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Volumn 42, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 1025-1060

Bicameral sequence: Theory and state legislative evidence

(1)  Rogers, James R a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0032220426     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2991848     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (31)

References (44)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.