Wittgenstein among the savages: Language, action and political theory

Polity

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 579-603

  Dienstag, Joshua Foa ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

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EID: 0032222150     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235256     Document Type: Review

References (59)

1. My approach thus differs (though perhaps not too greatly) from the best previous effort to derive an account of political action from Wittgenstein, Peter Winch's excellent The Idea of aSocial Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958). While sensitive to the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, Winch argues that "there is no sharp break between behavior which expresses discursive ideas and that which does not; and that which does not is sufficiently like that which does to make it necessary to regard it as analogous to the other" (129). While the premise here is certainly true, I doubt whether Winch's conclusion follows directly from it. He seems to suppose that if we do not consider actions as analogous to ideas, we will be left only with descriptions which liken them to "the interaction of physical forces" (129), i.e. to physics. This is a false dichotomy, an alternative to which, I hope to show, can be seen in Wittgenstein's writings on religion.
2. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
3. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
4. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
5. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
6. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
7. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
8. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
9. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
10. Wittgenstein's works are cited as follows: CV, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); LC, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); LE, "A Lecture on Ethics," in Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993); OC, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Ph, "Philosophy" (a chapter from the "Big Typescript"), in Philosophical Occasions; PI, Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968); RFGB, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," in Philosophical Occasions; TLP, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Z, Zettel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). All works are cited by paragraph number when available; otherwise page numbers are used.
11. See, e.g., Hannah Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); John Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); James Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," Political Theory 17(1989): 172-204; Tracy Strong, The Idea of Political Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), ch. 3.
12. See, e.g., Hannah Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); John Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); James Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," Political Theory 17(1989): 172-204; Tracy Strong, The Idea of Political Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), ch. 3.
13. See, e.g., Hannah Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); John Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); James Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," Political Theory 17(1989): 172-204; Tracy Strong, The Idea of Political Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), ch. 3.
14. See, e.g., Hannah Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); John Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); James Tully, "Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy," Political Theory 17(1989): 172-204; Tracy Strong, The Idea of Political Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), ch. 3.
15. Here it will be obvious to readers acquainted with his work how my perspective parallels that of Stanley Cavell, especially The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), see esp. chs. 2, 8. Like Cavell, I find Wittgenstein to have acknowledged skepticism in such a way that recognizes the extent, but limits the force, of its conclusions.
16. A. J. Ayer, Wittgenstein (New York: Random House, 1985), p. 87. For a similar view expressed by a philosopher of religion, see Kai Nielsen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), 63, quoted in Cyril Barret, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1991), 49.
17. A. J. Ayer, Wittgenstein (New York: Random House, 1985), p. 87. For a similar view expressed by a philosopher of religion, see Kai Nielsen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), 63, quoted in Cyril Barret, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1991), 49.
18. A. J. Ayer, Wittgenstein (New York: Random House, 1985), p. 87. For a similar view expressed by a philosopher of religion, see Kai Nielsen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), 63, quoted in Cyril Barret, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1991), 49.
19. Ayer, Wittgenstein, 87-92
20. Ayer, Wittgenstein, 92.
21. For the purposes of this paper, Wittgenstein's "skepticism" will be taken to mean his doubt that foundational truths about the world could be discovered by metaphysics and expressed in language. For explicit (though very different) attempts to relate this stance more directly to religious belief, see, e.g., G. E. M. Anscombe, "Faith," Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981); Dean Martin, "On Certainty and Religious Belief," Religious Studies 20 (1984): 593-613; Glen Martin, "The Religious Nature of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Philosophy Today 32 (1988): 207-20.
22. For the purposes of this paper, Wittgenstein's "skepticism" will be taken to mean his doubt that foundational truths about the world could be discovered by metaphysics and expressed in language. For explicit (though very different) attempts to relate this stance more directly to religious belief, see, e.g., G. E. M. Anscombe, "Faith," Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981); Dean Martin, "On Certainty and Religious Belief," Religious Studies 20 (1984): 593-613; Glen Martin, "The Religious Nature of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Philosophy Today 32 (1988): 207-20.
23. For the purposes of this paper, Wittgenstein's "skepticism" will be taken to mean his doubt that foundational truths about the world could be discovered by metaphysics and expressed in language. For explicit (though very different) attempts to relate this stance more directly to religious belief, see, e.g., G. E. M. Anscombe, "Faith," Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981); Dean Martin, "On Certainty and Religious Belief," Religious Studies 20 (1984): 593-613; Glen Martin, "The Religious Nature of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Philosophy Today 32 (1988): 207-20.
24. See Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, 122ff., for a similar view. I follow Barrett more closely concerning Wittgenstein's earlier views than the later ones. Whether Wittgenstein himself sought such a faith to embrace it or merely to admire it, it is not really my goal to determine. In any case, he was always much clearer on "what belief would look like" than on the status of his own beliefs. On this question, see Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 1; Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), ch. 2.10.
25. See Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, 122ff., for a similar view. I follow Barrett more closely concerning Wittgenstein's earlier views than the later ones. Whether Wittgenstein himself sought such a faith to embrace it or merely to admire it, it is not really my goal to determine. In any case, he was always much clearer on "what belief would look like" than on the status of his own beliefs. On this question, see Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 1; Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), ch. 2.10.
26. See Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, 122ff., for a similar view. I follow Barrett more closely concerning Wittgenstein's earlier views than the later ones. Whether Wittgenstein himself sought such a faith to embrace it or merely to admire it, it is not really my goal to determine. In any case, he was always much clearer on "what belief would look like" than on the status of his own beliefs. On this question, see Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 1; Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), ch. 2.10.
27. See Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, 122ff., for a similar view. I follow Barrett more closely concerning Wittgenstein's earlier views than the later ones. Whether Wittgenstein himself sought such a faith to embrace it or merely to admire it, it is not really my goal to determine. In any case, he was always much clearer on "what belief would look like" than on the status of his own beliefs. On this question, see Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 1; Russell Nieli, Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), ch. 2.10.
28. The literature here is too voluminous to fully document. Two excellent recent representatives of the opposing views, however, are Cora Diamond, "Throwing Away the Ladder," The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991) and Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, where the former resists transcendental implications for the Tractatus and the latter defends them.
29. The literature here is too voluminous to fully document. Two excellent recent representatives of the opposing views, however, are Cora Diamond, "Throwing Away the Ladder," The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991) and Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, where the former resists transcendental implications for the Tractatus and the latter defends them.
30. This view has a parallel in Nietzsche's thinking: "One would have to be situated outside life, and on the other hand to know it as thoroughly as any, as many, as all who have experienced it, to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all: sufficient reason for understanding that this problem is for us an inaccessible problem" [Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 45]. One of the more interesting attempts to compare Wittgenstein and Nietzsche here is Erich Heller, "Ludwig Wittgenstein: Unphilosophical Notes," in New Essays on Religious Language, ed. Dallas High (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). See also Monk, Wittgenstein, 121-23. But Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's positions are not identical. Nietzsche seems more certain that there is no overall meaning to life and merely uses this argument to bring home the point of the futility of believing otherwise. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, at this point, really does seem to hold out the possibility that there is an unknown, unknowable "meaning" to life as a whole. Later on, as we shall see, his position moves closer to that of Nietzsche, though the two are certainly never identical. Christopher Janaway argues that Wittgenstein's position here also parallels that of Schopenhauer, who, of course, also influenced Nietzsche [Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 317-342].
31. Recent debates about Searle's "chinese-room" argument essentially reexplore the territory Wittgenstein examined. In essence (though perhaps not in detail), Searle's argument that one could know all the correct responses in a language without grasping its meaning in any sense, parallels Wittgenstein's position. The validity of this argument has been strenuously challenged by Searle's critics. While I leave such contests to one side here, it is perhaps worth noting the continuing vitality of Wittgenstein's view and its central place in contemporary debates about meaning and consciousness. See John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992).
32. See Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics, 85ff.
33. Quoted in Monk, Wittgenstein, 282.
34. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), 365. Newton Garver describes a more semantic version of this dualism and ascribes it to the influence of Frege [This Complicated Form of Life: Essays on Wittgenstein (Chicago: Open Court, 1994), chs. 6-7]. Our two arguments are not incompatible, though it seems to me that the connection to Augustine explains the spiritual element of the dualism more completely.
35. In a parallel way (though by different people), Wittgenstein is also regularly accused of fideism (i.e. of conceiving religion solely as a matter of faith rather than reason, e.g. Nielsen, Introduction, 47-62). I think it is fair to say that in the Tractatus period, the shoe fits, even if Wittgenstein is reluctant to wear it (i.e. to believe). As I argue below, however, his position evolved into something quite different.
36. Garth Hallet seems to endorse this view, though with reservations as to whether Wittgenstein has been completely fair to Augustine [A Companion to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1977), 73-77]. Though Wittgenstein did not himself live to publish Philosophical Investigations, we can be fairly sure that this placement of his discussion of Augustine is neither an accident nor the product of later editing. An earlier version, the "Brown Book," begins with a similar discussion.
37. See also Ph 199: "An entire mythology is laid down in our language." This remark first appears in the "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" (133); this points to the crucial importance of the encounter with Frazer in reshaping Wittgenstein's approach to language and ritual. Though I do not wish to pursue the point here, it seems to me that a credible case could be made that the "Remarks" are the most important point of transition between the earlier and later Wittgenstein.
38. On the point that Wittgenstein's later distinctions are transformations of an earlier dualism, see Garver, This Complicated Form of Life, 130-31, though, again, I construct that dualism (and the corresponding distinctions) somewhat differently.
39. It is an interesting topic, but one I must largely leave to one side, to consider just how accurate or fair to Frazer Wittgenstein was. It is not clear that Wittgenstein read even the one-volume version of Frazer in its entirety (there are no notes for vast portions of the book); in any case, Wittgenstein certainly never intended the notes for publication.
40. Sir James Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (New York: Macmillan Publishing co., 1922), 56.
41. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 57
42. Thus Wittgenstein can preserve his admiration for Augustine by respecting his practice, even if his theory must be understood as limited. I should note here that the term "unspoken"(which I occasionally use for the sake of variety) is not completely accurate since ritual speech is meant to be included in a description of a form of life. "Expressible" "inexpressible" (though not fully satisfactory) is more precise since, on Wittgenstein's view, ritual speech does not "express" a theory or even a thought
43. Precisely in line with the understanding of religion in the "Remarks," he only acknowledges Christianity as a Lebensform: "Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life" (CV 28, emphasis added). Once it attempts to "justify" beliefs, "it becomes repellent" (CV 29). Given that many religions do have elaborate theologies on which their practices are plausibly based, however, Wittgenstein's account clearly faces the unpromising choice between declaring such things bad religions or not religions. It is hard to imagine either characterization bearing much scrutiny in the long run.
44. Geertz himself calls on Wittgenstein, with much justice. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), chs. 1, 14. Hilary Putnam, however, carefully considers, and rejects, the view that Wittgenstein uses a concept of "incommensurability" to describe the situation between religious and non-religious language. "Wittgenstein on Religious Belief," On Community, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1991).
45. The etymology of "conversation" and its close relative "conversion" support Wittgenstein here. Originally, to "converse" was "to live with" - that is, to converse with someone was not merely to share words, but to share a way of life.
46. I am particularly indebted to Jill Frank and George Klosko for discussion of this point.
47. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
48. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
49. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
50. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
51. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
52. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
53. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), ch. 1. While this claim is open to doubt, it also has many defenders. For opponents, see, e.g. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), chs. 13-15; for defenders, see, e.g. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Steven Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and my articles, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 497-511, and "Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders," The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 985-1009.
54. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition, 11
55. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), book 1.
56. One attempt to follow Hartz's reasoning out into American culture at large is Anne Norton, Republic of Signs: Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
57. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 45. See too Nietzsche's version of the distinction between speech and silence in The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967), 3.
58. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, p. 45. See too Nietzsche's version of the distinction between speech and silence in The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967), 3.
59. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), ch. 24.