Exploring the complicationist gambit: An Austrian approach to the economic analysis of law

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 315-382

  Crespi, Gregory Scott ^a,b,c  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032326294     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (378)

1. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (4th ed. 1992).
2. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 477 (1974).
3. EDWARD HUNDERT, LESSONS FROM AN OPTICAL ILLUSION: ON NATURE AND NURTURE, KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES (1995), at Part One frontispiece (quoting J.L. Austin).
4. Friedrich Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK, 266, 269, 272 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt Leube eds., 1984).
5. One recent study concluded that for the past several decades law-and-economics reasoning "appears to have pervaded about one quarter of scholarship in elite law reviews." Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 28 (1989). To reach this conclusion Ellickson surveyed annual volumes of the Harvard Law Review, the Stanford Law Review, the University of Chicago Law Review, and the Yale Law Journal at five-year intervals, ending with the 1985-86 issues. Id. at 26-29.
6. One recent study concluded that for the past several decades law-and-economics reasoning "appears to have pervaded about one quarter of scholarship in elite law reviews." Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 28 (1989). To reach this conclusion Ellickson surveyed annual volumes of the Harvard Law Review, the Stanford Law Review, the University of Chicago Law Review, and the Yale Law Journal at five-year intervals, ending with the 1985-86 issues. Id. at 26-29.
7. The other highly significant jurisprudential development, in this author's opinion, is the incorporation into legal thinking of the various branches of "critical theory," including critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminism.
8. The more basic concepts usually covered are those relevant to the standard supply-and-demand models of price and output determination. The somewhat more advanced concepts presented generally include the concepts of producer and consumer surplus, the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria and their normative premises, the Coase Theorem, externalities and public goods, certain basic statistical measures, the implications of risk-aversion, cost/benefit analysis, and basic game-theoretic concepts. For a detailed discussion of one professor's attempt to structure such a course along neoclassical lines, but with due regard given to criticisms of that framework, see Gregory Crespi, Teaching the New Law and Economics, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 713 (1994).
9. The AALS Directory of Law Teachers lists 153 law professors who teach law and economics courses and notes that 78 of these professors are currently teaching the subject. ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHS., AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1153-54 (1995-96). This information understates the number of law professors qualified to teach the subject, and probably the number of courses offered as well, because it omits many noted law and economics scholars. It also does not reflect the significant extent to which economic concepts have been incorporated into the teaching of substantive courses at many law schools.
10. There are professors teaching these courses, as well as leading scholars in the area, who have graduate degrees only in one of the two fields and have through infor-mal study developed the necessary level of expertise in the other field. However, it is difficult to teach economic concepts effectively if one has not had the opportunity for the advanced study and teaching of the subject provided by graduate economics programs. It is, of course, a rare person who can effectively teach law courses without having formal legal training. The standard credentials required today for obtaining a position at a major American law school that would involve teaching law and economics courses, particularly for a person seeking to obtain an entry-level position, are both a J.D. degree in law and a Ph.D. in economics.
11. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS]; ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1759).
12. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS]; ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1759).
13. DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1973) (1817).
14. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1961) (1890).
15. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 10.
16. See, e.g., CARL MENGER, INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS (Louis Schneider, ed. & Francis J. Nock, trans., N.Y. Univ. Press 1985) (1883); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (Bert F. Hoselitz, ed. & James Dingwald, trans., The Free Press 1950) (1871); KAREN I. VAUGHN, AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA: THE MIGRATION OF A TRADITION 12 (1994) ("Modern Austrians of all stripes uniformly trace their beginnings back to the writings of Carl Menger . . . , and especially to his Principles of Economics.").
17. See, e.g., CARL MENGER, INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS (Louis Schneider, ed. & Francis J. Nock, trans., N.Y. Univ. Press 1985) (1883); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (Bert F. Hoselitz, ed. & James Dingwald, trans., The Free Press 1950) (1871); KAREN I. VAUGHN, AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA: THE MIGRATION OF A TRADITION 12 (1994) ("Modern Austrians of all stripes uniformly trace their beginnings back to the writings of Carl Menger . . . , and especially to his Principles of Economics.").
18. See, e.g., CARL MENGER, INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS (Louis Schneider, ed. & Francis J. Nock, trans., N.Y. Univ. Press 1985) (1883); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (Bert F. Hoselitz, ed. & James Dingwald, trans., The Free Press 1950) (1871); KAREN I. VAUGHN, AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA: THE MIGRATION OF A TRADITION 12 (1994) ("Modern Austrians of all stripes uniformly trace their beginnings back to the writings of Carl Menger . . . , and especially to his Principles of Economics.").
19. See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 13.
20. EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, THE POSITIVE THEORY OF CAPITAL (William Smart trans., G.E. Steichert & Co. photo, reprint 1930) (1891).
21. FREIDRICH VON WEISER, NATURAL VALUE (William Smart ed. & Christian A. Malloch trans., Macmillan & Co. 1893).
22. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (3rd ed. 1966).
23. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
24. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
25. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
26. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
27. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
28. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
29. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
30. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
31. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
32. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
33. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
34. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
35. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
36. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
37. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
38. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
39. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
40. Friedrich Hayek's contributions to the development of Austrian economic theory are extensive. See, e.g., FA. HAYEK, COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING (1935); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE (1952); F.A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY]; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1st Gateway ed. 1972) (1945); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE]; F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE]; FA. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]; F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (N. Kaldor & H.M. Croome trans., 1933); F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES]; F.A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (2d ed. 1935); F.A. HAYEK, PROFITS, INTEREST AND INVESTMENT (1939); F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946); F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (1967); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). Hayek was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. While his most widely read work is probably his anti-socialist tract The Road to Serfdom, his most extensive discussions of his economic theories and their applications to legal questions are probably presented in The Constitution of Liberty, and in Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order.
41. Murray Rothbard has written extensively on Austrian economics and its political implications. His best known work is his two-volume treatise, Man, Economy and State, written in 1970. MURRAY NEWTON ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1970).
42. Israel Kirzner has written extensively on questions of Austrian economics. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992); Israel M. Kirzner, The Economics of Time and Ignorance: Review Essay, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter Kirzner, Review].
43. Israel Kirzner has written extensively on questions of Austrian economics. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992); Israel M. Kirzner, The Economics of Time and Ignorance: Review Essay, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter Kirzner, Review].
44. Israel Kirzner has written extensively on questions of Austrian economics. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992); Israel M. Kirzner, The Economics of Time and Ignorance: Review Essay, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter Kirzner, Review].
45. Israel Kirzner has written extensively on questions of Austrian economics. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992); Israel M. Kirzner, The Economics of Time and Ignorance: Review Essay, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter Kirzner, Review].
46. Israel Kirzner has written extensively on questions of Austrian economics. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963) [hereinafter, KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (1992); Israel M. Kirzner, The Economics of Time and Ignorance: Review Essay, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter Kirzner, Review].
47. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
48. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
49. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
50. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
51. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
52. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
53. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
54. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
55. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
56. Ludwig M. Lachmann has written a number of works important in the development of Austrian economic thinking. See, e.g., L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE (1956); L.M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1977); LM. LACHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER (1971); L.M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS]; Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 1-18 (L. Spadaro ed., 1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Carl Menger and the Incomplete Revolution of Subjectivism, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 57 (1978); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 54 (1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On Austrian Capital Theory, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 145-51 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: The Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 126-32 (E. Dolan ed., 1976); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Review Essay of The Economics of Time and Ignorance by Gerald O'Driscoll and Morio Rizzo, 3 MARKET PROCESS 1-4, 17-18 (1985) (book review) [hereinafter Lachmann, Review].
57. See, e.g., ROY E. CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE (1992); THE ECONOMICS OF LUDWIG VON MISES: TOWARDS A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (Laurence Moss ed., 1976); GERALD O'DRISCOLL & MARIO Rizzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE (1985); VAUCHN, supra note 14.
58. See, e.g., ROY E. CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE (1992); THE ECONOMICS OF LUDWIG VON MISES: TOWARDS A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (Laurence Moss ed., 1976); GERALD O'DRISCOLL & MARIO Rizzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE (1985); VAUCHN, supra note 14.
59. See, e.g., ROY E. CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE (1992); THE ECONOMICS OF LUDWIG VON MISES: TOWARDS A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (Laurence Moss ed., 1976); GERALD O'DRISCOLL & MARIO Rizzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE (1985); VAUCHN, supra note 14.
60. See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at x. But see THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1980), (including text in which the central Austrian concepts are developed in some detail and applied to a broad range of social policy issues).
61. See POSNER, supra note 1, and accompanying text.
62. See generally LAO-TZU, TAO, A NEW WAY OF THINKING: A TRANSLATION OF THE TAO TE CHING (1975), for the definitive explanation of the principle of complementarity.
63. See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1 ("Certainly, the number of books and articles that take an Austrian view of some issue or another or that make reference to the views of some well-known Austrian economist have grown dramatically since the early 1970s.").
64. See id. There remains, however, considerable hostility to Austrian economics among neoclassicists. See also infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
65. See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that these Ph.D. programs,
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See SOWELL, supra note 24.
69. Milton Friedman was quoted on the back cover of THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (2d ed. 1996) ("This is a brilliant book."). See also Peter Brimelow, A Man Alone, FORBES, Aug. 24, 1987, at 41. ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] regarded by [Milton] Friedman and other economists as his [Sowell's] single most important theoretical contribution to their discipline . . . ."); Phillip F. Lawler, Dismal Yes, Science No, POLICY REVIEW, Spring 1980, at 164 ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] a brilliantly original book . . . .").
70. Milton Friedman was quoted on the back cover of THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (2d ed. 1996) ("This is a brilliant book."). See also Peter Brimelow, A Man Alone, FORBES, Aug. 24, 1987, at 41. ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] regarded by [Milton] Friedman and other economists as his [Sowell's] single most important theoretical contribution to their discipline . . . ."); Phillip F. Lawler, Dismal Yes, Science No, POLICY REVIEW, Spring 1980, at 164 ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] a brilliantly original book . . . .").
71. Milton Friedman was quoted on the back cover of THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (2d ed. 1996) ("This is a brilliant book."). See also Peter Brimelow, A Man Alone, FORBES, Aug. 24, 1987, at 41. ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] regarded by [Milton] Friedman and other economists as his [Sowell's] single most important theoretical contribution to their discipline . . . ."); Phillip F. Lawler, Dismal Yes, Science No, POLICY REVIEW, Spring 1980, at 164 ("[Knowledge and Decisions is] a brilliantly original book . . . .").
72. SOWELL, supra note 33.
73. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (3d ed. 1970).
74. All Austrians trace the roots of their approach to the work of Carl Menger, particularly his Principles of Economics. See VAUGHN, supra note 14.
75. Richard B. McKenzie, The Neoclassicalists vs. the Austrians: A Partial Reconciliation of Competing Worldviews, 47 S. ECON. J. 1, 7 (1980).
76. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3-43 (1953).
77. See id. at 9.
78. There is a difference between the two approaches in the justification offered for use of the rationality assumption. The Austrians regard it as an axiom necessarily implicit in the concept of human action, where the neoclassicists tend to regard it more as an instrumental assumption selected for its ability to generate useful predictions. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 54 (1992).
79. Karl-Heinz Paqué, How Far Is Vienna from Chicago?: An Essay on the Methodology of Two Schools of Dogmatic Liberalism, 38 KYKLOS 412, 420 (1985).
80. DANIEL B. SUITS, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 320-43 (2d ed. 1973).
81. This congruence is to be expected, because the visible success of the Newtonian models is what led economic theorists to design their explanatory schemes along similarly deterministic lines. The dominent [sic] school of economic theory in the West, which we shall call "neoclassical economics," has in the past often been praised and damned by being held up to the standards of physics . . . [O] ne rapidly discovers that the resemblances of the theories are uncanny, and one reason they are uncanny is because the progenitors of neoclassical economic theory boldly copied the reigning physical theories in the 1870's. The further one digs, the greater the realization that those neoclassicals did not imitate physics in a desultory and superficial manner; no, they copied their models mostly term for term and symbol for symbol, and said so. PHILLIP MIROWSKI, MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT: ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL PHYSICS: PHYSICS AS NATURE'S ECONOMICS 3 (1989).
82. See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 4.
83. Ludwig Mises, for example, rejected mathematical and quantitative methods as unsuitable methodologies for economic analysis: The impracticability of measurement [in economics] is not due to the lack of technical methods for the establishment of measure. It is due to the absence of constant relations. If it were only caused by technical inefficiency, at least an approximate estimation would be possible in some cases. But the main fact is that there are no constant relations. [Austrian] Economics is not, as ignorant positivists repeat again and again, backward because it is not "quantitative." It is not quantitative and does not measure because there are no constants. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 56 (1949). In his 1974 Nobel Memorial Lecture, Friedrich Hayek offered a similarly critical assessment of the use of mathematical methods in economics: It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an approach which has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude - an attitude which, as I defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed." HAVEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 19, at 23, see also Walter Block, On Robert Nozick's 'On Austrian Methodology', 23 INQUIRY 397, 398 (1980). The explanation . . . of why people act is teleological; they act because they have purposes which they think can be accomplished if they act. But such a mode is completely at variance with that which prevails in the natural sciences. There, causality or correlation is all, and teleology is dismissed as a suspect and illegitimate kind of anthropomorphism. Id.
84. Ludwig Mises, for example, rejected mathematical and quantitative methods as unsuitable methodologies for economic analysis: The impracticability of measurement [in economics] is not due to the lack of technical methods for the establishment of measure. It is due to the absence of constant relations. If it were only caused by technical inefficiency, at least an approximate estimation would be possible in some cases. But the main fact is that there are no constant relations. [Austrian] Economics is not, as ignorant positivists repeat again and again, backward because it is not "quantitative." It is not quantitative and does not measure because there are no constants. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 56 (1949). In his 1974 Nobel Memorial Lecture, Friedrich Hayek offered a similarly critical assessment of the use of mathematical methods in economics: It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an approach which has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude - an attitude which, as I defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed." HAVEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 19, at 23, see also Walter Block, On Robert Nozick's 'On Austrian Methodology', 23 INQUIRY 397, 398 (1980). The explanation . . . of why people act is teleological; they act because they have purposes which they think can be accomplished if they act. But such a mode is completely at variance with that which prevails in the natural sciences. There, causality or correlation is all, and teleology is dismissed as a suspect and illegitimate kind of anthropomorphism. Id.
85. Ludwig Mises, for example, rejected mathematical and quantitative methods as unsuitable methodologies for economic analysis: The impracticability of measurement [in economics] is not due to the lack of technical methods for the establishment of measure. It is due to the absence of constant relations. If it were only caused by technical inefficiency, at least an approximate estimation would be possible in some cases. But the main fact is that there are no constant relations. [Austrian] Economics is not, as ignorant positivists repeat again and again, backward because it is not "quantitative." It is not quantitative and does not measure because there are no constants. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 56 (1949). In his 1974 Nobel Memorial Lecture, Friedrich Hayek offered a similarly critical assessment of the use of mathematical methods in economics: It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an approach which has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude - an attitude which, as I defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed." HAVEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 19, at 23, see also Walter Block, On Robert Nozick's 'On Austrian Methodology', 23 INQUIRY 397, 398 (1980). The explanation . . . of why people act is teleological; they act because they have purposes which they think can be accomplished if they act. But such a mode is completely at variance with that which prevails in the natural sciences. There, causality or correlation is all, and teleology is dismissed as a suspect and illegitimate kind of anthropomorphism. Id.
86. Ludwig Mises, for example, rejected mathematical and quantitative methods as unsuitable methodologies for economic analysis: The impracticability of measurement [in economics] is not due to the lack of technical methods for the establishment of measure. It is due to the absence of constant relations. If it were only caused by technical inefficiency, at least an approximate estimation would be possible in some cases. But the main fact is that there are no constant relations. [Austrian] Economics is not, as ignorant positivists repeat again and again, backward because it is not "quantitative." It is not quantitative and does not measure because there are no constants. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 56 (1949). In his 1974 Nobel Memorial Lecture, Friedrich Hayek offered a similarly critical assessment of the use of mathematical methods in economics: It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an approach which has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude - an attitude which, as I defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed." HAVEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 19, at 23, see also Walter Block, On Robert Nozick's 'On Austrian Methodology', 23 INQUIRY 397, 398 (1980). The explanation . . . of why people act is teleological; they act because they have purposes which they think can be accomplished if they act. But such a mode is completely at variance with that which prevails in the natural sciences. There, causality or correlation is all, and teleology is dismissed as a suspect and illegitimate kind of anthropomorphism. Id.
87. See VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 80.
88. There are not two kinds of things-individual actions and institutions. Rather, they are one and the same, looked at, perhaps, from two different perspectives. Human history is the story of the unfolding of actions which lead to other actions which lead to further ones, in a, so far, unending chain. The fact that some commentators have called some of these complex patterns of individual actions "institutions" should not confuse the issue, and lead us to believe that there is anything apart from such separate human actions. Block, supra note 45, at 405.
89. Paqué, supra note 41, at 429.
90. A change in the allocation of resources is defined as a Pareto improvement if at least one person prefers the new allocation over the original allocation, and no person regards himself as worse off as a result of the new allocation. For a discussion of the properties and problems of the Pareto improvement criterion, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The Midlife Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 234-37 (1991).
91. A change in a resource allocation is defined as a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the benefits of the change, as measured by the willingness to pay of the persons benefited, exceeds the costs of the change, as measured by the willingness to pay of the persons injured. For a discussion of the properties and problems of the Kaldor-Hicks improvement criterion, see id.
92. See id. at 235.
93. See id. at 236-37
94. But see infra notes 121-50, 207-12 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of Roy Cordato and Linda Schwartzstein to develop an efficiency criterion grounded in Austrian premises).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 285-88.
96. Mises "defines freedom as that state of affairs in which the individual is free in the sense of being free to choose between various actions within a market economy. The government is to be confined to the protection of people against the violence or aggression of other individuals." ALEXANDER H. SHAND, FREE MARKET MORALITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 94-95 (1990). "Freedom is the predominent [sic] value in Hayek's social and economic philosophy . . . ." Id. at 97. "[Rothbard contends] that freedom is meaningfully definable only as absence of interpersonal restrictions . . . . [Rothbard states that] 'it is the free market in a free society that furnishes the only instrument to reduce or eliminate poverty and provide abundance.'" Id. at 109.
97. Mises "defines freedom as that state of affairs in which the individual is free in the sense of being free to choose between various actions within a market economy. The government is to be confined to the protection of people against the violence or aggression of other individuals." ALEXANDER H. SHAND, FREE MARKET MORALITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 94-95 (1990). "Freedom is the predominent [sic] value in Hayek's social and economic philosophy . . . ." Id. at 97. "[Rothbard contends] that freedom is meaningfully definable only as absence of interpersonal restrictions . . . . [Rothbard states that] 'it is the free market in a free society that furnishes the only instrument to reduce or eliminate poverty and provide abundance.'" Id. at 109.
98. Mises "defines freedom as that state of affairs in which the individual is free in the sense of being free to choose between various actions within a market economy. The government is to be confined to the protection of people against the violence or aggression of other individuals." ALEXANDER H. SHAND, FREE MARKET MORALITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 94-95 (1990). "Freedom is the predominent [sic] value in Hayek's social and economic philosophy . . . ." Id. at 97. "[Rothbard contends] that freedom is meaningfully definable only as absence of interpersonal restrictions . . . . [Rothbard states that] 'it is the free market in a free society that furnishes the only instrument to reduce or eliminate poverty and provide abundance.'" Id. at 109.
99. See Cordato, supra note 23, at 62-63.
100. See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 147. If entrepreneurs can be wrong, not in the simple sense of missing opportuni-ties but in the far more important sense of using resources in ways that lead to losses, how can they be seen as the unequivocal driving force bringing the system toward equilibrium? If they can be wrong, perhaps they can be a destabilizing influence on the market and perhaps that instability can persist for long periods of time. Id. In other words, rather than entrepreneurs having only the effect of arbitrageurs who reduce price differentials and thus smooth fluctuations and imbalances, they may at times act in a discoordinated group fashion to push markets further out of balance, at least temporarily, until their collective error becomes apparent. For example, the Austrian view of the monetary disturbance-generated business cycle assumes that entrepreneurs in the capital goods industries will collectively overreact to the fall in interest rates caused by an expansion in the money supply, which will lead to a subsequent discoordination between the production of investment and consumption goods. See Edwin Dolan, Introduction to THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Edwin Dolan ed., 1976). There is therefore both a "boom" and a "bust" period generated by entrepreneurial behavior during such a business cycle, rather than a simple move towards equilibrium.
101. See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1-9, 162-78; Kirzner, Review, supra note 21, at 1-4, 17-18; Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 1-4, 17-18 (1985).
102. See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 1-9, 162-78; Kirzner, Review, supra note 21, at 1-4, 17-18; Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 1-4, 17-18 (1985).
103. KIRZNER, COMPETITION, supra note 21.
104. See LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS, supra note 22; ]; VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 162-78; Mario Rizzo, Afterward to AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 245, 246-47 (Bruce J. Caldwell & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992) [hereinafter Rizzo, Afterward].
105. See LACHMANN, ECONOMIC PROCESS, supra note 22; ]; VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 162-78; Mario Rizzo, Afterward to AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 245, 246-47 (Bruce J. Caldwell & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992) [hereinafter Rizzo, Afterward].
106. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
107. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
108. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
109. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
110. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
111. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
112. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
113. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
114. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
115. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
116. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
117. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
118. For example, neoclassicists in recent years have made increasing use of gametheoretic models in an attempt to capture some of the dynamic aspects of market processes and their relation to law. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET. AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). In addition, there has developed an economics of information literature that examines some of the implications of relaxing the neoclassical perfect information assumption. See, e.g., 2 HERBERT ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973); George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Some of the work associated with various strands of neoclassical thought commonly labeled "Transaction Cost Economics," "Institutional Economics," "Socio-Economies," or "Evolutionary Economics" also shows an attempt to grapple with the difficulties of introducing dynamic considerations into the essentially static equilibrium framework. See, e.g., SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); George Barker, A Comparative Institutional Approach to Law and Economics, 26 VICTORIAN U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 109 (1996); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). Finally, some of the work done by the prominent public choice theorist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan reveals the major influence of Austrian thought upon his work. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC THEORY (1969) (endorsing Hayek's methodology and the Austrian position taken in the socialist calculation debate); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? (1979) (containing the 1963 Presidential address to the Southern Ecoz nomic Association and arguing that economics should be regarded as the study of exchange in a catallaxy). In addition, until shortly after he received the Nobel Prize in 1986, Buchanan taught virtually all of the graduate students who studied Austrian economics at George Mason University, one of the leading American centers of Austrian thought. His influence over those students was described as "immense.VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 119 n.10.
119. "The intellectual climate in the mainstream of the [economics] profession has become increasingly hostile to Austrian economics." Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 246.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 247 (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)).
122. See id. at 247 (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)).
123. But see VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 143, 146-47.
124. Some recent Austrian writers, however, are quite skeptical regarding the ability of the government to assemble the information necessary to accurately "internalize" the impacts of behavior that are not priced through markets. See, e.g., CORDATO, supra note 23, at 15-27.
125. But see id. (arguing that Austrian premises do not support government intervention to facilitate the provision of public goods).
126. Friedrich Hayek took the following position concerning the proper role of the judge in a legal dispute: In this [judging] it will often be impossible to distinguish between the mere articulation of rules which have so far existed only as practices and the statement of rules which have never been acted upon before but which, once stated, will be accepted as reasonable by most. But in neither case will the judge be free to pronounce any rule he likes. The rules which he pronounces will have to fill a definite gap in the body of already recognized rules in a manner that will serve to maintain and improve that order of actions which the already existing rules make possible. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 19, at 56.
127. It could well be that theorizing as to the optimal contours of legal regimes, such as the major Austrian writers have done extensively, might not be a particularly effective way to bring about such regimes. Moreover, the ultimate consequences of such theorizing could be to move the legal institutions in the wrong direction, given the particular dynamic of counter-responses and adjustments that might be triggered by the behavior inspired by those theories.
128. This problem has been noted by other observers. See, e.g., McKenzie, supra ' note 37, at 11. Austrians are primarily interested in discussing the broad outlines of a Lockian-style social contract that will maximize individual freedom. . . . However, much of the discussion of social contracts appears to be conducted on the assumption that the contract, once devised, will be fully operative. Any dispute which may arise subsequently to the adoption of the contract can be settled with reference to rules laid down within the contract. There is a presumption, in other words, that rules for maximizing individual freedom and minimizing collective action can be constructed and can form an effective barrier against subsequent efforts by special interest groups to distort the substance and meaning of the adopted rules. Austrians seem . . . to presume that the economic forces which make a social contract necessary in the first place are held in check by the social contract that is developed. Id.
129. See e.g., MISES, supra note 18, at 855-61.
130. Other observers have also noted and been critical of the dearth of Austrian attempts to operationalize their explanatory models through empirical research. See, e.g., Paqué, supra note 41, at 426. The central question for [Austrian] economics, then is whether, how, and how quickly individuals become successful entrepreneurs by discerning past errors and inefficiencies and correcting their resource allocation accordingly. Unfortunately, Austrian economics at its present stage of development looks very much like a programme without research. While the fundamental points of departure from mainstream economics have been repeatedly formulated, there has so far been no serious attempt to operationalize the ideas in a full-scale empirical research project. This is probably due to two facts: the traditional Austrian scepticism [sic] concerning empirical research, and the nature of the required research project itself which would have to fall in the no man's land between social psychology, sociology, and economics. Until the Austrians overcome their reluctance to start empirical research on the dissemination of information, their programme is stuck. Id.
131. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
132. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
133. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
134. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
135. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
136. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
137. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
138. See, e.g., Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982); Mario Rizzo, Can There be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); Mario Rizzo, Foreword: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHI.-RENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Mario Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Law]; Mario Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) [hereinafter Rizzo, Mirage]; see also TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQUILIBRIUM: EXPLORATION OF AUSTRIAN THEMES (Mario Rizzo ed., 1979); Rizzo, Afterward, supra note 60, at 245-53.
139. [T]he substantial information requirements that must be satisfied in order to identify efficient rules make efficiency impractical as a standard. Unless the efficiency theorists can show how courts can overcome the difficulties . . . they will continue to argue for a norm that has little operational content. It is all too easy to show that efficiency leads to desirable results within simplified constructs; it is quite another thing to show what this has to do with the world in which we live. Rizzo, Mirage, supra note 73, at 658.
140. Rizzo, Law, supra note 73, at 317.
141. O'DRISCOLL & Rizzo, supra note 23.
142. Gerald O'Driscoll, Jr.,Justice, Efficiency, and the Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment on Fried, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (1980).
143. Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (1980).
144. O'Driscoll, supra note 77, at 356-57.
145. See id. at 359.
146. See, e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM (J. Kohane trans., MacMillan Co. 1936) (1922); Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING 87 (F.A. Hayek ed., 1938).
147. See, e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM (J. Kohane trans., MacMillan Co. 1936) (1922); Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING 87 (F.A. Hayek ed., 1938).
148. O'Driscoll, supra note 77, at 364.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. O'DRISCOLL & RIZZO, supra note 23.
153. See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 133-38; Kirzner, Review, supra note 21, at 1-4, 17-18; Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 1-4, 17-18.
154. See, e.g., VAUGHN, supra note 14, at 133-38; Kirzner, Review, supra note 21, at 1-4, 17-18; Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 1-4, 17-18.
155. See O'DRISCOLL & Rizzo, supra note 23, at 1.
156. See id. at 17-33.
157. See id. at 52-70.
158. See id. at 35-51.
159. [M]arket activity . . . can be rendered intelligible as a process of attempting to correct errors and coordinate behavior. . . . . . . [But] [t]here is no stable endpoint to which the process must lead, nor a single path that it must follow. Id. at 5.
160. See id. at 77-78.
161. See id. at 90.
162. See, e.g., Lachmann, Review, supra note 22, at 17.
163. The absence of any tendency to change is incompatible with real time. Yet . . . some idea of equilibrium is important. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a viable economics without one. O'DRISCOLL & RIZZO, supra note 23, at 71. In the broadest sense, equilibrium is inextricably linked to the causal mode of reasoning. . . . [W]e believe that some concept of equilibrium is an indispensable ingredient in all economic explanations. Id. at 85.
164. See id. at 85-88.
165. See id. at 76-79.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 85.
168. See id. at 87.
169. See id. at 88.
170. Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 507 (1986).
171. See id. at 508.
172. As has been discussed earlier in this article, Austrians assume that preferences are malleable and often change over time. Hence, they regard as rather meaningless neoclassical calculations as to the "efficiency" of rules, since those calculations are based upon an assumption of unchanged preferences over the period of analysis. Austrians in their normative assessments consequently emphasize the impacts of policies upon the entrepreneurial market process rather than comparative evaluations of end-states of the economy at different points in time. However, they do not generally utilize the term "efficiency" as a metric for assessing the impacts of proposed meas-ures upon the market process. The following excerpts from Wonnell's article suggest that he has failed to fully appreciate this point: The law-and-economics school can be criticized for . . . assuming the unspoken norm that economic efficiency is a desirable goal. The difference be-tween neoclassical economics and the Austrian school, however, concerns positive analysis, not the desirability of particular ends. . . . [I]t is assumed without much argument [for this article] that efficiency is in fact a good thing. The Austrian critique of neoclassical economics, if accepted, tends to alter the raison d'etre of the free market and freedom of contract. In general terms, freedom of contract is no longer defended because it produces perfect efficiency. Rather, freedom of contract produces more efficient outcomes than does judicial or legislative intervention, and outcomes that are increasingly efficient over time. Id. at 510, 524-25 (footnotes omitted).
173. "[T]he Austrians believe that freedom of contract leads to an increasingly efficient economy . . . ." Id. at 542.
174. Id. at 525-42.
175. See Richard Posner & Andrew Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
176. See Wonnell, supra note 103, at 525-26.
177. See id. at 526-27.
178. See Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
179. See id. at 16.
180. See Wonnell, supra note 103, at 528-31.
181. See id. at 530.
182. See id. at 530-35.
183. See id. at 530.
184. See id. at 531-33.
185. See id. at 533.
186. See id. at 535.
187. See id. at 536.
188. Roy Cordato, Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the Economics of Harmful Effects, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 229 (1989).
189. See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). The Pigouvian approach to externalities focuses upon the use of taxes or subsidies to align the marginal personal costs and benefits of an action to the actor with its marginal social costs.
190. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coasian approach to externalities focuses upon achieving social wealth maximization. This approach assigns the property right to the party to a dispute concerning the use of the property who places the highest value on that property right.
191. See Cordato, supra note 121, at 229-36.
192. See id. at 235-36.
193. See id. at 237.
194. See id. at 239. See generally KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY, supra note 21.
195. Cordato, supra note 121, at 239.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 239-40.
198. See id. at 240-41.
199. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
200. See Cordato, supra note 121, at 241-42.
201. See CORDATO, supra note 23.
202. See id. at 58. A "catallaxy" is defined by Cordato as "a social order generated by the market activities of separate individuals and organizations, each pursuing their own purposes." Id. This term "catallaxy" is preferred to the term "economy" by a number of Austrian writers, including Friedrich Hayek, who originally coined the term: The spontaneous order of the market resulting from the interaction of many . . . [smaller economic entities such as households or farms] is something so fundamentally different from an economy proper that it must be regarded as a great misfortune that it has ever been called by the same name. I have become convinced that this practice so constantly misleads people that it is necessary to invent a new technical term for it. I propose that we call this spontaneous order a catallaxy in analogy to the term "catallactics," which has often been proposed as a substitute for the term "economics." Friedrich Hayek, The Principles of a Liberal Social Order, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 363, 367 (C. Nishiyama & K. Leube eds., 1984).
203. CORDATO, supra note 23, at 62.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 62-63.
207. See id. at 63.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 64.
210. See id. at 48; see also KIRZNER, COMPETITION, supra note 21, at 222: Each entrepreneurial discovery represents alertness to a hitherto unperceived interpersonal opportunity-an opportunity that depends on the coordinated plans of two separate individuals. As this "general" equilibrating process proceeds by competitive-entrepreneurial alertness, it identifies more and more uncoordinated situations, at the same time spreading the information perceived by entrepreneurial alertness among wider and wider circles in the market. Id. But see CORDATO, supra note 23, at 50-54 (recognizing that entrepreneurial activity can have discoordinating consequences for some third parties).
211. CORDATO, supra note 23, at 64.
212. See id. at 65.
213. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 96-97 (1992) (discussing some of the difficulties raised by this concept).
214. See Crespi, supra note 49, at 234-35.
215. It is easy to envision circumstances where a greater degree of coordination among some persons would impose greater difficulties upon others. For example, consider where a firm's potential competitors are now excluded by the firm's more coordinated relationships vvith its suppliers or customers, or where a greater degree of coordination among competitors through cartel arrangements or other collusive practices would impose added burdens upon customers.
216. But see Dominick T. Armentano, one of Roy Cordato's mentors, who wrote the foreword to Cordato's book, and who apparently endorses an aggregation methodology for a catallactic efficiency criterion that completely ignores the consequences of certain actions-specifically business collusion agreements-upon persons not party to those agreements, leading to a rather radical endorsement of collusive practices: From a catallactic perspective the issue of social efficiency would be seen very differently. In the first place it would be impossible . . . to conclude that business collusion reduces social welfare . . . . [A]ll business mergers and all joint ventures would be seen as socially efficient arrangements . . . . Finally, the traditional antitrust concern with market share, concentration, and "entry barriers"] would be seen as entirely misplaced. Dominick T. Armentano, Foreword to CORDATO, supra note 23, at xii.
217. CORDATO, supra note 23, at 15-27.
218. See id. at 16-23.
219. See id. at 23.
220. See id. at 24.
221. See id. at 24-25.
222. See id. at 23-27.
223. See id. at 92-110.
224. See id. at 99.
225. See id. at 100.
226. See id. at 105-08.
227. But see Armentano, supra note 149, at xii, where he regards the catallactic efficiency criterion as going much further than earlier normative declarations and as excluding consideration of the impacts of collusive business arrangements upon third parties.
228. Michael E. Debow, Markets, Government Intervention, and the Role of Information: An "Austrian School" Perspective, with an Application to Merger Regulation, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31 (1991).
229. See id. at 91-95.
230. See id. at 57.
231. See id. at 39-42.
232. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
233. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
234. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
235. See Peter J. Boettke, Hayek's The Road to Serfdom Revisited: Government Failure in the Argument Against Socialism, 21 E. ECON. J. 7, 19 (1995).
236. See DeBow, supra note 161, at 96.
237. Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1994).
238. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
239. "The all-out pursuit of perfect competition . . . cannot produce sensible results for antitrust law. Perfect competition is unattainable in the real world . . . . Many practices challenged under the antitrust laws are in fact attempts to economize on the costs of coordinating interdependent economic actors in a complex economy." Arthur, supra note 168, at 3-4. [T] he [perfectly competitive] model provides only a snapshot of an endstate. The only process it admits is pricing according to its assumptions. It cannot explain competition as we commonly think of it, as rivalry among business firms, nor can it explain innovation and entrepreneurship. It tells us nothing about the conditions necessary for economic progress. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
240. Id. at 10 n.30, 11 n.33.
241. Id. at 11 n.33.
242. Id. at 11 n.33, 12 nn.38-39.
243. Id. at 11 n.31.
244. Id. at 11 nn.32, 34, 12 nn.40-43.
245. Id. at 11 n.35.
246. Id. at 11.
247. This concept of rivalrous competition has important virtues which perfect competition lacks. First, the concept accepts the 'market imperfections' which prevent the full achievement of perfect competition and admits the real world competitive activities absent in the artificial world of perfect competition and monopoly: advertising, marketing, product differentiation, price cutting, entrepreneurship, business associations, complex products, relational contracts, and, most importantly, innovation and change. It recognizes that rivals compete on far more than just price. In particular, it accepts the reality that in a world of imperfect information, consumers cannot afford the unbounded rationality of economic man, who considers every piece of relevant information before making an economic decision. Instead, real-world economic actions can only be boundedly rational; consumers acquire and use information only so far as the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs of acquiring and considering it. Second, rivalrous competition does not suggest that rivalry itself is always desirable. In the real world not all rivalry is productive . . . . Third, competition as rivalry recognizes that despite the epithet 'market imperfections,' product variety and asset specificity are in fact essential to economic progress . . . . Fourth, rivalrous competition emphasizes that markets seldom are in the equilibrium states described by the perfect competition and monopoly models, in which the course of competition already has been run. Instead, there exists a dynamic process of rivalry in which entrepreneurs seek to discover new profit opportunities in a world of ignorance, risk and uncertainty. Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
248. See id. at 13-14, 42-76.
249. "Despite its oft-criticized unworldliness, perfect competition remains the model of choice in mainstream economics, due to its superiority over its more 'realistic' rivals in providing useful generalizations and testable propositions." Id. at 7. Despite the greater descriptive accuracy of rivalrous competition, the perfect competition and monopoly models dominate mainstream microeconomics. Notwithstanding the limitations of its assumptions-indeed, because of them-perfect competition has served economic science well as a model. Rivalrous competition has not. In accepting the particularizing realities of the competitive world, it lacks the rigor and generality necessary to generate testable propositions and provide useful generalizations. Moreover, the deviations from perfect competition's assumptions are often insignificant. Its predictions hold true in a wide array of real world situations. Id. at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
250. Despite its invaluable use as a scientific model, perfect competition is a treacherous normative guide for economic regulation . . . . [I]t cannot be emphasized too strongly that perfect competition is an artificial, abstract model which can exist only in theory. It cannot be attained in the real world at any cost. It simply is not possible to eliminate the market "imperfections" that are abstracted out of the model. Id. at 13-14.
251. See Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1049 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartzstein, Legal Process]; Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate Between Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartzstein, Current Debate].
252. See Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1049 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartzstein, Legal Process]; Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate Between Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartzstein, Current Debate].
253. See Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1105.
254. See id. at 1127-28.
255. See id. at 1128.
256. See, e.g., MARK. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 65-67 (1987).
257. See Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1127-28.
258. See id. at 1128.
259. Id. at 1131.
260. Don Lavoie, Economic Chaos or Spontaneous Order? Implications for Political Economy of the New View of Science, 8 CATO J. 613, 621 (1989), quoted in Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1135.
261. Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1129; see also Murray N. Rothbard, Comment: The Myth of Efficiency, in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 90 (Mario J. Rizzo ed., 1979), at 90. [T]he individual's ends are not really given, for there is no reason to assume that they are set in concrete for all time. As the individual learns more about the world, about nature and about other people, his values and goals are bound to change. The individual's ends will change as he learns from other people; they may also change out of sheer caprice. But if ends change in the course of an action, the concept of efficiency-which can only be defined as the best combination of means in pursuit of given ends-again becomes meaningless. Id.
262. Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1129; see also Murray N. Rothbard, Comment: The Myth of Efficiency, in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 90 (Mario J. Rizzo ed., 1979), at 90. [T]he individual's ends are not really given, for there is no reason to assume that they are set in concrete for all time. As the individual learns more about the world, about nature and about other people, his values and goals are bound to change. The individual's ends will change as he learns from other people; they may also change out of sheer caprice. But if ends change in the course of an action, the concept of efficiency-which can only be defined as the best combination of means in pursuit of given ends-again becomes meaningless. Id.
263. Schwartzstein, Current Debate, supra note 182, at 1129; see also Murray N. Rothbard, Comment: The Myth of Efficiency, in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 90 (Mario J. Rizzo ed., 1979), at 90. [T]he individual's ends are not really given, for there is no reason to assume that they are set in concrete for all time. As the individual learns more about the world, about nature and about other people, his values and goals are bound to change. The individual's ends will change as he learns from other people; they may also change out of sheer caprice. But if ends change in the course of an action, the concept of efficiency-which can only be defined as the best combination of means in pursuit of given ends-again becomes meaningless. Id.
264. See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182.
265. Id. at 1051-57.
266. Id. at 1060.
267. Id. at 1061.
268. Id. at 1062.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1062-66.
271. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 35 (1960).
272. See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1063; see also HAYEK, supra note 199, at 69-70. What we must learn to understand is that human civilization has a life of its own, that all of our efforts to improve things must operate within a working whole which we cannot entirely control, and the operation of whose forces we can hope merely to facilitate and assist so far as we understand them. Our attitude ought to be similar to that of the physician towards a living organism: like him, we have to deal with a self-maintaining whole which is kept going by forces which we cannot replace and which we must therefore use in all we try to achieve. Id.
273. See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1063; see also HAYEK, supra note 199, at 69-70. What we must learn to understand is that human civilization has a life of its own, that all of our efforts to improve things must operate within a working whole which we cannot entirely control, and the operation of whose forces we can hope merely to facilitate and assist so far as we understand them. Our attitude ought to be similar to that of the physician towards a living organism: like him, we have to deal with a self-maintaining whole which is kept going by forces which we cannot replace and which we must therefore use in all we try to achieve. Id.
274. See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1063.
275. See HAYEK, supra note 199, at 155.
276. Id. at 154.
277. See Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1065.
278. See id. at 1066-67.
279. See supra text accompanying note 65; see also Paqué, supra note 41.
280. Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1068.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1070.
284. Id. at 1078.
285. See id. at 1069-70.
286. Id. at 1071-72.
287. See id. at 1071.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 1072.
291. See id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1078.
294. Michael Spicer, On Friedrich Hayek and Public Administration: An Argument for Discretion Within Rules, 25 ADMIN. & Soc'y 46 (1993) [hereinafter Spicer, Public Administration]; Michael Spicer, On Friedrich Hayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and Majority Rule, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 103 (1995) [hereinafter Spicer, Taxation].
295. Michael Spicer, On Friedrich Hayek and Public Administration: An Argument for Discretion Within Rules, 25 ADMIN. & Soc'y 46 (1993) [hereinafter Spicer, Public Administration]; Michael Spicer, On Friedrich Hayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and Majority Rule, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 103 (1995) [hereinafter Spicer, Taxation].
296. Spicer, Public Administration, supra note 221.
297. Id. at 50-51.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 51.
300. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text for more discussion of Hayek's view as to the nature of such rules of just conduct.
301. See Spicer, Public Administration, supra note 221, at 51-54.
302. Spicer, Taxation, supra note 221.
303. Id. at 104-06.
304. Id. at 111.
305. Id. at 106.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 108.
308. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL Struggle (1987); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW (1994); THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANNOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY (1995).
309. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL Struggle (1987); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW (1994); THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANNOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY (1995).
310. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL Struggle (1987); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW (1994); THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANNOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY (1995).
311. SOWELL, supra note 24.
312. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 33.
313. In the Preface to the 1996 republication, Sowell expressly acknowledges his "intellectual debt" to Friedrich Hayek. SOWELL, supra note 33, at xxii. He also notes there that Hayek's work "has inspired numerous other scholars, writers, activists and organizations around the world. I am proud to say that he inspired Knowledge and Decisions . . . ." Id. at xxiii. The Acknowledgments section of both editions also recognized Hayek's great influence on Sowell: If one writing contributed more than any other to the framework within which this work developed, it would be an essay entitled The Use of Knowledge ' in Society, published in the American Economic Review of September 1945, and written by F. A. Hayek, later to become a Nobel Laureate in economics. In this plain and apparently simple essay was a deeply penetrating insight into the way societies function and malfunction, and clues as to why they are so often and so profoundly misunderstood. Id. at xxv; SOWELL, supra note 24, at ix.
314. Another current popular author who has obviously been influenced to some significant extent by Austrian thinking, but who has barely acknowledged this influence upon his work, is George Gilder. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE 260 (1984) ("The one group of economists most cognizant of entrepreneurs is the Austrian school . . . ."). Gilder's book is much narrower than Thomas Sowell's work in that it focuses almost exclusively upon the phenomena of business entrepreneurship, and does not employ the broad range of Austrian concepts that Sowell utilizes.
315. SOWELL, supra note 33, at x.
316. Id. at ix.
317. Id. at xxii.
318. For example, Sowell places great stress on the distinction between the "incremental" trade-off oriented form of decision making that characterizes most market behavior, as opposed to the absolute, "categorical" form of decision making that characterizes governmental - and especially judicial-decisions. Id. at xii-xiii, 21-44. He also insightfully contrasts the advantages and disadvantages of "informal" and "formal" relationships. Id. at 21-44. He also places greater emphasis upon the role of "feedback" in the process by which entrepreneurial behavior is guided than have prior Austrian writers. Id. at xv-xvii.
319. Id. at 3-159.
320. Id. at 163-383.
321. Id. at 163-66.
322. Id. at 167-228.
323. Id. at 305-83.
324. Id. at 229-304.
325. Id. at 229.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 232-37.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 238-46.
332. Id. at 246-49.
333. Id. at 249-60.
334. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
335. SOWELL, supra note 33, at 264.
336. Id. at 263.
337. Id. at 269-88.
338. Id. at 289-99.
339. See id. at 299-304.
340. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
341. SOWELL, supra note 24.
342. See SOWELL, supra note 33, at ix-xxiii.
343. Id. at 229-304.
344. O'DRISCOLL & RIZZO, supra note 23.
345. DeBow, supra note 161.
346. Arthur, supra note 168.
347. Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
349. See id.
350. Rizzo, Law, supra note 73.
351. Id.
352. O'Driscoll, supra note 23; Cordato, supra note 23.
353. Wonnell, supra note 103.
354. CORDATO, supra note 23, at 92-110.
355. Id. at 15-37.
356. Spicer, Public Administration, supra note 221.
357. Spicer, Taxation, supra note 221.
358. CORDATO, supra note 23, at 57-117; Cordato, supra note 121, at 237-44.
359. Schwartzstein, Legal Process, supra note 182, at 1066-78.
360. See generally Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
361. See also Alan P. Hamlin, On the Possibility of Austrian Welfare Economics, in AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 60, at 193 (Bruce Caldwell & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992). This Austrian concern with the operating characteristics of processes, rather than their particular outcomes, provides the basis for an Austrian welfare economics. The central point here is that while a genuinely Austrian welfare economics cannot set out to evaluate states of the world seen as outcomes, it could set out to evaluate alternative institutional and procedural structures in terms of their feasibility and general operating properties. Id.
362. See also Alan P. Hamlin, On the Possibility of Austrian Welfare Economics, in AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 60, at 193 (Bruce Caldwell & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992). This Austrian concern with the operating characteristics of processes, rather than their particular outcomes, provides the basis for an Austrian welfare economics. The central point here is that while a genuinely Austrian welfare economics cannot set out to evaluate states of the world seen as outcomes, it could set out to evaluate alternative institutional and procedural structures in terms of their feasibility and general operating properties. Id.
363. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, and the accompanying text; Leff, supra note 2, and the accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 4, and the accompanying text.
365. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, and the accompanying text.
366. The clearest analogy this author can present is that of the wildlife photographer, who needs to carry both a wide-angle lens and a close-up zoom lens in his camera bag, and uses the one that best fits the circumstances that he encounters.
367. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 2, at 477, and the accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., HUNDERT, supra note 3, at Part One frontispiece, and the accompanying text (quoting J.L. Austin).
369. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 4, at 272, and the accompanying text.
370. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 6-8 (1991). They publish separate journals. They gather at separate conferences. They seem rarely to read, much less to cite, work by loyalists of the other camp. . . . To exaggerate only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the law-and-society group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the law-and-society scholars believe that the law-and-economics theorists are not only out of touch with reality but also short on humanity, (footnote omitted). Id.
371. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 6-8 (1991). They publish separate journals. They gather at separate conferences. They seem rarely to read, much less to cite, work by loyalists of the other camp. . . . To exaggerate only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the law-and-society group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the law-and-society scholars believe that the law-and-economics theorists are not only out of touch with reality but also short on humanity, (footnote omitted). Id.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. See supra Part IA.
375. A succinct description of the core principles of socio-economics that makes clear their broad overlap with Austrian concepts is presented in SECTION ON SOCIOECONOMICS NEWSLETTER (Association of Am. Law. Schs.), Nov. 1996. Socio-economics begins with the assumption that economics is not a self-contained system, but is embedded in society, polity, and culture. Drawing upon economics, sociology, political science, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, history, law, and management, socio-economics regards competitive behavior as a subset of human behavior within a social context that both enables and constrains competition and cooperation. Unique among interdisciplinary approaches, however, socio-economics recognizes the pervasive and powerful influence of the neoclassical paradigm on twentieth century thought, and seeks to examine its assumptions, develo a rigorous understanding of its limitations, improve upon its application, and develop alternative, perhaps complementary, approaches that are predictive, exemplary, and morally sound. Id. at 4.
376. A succinct description of the core principles of socio-economics that makes clear their broad overlap with Austrian concepts is presented in SECTION ON SOCIOECONOMICS NEWSLETTER (Association of Am. Law. Schs.), Nov. 1996. Socio-economics begins with the assumption that economics is not a self-contained system, but is embedded in society, polity, and culture. Drawing upon economics, sociology, political science, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, history, law, and management, socio-economics regards competitive behavior as a subset of human behavior within a social context that both enables and constrains competition and cooperation. Unique among interdisciplinary approaches, however, socio-economics recognizes the pervasive and powerful influence of the neoclassical paradigm on twentieth century thought, and seeks to examine its assumptions, develo a rigorous understanding of its limitations, improve upon its application, and develop alternative, perhaps complementary, approaches that are predictive, exemplary, and morally sound. Id. at 4.
377. That petition was signed by 120 law professors from 50 AALS member schools. Id.
378. See, e.g., supra note 297.