The new institutional analysis of politics

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 154, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 744-753

  Aranson, Peter H ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032219125     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. ARANSON, P. H. [1989/1990], "Rational Ignorance in Politics, Economics, and Law," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 1(1), 25-42.
2. -[1999], "Electoral Competition and Entrepreneurship," Advances in Austrian Economies, forthcoming.
3. AXELROD, R. [1984], The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books: New York.
4. BLACK, D. [1963], The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge University Press: New York.
5. BRENNAN, G. and J. M. BUCHANAN [1985], The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge University Press: New York.
6. BUCHANAN, J. M. [1975], The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
7. CHANDLER, A. D. [1962], Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
8. COASE, R. H. [1937], "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, 4, 386-405.
9. -[1960], "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.
10. DAVIS, O. A., M. D. HINICH and P. C. ORDESHOOK [1970], "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," American Political Science Review, 64(2), 426-448.
11. DEMSETZ, H. [1969], "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, 12(1), 1-22.
12. -[1972], "When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?" Journal of Legal Studies, 1(1), 13-28.
13. -[1982], "Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, 72(1), 47-57.
14. DOWNS, A. [1957], An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row: New York.
15. DUVERGER, M. [1963], Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Wiley: New York.
16. ENELOW, J. M. [1981], "Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting," Journal of Politics, 43(4), 1062-1089.
17. FENNO, R. F. [1966], The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress, Little, Brown: Boston.
18. HALL, P. A. and R. C. R. TAYLOR [1996], "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies, 44(5), 936-957.
19. KIRZNER, I. M. [1973], Competition and Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
20. KLEIN, B. and K. B. LEFFLER [1981], "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 615-641.
21. MCKELVEY, R. D. and P. C. ORDESHOOK [1984], "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior," Journal of Politics, 46(1), 182-205.
22. RIKER, W. H. [1958], "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," American Political Science Review, 52(2), 349-366.
23. -[1982], "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," American Political Science Review, 76(4), 753-766.
24. -[1984], "The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency of 1787, With Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice," American Political Science Review, 78(1), 1-16.
25. SCHUMPETER, J. A. [1950], Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed., Harper: New York.
26. SHEPSLE, K. A. [1986], "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," pp. 51-81 in: H. F. Weisberg (ed.), Political Science: The Science of Politics, Agathon Press: New York.
27. -and B. A. WEINGAST [1981], "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice," Public Choice, 37(3), 503-519.
28. -and - [1984], "When do Rules of Procedure Matter?" Journal of Politics, 46(1), 183-221.
29. -and - [1987], "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, 81(1), 85-104.
30. STIGLER, G. J. [1968], The Organization of Industry, Irwin: Homewood, IL.
31. TULLOCK, G. (ed.) [1972], Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, Center for the Study of Public Choice: Blacksburg, VA.
32. WEINGAST, B. R. and W. MARSHALL [1988], "The Industrial Organization of Congress," Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), 132-163.
33. WILLIAMSON, O. E. [1979], "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261.