Aristotle and natural law

History of Political Thought

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 142-166

  Burns, Tony ^a  

^a NOTTINGHAM TRENT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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References (145)

1. 1 The Greek term employed by Aristotle should strictly speaking be translated into English as 'natural justice'. Leo Strauss prefers the expression 'natural right'. Cf. L. Strauss, 'Natural Law', International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 11 (New York, 1968), p. 81. As M. Salomon Shellens has pointed out, however, many commentators employ the phrase 'natural law' in this context. Cf. M. Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', Natural Law Forum, 72 (1959), p. 74. We shall use the terms 'natural justice' and 'natural law' interchangeably.
2. 1 The Greek term employed by Aristotle should strictly speaking be translated into English as 'natural justice'. Leo Strauss prefers the expression 'natural right'. Cf. L. Strauss, 'Natural Law', International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 11 (New York, 1968), p. 81. As M. Salomon Shellens has pointed out, however, many commentators employ the phrase 'natural law' in this context. Cf. M. Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', Natural Law Forum, 72 (1959), p. 74. We shall use the terms 'natural justice' and 'natural law' interchangeably.
3. 2 M.B. Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law (The Hague, 1977), p. 22.
4. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
5. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
6. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
7. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
8. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
9. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
10. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
11. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
12. 3 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1974), p. 156. We shall focus here on the Nicomachean Ethics and ignore the Rhetoric. The value of the latter as a source for Aristotle's views on natural law is a matter of dispute. See C.J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1963), p. 23 n. 16; M. Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New Haven, 1951), p. 39 n. 1 and p. 65; H. Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', in H. Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 135; D.G. Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice', Classical Review, VIII (1894), pp. 185-92, esp. p. 191 n. 2; D.G. Ritchie, Natural Law and Natural Rights (London, 1895), p. 30; P.E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 9-10; J.W. Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', The Law Quarterly Review, 42 (1895), p. 127; F.D. Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. M.R. Konvitz and A.E. Murphy (New York, 1948).
13. 4 Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law, p. 25.
14. 5 Ibid.
15. 6 Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought, p. 9.
16. 7 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, trans. W.D. Ross (Oxford, 1925), Book V, ch. 7, 1134b-1135a.
17. 8 The account presented here is based on an earlier discussion of Aristotle's views in Tony Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology in the Philosophy of Hegel (Avebury, 1996), pp. 3, 14, 67-8. See also A.P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law (London, 2nd edn., 1974), pp. 174-5; H. Rommen, The Natural Law (New York, 1979), p. 247.
18. 8 The account presented here is based on an earlier discussion of Aristotle's views in Tony Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology in the Philosophy of Hegel (Avebury, 1996), pp. 3, 14, 67-8. See also A.P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law (London, 2nd edn., 1974), pp. 174-5; H. Rommen, The Natural Law (New York, 1979), p. 247.
19. 8 The account presented here is based on an earlier discussion of Aristotle's views in Tony Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology in the Philosophy of Hegel (Avebury, 1996), pp. 3, 14, 67-8. See also A.P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law (London, 2nd edn., 1974), pp. 174-5; H. Rommen, The Natural Law (New York, 1979), p. 247.
20. 9 See B. Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice, Political Theory, 18(2) (1990), p. 219; also M. Salomon, 'Le droit natural chez Aristote', Archives de philosophie de droit et de sociologie juridique, 7 (1937), pp. 120-7; Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', p. 127 n. 2.
21. 9 See B. Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice, Political Theory, 18(2) (1990), p. 219; also M. Salomon, 'Le droit natural chez Aristote', Archives de philosophie de droit et de sociologie juridique, 7 (1937), pp. 120-7; Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', p. 127 n. 2.
22. 9 See B. Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice, Political Theory, 18(2) (1990), p. 219; also M. Salomon, 'Le droit natural chez Aristote', Archives de philosophie de droit et de sociologie juridique, 7 (1937), pp. 120-7; Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', p. 127 n. 2.
23. 10 The term 'positive law' (or its equivalent) actually comes into use for the first time in the medieval period. See D. van den Eynde, 'The Terms lus Positivism and Signum Positivum in Twelfth Century Scholasticism', Franciscan Studies, 9 (1949), pp. 41-9; S. Kuttner, 'Sur les origines du terme droit positif', Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 15 (1936), pp. 728 ff.; W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1975), p. 62. Most commentators acknowledge that the features which at this time come to be associated with positive law are those which Aristotle associates with legal or conventional justice.
24. 10 The term 'positive law' (or its equivalent) actually comes into use for the first time in the medieval period. See D. van den Eynde, 'The Terms lus Positivism and Signum Positivum in Twelfth Century Scholasticism', Franciscan Studies, 9 (1949), pp. 41-9; S. Kuttner, 'Sur les origines du terme droit positif', Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 15 (1936), pp. 728 ff.; W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1975), p. 62. Most commentators acknowledge that the features which at this time come to be associated with positive law are those which Aristotle associates with legal or conventional justice.
25. 10 The term 'positive law' (or its equivalent) actually comes into use for the first time in the medieval period. See D. van den Eynde, 'The Terms lus Positivism and Signum Positivum in Twelfth Century Scholasticism', Franciscan Studies, 9 (1949), pp. 41-9; S. Kuttner, 'Sur les origines du terme droit positif', Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 15 (1936), pp. 728 ff.; W. Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1975), p. 62. Most commentators acknowledge that the features which at this time come to be associated with positive law are those which Aristotle associates with legal or conventional justice.
26. 11 Salmond, 'The Law of Nature', p. 127 n. 2.
27. 12 As Ernest Barker points out, Aristotle employs the terms 'justice' and 'injustice' in a sense which is as much 'moral' or 'ethical' as it is 'legal'. See Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. Sir Ernest Barker (Oxford, 1946), Appendix II, p. 362.
28. 13 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, II, 6, 1107a, 10-20.
29. 14 See for example J.M. Brennan, The Open Texture of Moral Concepts (London, 1977), pp. 36, 41, 44-57, 64-5, 119; J. Kovesi, Moral Notions (London, 1967), pp. 26, 32, 109; and L.A. Jost, 'A Descriptivist Reading of Aristotle's Treatment of Virtue Terms', Apeiron, 13 (1979), pp. 41-8.
30. 14 See for example J.M. Brennan, The Open Texture of Moral Concepts (London, 1977), pp. 36, 41, 44-57, 64-5, 119; J. Kovesi, Moral Notions (London, 1967), pp. 26, 32, 109; and L.A. Jost, 'A Descriptivist Reading of Aristotle's Treatment of Virtue Terms', Apeiron, 13 (1979), pp. 41-8.
31. 14 See for example J.M. Brennan, The Open Texture of Moral Concepts (London, 1977), pp. 36, 41, 44-57, 64-5, 119; J. Kovesi, Moral Notions (London, 1967), pp. 26, 32, 109; and L.A. Jost, 'A Descriptivist Reading of Aristotle's Treatment of Virtue Terms', Apeiron, 13 (1979), pp. 41-8.
32. 15 Kelsen, 'The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law', p. 131.
33. 16 For a discussion of the stoic conception of natural law see Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, Ch. 1.
34. 17 Aristotle, APIΣTOTEΛOΥΣ HΘIKA NIKOMAXEIA: The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. J. Burnet (London, 1900), V, 7, 1134b, 18-19.
35. 18 Aristotle, IIEPI ΔIKAIOΣΥTNHΣ: The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. H. Jackson (Cambridge, 1879), p. 39. Similar translations are offered by Chase, in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. D.P. Chase (London, n.d.), p. 145, and by Thompson in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. J.A.K. Thompson (Harmondsworth, 1965), p. 157, although Thompson refers to two 'forms' of political justice rather than two 'kinds'. See also Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 220.
36. 18 Aristotle, IIEPI ΔIKAIOΣΥTNHΣ: The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. H. Jackson (Cambridge, 1879), p. 39. Similar translations are offered by Chase, in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. D.P. Chase (London, n.d.), p. 145, and by Thompson in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. J.A.K. Thompson (Harmondsworth, 1965), p. 157, although Thompson refers to two 'forms' of political justice rather than two 'kinds'. See also Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 220.
37. 18 Aristotle, IIEPI ΔIKAIOΣΥTNHΣ: The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. H. Jackson (Cambridge, 1879), p. 39. Similar translations are offered by Chase, in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. D.P. Chase (London, n.d.), p. 145, and by Thompson in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. J.A.K. Thompson (Harmondsworth, 1965), p. 157, although Thompson refers to two 'forms' of political justice rather than two 'kinds'. See also Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 220.
38. 18 Aristotle, IIEPI ΔIKAIOΣΥTNHΣ: The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. H. Jackson (Cambridge, 1879), p. 39. Similar translations are offered by Chase, in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ed. D.P. Chase (London, n.d.), p. 145, and by Thompson in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. J.A.K. Thompson (Harmondsworth, 1965), p. 157, although Thompson refers to two 'forms' of political justice rather than two 'kinds'. See also Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 220.
39. 19 A similar translation to that of Ross is provided by both Grant, in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: Illustrated with Essays and Notes, ed. Sir Alexander Grant (2 vols., London, 4th edn., 1885), Vol. II, p. 126, and by Stewart, in J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (2 vols., Oxford, 1892), p. 492, although Grant and Stewart employ the word 'element' rather than the word 'part'.
40. 19 A similar translation to that of Ross is provided by both Grant, in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: Illustrated with Essays and Notes, ed. Sir Alexander Grant (2 vols., London, 4th edn., 1885), Vol. II, p. 126, and by Stewart, in J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (2 vols., Oxford, 1892), p. 492, although Grant and Stewart employ the word 'element' rather than the word 'part'.
41. 20 Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 156.
42. 21 Aristotle does not make any explicit distinction between legal or conventional justice which is customary and legal or conventional justice which is enacted. It would, however, be a mistake to assume automatically, as W.A. Robson appears to do, that he must have had customary law in mind here. Cf. W.A. Robson, Civilisation and the Growth of Law (London, 1935), pp. 243-5. As G.R. Morrow has pointed out, the idea of 'legislation' is evidently by no means alien either to Greek political experience or to Greek political thought at this time. Cf. G.R. Morrow, 'Plato and the Law of Nature', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. Konvitz and Murphy, pp. 38 ff. This is, indeed, evident from what Aristotle himself has to say about such matters in Chapter 9 of Book 10 of the Ethics.
43. 21 Aristotle does not make any explicit distinction between legal or conventional justice which is customary and legal or conventional justice which is enacted. It would, however, be a mistake to assume automatically, as W.A. Robson appears to do, that he must have had customary law in mind here. Cf. W.A. Robson, Civilisation and the Growth of Law (London, 1935), pp. 243-5. As G.R. Morrow has pointed out, the idea of 'legislation' is evidently by no means alien either to Greek political experience or to Greek political thought at this time. Cf. G.R. Morrow, 'Plato and the Law of Nature', in Essays in Political Theory, ed. Konvitz and Murphy, pp. 38 ff. This is, indeed, evident from what Aristotle himself has to say about such matters in Chapter 9 of Book 10 of the Ethics.
44. 22 Aquinas, Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle, ed. C.I. Litzinger (Chicago, 1964), p. 443.
45. 23 For this see, inter alia, R.A. Armstrong, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching (The Hague, 1966).
46. 24 Aristotle, Ethics, V, 1, 1129a, 34-43.
47. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
48. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
49. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
50. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
51. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
52. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
53. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
54. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
55. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
56. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
57. 25 Modern discussion of the concept of justice has been greatly influenced by what Aristotle has to say about the subject. See, for example, I. Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955-6); W.T. Blackstone, 'On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle', Ethics (1967); M. Ginsberg, 'The Concept of Justice', in On Justice in Society (Harmondsworth, 1971); H. Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957); H. Kelsen, A General Theory of Law and the State (New York, 1961); D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth, 1972); Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (London, 1963); Ch. Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument: Essays on Legal and Moral Reasoning (Dordrecht, 1980); D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, 1970); A. Ross, 'The Idea of Justice', in On Law and Justice (London, 1958); B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, second series (1967).
58. 26 That the English term 'equity' is derived ultimately (via the Latin aequitas) from the Greek το ιοον has been maintained by a number of commentators. See for example, J. Riley, 'A Conspectus of the Meaning of 'Epieikeia' and 'Aequitas' in History', in The History, Nature and Uses of Epieikeia in Moral Theology (Washington, 1948), pp. 10-18. For a different view see H. Maine, Ancient Law, ed. J.H. Morgan (London, 1965), p. 34. It is important to note that the English word 'equity' used in this more general sense must be distinguished from the same term when it is used to translate the Greek word επιεικεια (epieikeia). Aristotle discusses επιεικεια in Book V, Chapter 10 of the Ethics. Equity in this more technical sense is a legal principle which is supposed to deal with 'problem cases' which call for 'a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality' (Aristotle, Ethics, V, 10, 1137b, 25-30).
59. 26 That the English term 'equity' is derived ultimately (via the Latin aequitas) from the Greek το ιοον has been maintained by a number of commentators. See for example, J. Riley, 'A Conspectus of the Meaning of 'Epieikeia' and 'Aequitas' in History', in The History, Nature and Uses of Epieikeia in Moral Theology (Washington, 1948), pp. 10-18. For a different view see H. Maine, Ancient Law, ed. J.H. Morgan (London, 1965), p. 34. It is important to note that the English word 'equity' used in this more general sense must be distinguished from the same term when it is used to translate the Greek word επιεικεια (epieikeia). Aristotle discusses επιεικεια in Book V, Chapter 10 of the Ethics. Equity in this more technical sense is a legal principle which is supposed to deal with 'problem cases' which call for 'a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality' (Aristotle, Ethics, V, 10, 1137b, 25-30).
60. 26 That the English term 'equity' is derived ultimately (via the Latin aequitas) from the Greek το ιοον has been maintained by a number of commentators. See for example, J. Riley, 'A Conspectus of the Meaning of 'Epieikeia' and 'Aequitas' in History', in The History, Nature and Uses of Epieikeia in Moral Theology (Washington, 1948), pp. 10-18. For a different view see H. Maine, Ancient Law, ed. J.H. Morgan (London, 1965), p. 34. It is important to note that the English word 'equity' used in this more general sense must be distinguished from the same term when it is used to translate the Greek word επιεικεια (epieikeia). Aristotle discusses επιεικεια in Book V, Chapter 10 of the Ethics. Equity in this more technical sense is a legal principle which is supposed to deal with 'problem cases' which call for 'a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality' (Aristotle, Ethics, V, 10, 1137b, 25-30).
61. 27 G. del Vecchio, Justice, ed. A.H. Campbell (Edinburgh, 1952), pp. 84, 187-8. For additional references to Aristotle and the Golden Rule see: Hamburger, Morals and Law, p. 52; W.A. Spooner, 'Golden Rule', in The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. G. Hastings (New York, 1914), Vol. 6, p. 311; J.O. Hertzler, 'On Golden Rules', International Journal of Ethics, 44 (1934), p. 423.
62. 27 G. del Vecchio, Justice, ed. A.H. Campbell (Edinburgh, 1952), pp. 84, 187-8. For additional references to Aristotle and the Golden Rule see: Hamburger, Morals and Law, p. 52; W.A. Spooner, 'Golden Rule', in The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. G. Hastings (New York, 1914), Vol. 6, p. 311; J.O. Hertzler, 'On Golden Rules', International Journal of Ethics, 44 (1934), p. 423.
63. 27 G. del Vecchio, Justice, ed. A.H. Campbell (Edinburgh, 1952), pp. 84, 187-8. For additional references to Aristotle and the Golden Rule see: Hamburger, Morals and Law, p. 52; W.A. Spooner, 'Golden Rule', in The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. G. Hastings (New York, 1914), Vol. 6, p. 311; J.O. Hertzler, 'On Golden Rules', International Journal of Ethics, 44 (1934), p. 423.
64. 27 G. del Vecchio, Justice, ed. A.H. Campbell (Edinburgh, 1952), pp. 84, 187-8. For additional references to Aristotle and the Golden Rule see: Hamburger, Morals and Law, p. 52; W.A. Spooner, 'Golden Rule', in The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. G. Hastings (New York, 1914), Vol. 6, p. 311; J.O. Hertzler, 'On Golden Rules', International Journal of Ethics, 44 (1934), p. 423.
65. 28 R. Newman, 'Introduction' to Equity in the World's Legal System, ed. R. Newman (Brussels, 1973), p. 28.
66. 29 R.N. Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', in Equity in the World's Legal System, ed. Newman, p. 38.
67. 30 E.H.T. Snell, The Principles of Equity (London, 17th edn., 1915), p. 1.
68. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
69. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
70. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
71. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
72. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
73. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
74. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
75. 31 See also Snyder, 'Natural Law and Equity', pp. 33-43; Ch. Perelman, 'Equity and the Rule of Justice', in Justice, Law and Argument, pp. 34-43; D.D. Raphael, 'Equality and Equity', Philosophy, 21 (1946); F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (New York, 1936); H. Maine, 'Law of Nature and Equity', in Ancient Law; C.K. Allen, 'Equity', in Law in the Making (Oxford, 1951); P. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1923), Vol. 2, ch. III, s. 5; P. Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London, 1943), Chs. VIII and IX.
76. 32 S.B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago, 1991), pp. 138-9.
77. 33 See Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 36-41.
78. 34 In the terminology of the Hegelian philosophy, a precept of natural justice is an 'essence'. This principle manifests itself, or 'appears', in a particular society at a particular time, as a principle of positive law or 'political justice'. To see a principle of positive law as a 'synthesis' of an 'essence' with an 'appearance' is to see it in its 'actuality'. See Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 66-74.
79. 35 E. Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York, 1959), p. 327. This Aristotelian insight is preserved in the philosophy of Hegel, who states that although natural law 'is distinct from positive law', nevertheless to 'pervert their difference into an opposition and a contradiction would be a gross misunderstanding'. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1979), Para. 3, p. 16.
80. 35 E. Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York, 1959), p. 327. This Aristotelian insight is preserved in the philosophy of Hegel, who states that although natural law 'is distinct from positive law', nevertheless to 'pervert their difference into an opposition and a contradiction would be a gross misunderstanding'. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1979), Para. 3, p. 16.
81. 36 See Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 18-19; also J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, 1980), pp. 28, 281; Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, p. 416.
82. 36 See Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 18-19; also J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, 1980), pp. 28, 281; Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, p. 416.
83. 36 See Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 18-19; also J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, 1980), pp. 28, 281; Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, p. 416.
84. 37 Bentham would insist that it is logically impossible for a positive law to permit the act of murder. See J. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (London, 1977), pp. 42-3. See also Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 36-7.
85. 37 Bentham would insist that it is logically impossible for a positive law to permit the act of murder. See J. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (London, 1977), pp. 42-3. See also Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 36-7.
86. 38 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 9, 1180b, 10-25; Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora ed. G.R.G. Mure (Oxford, 1926), I, 4, 73b, 25-30; ibid., I, 33, 88b, 30-35.
87. 38 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 9, 1180b, 10-25; Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora ed. G.R.G. Mure (Oxford, 1926), I, 4, 73b, 25-30; ibid., I, 33, 88b, 30-35.
88. 38 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 9, 1180b, 10-25; Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora ed. G.R.G. Mure (Oxford, 1926), I, 4, 73b, 25-30; ibid., I, 33, 88b, 30-35.
89. 39 Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, ed. Mure, II, 12, 96a, 5-15.
90. 40 For this interpretation of the notion of 'changeability' in relation to natural law see R.F. Begin, Natural Law and Positive Law (Washington, 1959), p. 88; J. Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago, 1958), pp. 84-94; Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 9, 97-8.
91. 40 For this interpretation of the notion of 'changeability' in relation to natural law see R.F. Begin, Natural Law and Positive Law (Washington, 1959), p. 88; J. Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago, 1958), pp. 84-94; Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 9, 97-8.
92. 40 For this interpretation of the notion of 'changeability' in relation to natural law see R.F. Begin, Natural Law and Positive Law (Washington, 1959), p. 88; J. Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago, 1958), pp. 84-94; Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 9, 97-8.
93. 41 Aristotle, Ethics, I, 4, 1095b, 1-5.
94. 42 Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 3, 1139b, 15-25; also VI, 5, 1140a, 30-5; VI, 6, 1140b, 30-5.
95. 42 Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 3, 1139b, 15-25; also VI, 5, 1140a, 30-5; VI, 6, 1140b, 30-5.
96. 42 Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 3, 1139b, 15-25; also VI, 5, 1140a, 30-5; VI, 6, 1140b, 30-5.
97. 43 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 9, 1180b, 10-25; Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, ed. Mure, I, 33, 88b, 30-5.
98. 43 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 9, 1180b, 10-25; Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, ed. Mure, I, 33, 88b, 30-5.
99. 44 Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, ed. Mure, I, 4, 73b, 25-30.
100. 45 Ibid., II, 12, 96a, 5-15.
101. 46 Aristotle, Ethics, I, 3, 1094b, 10-30; II, 2, 1103b, 25-1104a, 10.
102. 46 Aristotle, Ethics, I, 3, 1094b, 10-30; II, 2, 1103b, 25-1104a, 10.
103. 47 Ibid., I, 3, 1094b, 10-20; II, 2, 1103b, 25-1104a, 5.
104. 47 Ibid., I, 3, 1094b, 10-20; II, 2, 1103b, 25-1104a, 5.
105. 48 Ibid., X, 9, 1181a, 25-1181b, 1.
106. 49 Ibid., VI, 5, 1140a, 25-1140b, 30.
107. 50 Ibid., VI, 7, 1141b, 15-20.
108. 51 Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 72. See also Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law, p. 19; W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (London, 5th edn., 1967), p. 10; Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, pp. 22-3.
109. 51 Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 72. See also Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law, p. 19; W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (London, 5th edn., 1967), p. 10; Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, pp. 22-3.
110. 51 Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 72. See also Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law, p. 19; W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (London, 5th edn., 1967), p. 10; Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, pp. 22-3.
111. 51 Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 72. See also Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law, p. 19; W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (London, 5th edn., 1967), p. 10; Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, pp. 22-3.
112. 52 Kelsen, 'The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law', pp. 122-36; H. Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', in What is Justice?, pp. 125-36; Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 216.
113. 52 Kelsen, 'The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law', pp. 122-36; H. Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', in What is Justice?, pp. 125-36; Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 216.
114. 52 Kelsen, 'The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law', pp. 122-36; H. Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', in What is Justice?, pp. 125-36; Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', p. 216.
115. 53 R.G. Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Thought (Oxford, 1977), p. 141.
116. 54 Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', p. 133. See also, H. Kelsen, 'Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism', in A General Theory of Law and the State, pp. 439-40.
117. 54 Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', p. 133. See also, H. Kelsen, 'Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism', in A General Theory of Law and the State, pp. 439-40.
118. 55 Ross, On Law and Justice, pp. 274, 280.
119. 56 See the discussion of 'formal conceptions of natural law' in Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, pp. 34-41.
120. 57 Kelsen, 'The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law', p. 132.
121. 58 Ibid., p. 131; see also p. 127 ; and Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', p. 126.
122. 58 Ibid., p. 131; see also p. 127 ; and Kelsen, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice', p. 126.
123. 59 Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, Ch. 1.
124. 60 Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', p. 59; also pp. 46, 54-8 . The view of Kelsen and Wormuth is shared by Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', pp. 220, 234.
125. 60 Wormuth, 'Aristotle on Law', p. 59; also pp. 46, 54-8 . The view of Kelsen and Wormuth is shared by Yack, 'Natural Right and Aristotle's Understanding of Justice', pp. 220, 234.
126. 61 I have discussed the role that the Aristotelian conception of natural law has to play in Hegel's political thought, briefly, in Tony Burns, 'Hegel and Natural Law Theory', Politics, 15(1) (1995), pp. 27-32, and at greater length in Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, Chs. 2 and 4.
127. 61 I have discussed the role that the Aristotelian conception of natural law has to play in Hegel's political thought, briefly, in Tony Burns, 'Hegel and Natural Law Theory', Politics, 15(1) (1995), pp. 27-32, and at greater length in Burns, Natural Law and Political Ideology, Chs. 2 and 4.
128. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
129. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
130. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept
131. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
132. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
133. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
134. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
135. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
136. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
137. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
138. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
139. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
140. 62 In our view, Aristotle's principal task throughout Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is to define the concept of justice - which he does by relating this concept to that of equity. Book V, therefore, as del Vecchio has put it, contains Aristotle's understanding of the concept of justice, as it is 'genetically understood'. That is to say, it contains an account of the concept of justice understood in its strictest sense, or 'without qualification' (απλως δικαιον, haplos dikaion). For this reading of Aristotle's intentions see del Vecchio, Justice, p. 23; Gauthier and Jolif, in Aristotle, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, ed. R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif (4 vols., Louvain-Paris, 2nd edn., 1970), Vol. III, p. 385; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 100-4; W.L. Newman in Aristotle: The Politics, ed. W.L. Newman (4 vols., Oxford, 1881-1902), Vol. III, p. 192; Salomon Shellens, 'Aristotle on Natural Law', p. 89. Such a reading of Aristotle's intentions implies that, although it may not appear so on the surface, Book V does actually possess, at least implicitly, some sort of underlying, coherent structure. For this hotly debated issue see Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, pp. 213, 217-24; del Vecchio, Justice, pp. 53, 68; Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. II, pp. 108-12; Jackson, The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. xx, 76, 82-3 and 100-4; Gauthier and Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Vol. III, pp. 369-73, 385; Ritchie, 'Aristotle's Sub-Divisions of Particular Justice', p. 185; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1964), p. 212; Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, I, pp. 431-2.
141. 63 cf. Aristotle, Politics, ed. Barker, III, IX, 3, 1280a, p. 136; III, XII, 1, 1282b, p. 151.
142. 63 cf. Aristotle, Politics, ed. Barker, III, IX, 3, 1280a, p. 136; III, XII, 1, 1282b, p. 151.
143. 64 Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory, p. 141.
144. 65 D. Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence (London, 1959), p. 65, n. 54.
145. 66 Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought, p. 12.