Equilibria of collective action in different distributions of protest thresholds

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 535-567

  Yin, Chien Chung ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032270660     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004921725560     Document Type: Article

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