The Kurds and Their "Others": Fragmented Identity and Fragmented Politics

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 82-95

  Vali, Abbas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL IDENTITY; ETHNOPOLITICS; IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION;

IRAN; TURKEY;

EID: 0032232169     PISSN: 1089201X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/1089201X-18-2-82     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Before 1514 the bulk of the territory known as Kurdistan was administered by the successive regimes ruling Iran. This had been the case at least since the Buyid times in the tenth century A.D., when the territory was referred to by its current name and its geographical limits within the shifting boundaries of the state were delineated. In 1514 the newly founded Safavid state lost the greater part of its Kurdish territory to its powerful neighbor, the Ottoman State, and this division, which was ratified in the Zahab treaty of 1639, remained in force until the dissolution the Ottoman empire in 1918. During this period, the Ottoman Kurdish territory was ruled indirectly from Istanbul through a tributary structure involving the semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities; these eventually fell victim to the process and practice of territorial centralism that followed the advent of state-managed modernization, culminating in the Tanzimat reforms of 1837. By the late 1870s the last Kurdish principality had fallen to Ottoman centralism and the Ottoman state was in full control of its Kurdish territory. In Iran, too, the semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities, which had sustained the military and fiscal structures of an uneasy tributary relationship with the state for nearly four centuries, fell victim to the combined force of internal decay and the growing external pressures brought to bear by the declining Qajar state in need of revenue. The destruction of the Kurdish principalities by the Ottoman and the Qajar states seems to have had the same effect on the political and administrative structures in Kurdistan before 1918: in both cases the power of the princes was replaced by the authority of the religious leaders, who were closely associated with the Sufi orders, the tribal lineage and landed property, and who played a decisive role in the organizational structure of the Kurdish movements for the decades to come (notably Sheikh Ubaydallah's movement in 1880-1882). Sheikhs and Aghas continued to dominate the leadership of the Kurdish movements after 1918, when the eastern possessions of the Ottoman empire were partitioned by Britain and France, and parts of the Kurdish territory were attached to the newly created states of Iraq and Syria. Uprisings led by Sheikh Said (1925) and Sheikh Reza (1937) against the Kemalist State in Turkey, the rebellions of Sheikh Mahmoud (1920s) and Molla Mustafa Barzani (1940s, 1960s, 1970s) against the Iraqi state, and Semko's rebellion (1920s) and the movement culminating in Mahabad republic (1947) in Iran all show this specific though quite uneven articulation of religion, tribal lineage and landownership in the leadership of the Kurdish movements before recent times. This structural specificity of Kurdish movements has changed significantly in Turkey and Iran since the 1970s, largely due to growing urbanization, the development of commodity production and the modern middle class, and the influence of secular ideologies, especially Marxism-Leninism: the emergence of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Socialist Party of Kurdistan and the People's Democractic Labor Party (HADEP) in Turkey, as well as the emergence of a socialist leadership in the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the formation of the Revolutionary Association of the Toilers of Kurdistan (KSRKI, now CPI) in Iranian Kurdistan, all testify to this shift. In Iraqi Kurdistan, by contrast, the formation of the predominantly urban, socialist-orientated Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the 1960s has not been able to dislodge Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) or undermine its power in its traditional constituencies of support, where tribal lineage and religious affiliation have proved remarkably resistant to external influence and change. General histories of the Kurds and Kurdistan are scarce, both in European and Middle Eastern languages. For informed but highly descriptive modern political histories see: W. Jwaideh, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: its Origins and Development," Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University 1960; D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996).
2. Before 1514 the bulk of the territory known as Kurdistan was administered by the successive regimes ruling Iran. This had been the case at least since the Buyid times in the tenth century A.D., when the territory was referred to by its current name and its geographical limits within the shifting boundaries of the state were delineated. In 1514 the newly founded Safavid state lost the greater part of its Kurdish territory to its powerful neighbor, the Ottoman State, and this division, which was ratified in the Zahab treaty of 1639, remained in force until the dissolution the Ottoman empire in 1918. During this period, the Ottoman Kurdish territory was ruled indirectly from Istanbul through a tributary structure involving the semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities; these eventually fell victim to the process and practice of territorial centralism that followed the advent of state-managed modernization, culminating in the Tanzimat reforms of 1837. By the late 1870s the last Kurdish principality had fallen to Ottoman centralism and the Ottoman state was in full control of its Kurdish territory. In Iran, too, the semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities, which had sustained the military and fiscal structures of an uneasy tributary relationship with the state for nearly four centuries, fell victim to the combined force of internal decay and the growing external pressures brought to bear by the declining Qajar state in need of revenue. The destruction of the Kurdish principalities by the Ottoman and the Qajar states seems to have had the same effect on the political and administrative structures in Kurdistan before 1918: in both cases the power of the princes was replaced by the authority of the religious leaders, who were closely associated with the Sufi orders, the tribal lineage and landed property, and who played a decisive role in the organizational structure of the Kurdish movements for the decades to come (notably Sheikh Ubaydallah's movement in 1880-1882). Sheikhs and Aghas continued to dominate the leadership of the Kurdish movements after 1918, when the eastern possessions of the Ottoman empire were partitioned by Britain and France, and parts of the Kurdish territory were attached to the newly created states of Iraq and Syria. Uprisings led by Sheikh Said (1925) and Sheikh Reza (1937) against the Kemalist State in Turkey, the rebellions of Sheikh Mahmoud (1920s) and Molla Mustafa Barzani (1940s, 1960s, 1970s) against the Iraqi state, and Semko's rebellion (1920s) and the movement culminating in Mahabad republic (1947) in Iran all show this specific though quite uneven articulation of religion, tribal lineage and landownership in the leadership of the Kurdish movements before recent times. This structural specificity of Kurdish movements has changed significantly in Turkey and Iran since the 1970s, largely due to growing urbanization, the development of commodity production and the modern middle class, and the influence of secular ideologies, especially Marxism-Leninism: the emergence of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Socialist Party of Kurdistan and the People's Democractic Labor Party (HADEP) in Turkey, as well as the emergence of a socialist leadership in the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the formation of the Revolutionary Association of the Toilers of Kurdistan (KSRKI, now CPI) in Iranian Kurdistan, all testify to this shift. In Iraqi Kurdistan, by contrast, the formation of the predominantly urban, socialist-orientated Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the 1960s has not been able to dislodge Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) or undermine its power in its traditional constituencies of support, where tribal lineage and religious affiliation have proved remarkably resistant to external influence and change. General histories of the Kurds and Kurdistan are scarce, both in European and Middle Eastern languages. For informed but highly descriptive modern political histories see: W. Jwaideh, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: its Origins and Development," Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University 1960; D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996).
3. Modernity is an elusive concept, remaining ambiguous despite its wide currency in contemporary post-Marxist and post-liberal discourse. This ambiguity is largely due to the association of the concept with the philosophical foundations of post-structuralism and postmodernism, which are diverse and heterogeneous. They assume or propound different conceptions of modernity informed by their critical evaluation of the conditions of the construction of the "subject" and "subjectivity" in Western political and philosophical discourse since the Renaissance. These conditions vary widely but are defined, in various ways, by the triumph of "reason" and its intrinsic relationship to "freedom." The relationship between reason and freedom has been a central theoretical presupposition of the discourse of modernity, especially since the Enlightenment, when it was inextricably linked with the idea of "progress." Thus the current concepts of modernity, despite their variations, share a common trait; they signify the "sovereignty of reason" in discourse and practice, emphasizing its intrinsic link with freedom and progress in the domains of history, politics and culture. Hence the critical association of modernity with modernism as both the ideology and strategy of an "endogenous" modernization, ensuring freedom and progress. The contemporary critique of modernity rejects this central theoretical presupposition. Reason, it is variously argued, has failed to ensure freedom; nor has it been the real locus or agent of modernization, which was for the most part carried out by political and economic agencies with scant regard for human freedom and happiness. The history of the development of Western societies since the Enlightenment is thus held to demonstrate this failure. Although this argument clearly refers to a fundamental inconsistency in the conceptual structure of the political and philosophical discourse of modernity, its critical value should not be exaggerated; it raises more theoretical problems than it proposes to solve. The case in point here is the conceptualization of the relationship between the discourse and practice of modernity in postmodern discourse, which almost invariably leads to the conflation of modernity with the historical experience of modernization in the West. This assumed identity of the "concept" with the "real" is firmly grounded in essentialism; it is underpinned by the assumption that the modern West is not just the locus of reason and rationalist discourse and practice but identical with it, albeit in the context of a failed historical experience. Hence the failure of the West is the failure of reason. The implications of this essentialist assumption for Eastern/Oriental societies are clear: they fall outside the domain of reason experiencing a problematic relationship with an exogenous modernity. This essentialist assumption has an uneasy coexistence with the anti-essentialist argument which informs the postmodern critique and rejection of the universal claims of modernity. The concept of modernity informing this essay is different. It signifies a "discursive formation" in the Foucauldian sense, that is, a specific discourse and its non-discursive conditions of existence; in this case the discourse of "reason" and its economic, political and cultural conditions of possibility. The relationship between the discursive and non-discursive, that is, the possibility of modernity, is defined by strategies of power which are also constitutive of the "subject" in modern society. It is in this sense that the conditions of modernity and the conditions of the constitution of the "subject" in modern society coincide: they both presuppose the articulation and dominance of reason in societal processes and practices engendered and sustained by strategies of power in society. This means therefore that reason/power has no specific locus or agency, nor can any general or uniform conception of modernization, endogenous or otherwise, be deduced from the conditions of its articulation in society. The relationship between reason and freedom, too, remains contingent upon the conditions of the constitution of the subject defined by the prevailing strategies of power and modes of "resistance" to them. Modernity so defined cannot be identified with any specific traits of modern society - be it capitalist economic form, rationalization or the nation-state - in a historicist manner, whether Marxist or Weberian. Nor can it identified with the historical experience of "modernization" in any specific society. This is because the strategies of power and the forms and conditions of their operation vary widely from one society to another.
4. Modernity is an elusive concept, remaining ambiguous despite its wide currency in contemporary post-Marxist and post-liberal discourse. This ambiguity is largely due to the association of the concept with the philosophical foundations of post-structuralism and postmodernism, which are diverse and heterogeneous. They assume or propound different conceptions of modernity informed by their critical evaluation of the conditions of the construction of the "subject" and "subjectivity" in Western political and philosophical discourse since the Renaissance. These conditions vary widely but are defined, in various ways, by the triumph of "reason" and its intrinsic relationship to "freedom." The relationship between reason and freedom has been a central theoretical presupposition of the discourse of modernity, especially since the Enlightenment, when it was inextricably linked with the idea of "progress." Thus the current concepts of modernity, despite their variations, share a common trait; they signify the "sovereignty of reason" in discourse and practice, emphasizing its intrinsic link with freedom and progress in the domains of history, politics and culture. Hence the critical association of modernity with modernism as both the ideology and strategy of an "endogenous" modernization, ensuring freedom and progress. The contemporary critique of modernity rejects this central theoretical presupposition. Reason, it is variously argued, has failed to ensure freedom; nor has it been the real locus or agent of modernization, which was for the most part carried out by political and economic agencies with scant regard for human freedom and happiness. The history of the development of Western societies since the Enlightenment is thus held to demonstrate this failure. Although this argument clearly refers to a fundamental inconsistency in the conceptual structure of the political and philosophical discourse of modernity, its critical value should not be exaggerated; it raises more theoretical problems than it proposes to solve. The case in point here is the conceptualization of the relationship between the discourse and practice of modernity in postmodern discourse, which almost invariably leads to the conflation of modernity with the historical experience of modernization in the West. This assumed identity of the "concept" with the "real" is firmly grounded in essentialism; it is underpinned by the assumption that the modern West is not just the locus of reason and rationalist discourse and practice but identical with it, albeit in the context of a failed historical experience. Hence the failure of the West is the failure of reason. The implications of this essentialist assumption for Eastern/Oriental societies are clear: they fall outside the domain of reason experiencing a problematic relationship with an exogenous modernity. This essentialist assumption has an uneasy coexistence with the anti-essentialist argument which informs the postmodern critique and rejection of the universal claims of modernity. The concept of modernity informing this essay is different. It signifies a "discursive formation" in the Foucauldian sense, that is, a specific discourse and its non-discursive conditions of existence; in this case the discourse of "reason" and its economic, political and cultural conditions of possibility. The relationship between the discursive and non-discursive, that is, the possibility of modernity, is defined by strategies of power which are also constitutive of the "subject" in modern society. It is in this sense that the conditions of modernity and the conditions of the constitution of the "subject" in modern society coincide: they both presuppose the articulation and dominance of reason in societal processes and practices engendered and sustained by strategies of power in society. This means therefore that reason/power has no specific locus or agency, nor can any general or uniform conception of modernization, endogenous or otherwise, be deduced from the conditions of its articulation in society. The relationship between reason and freedom, too, remains contingent upon the conditions of the constitution of the subject defined by the prevailing strategies of power and modes of "resistance" to them. Modernity so defined cannot be identified with any specific traits of modern society - be it capitalist economic form, rationalization or the nation-state - in a historicist manner, whether Marxist or Weberian. Nor can it identified with the historical experience of "modernization" in any specific society. This is because the strategies of power and the forms and conditions of their operation vary widely from one society to another.
5. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
6. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
7. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
8. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
9. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
10. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
11. The new states which emerged out of the ruins of the old in Turkey and Iran, and those which were founded by colonial powers in Iraq and Syria, were fundamentally different formations. Their structural developments were diverse, having diverse consequences for the economic, political and cultural developments of Kurdish territories in their jurisdictions. This crucial diversity can be illustrated by the contrasting political development and conduct of the Kurdish landowning class in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the Kemalist policy of total denial of the Kurd and Kurdish identity and the brutal suppression of Kurdish movements led not only to the suppression of Kurdish language and culture but also to the political and cultural decline of the Kurdish landowning class, both tribal and non-tribal, which was thus expelled from the ethnically defined spheres of political rights and representation. The introduction in 1948 of the multi-party system, confined to the ethnically defined political process, though it still denied Kurdish representation, turned Kurdistan into a market in which Turkish parties competed for Kurdish votes by dispensing political and economic favors. This led to the political revival of the Kurdish landowning class, albeit in the framework of a new clientelism, which formed the mainstay of Turkish parliamentary politics in Kurdistan before it was undermined by the appearance of the PKK in the political scene. In Iran, by contrast, the politics of territorial centralism pursued by Reza Shah involved detribalization, which significantly weakened the political organization of the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s. The sudden (though temporary) revival of tribal political power in 1941 contributed both to the rise of the Kurdish republic and to its swift demise in 1947. In the following decade, the Kurdish landowning class especially the tribal leadership was largely co-opted into the precarious power structure in Iran which, owing to the overcentralization of power and the absence of a genuine pluralist political process, failed to generate an effective clientelist structure in Kurdistan. The implementation of land reform in the early 1960s undermined not only the economic foundation of the Kurdish landowning class but also their political power base in the countryside. In the upsurge of nationalist politics which followed the 1979 revolution, the landowning class was largely absent; with few notable exceptions, it played little role either in nationalist politics or in opposition to it. For discussions of aspects of diverse structural developments of Kurdish societies in Turkey and Iran see the following: M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1992); R. Olson (ed.), The Turkish Nationalist Movement in Turkey in the 1990s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); H. J. Barkey and G. Fuller,. Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Roman & Littlefleld, 1998); A. Vali, "The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran," Critique, 3, 7, Fall 1995; A. Vali, "Kurdish Nationalism in Iran: The Formative Period, 1942-1947," The Journal of Kurdish Studies, II, 2. 1997; McDowall, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of diverse state linguistic and cultural policies in Kurdistan see: A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan (San Francisco: Mellon University Press, 1994).
12. This point is explained by, among others, Calhoun and McCrone, both drawing on modern European history. See: G. Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society," G. Calhoun (ed.), Social Theory and Identity (Oxford:Blackwell, 1994); D. McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism (London: Macmillan, 1998).
13. This point is explained by, among others, Calhoun and McCrone, both drawing on modern European history. See: G. Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society," G. Calhoun (ed.), Social Theory and Identity (Oxford:Blackwell, 1994); D. McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism (London: Macmillan, 1998).
14. Kurdish principalities were semi-autonomous juridico-political entities within the boundaries of the Ottoman and the Iranian states. Little is known about their conditions before the early 16th century, when the military conflict between the Ottoman and the Safavid states and the subsequent partition of the Kurdish territory gave them an unprecedented prominence in regional politics. It seems that the Kurdish principalities officially recognized and submitted to the supreme authority of their Ottoman and Iranian overlords in Friday khotbas which were read in the names of the reigning monarchs. In practice, their relationships with their respective authority were regulated in a tributary structure which at times closely resembled feudal vassalage. The mutation in the form of this tributary relationship depended largely on the political and military powers of the Ottoman and Iranian states and the effective range of their centralizing functions, which defined, though in an inverse manner, the actual boundaries of the political and administrative power in the Kurdish principalities. Hence the "reactive" nature of their politics vis-a-vis the two states, which quickly degenerated into armed conflict when the balance of power was disturbed in periods of acute centralization or decentralization of state power. For explanations of the structures and organizations of the Kurdish principalities in different periods of their development see: van Bruinessen, op. cit.; Hassanpour, op. cit.; C. J. Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, 2 vols. (London: Cape, 1836).
15. Kurdish principalities were semi-autonomous juridico-political entities within the boundaries of the Ottoman and the Iranian states. Little is known about their conditions before the early 16th century, when the military conflict between the Ottoman and the Safavid states and the subsequent partition of the Kurdish territory gave them an unprecedented prominence in regional politics. It seems that the Kurdish principalities officially recognized and submitted to the supreme authority of their Ottoman and Iranian overlords in Friday khotbas which were read in the names of the reigning monarchs. In practice, their relationships with their respective authority were regulated in a tributary structure which at times closely resembled feudal vassalage. The mutation in the form of this tributary relationship depended largely on the political and military powers of the Ottoman and Iranian states and the effective range of their centralizing functions, which defined, though in an inverse manner, the actual boundaries of the political and administrative power in the Kurdish principalities. Hence the "reactive" nature of their politics vis-a-vis the two states, which quickly degenerated into armed conflict when the balance of power was disturbed in periods of acute centralization or decentralization of state power. For explanations of the structures and organizations of the Kurdish principalities in different periods of their development see: van Bruinessen, op. cit.; Hassanpour, op. cit.; C. J. Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, 2 vols. (London: Cape, 1836).
16. Kurdish principalities were semi-autonomous juridico-political entities within the boundaries of the Ottoman and the Iranian states. Little is known about their conditions before the early 16th century, when the military conflict between the Ottoman and the Safavid states and the subsequent partition of the Kurdish territory gave them an unprecedented prominence in regional politics. It seems that the Kurdish principalities officially recognized and submitted to the supreme authority of their Ottoman and Iranian overlords in Friday khotbas which were read in the names of the reigning monarchs. In practice, their relationships with their respective authority were regulated in a tributary structure which at times closely resembled feudal vassalage. The mutation in the form of this tributary relationship depended largely on the political and military powers of the Ottoman and Iranian states and the effective range of their centralizing functions, which defined, though in an inverse manner, the actual boundaries of the political and administrative power in the Kurdish principalities. Hence the "reactive" nature of their politics vis-a-vis the two states, which quickly degenerated into armed conflict when the balance of power was disturbed in periods of acute centralization or decentralization of state power. For explanations of the structures and organizations of the Kurdish principalities in different periods of their development see: van Bruinessen, op. cit.; Hassanpour, op. cit.; C. J. Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, 2 vols. (London: Cape, 1836).
17. Recent years have witnessed an explosion in discourse on identity, largely as a result of the growing academic interest in the works of the post-structralist philosophers, especially Jacques Derrida, and the post-modernist appropriations of them. But despite the academic fashion, serious theoretical writing on the subject is rather scarce. See: J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); E. Laclau (ed.), Writing and Difference (London, 1976); "The Making of Modern Political Identities," (London: Verso, 1994); Emancipations (London: Verso, 1997); W. E. Connoly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiation of a Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); G. Bennington, Negotiations (London: Verso, 1995).
18. Recent years have witnessed an explosion in discourse on identity, largely as a result of the growing academic interest in the works of the post-structralist philosophers, especially Jacques Derrida, and the post-modernist appropriations of them. But despite the academic fashion, serious theoretical writing on the subject is rather scarce. See: J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); E. Laclau (ed.), Writing and Difference (London, 1976); "The Making of Modern Political Identities," (London: Verso, 1994); Emancipations (London: Verso, 1997); W. E. Connoly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiation of a Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); G. Bennington, Negotiations (London: Verso, 1995).
19. Recent years have witnessed an explosion in discourse on identity, largely as a result of the growing academic interest in the works of the post-structralist philosophers, especially Jacques Derrida, and the post-modernist appropriations of them. But despite the academic fashion, serious theoretical writing on the subject is rather scarce. See: J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); E. Laclau (ed.), Writing and Difference (London, 1976); "The Making of Modern Political Identities," (London: Verso, 1994); Emancipations (London: Verso, 1997); W. E. Connoly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiation of a Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); G. Bennington, Negotiations (London: Verso, 1995).
20. Recent years have witnessed an explosion in discourse on identity, largely as a result of the growing academic interest in the works of the post-structralist philosophers, especially Jacques Derrida, and the post-modernist appropriations of them. But despite the academic fashion, serious theoretical writing on the subject is rather scarce. See: J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); E. Laclau (ed.), Writing and Difference (London, 1976); "The Making of Modern Political Identities," (London: Verso, 1994); Emancipations (London: Verso, 1997); W. E. Connoly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiation of a Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); G. Bennington, Negotiations (London: Verso, 1995).
21. Recent years have witnessed an explosion in discourse on identity, largely as a result of the growing academic interest in the works of the post-structralist philosophers, especially Jacques Derrida, and the post-modernist appropriations of them. But despite the academic fashion, serious theoretical writing on the subject is rather scarce. See: J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); E. Laclau (ed.), Writing and Difference (London, 1976); "The Making of Modern Political Identities," (London: Verso, 1994); Emancipations (London: Verso, 1997); W. E. Connoly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiation of a Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); G. Bennington, Negotiations (London: Verso, 1995).
22. Recent years have witnessed an explosion in discourse on identity, largely as a result of the growing academic interest in the works of the post-structralist philosophers, especially Jacques Derrida, and the post-modernist appropriations of them. But despite the academic fashion, serious theoretical writing on the subject is rather scarce. See: J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); E. Laclau (ed.), Writing and Difference (London, 1976); "The Making of Modern Political Identities," (London: Verso, 1994); Emancipations (London: Verso, 1997); W. E. Connoly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiation of a Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); G. Bennington, Negotiations (London: Verso, 1995).
23. A discrepancy between discourse and practice is a common feature of modern political movements. In the case of Kurdish nationalism the issue is more complex. It is not so much a discrepancy as a total absence of nationalist political practice; the nationalist discourse enjoys popular appeal, but lacks popular political existence, that is, the means and conditions to translate it into political practice. It is a popular political idea rather than a mass political ideology. But this crucial difference cannot be reduced only to the absence of an effective mobilizing force in Kurdistan; it amounts to the fundamental difference that exists between sovereignty and autonomy, so deeply rooted in the structural conditions of Kurdish nationalism. The formation and development of the PKK bears witness to the truth of this argument. It is the only significant modern Kurdish political organization which started its campaign with a clear nationalist strategy demanding independence for Kurdistan. But in March 1993, after barely a decade of active nationalist politics, it changed its strategic objective, asking for the creation of a federal political system in Turkey; this demand was further modified to autonomy in November 1998, when its leader came to Europe in search of a political solution to the armed conflict with Turkey. However the radical change in the strategic objective of the PKK does not seem to have affected its nationalist discourse, which appears side by side with arguments for a political solution in the framework of Turkish sovereignty. This paradox testifies not only to an ambiguous political identity, but also to the curious case of nationalists without nationalism, which characterized the discourse and practice of the Mahabad republic five decades earlier. For the political development of the PKK see: Barkey and Fuller, 1998, op. cit.; Olson, 1996, op. cit. For the discourse and practice of the Republic see: Vali, 1997, op. cit.
24. A discrepancy between discourse and practice is a common feature of modern political movements. In the case of Kurdish nationalism the issue is more complex. It is not so much a discrepancy as a total absence of nationalist political practice; the nationalist discourse enjoys popular appeal, but lacks popular political existence, that is, the means and conditions to translate it into political practice. It is a popular political idea rather than a mass political ideology. But this crucial difference cannot be reduced only to the absence of an effective mobilizing force in Kurdistan; it amounts to the fundamental difference that exists between sovereignty and autonomy, so deeply rooted in the structural conditions of Kurdish nationalism. The formation and development of the PKK bears witness to the truth of this argument. It is the only significant modern Kurdish political organization which started its campaign with a clear nationalist strategy demanding independence for Kurdistan. But in March 1993, after barely a decade of active nationalist politics, it changed its strategic objective, asking for the creation of a federal political system in Turkey; this demand was further modified to autonomy in November 1998, when its leader came to Europe in search of a political solution to the armed conflict with Turkey. However the radical change in the strategic objective of the PKK does not seem to have affected its nationalist discourse, which appears side by side with arguments for a political solution in the framework of Turkish sovereignty. This paradox testifies not only to an ambiguous political identity, but also to the curious case of nationalists without nationalism, which characterized the discourse and practice of the Mahabad republic five decades earlier. For the political development of the PKK see: Barkey and Fuller, 1998, op. cit.; Olson, 1996, op. cit. For the discourse and practice of the Republic see: Vali, 1997, op. cit.
25. A discrepancy between discourse and practice is a common feature of modern political movements. In the case of Kurdish nationalism the issue is more complex. It is not so much a discrepancy as a total absence of nationalist political practice; the nationalist discourse enjoys popular appeal, but lacks popular political existence, that is, the means and conditions to translate it into political practice. It is a popular political idea rather than a mass political ideology. But this crucial difference cannot be reduced only to the absence of an effective mobilizing force in Kurdistan; it amounts to the fundamental difference that exists between sovereignty and autonomy, so deeply rooted in the structural conditions of Kurdish nationalism. The formation and development of the PKK bears witness to the truth of this argument. It is the only significant modern Kurdish political organization which started its campaign with a clear nationalist strategy demanding independence for Kurdistan. But in March 1993, after barely a decade of active nationalist politics, it changed its strategic objective, asking for the creation of a federal political system in Turkey; this demand was further modified to autonomy in November 1998, when its leader came to Europe in search of a political solution to the armed conflict with Turkey. However the radical change in the strategic objective of the PKK does not seem to have affected its nationalist discourse, which appears side by side with arguments for a political solution in the framework of Turkish sovereignty. This paradox testifies not only to an ambiguous political identity, but also to the curious case of nationalists without nationalism, which characterized the discourse and practice of the Mahabad republic five decades earlier. For the political development of the PKK see: Barkey and Fuller, 1998, op. cit.; Olson, 1996, op. cit. For the discourse and practice of the Republic see: Vali, 1997, op. cit.
26. This point invokes Foucault's argument in his much-quoted essay on governmentality. Foucault, however, does not explore the full implications of his own argument for the conceptualization of modern politics and governmentality, largely due to his problematic approach to and treatment of some of the fundamental philosophical premises of liberal political theory. This point has been noted by some recent critics of his writings on power and governmentality. Foucault's essay on governmentality appears in G. Burchell, et. al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). For critical analysis and commentary on Foucault's essay see: B. Hindess, Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) and "Politics and Governmentality," Economy and Society, 26, 2, 1997; C. Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," and G. Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing the System of Natural Liberty," both in Burchell, et. al. 1991; A. Barry, et. al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, NeoLiberalism and Rationalities of Government (London: University College London Press, 1996).
27. This point invokes Foucault's argument in his much-quoted essay on governmentality. Foucault, however, does not explore the full implications of his own argument for the conceptualization of modern politics and governmentality, largely due to his problematic approach to and treatment of some of the fundamental philosophical premises of liberal political theory. This point has been noted by some recent critics of his writings on power and governmentality. Foucault's essay on governmentality appears in G. Burchell, et. al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). For critical analysis and commentary on Foucault's essay see: B. Hindess, Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) and "Politics and Governmentality," Economy and Society, 26, 2, 1997; C. Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," and G. Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing the System of Natural Liberty," both in Burchell, et. al. 1991; A. Barry, et. al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, NeoLiberalism and Rationalities of Government (London: University College London Press, 1996).
28. This point invokes Foucault's argument in his much-quoted essay on governmentality. Foucault, however, does not explore the full implications of his own argument for the conceptualization of modern politics and governmentality, largely due to his problematic approach to and treatment of some of the fundamental philosophical premises of liberal political theory. This point has been noted by some recent critics of his writings on power and governmentality. Foucault's essay on governmentality appears in G. Burchell, et. al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). For critical analysis and commentary on Foucault's essay see: B. Hindess, Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) and "Politics and Governmentality," Economy and Society, 26, 2, 1997; C. Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," and G. Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing the System of Natural Liberty," both in Burchell, et. al. 1991; A. Barry, et. al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, NeoLiberalism and Rationalities of Government (London: University College London Press, 1996).
29. This point invokes Foucault's argument in his much-quoted essay on governmentality. Foucault, however, does not explore the full implications of his own argument for the conceptualization of modern politics and governmentality, largely due to his problematic approach to and treatment of some of the fundamental philosophical premises of liberal political theory. This point has been noted by some recent critics of his writings on power and governmentality. Foucault's essay on governmentality appears in G. Burchell, et. al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). For critical analysis and commentary on Foucault's essay see: B. Hindess, Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) and "Politics and Governmentality," Economy and Society, 26, 2, 1997; C. Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," and G. Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing the System of Natural Liberty," both in Burchell, et. al. 1991; A. Barry, et. al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, NeoLiberalism and Rationalities of Government (London: University College London Press, 1996).
30. This point invokes Foucault's argument in his much-quoted essay on governmentality. Foucault, however, does not explore the full implications of his own argument for the conceptualization of modern politics and governmentality, largely due to his problematic approach to and treatment of
31. This point invokes Foucault's argument in his much-quoted essay on governmentality. Foucault, however, does not explore the full implications of his own argument for the conceptualization of modern politics and governmentality, largely due to his problematic approach to and treatment of some of the fundamental philosophical premises of liberal political theory. This point has been noted by some recent critics of his writings on power and governmentality. Foucault's essay on governmentality appears in G. Burchell, et. al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). For critical analysis and commentary on Foucault's essay see: B. Hindess, Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) and "Politics and Governmentality," Economy and Society, 26, 2, 1997; C. Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," and G. Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing the System of Natural Liberty," both in Burchell, et. al. 1991; A. Barry, et. al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, NeoLiberalism and Rationalities of Government (London: University College London Press, 1996).
32. The changing ethnic and racial composition of West European societies and the associated problems of social and political marginalization and exclusion have led to a revival of scholarly interest in the concept of citizenship. Social and political theorists have rightly pointed out the shortcomings of the normative concept of citizenship in the increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies of Western Europe and North America, and the failure of these societies to ensure democratic representation of the ethnic and racial groupings. They have thus argued for a redefinition of the conditions of citizenship and political participation in democratic societies, to ensure the representation of the "marginal" and "excluded" in political and cultural processes. The recent "revisionist" works on citizenship and ethnicity clearly pose important questions regarding the nature of democracy and democratic process in the contemporary West, but fail to provide appropriate answers to them. The often-quoted work of Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), is a prime example: for him the inability of the democratic process to represent ethnic and cultural difference is rooted in the inadequacies of the concept of citizenship, that is, the rights and conditions of its realization in society. But in so doing he fails to relate it to political sovereignty and its restrictive effects on the democratic political process, thus arguing for a change in the conditions of citizenship without a change in the "ethnic" identity of the sovereign, the identity of political power. The discourse of rights within which Kymlicka poses and answers his questions is defined by the discourse of sovereignty which leaves no room for non-sovereign identities; the marginal, the excluded or the stateless remain unrepresented and unrepresentable. Political theory must break out of the narrow ethnic confines of the discourse of sovereignty if it is to represent the unrepresented.
33. This idea is hardly new; it has been around since Renan's seminal essay "What is the Nation?" a new English translation of which appeared in H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1988). In recent years it has informed an increasingly influential body of literature which entertains "constructionist" conceptions of the nation and nationalism, exemplified best by the works of Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London:Verso, 1983). For a critical discussion of the idea and a theoretical evaluation of the constructionist conceptions of the nation and nationalism, its political and methodological significance and theoretical limitations and wrongs, see my essay "Nationalism and Kurdish Historical Writing," New Perspectives on Turkey, 14, Spring 1996.
34. This idea is hardly new; it has been around since Renan's seminal essay "What is the Nation?" a new English translation of which appeared in H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1988). In recent years it has informed an increasingly influential body of literature which entertains "constructionist" conceptions of the nation and nationalism, exemplified best by the works of Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London:Verso, 1983). For a critical discussion of the idea and a theoretical evaluation of the constructionist conceptions of the nation and nationalism, its political and methodological significance and theoretical limitations and wrongs, see my essay "Nationalism and Kurdish Historical Writing," New Perspectives on Turkey, 14, Spring 1996.
35. This idea is hardly new; it has been around since Renan's seminal essay "What is the Nation?" a new English translation of which appeared in H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1988). In recent years it has informed an increasingly influential body of literature which entertains "constructionist" conceptions of the nation and nationalism, exemplified best by the works of Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London:Verso, 1983). For a critical discussion of the idea and a theoretical evaluation of the constructionist conceptions of the nation and nationalism, its political and methodological significance and theoretical limitations and wrongs, see my essay "Nationalism and Kurdish Historical Writing," New Perspectives on Turkey, 14, Spring 1996.
36. This idea is hardly new; it has been around since Renan's seminal essay "What is the Nation?" a new English translation of which appeared in H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1988). In recent years it has informed an increasingly influential body of literature which entertains "constructionist" conceptions of the nation and nationalism, exemplified best by the works of Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London:Verso, 1983). For a critical discussion of the idea and a theoretical evaluation of the constructionist conceptions of the nation and nationalism, its political and methodological significance and theoretical limitations and wrongs, see my essay "Nationalism and Kurdish Historical Writing," New Perspectives on Turkey, 14, Spring 1996.
37. It is widely held that the concept of citizenship regulates the boundaries of the state and civil society in the democratic order. This is clearly argued by David Held and Bhikhu Parekh in their contributions to a collection edited by Geoffrey Andrews, Citizenship (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991). The truth of the argument notwithstanding, it largely exaggerates the autonomy of the regulatory function of citizenship in the democratic process by overlooking the limitations that the ethnic identity of political power imposes in the development of civil society. This issue will be discussed in the following section of this essay. See also B. S. Turner (ed), Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage, 1993), esp. contributions by Hindess, Kalberg and Turner.
38. It is widely held that the concept of citizenship regulates the boundaries of the state and civil society in the democratic order. This is clearly argued by David Held and Bhikhu Parekh in their contributions to a collection edited by Geoffrey Andrews, Citizenship (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991). The truth of the argument notwithstanding, it largely exaggerates the autonomy of the regulatory function of citizenship in the democratic process by overlooking the limitations that the ethnic identity of political power imposes in the development of civil society. This issue will be discussed in the following section of this essay. See also B. S. Turner (ed), Citizenship and Social Theory (London: Sage, 1993), esp. contributions by Hindess, Kalberg and Turner.
39. On this point see Graham Burchell's discussion and development of Foucault's concept of governmentality in his essay in G. Burchell et. al., op. cit., 1991.
40. Civil society always functions within the unifying framework of the legal regulations of the state, which clearly dispels the myth of its autonomy widely held by its contemporary enthusiasts. This point is forcefully put by Althusser in his brief but incisive critique of Gramsci's concept of civil society. Althusser's conception of social totality structured by the dominance of the economic level leads him to the other extreme, arguing for the total dependence of civil society on dominant class relations, and hence subjected to their centralizing functions through the medium of the state. See L. Althusser, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970), p. 168; also his "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy. (London: New Left Books, 1971).
41. Civil society always functions within the unifying framework of the legal regulations of the state, which clearly dispels the myth of its autonomy widely held by its contemporary enthusiasts. This point is forcefully put by Althusser in his brief but incisive critique of Gramsci's concept of civil society. Althusser's conception of social totality structured by the dominance of the economic level leads him to the other extreme, arguing for the total dependence of civil society on dominant class relations, and hence subjected to their centralizing functions through the medium of the state. See L. Althusser, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970), p. 168; also his "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy. (London: New Left Books, 1971).
42. The concept of "transactional domain" is borrowed from Graham Burchell; see Burchell, op. cit., 1993.
43. This argument is developed by Barry Hindess in his discussion and critique of Foucault's concept of governmentality and political reason; Hindess op. cit., 1997 and op. cit., 1996.
44. This argument is developed by Barry Hindess in his discussion and critique of Foucault's concept of governmentality and political reason; Hindess op. cit., 1997 and op. cit., 1996.
45. See Hindess op. cit., 1997.
46. On this point see Burchell op. cit.. 1991.
47. Ibid.
48. The discussion of civil society and democratic process in the remaining part of this essay will be confined to Turkey and Iran, excluding Iraq and Syria. Syria is excluded because of the absence of democratic process and the dearth of information on the state of civil society, especially with regard to ethnicity and ethnic difference; while the social, political and cultural conditions of Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991, and the complete concentration of political power in the coercive and security apparatuses of the state, renders absurd any discussion of civil society. In so far as civil society and democratic process are concerned the current situation in Iraq is only a culmination of the process which started under Ba'ath rule, which by definition implied the closure of civil society.
49. There is a growing body of literature on civil society and democratic process in Turkey, which mostly remains within the normative framework of constitutional politics, thus excluding consideration of non-constitutional issues such as Kurdish and Islamic identities. Only a few writers break out of this narrow political and methodological framework. See for example: B. Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," and N. Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamic Participation: The Case of Turkey" both in A. R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994); E. Ozbudun, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," and L. Koker, "National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of Turkey's Democratic Experience" both in E. Ozdalga and S. Perrson (eds.), Civil Society and Democracy in the Muslim World (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), vol. 7.
50. There is a growing body of literature on civil society and democratic process in Turkey, which mostly remains within the normative framework of constitutional politics, thus excluding consideration of non-constitutional issues such as Kurdish and Islamic identities. Only a few writers break out of this narrow political and methodological framework. See for example: B. Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," and N. Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamic Participation: The Case of Turkey" both in A. R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994); E. Ozbudun, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," and L. Koker, "National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of Turkey's Democratic Experience" both in E. Ozdalga and S. Perrson (eds.), Civil Society and Democracy in the Muslim World (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), vol. 7.
51. There is a growing body of literature on civil society and democratic process in Turkey, which mostly remains within the normative framework of constitutional politics, thus excluding consideration of non-constitutional issues such as Kurdish and Islamic identities. Only a few writers break out of this narrow political and methodological framework. See for example: B. Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," and N. Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamic Participation: The Case of Turkey" both in A. R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994); E. Ozbudun, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," and L. Koker, "National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of Turkey's Democratic Experience" both in E. Ozdalga and S. Perrson (eds.), Civil Society and Democracy in the Muslim World (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), vol. 7.
52. There is a growing body of literature on civil society and democratic process in Turkey, which mostly remains within the normative framework of constitutional politics, thus excluding consideration of non-constitutional issues such as Kurdish and Islamic identities. Only a few writers break out of this narrow political and methodological framework. See for example: B. Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," and N. Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamic Participation: The Case of Turkey" both in A. R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994); E. Ozbudun, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," and L. Koker, "National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of Turkey's Democratic Experience" both in E. Ozdalga and S. Perrson (eds.), Civil Society and Democracy in the Muslim World (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), vol. 7.
53. Toprak (op. cit., 1995)
54. and Gole (op. cit., 1995) are examples of the partial recognition, but the crucial break with the normative constitutional framework is not carried to its logical conclusion.
55. Koker (op. cit., 1997) provides a more radical analysis, clearly departing from the normative premises of the constitutional framework. His radical approach to Kurdish identity is premised on his rejection of the Kemalist contours of the discourse of civil society and democratization in contemporary Turkey.
56. Civil society (Jame-yeh Madani) was the battle cry of Khatami in the presidential elections of 1997. The concept was used to refer to the rule of law, which was identified with democratic order. As such it became the central plank in the reformist platform attracting the active support of both religious and secular sections of the population. The reformist platform was opposed by the conservative hardliners in the regime who rejected the discourse of civil society in the name of the wilayat i faqih which, they argued, represented the revolutionary legitimacy and the ethos of the Islamic repubic. The debate on civil society and democratic order has continued more rigorously since Khatami's victory, signifying the persistence of political struggle between the reformists and the conservative hardliners which is now clearly centered on state power. This struggle, and in fact the debate on civil society, is still fought in terms of the competing definitions of Islam and their associated notions of political authority and legitimacy in which Khomeini and his concept of wilayat i faqih remain the point of reference. For the Islamic reformist argument for civil society and the rule of law during and since the presidential elections see the issues of the Tehran daily Salam, and the weeklies Jame-eh, Toos, Keeyan, Neshat. The conservative opposition to the reformist platform see the issues of the Tehran daily Resalat since Jan. 1997.
57. The volume Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz ('Civil Society and the Present day Iran), Tehran 1377/1997 contains a collection of articles by religious and secular writers who put forward different arguments in defense of civil society, see especially Abdul Karim Soroush's contribution: Din va Jame-eh (Religion and Society). See also Iran-e Farda, special issues on civil society, Tehran, 1997, and Iran Nameh (A Persian Journal of Iranian Studies), special issues on civil society in Iran, XIII, 4, Fall 1995 and XIV, 1, Fall 1996.
58. The volume Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz ('Civil Society and the Present day Iran), Tehran 1377/1997 contains a collection of articles by religious and secular writers who put forward different arguments in defense of civil society, see especially Abdul Karim Soroush's contribution: Din va Jame-eh (Religion and Society). See also Iran-e Farda, special issues on civil society, Tehran, 1997, and Iran Nameh (A Persian Journal of Iranian Studies), special issues on civil society in Iran, XIII, 4, Fall 1995 and XIV, 1, Fall 1996.
59. The volume Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz ('Civil Society and the Present day Iran), Tehran 1377/1997 contains a collection of articles by religious and secular writers who put forward different arguments in defense of civil society, see especially Abdul Karim Soroush's contribution: Din va Jame-eh (Religion and Society). See also Iran-e Farda, special issues on civil society, Tehran, 1997, and Iran Nameh (A Persian Journal of Iranian Studies), special issues on civil society in Iran, XIII, 4, Fall 1995 and XIV, 1, Fall 1996.
60. The volume Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz ('Civil Society and the Present day Iran), Tehran 1377/1997 contains a collection of articles by religious and secular writers who put forward different arguments in defense of civil society, see especially Abdul Karim Soroush's contribution: Din va Jame-eh (Religion and Society). See also Iran-e Farda, special issues on civil society, Tehran, 1997, and Iran Nameh (A Persian Journal of Iranian Studies), special issues on civil society in Iran, XIII, 4, Fall 1995 and XIV, 1, Fall 1996.
61. The volume Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz ('Civil Society and the Present day Iran), Tehran 1377/1997 contains a collection of articles by religious and secular writers who put forward different arguments in defense of civil society, see especially Abdul Karim Soroush's contribution: Din va Jame-eh (Religion and Society). See also Iran-e Farda, special issues on civil society, Tehran, 1997, and Iran Nameh (A Persian Journal of Iranian Studies), special issues on civil society in Iran, XIII, 4, Fall 1995 and XIV, 1, Fall 1996.
62. See for example Hussein Bashiryeh's contribution to the debate in Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz (op. cit., 1997) and articles by Farhad Kazemi and Gholam Reza Afghami in special issues of Iran Nameh (op. cit., 1996, 1997).
63. See for example Soroush (op.cit, 1997) and various speeches by Khatami before and since the presidential elections in June 1997 printed in issues of Salam. and the brief but rather interesting contribution of Hashemi Nejad in Jame-eyeh Madani va Iran-e Emrooz (op. cit., 1997).
64. For a detailed and informed study of the politics of the preparation and ratification of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its democratic and authoritarian contens see the recent work of Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).