SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼 - 논문 보기

메뉴 건너뛰기

Economic Theory

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 129-155

Ranking agencies under moral hazard

(2) Robbins, Edward Henry a Sarath, Bharat b

a Fin Econ Analytics and Research (United States)

b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032221360 PISSN: 09382259 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050181 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (5)

References (13)

1
- 0003451960
- New York: Wiley
- Blackwell, D., Girsshick, M.A.: Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions. New York: Wiley 1954
- (1954) Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions
- Blackwell, D.¹ Girsshick, M.A.²

2
- 84925978633
- Information and incentives: The agency information problem
- Gjesdal, F.: Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem. Review of Economic Studies 49, 373-390 (1982)
- (1982) Review of Economic Studies , vol.49 , pp. 373-390
- Gjesdal, F.¹

3
- 0000638668
- An analysis of the principal-agent problem
- Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D.: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica 51, 7-45 (1983)
- (1983) Econometrica , vol.51 , pp. 7-45
- Grossman, S.J.¹ Hart, O.D.²

4
- 0002942943
- Rules for ordering uncertain prospects
- Hadar, J., Russell, W.R.: Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects. American Economic Review 59, 25-34 (1969)
- (1969) American Economic Review , vol.59 , pp. 25-34
- Hadar, J.¹ Russell, W.R.²

5
- 0000930326
- On the optimality of equilibrium when market structures are incomplete
- Hart, O.: On the Optimality of Equilibrium When Market Structures are Incomplete. Journal of Economic Theory 11, 418-443 (1975)
- (1975) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.11 , pp. 418-443
- Hart, O.¹

6
- 0000328264
- The market mechanism as an incentive scheme
- Hart, O.: The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14, No. 2, 366-382 (Autumn 1983)
- (1983) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.14 , Issue.2 AUTUMN , pp. 366-382
- Hart, O.¹

7
- 0000139691
- Moral hazard and observability
- Holmström, B.: Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10, No. 1, 74-91 (Spring 1979)
- (1979) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.10 , Issue.1 SPRING , pp. 74-91
- Holmström, B.¹

8
- 0000777416
- Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
- Jewitt, I.: Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems. Econometrica 56, No. 5, 1177-1190 (September 1988)
- (1988) Econometrica , vol.56 , Issue.5 SEPTEMBER , pp. 1177-1190
- Jewitt, I.¹

9
- 0002119044
- Efficiency of an information system in an agency model
- Kim, S.K.: Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model. Econometrica 63, No. 1, 89-102 (January 1995)
- (1995) Econometrica , vol.63 , Issue.1 JANUARY , pp. 89-102
- Kim, S.K.¹

10
- 0003428399
- Academic Press: New York
- Marshall, A.W, Olkin, I.: Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications. Academic Press: New York 1979
- (1979) Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications
- Marshall, A.W.¹ Olkin, I.²

11
- 0003940555
- Working Paper, Nuffield College (Oxford University), October
- Mittlees, J.A.: The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior: Part I. Working Paper, Nuffield College (Oxford University), October 1975
- (1975) The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior: Part I
- Mittlees, J.A.¹

12
- 0001746373
- The first-order approach to principal-agent problems
- Rogerson, W.P.: The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems. Econometrica 53, No. 6, 1357-1367 (November 1985)
- (1985) Econometrica , vol.53 , Issue.6 NOVEMBER , pp. 1357-1367
- Rogerson, W.P.¹

13
- 0000625631
- Product-market competition and managerial slack
- Scharfstein D.: Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack. RAND Journal of Economics 19, No. 1, 147-155 (Spring 1988)
- (1988) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.19 , Issue.1 SPRING , pp. 147-155
- Scharfstein, D.¹

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.