 41f.
18. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 100.
19. See The Dual State of E. Fraenkel (London, 1942). In a penetrating essay. Roger Sharlet has show how the dual-state model applies to the Soviet Union. Cf. Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," in R. C. Tucker, ed., Stalinism. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 115-179.
20. See The Dual State of E. Fraenkel (London, 1942). In a penetrating essay. Roger Sharlet has show how the dual-state model applies to the Soviet Union. Cf. Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," in R. C. Tucker, ed., Stalinism. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 115-179.
21. Paradoxically, the Great Terror itself contributed, to some degree, to the upsurge of this trend. At its very height, an implacable campaign has been launched against the so-called commodity exchange school of law, which professed the withering away of legal institutions under communism and proposed simplification of the legal material and de-professionalization of legal pratice as immediate steps in that direction. The purge was conducted in the name of legal stability, predictability, and professionalism, and contributed to the rehabilitation of traditional civil law, family law, the law on property, labor law, and civil as well as criminal procedure. See P. H. Solomon, Jr., "Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror," Slavic Review 46 (1987): 391-413. On the long-standing tendency toward routinization and its limits, see E. Huskey, "From Legal Nihilism to Pravovoc Gosudarstvo [law-based state]," in D. D. Barry, ed., Toward the "Rule of Law" in Russia?, Armon K N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 23-42.
22. Paradoxically, the Great Terror itself contributed, to some degree, to the upsurge of this trend. At its very height, an implacable campaign has been launched against the so-called commodity exchange school of law, which professed the withering away of legal institutions under communism and proposed simplification of the legal material and de-professionalization of legal pratice as immediate steps in that direction. The purge was conducted in the name of legal stability, predictability, and professionalism, and contributed to the rehabilitation of traditional civil law, family law, the law on property, labor law, and civil as well as criminal procedure. See P. H. Solomon, Jr., "Soviet Criminal Justice and the Great Terror," Slavic Review 46 (1987): 391-413. On the long-standing tendency toward routinization and its limits, see E. Huskey, "From Legal Nihilism to Pravovoc Gosudarstvo [law-based state]," in D. D. Barry, ed., Toward the "Rule of Law" in Russia?, Armon K N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 23-42.
23. At the end of 1988, at a briefing given to leading journalist, Károly Grósz then prime minister of Hungary, was asked if the political crisis could provoke an action of the Soviet army. The answer was that in case of extreme necessity the Soviets would be ready to close down the Western frontiers of the country but that they would not interfere with its internal developments. The journalist who reported on this event added that this was the moment for him to recognize that change in the regime was inevitable. See S. Köröspataki Kiss, "Kis Emlék Grósz Károlyról" (A Little Memory About Károly Grósz), Mangyar Hírlap, 17 January 1996.
24. This was the view of Rezsö Nyers, one of the leading MSZMP progressives, expressed by him in the fall of 1987. See his interview in Magyar Ifjúság, 18 December 1987.
25. It was in the same spirit that (Imre Pozsgay offered the umbrella of the People's Patriotic Front to the emerging Hungarian Democratic Forum. See his interview in Magyar Nemzet, 14 November 1987. The hope that the Communist party would be able to maintain the key power centers, such as the military, the security forces, and the foreign affairs, survived the National Roundtable negotiations and did not completely evaporate until the referendum held in the late fall of 1989.
26. Interestingly enough, some of the later opposition parties were created with the help of the leaders of the MSZMP. Before the resuscitation of the pre-1948 parties, Imre Pozsgay experimented with the MDF, then with the People's party (the heir of the National Peasant party), and created a voluntary association of his own, the ill-fated Movement for Democratic Hungary. Rezsö Nyers stood behind the creation of the New March Front (a loose network meant to unite reform-minded party members and nonparty reformers), and later he was said to support the attempt to revive the Social Democratic party, while János Berecz had a try with the Smallholders party. (See the interview with János Berecz, Beszélö, 20 April 1995. Berecz's attempt is particularly telling because he was one of the most outspoken hard-liners in the post-Kádár leadership. But, since the fall of 1987 on, the MSZMP leaders competing for supreme power saw no other options for strengthening their hands than to marshal organized support outside the party.
27. In a January 19 memo on party pluralism and the electoral system. György Fejti, the secretary of the Central Committee, sided firmly with a distribution of the parliamentary seats before the elections in order to secure a majority for the MSZMP. Kálmán Kulcsár, then minister of justice, who gives a detailed account of this memo, notes that this was the mainstream position within the communist leadership, and that it took a couple more months for the MSZMP to accept the idea of free and contested elections. See Kulcsár, Két világ kózott (Between Two Worlds) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994), 123.
28. The May 1988 party conference, while eliminating Kádár and his generation from the Politburo, decided for the maintenance of the one-party system, and no communist leader departed, in his public statements, from this position until early November. On November 2, Berecz (then a member of both the Politburo and the CC Secretariat) closed a Central Committee meeting by the affirmation that, while it was unclear whether the one-party system would stay or be changed for party pluralism, it was better to stick, for the time being, to the decision of the party conference. The next couple of months before the February 1989 Central Committee meeting were marked by internally incoherent and mutually contradictory statements by individual leaders. See S. Révész, Aczél és korunk (Aczél and Our Times), (Budapest: Sík kiadó, 1997), 394 ff.
29. Ferene Munnich (1890-1966), a Communist party member since 1918 and a fighter with the International Brigades in the Spanish civil war, became notorious as a leading figure in the postrevolutionary repression of 1956-1957.
30. For example, Imre Pozsgay gravitated toward the populists, while Rezsö Nyers, a young Social Democrat before 1948, made overtures toward his old political family.
31. It was common knowledge, for example, that Károly Grósz and János Berecz were opposed to each other, and that this opposition took the form of bitter power struggles.
32. For example, an attempt was made in the spring of 1989 to pass a Law on the Parties without even consulting the opposition. The bill was published twice (Magyar Nemzet, 19, April 1989, and 18 May 1989), and it was submitted to the Parliament for discussion. See A. Bozóki, "Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable," East European Politics and Societies 7 (1993):276-308.
33. For example, an attempt was made in the spring of 1989 to pass a Law on the Parties without even consulting the opposition. The bill was published twice (Magyar Nemzet, 19, April 1989, and 18 May 1989), and it was submitted to the Parliament for discussion. See A. Bozóki, "Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable," East European Politics and Societies 7 (1993):276-308.
34. György Fejti, who led the preparatory talks on behalf of the Communist party, followed these tactics in April. His aim was to exclude Fidesz from the negotiations and to include various satellites of the MSZMP. See the report by Imre Kónya, who represented the opposition at the first meeting convened by Fejti, in B. A. Bálint, Guözelemre születtünk Kónya Imre az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalról (Born for Victory: Imre Kónya on the Opposition Roundtable) (Budapest:Progresszió Kft 1990), 35ff.
35. According to Kálmán Kulcsár, this possibility was still being seriously considered by some communist leaders at a Politburo meeting on May 26, - that is, less than three weeks before the opening of the formal roundtable talks. See Kulcsár, Két viĺg Kozott, 125.
36. The populistic MDF and the liberal SZDSZ were opposed to each other by dint of their political philosophy, their background culture, and their bitter historical memories not untainted by anti-Semitic statements by some of the MDF leaders.
37. It originally consisted of the MDF, the SZDSZ, Fidesz, the Smallholders' party, the People's party, the Social Democratic party, the League of the Independent Trade Unions, and the Society of Bajcsy-Zsilinszky's Friends, a discussion club named after a prewar politician who was killed by the Nazis in December 1944. Somewhat later, the newly reconstituted Christian Democratic People's party was co-opted. The best account of the history of the OR and of the negotiations between it and the Communist party is, to my knowledge, "Hungary's Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable," by Andrá Bozó See note 33.
38. On the attempts of the communist leadership, including the widespread use of the secret services in order to spread disinformation and influence the behavior of the major opposition groups, see János Kenedi's excellent Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv (Little Reader in State Security) (Budapest: Magvetö, 1996), a documentary based on the secret files of the MSZMP and the Ministry of the Interior.
39. In fact, the party was split in October 1989, and not more than 5 percent of the old MSZMP membership joined the MSZP, the larger of the two successor organizations. The unexpected level of defections further demoralized the communist camp.
40. During the entire era of the communist rule, the PZPR (the Polish United Workers' party) governed in coalition with the SD (the Democratic party) and the SL (the People's party), which had to run on a common list with the communists and have given minor government positions. In 1989, the PZPR reserved 38 percent of the seats for itself and 27 percent for its satellites.
41. The first opposition candidate to win, Gábor Roszik, was jointly supported by the MDF, Fidesz, and the SZDSZ, while the other two, József Debreczeni and Ernö Raffay, were presented by the MDF.
42. See Zbigniew Bujak, as cited by W. Osiatynski, "The Roundtable Talks in Poland," in J. Elster, ed., The Rountable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 53.
43. See the interview with Bálint Magyar in A. Richter, Ellenzéki kerekasztal (Budapest: Ötlet Kft, 1990), 30.
44. For a sense of the weakening of the communist bargaining positions, see Kulcsár; Két világ Kozott, 151.
45. In large part, the split of the OR reflected a time lag in the perception, by the more moderate and radical opposition forces, of the shift in the international conditions of the Hungarian transition process. But another fact contributed to the break as well. Since about mid-August, the SZDSZ negotiators had had the feeling that the MDF was leading separate talks with the MSZMP, See Iván Petö's interview in Richter, Ellenzékt́ Kerekasztal, 184. This was categorically denied by both parties in the weeks before and after the September 18 agreement. Later, however, Imre Pozsgay made a different statement to the effect that he was having almost regular contacts with József Antall in the relevant period. In the course of these meetings, he said, he had obtained significant information about the state of affairs within the OR and, at times, Mr. Antall would even provide him with pieces of advice. See "Antall instrualta volna az MSZMP-1?" (Was the MSZMP Advised by Mr. Antall?), Magyar Hirlap, 27 September 1990. Antall, then prime minister, vehemently denied the allegation. See Magyar Hirlap, 28 September 1990. However, Pozsgay did not retract his statement. In his memoirs, published three years later, he says that he met Antall in the company of two other MDF leaders in his house at Lake Balaton sometime in mid-August, although he is rather vague about the topic of the discussions: "[A] helyzet és a tennivalók megitélése volt napirenden" (On the agenda was the question how to judge the situation and the tasks.) See I. Pozsgay 1989, 167. I don't believe that the fact of informal discussions was a problem in itself. What did harm the much-needed confidence between the two wings of the OR, however, was the denial of the contacts which gave rise to the specter of a separate deal.
46. In large part, the split of the OR reflected a time lag in the perception, by the more moderate and radical opposition forces, of the shift in the international conditions of the Hungarian transition process. But another fact contributed to the break as well. Since about mid-August, the SZDSZ negotiators had had the feeling that the MDF was leading separate talks with the MSZMP, See Iván Petö's interview in Richter, Ellenzékt́ Kerekasztal, 184. This was categorically denied by both parties in the weeks before and after the September 18 agreement. Later, however, Imre Pozsgay made a different statement to the effect that he was having almost regular contacts with József Antall in the relevant period. In the course of these meetings, he said, he had obtained significant information about the state of affairs within the OR and, at times, Mr. Antall would even provide him with pieces of advice. See "Antall instrualta volna az MSZMP-1?" (Was the MSZMP Advised by Mr. Antall?), Magyar Hirlap, 27 September 1990. Antall, then prime minister, vehemently denied the allegation. See Magyar Hirlap, 28 September 1990. However, Pozsgay did not retract his statement. In his memoirs, published three years later, he says that he met Antall in the company of two other MDF leaders in his house at Lake Balaton sometime in mid-August, although he is rather vague about the topic of the discussions: "[A] helyzet és a tennivalók megitélése volt napirenden" (On the agenda was the question how to judge the situation and the tasks.) See I. Pozsgay 1989, 167. I don't believe that the fact of informal discussions was a problem in itself. What did harm the much-needed confidence between the two wings of the OR, however, was the denial of the contacts which gave rise to the specter of a separate deal.
47. In large part, the split of the OR reflected a time lag in the perception, by the more moderate and radical opposition forces, of the shift in the international conditions of the Hungarian transition process. But another fact contributed to the break as well. Since about mid-August, the SZDSZ negotiators had had the feeling that the MDF was leading separate talks with the MSZMP, See Iván Petö's interview in Richter, Ellenzékt́ Kerekasztal, 184. This was categorically denied by both parties in the weeks before and after the September 18 agreement. Later, however, Imre Pozsgay made a different statement to the effect that he was having almost regular contacts with József Antall in the relevant period. In the course of these meetings, he said, he had obtained significant information about the state of affairs within the OR and, at times, Mr. Antall would even provide him with pieces of advice. See "Antall instrualta volna az MSZMP-1?" (Was the MSZMP Advised by Mr. Antall?), Magyar Hirlap, 27 September 1990. Antall, then prime minister, vehemently denied the allegation. See Magyar Hirlap, 28 September 1990. However, Pozsgay did not retract his statement. In his memoirs, published three years later, he says that he met Antall in the company of two other MDF leaders in his house at Lake Balaton sometime in mid-August, although he is rather vague about the topic of the discussions: "[A] helyzet és a tennivalók megitélése volt napirenden" (On the agenda was the question how to judge the situation and the tasks.) See I. Pozsgay 1989, 167. I don't believe that the fact of informal discussions was a problem in itself. What did harm the much-needed confidence between the two wings of the OR, however, was the denial of the contacts which gave rise to the specter of a separate deal.
48. This condition again failed to obtain in Poland in 1980-1981, The Gdansk workers agreed with the representatives of the government on a formula that was not sustainable in the long run. The compromise followed the strategic formula of the democratic opposition: Give full governmental power to the party-state and, in exchange, acquire the right to organized social self-defense. From this, it followed first that the government bore sole responsibility for the costs of economic stabilization and reform; this rendered the movement defenseless against the temptations of economic populism. Second, institutional changes assumed a wrong direction: from political pluralism toward economic self-management. Third, political opposition became subordinate to economic; interest-representation, and economic interest-representation directly addressed the question of power; political polarization was unavoidable. Clearly, the convergence of the negotiations on this unhappy formula reflected the constraints of the political situation at the time, neither the Soviet leadership nor its Polish proxies being ready to conceive a deal in terms of political pluralism. And the same unwillingness to share power made its independent contribution to the unfolding of the crisis in 1981. But once we have observed this, it is important to see that the structure of the agreement also played a part in giving rise to a stalemate that, in its turn, could not be overcome in any other way than by clamping down on the Solidarity movement with military force. The year 1989 differed from 1980 not only in that in the meantime the crisis of Soviet rule became open but also in that a learning process took place concerning the nature of forging compromises. I elaborated on this issue in my article "A Szolidaritás hosszú menetelése" (The Long March of Solidarnosc), Beszélö, 5-6, 1983; and "Politika mint állampolgári hivatás" (Politics as a Civic Vocation) Café Babel, January 1995.
49. This condition again failed to obtain in Poland in 1980-1981, The Gdansk workers agreed with the representatives of the government on a formula that was not sustainable in the long run. The compromise followed the strategic formula of the democratic opposition: Give full governmental power to the party-state and, in exchange, acquire the right to organized social self-defense. From this, it followed first that the government bore sole responsibility for the costs of economic stabilization and reform; this rendered the movement defenseless against the temptations of economic populism. Second, institutional changes assumed a wrong direction: from political pluralism toward economic self-management. Third, political opposition became subordinate to economic; interest-representation, and economic interest-representation directly addressed the question of power; political polarization was unavoidable. Clearly, the convergence of the negotiations on this unhappy formula reflected the constraints of the political situation at the time, neither the Soviet leadership nor its Polish proxies being ready to conceive a deal in terms of political pluralism. And the same unwillingness to share power made its independent contribution to the unfolding of the crisis in 1981. But once we have observed this, it is important to see that the structure of the agreement also played a part in giving rise to a stalemate that, in its turn, could not be overcome in any other way than by clamping down on the Solidarity movement with military force. The year 1989 differed from 1980 not only in that in the meantime the crisis of Soviet rule became open but also in that a learning process took place concerning the nature of forging compromises. I elaborated on this issue in my article "A Szolidaritás hosszú menetelése" (The Long March of Solidarnosc), Beszélö, 5-6, 1983; and "Politika mint állampolgári hivatás" (Politics as a Civic Vocation) Café Babel, January 1995.
50. For an overview of the third-way ideas that were cropping up in all political corners, see S. Révész, Antall József távolról (József Antall from a Distance) (Budapest: Sik Kiadó, 1995), 54 skk.
51. "During the negotiations the parties refrain from any unilateral move that could prejudice the aim of the negotiatíons," states the agreement on the negotiations, which served as the basis for the Hungarian roundtable negotiations, Magyar Nemzet, 12 June 1989.
52. "Legislation cannot precede the political agreements," ibid.
53. Cf. T. Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social-Structural Approach," (in Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 99-119.
54. Cf. F. Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society (London, 1961): and C. Kerr et. al.: Industrialism and Industrial Man (London, 1962).
55. Cf. F. Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society (London, 1961): and C. Kerr et. al.: Industrialism and Industrial Man (London, 1962).
56. See the debate between Peter Hahner and István Eörsi in Kritika, January 1994 Hahner, "Mit üzen a guillotine?" (What is the Guillotine's Message?); and Eörsi, "Kedvetlen válasz három pontban" (Ill-Tempered Answer in Three Points).
57. See the debate between Peter Hahner and István Eörsi in Kritika, January 1994 Hahner, "Mit üzen a guillotine?" (What is the Guillotine's Message?); and Eörsi, "Kedvetlen válasz három pontban" (Ill-Tempered Answer in Three Points).
58. See Ackerman's Liberal Revolution. Some would identify the Czechoslovak and East German cases as instances of a peaceful revolution. I do not believe this is exact. Both the October 1989 events in the GDR and the November 1989 events in Czechoslovakia peaked in a roundtable agreement. And in both cases the talks came before the situation could have evolved into a confrontation among multiple power centers. This made possible the maintenance of an impeccable legal continuity. Therefore, although the regime changes in Czechoslovakia and the GDR show some interesting similarities with the amended Case Two of Section 2. they nevertheless fall under Case Four.
59. John Rawls attributes this capacity to constitutional democracy. See his Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 143.
60. In an article that suggested that the newly elected Parliament should follow a procedure that I called conservative constitution-making, based on the understanding that the framers should interpret the constitutional practices issued from the transition instead of designing a new blueprint out of thin air. See J. Kis, "A rendszerváltást lezáró alkotmány" (A Constitution for Closing the Regime Change), Népszabadsag, 20 August 1994.
61. For an excellent account of the vagaries of constitution-making, see A. Arato, "The Constitution-Making Endgame in Hungary," East European Constitutional Review 5 (1996): 31-39.