Optimal bidding algorithms against cheating in multiple-object auctions

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 955-969

  Kao, Ming Yang ^a   Qi, Junfeng ^b   Tan, Lei ^c  

^a Yale University   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction theory; Automated negotiation mechanisms; Bidding algorithms; Electronic commerce; Market based control; Software agents

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SALES;

AUCTION THEORY; AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS; BIDDING ALGORITHM; MARKET BASED CONTROL; SOFTWARE AGENTS;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 0032267124     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/s0097539796305377     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. V. BENES AND J. STEFAN, Extremal solutions in the marginal problem, in Advances in Probability Distributions with Given Marginals: Beyond the Copulas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, 1994, pp. 189-206.
2. D. BLACKWELL, An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs, Pacific J. Math., 6 (1956), pp. 1-8.
3. D. BLACKWELL AND M. A. GIRSHICK, Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1954.
4. S. H. CLEARWATER, ED., Market-Based Control, a Paradigm for Distributed Resource Allocation, World Scientific, River Ridge, NJ, 1996.
5. G. DALL'AGLIO, Fréchet classes: The beginnings, in Advances in Probability Distributions with Given Marginals: Beyond the Copulas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, 1994, pp. 1-12.
6. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Fifth Report and Order, FCC 94-178, Washington, DC, 1994.
7. M. FRÉCHET, Sur les tableaux de corrélation dont les marges sont données, Ann. Univ. Lyon. Sect. A (3), 14 (1951), pp. 53-77.
8. Y. FREUND AND R. SCHAPIRE, Game theory, on-line prediction and boosting, in Proc. 9th Annual Conference on Computational Learning Theory, ACM, New York, 1996, pp. 325-332.
9. D. FUDENBERG AND J. TIROLE, Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
10. R. A. GAGLIANO, M. D. FRASER, AND M. E. SCHAEFER, Auction allocation of computing resources, Comm. ACM, 38 (1995), pp. 88-99.
11. K. HENDRICKS AND H. J. PAARSH, A survey of recent empirical work concerning auctions, Canad. J. Econom., 28 (1995), pp. 403-426.
12. S. KOTZ AND J. P. SEEGER, A new approach to dependence in multivariate distributions, in Advances in Probability Distributions with Given Marginals: Beyond the Copulas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, 1994, pp. 113-128.
13. J. MCMILLAN AND R. P. MCAFEE, Auctions and bidding, J. Econom. Literature, 25 (1987), pp. 699-738.
14. P. R. MILGROM, Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications, Bell J. Econom., 12 (1981), pp. 380-391.
15. P. R. MILGROM AND R. J. WEBER, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica, 50 (1982), pp. 1089-1122.
16. R. B. MYERSON, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res., 6 (1981), pp. 58-73.
17. C. PITCHIK AND A. SCHOTTER, Perfect equilibria in budget-constrained sequential auctions: An experimental study, RAND J. Econom., 19 (1988), pp. 363-388.
18. B. SCHWEIZER, Thirty years of copulas, in Advances in Probability Distributions with Given Marginals: Beyond the Copulas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, 1994, pp. 13-50.
19. R. WILSON, Strategic analysis of auctions, in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 1, R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Elsevier Science, New York, 1992, pp. 227-279.
20. E. H. YANG, M. M. BARASH, AND D. M. UPTON, Accommodation of priority parts in a distributed computer-controlled manufacturing system with aggregate bidding schemes, in Proc. 2nd Industrial Engineering Research Conference, 1993, pp. 827-831.