Rules, restrictions, constraints: Structure and process in the new institutional economics

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 154, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 735-743

  Alt, James E ^a   Shepsle, Kenneth A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032219126     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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