Political Action Committee spending and Senate roll call voting

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 569-585

  Calcagno, Peter T ^a   Jackson, John D ^a  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032272469     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004957122069     Document Type: Article

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