Why only Nixon could go to China

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 605-615

  Cowen, Tyler ^a   Sutter, Daniel ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032278750     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004907414530     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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3. Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. (1989). Electoral accountability and incumbency. In P. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
4. Coate, S. and Morris, S. (1995). On the form of transfers to special interests. Journal of Political Economy 103: 1210-1235.
5. Cukierman, A. and Tommasi, M. (1995). When does it take a Nixon to go to China? Unpublished manuscript.
6. Farrell, J. and Gibbons, R. (1989). Cheap talk with two audiences. American Economic Review 79: 1214-1223.
7. Harrington, J.E. (1992). The revelation of information through the electoral process: An explanatory analysis. Economics and Politics 4: 255-275.
8. Kuran, T. (1989). Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution. Public Choice 61: 41-74.
9. Mitchell, D.W. (1987). Candidate behavior under mixed motives. Social Choice and Welfare 4: 153-160.
10. Reed, W.R. and Cho, J. (1996). A comparison of prospective and retrospective voting. Public Choice, forthcoming.
11. Wittman, D. (1983). Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories. American Political Science Review 77: 142-157.