Lawyers, the economy, and society

American Business Law Journal

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 477-514

  Cross, Frank B ^b   Kelleher, Herbert D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Adduct ions; Deuterium isotope effects; Dissociation fragments; Hydrogen bonding interactions; Polyatomic ions; Ultrahigh vacuum chamber

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032263830     PISSN: 00027766     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1744-1714.1998.tb01013.x     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 119 (1989); Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 667 (1992) [hereinafter The Optimum Number of Lawyers]; KEVIN MURPHY ET AL., THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3530, 1990), reprinted in 106 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1991); David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1988); Samar K Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Adversary Activities and Per Capita Income Growth, 14 WORLD DEV. 1457 (1986).
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 119 (1989); Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 667 (1992) [hereinafter The Optimum Number of Lawyers]; KEVIN MURPHY ET AL., THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3530, 1990), reprinted in 106 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1991); David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1988); Samar K Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Adversary Activities and Per Capita Income Growth, 14 WORLD DEV. 1457 (1986).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 119 (1989); Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 667 (1992) [hereinafter The Optimum Number of Lawyers]; KEVIN MURPHY ET AL., THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3530, 1990), reprinted in 106 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1991); David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1988); Samar K Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Adversary Activities and Per Capita Income Growth, 14 WORLD DEV. 1457 (1986).
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 119 (1989); Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 667 (1992) [hereinafter The Optimum Number of Lawyers]; KEVIN MURPHY ET AL., THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3530, 1990), reprinted in 106 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1991); David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1988); Samar K Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Adversary Activities and Per Capita Income Growth, 14 WORLD DEV. 1457 (1986).
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 119 (1989); Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 667 (1992) [hereinafter The Optimum Number of Lawyers]; KEVIN MURPHY ET AL., THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3530, 1990), reprinted in 106 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1991); David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1988); Samar K Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Adversary Activities and Per Capita Income Growth, 14 WORLD DEV. 1457 (1986).
6. See Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 645 (1992) [hereinafter The First Thing We Do]; Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 585 (1992).
7. See Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 645 (1992) [hereinafter The First Thing We Do]; Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 585 (1992).