Avoiding logical omniscience and perfect reasoning: A survey

AI Communications

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 101-122

  Moreno, Antonio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

Author keywords

Doxastic logics; Kripke semantics; Logical omniscience; Non ideal agents; Perfect reasoning; Possible worlds

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SEMANTICS; THEOREM PROVING;

DOXASTIC LOGICS; KRIPKE SEMANTICS; LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE; NON-IDEAL AGENTS; PERFECT REASONING; POSSIBLE WORLDS;

FORMAL LOGIC;

EID: 0032296375     PISSN: 09217126     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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