Developing countries and international environmental agreements: The case of perfect correlation

International Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 85-102

  Batabyal, Amitrajeet A ^a  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032325537     PISSN: 10590560     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1059-0560(99)80018-5     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Barrett, S. (1994). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878-894.
2. Batabyal, A. A. (1996a). An agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements. Ecological Economics, 79, 3-9.
3. Batabyal, A. A. (1996b). Developing countries and environmental protection: The effects of budget balance and pollution ceiling constraints. Forthcoming, Journal of Development Economics.
4. Batabyal, A. A. (1996c). Developing countries and environmental protection: The effects of ex ante versus ex post contracting. Forthcoming, Journal of Regional Science.
5. Bernauer, T. (1995). The effect of international environmental institutions: How we might learn more. International Organization, 49, 351-77.
6. Black, J., Levi, M., & de Meza, D. (1993). Creating a good atmosphere: Minimum participation for tackling the "greenhouse effect." Economica, 60, 281-293.
7. Crane, B. (1993). International population institutions: Adapting to a changing world order. In Haas, P., Keohane, R., & Levy, M. (Eds.), Institutions for the Earth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
8. Demski, J. S., & Sappington, D. (1984). Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 33, 152-171.
9. Hoel, M. (1992). International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141-159.
10. Keohane, R., Haas, P., & Levy, M. (1993). The effectiveness of international environmental institutions. In Haas, P., Keohane, R., & Levy, M. (Eds.), Institutions for the Earth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
11. Kofman, F., & Lawarree, J. (1993). Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica, 61, 629-656.
12. Krasner, S. (1983a). Regimes and the limits of realism. In Krasner, S. (Ed.), International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
13. Krasner, S. (1983b). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. In Krasner, S. (Ed.), International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
14. Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. (1995). Corruptible law enforcers: How should they be compensated? Economic Journal, 105, 145-159.
15. Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1991). Aid and power: The World Bank and policy-based lending in the 1980s. London, UK: Routledge.
16. Paarlberg, R. (1993). Managing pesticide use in developing countries. In Haas, P., Keohane, R., & Levy, M. (Eds.), Institutions for the Earth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
17. Parson, E. A. (1993). Protecting the ozone layer. In Haas, P., Keohane, R., & Levy, M. (Eds.), Institutions for the Earth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
18. Peterson, M. J. (1993). International fisheries management. In Haas, P., Keohane, R., & Levy, M. (Eds.), Institutions for the Eart. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
19. Rogers, A. (1993). The earth summit. Los Angeles, CA: Global View Press.
20. Sandier, T., & Sargent, K. (1995). Management of transnational commons: Coordination, publicness, and treaty formation. Land Economics, 71, 145-162.
21. Sappington, D., & Demski, J. S. (1983). Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments. Economics Letters, 13, 325-330.
22. Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2, 181-214.
23. Tirole, J. (1988). The multicontract organization. Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, 459-466.