Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychology

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 5-28

  Chen, Xiang ^a   Andersen, Hanne ^b   Barker, Peter ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032221216     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089808573246     Document Type: Article

References (43)

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