Division of labor among international organizations: The bosnian experience

Global Governance

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 461-484

  Kostakos, Georgios ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032217867     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00404006     Document Type: Review

References (73)

1. Bosniacs is the politically correct term used instead of Bosnian Muslims to refer to the largest ethnic group in Bosnia.
2. See "Letter Dated 23 December 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Addressed to the Secretary-General," UN Doc. S/1996/1066, 24 December 1996, pp. 2, 4, par. 1.
3. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 317-322, 327-330, 377-378.
4. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization - 1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996), par. 988-990. Of course, this major transfer of UN infrastructure and assets meant that the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the UN international police task force (IPTF) had to fight an uphill struggle before becoming fully operational. See a report by the secretary-general, UN Doc. S/1996/210, 29 March 1996, par. 2-5.
5. See, among others, Patrick Moore, "The Chess Players' Peace," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 6-9; International Crisis Group (ICG), Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation, ICG report, Sarajevo, 24 November 1996, pp. 2, 8-9, 18. The adoption of a more assertive attitude toward suspected war criminals was perhaps indicated through the decisive action against suspected war criminals by SFOR troops in Prijedor, Republika Srpska, following the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in early July 1997; see International Herald Tribune, 9 July 1997, p. 10; International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1997, p. 1. Note also the arrest by Dutch SFOR troops of indicted Bosnian Croats in late 1997; see Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1997, p. 47.
6. See, among others, Patrick Moore, "The Chess Players' Peace," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 6-9; International Crisis Group (ICG), Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation, ICG report, Sarajevo, 24 November 1996, pp. 2, 8-9, 18. The adoption of a more assertive attitude toward suspected war criminals was perhaps indicated through the decisive action against suspected war criminals by SFOR troops in Prijedor, Republika Srpska, following the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in early July 1997; see International Herald Tribune, 9 July 1997, p. 10; International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1997, p. 1. Note also the arrest by Dutch SFOR troops of indicted Bosnian Croats in late 1997; see Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1997, p. 47.
7. See, among others, Patrick Moore, "The Chess Players' Peace," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 6-9; International Crisis Group (ICG), Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation, ICG report, Sarajevo, 24 November 1996, pp. 2, 8-9, 18. The adoption of a more assertive attitude toward suspected war criminals was perhaps indicated through the decisive action against suspected war criminals by SFOR troops in Prijedor, Republika Srpska, following the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in early July 1997; see International Herald Tribune, 9 July 1997, p. 10; International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1997, p. 1. Note also the arrest by Dutch SFOR troops of indicted Bosnian Croats in late 1997; see Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1997, p. 47.
8. See, among others, Patrick Moore, "The Chess Players' Peace," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 6-9; International Crisis Group (ICG), Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation, ICG report, Sarajevo, 24 November 1996, pp. 2, 8-9, 18. The adoption of a more assertive attitude toward suspected war criminals was perhaps indicated through the decisive action against suspected war criminals by SFOR troops in Prijedor, Republika Srpska, following the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in early July 1997; see International Herald Tribune, 9 July 1997, p. 10; International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1997, p. 1. Note also the arrest by Dutch SFOR troops of indicted Bosnian Croats in late 1997; see Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1997, p. 47.
9. See, among others, Patrick Moore, "The Chess Players' Peace," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 6-9; International Crisis Group (ICG), Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation, ICG report, Sarajevo, 24 November 1996, pp. 2, 8-9, 18. The adoption of a more assertive attitude toward suspected war criminals was perhaps indicated through the decisive action against suspected war criminals by SFOR troops in Prijedor, Republika Srpska, following the NATO summit meeting in Madrid in early July 1997; see International Herald Tribune, 9 July 1997, p. 10; International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1997, p. 1. Note also the arrest by Dutch SFOR troops of indicted Bosnian Croats in late 1997; see Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 20 December 1997, p. 47.
10. See Janusz Bugajski, "Stabilizing Partition with SFOR," Transition 3, no. 3 (21 February 1997): 40-43, 56.
11. Because both people to hold this post in the first two years of Dayton implementation have been male, I use the masculine pronoun.
12. Following the Peace Implementation Conference in London, 8-9 December 1995, a peace implementation council (PIC) was established as the successor to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY); see Boutros-Ghali, The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization - 1996, par. 984, 1033-1034.
13. See General Framework Agreement on Peace, Annex 10, art. V, Annex 1-A, art. XII, respectively.
14. A European Union body not mandated by Dayton but deployed before it in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, with a broad and flexible mandate of political reporting and analysis, local contacts, and confidence-building initiatives. The European Community Monitoring Mission retains its independence, but since Dayton it has been working closely with and in support of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the office of the high representative.
15. See two of the periodic "Report[s] of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General," contained respectively in UN Docs. S/1997/310, 14 April 1997, par. 5-7, and S/1996/1024, 10 December 1996, par. 4-5; see also a report by the secretary-general, UN Doc. S/1997/224, 14 March 1997, par. 3.
16. See UN Docs. S/1997/310, par. 16-17, and S/1996/190, 14 March 1996, par. 23-24, 59-61.
17. See UN Doc. S/1996/1024, par. 14-15, 71.
18. UN Doc. S/1996/820, 1 October 1996, par. 39.
19. See "Guiding Principles of the Civilian Consolidation Plan," in "Conclusions of the Ministerial Steering Board and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Paris, 14 November 1996," contained in UN Doc. S/1996/968, 22 November 1996, pp. 8-9; "London Peace Implementation Conference 1996 - Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work," in UN Doc. S/1996/1012, 6 December 1996, par. 96-101.
20. See "Guiding Principles of the Civilian Consolidation Plan," in "Conclusions of the Ministerial Steering Board and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Paris, 14 November 1996," contained in UN Doc. S/1996/968, 22 November 1996, pp. 8-9; "London Peace Implementation Conference 1996 - Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work," in UN Doc. S/1996/1012, 6 December 1996, par. 96-101.
21. See UN Doc. S/1997/310, par. 12-17.
22. See par. 90 of "Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, Sintra, 30 May, 1997," annexed to UN Doc. S/1997/434, 5 June 1997.
23. See The Economist (13 December 1997): 23; Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 11 December 1997, p. 15, and 29 December 1997, p. 12; "Bosnia: The Protectorate," The Economist (14 February 1998): pp. 30-31.
24. See The Economist (13 December 1997): 23; Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 11 December 1997, p. 15, and 29 December 1997, p. 12; "Bosnia: The Protectorate," The Economist (14 February 1998): pp. 30-31.
25. See The Economist (13 December 1997): 23; Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 11 December 1997, p. 15, and 29 December 1997, p. 12; "Bosnia: The Protectorate," The Economist (14 February 1998): pp. 30-31.
26. See two International Crisis Group reports: Recommendations to Get the Dayton Peace Process Back on Track, ICG Report, 13 November 1996, p. 5; Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICG Report, 22 September 1996, p. 13 and throughout.
27. See two International Crisis Group reports: Recommendations to Get the Dayton Peace Process Back on Track, ICG Report, 13 November 1996, p. 5; Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICG Report, 22 September 1996, p. 13 and throughout.
28. See UN Doc. S/1966/1066, 24 December 1996, p. 3.
29. See International Crisis Group, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 3-34.
30. See ibid., pp. 9-10; Thomas L. Friedman, "Bosnia Election Blues," New York Times, 12 June 1996.
31. See ibid., pp. 9-10; Thomas L. Friedman, "Bosnia Election Blues," New York Times, 12 June 1996.
32. See, among others, UN Docs. S/1997/966, 10 December 1997, par. 12; S/1997/975, 13 December 1997, par. 17-18; S/1997/193, 5 March 1997, par. 15.
33. See Boutros-Ghali, The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization - 1996, par. 983, 988-1003.
34. See Thomas G. Weiss and Amir Pasic, "Reinventing UNHCR: Enterprising Humanitarians in the Former Yugoslavia 1991-1995," Global Governance 3, no. 1 (Jan.-Apr. 1997): 41-57.
35. See, for example, "Rebuilding Communities Devastated by War," Peace-Watch (United States Institute of Peace) 2, no. 6 (October 1996): 9.
36. See, among others, UN Doc. S/1996/1017, 9 December 1996, par. 22-24.
37. See ibid., par. 22; UN Doc. S/1996/1024, par. 51; UN Doc. S/1997/966, par. 29. A comprehensive treatment of the issues of refugee and displaced person returns, including statistics, can be found in International Crisis Group, Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICG Report, Sarajevo, 30 April 1997, especially pp. 4-6.
38. See ibid., par. 22; UN Doc. S/1996/1024, par. 51; UN Doc. S/1997/966, par. 29. A comprehensive treatment of the issues of refugee and displaced person returns, including statistics, can be found in International Crisis Group, Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICG Report, Sarajevo, 30 April 1997, especially pp. 4-6.
39. See UN Doc. S/1997/966, par. 3 and annex.
40. See UN Doc. S/1997/224, par. 3-14.
41. See UN Docs. S/1997/966, par. 5, 10-12; S/1997/975, par. 6-7, 10-11.
42. Interestingly enough, the framework agreement provides in Annex 11, art. II, that "the IPTF Commissioner shall receive guidance from the High Representative," but does not mention that this should be done through the special representative of the secretary-general or some other UN channel.
43. See UN Doc. S/1996/1017, par. 49.
44. See report of the UN secretary-general entitled "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform," 14 July 1997, UN Doc. A/51/950, par. 187.
45. See UN Docs. S/1996/1017, par. 18-20; S/1997/224, par. 18-21; S/1997/975, par. 15; S/1997/966, par. 21-23.
46. Michael Mihalka, "Cauldron of the Emerging Security Order," Transition 2, no 1. (12 January 1996): 42. See also Charles King, "A World Waits for Signals from Bosnia," The World Today 52, no. 2 (February 1996): 32-34.
47. Michael Mihalka, "Cauldron of the Emerging Security Order," Transition 2, no 1. (12 January 1996): 42. See also Charles King, "A World Waits for Signals from Bosnia," The World Today 52, no. 2 (February 1996): 32-34.
48. For a critical discussion that emphasizes shortcomings and also identifies very real problems of the performance of UNPROFOR and the international community involvement in the war in the former Yugoslavia, see, among others, "With No Peace to Keep: UN Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia," a special feature edited by Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski, WarReport, no. 37 (October 1995): 27-46; Fouad Ajami, "The Mark of Bosnia: Boutros-Ghali's Reign of Indifference," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May-June 1996): 162-164.
49. For a critical discussion that emphasizes shortcomings and also identifies very real problems of the performance of UNPROFOR and the international community involvement in the war in the former Yugoslavia, see, among others, "With No Peace to Keep: UN Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia," a special feature edited by Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski, WarReport, no. 37 (October 1995): 27-46; Fouad Ajami, "The Mark of Bosnia: Boutros-Ghali's Reign of Indifference," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May-June 1996): 162-164.
50. Of the approximately 21,000 UNPROFOR troops that remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the date of the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (20 December 1995), about 18,500 were designated to stay on as part of IFOR. Augmented by U.S. and other troops, the force numbered more than 60,000. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The 50th Anniversary Annual Report on the Work of the Organization - 1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996), par. 989.
51. Interestingly enough, the cost to maintain IFOR in Bosnia for twelve months has been estimated at more than $8 billion. See Jan Urban, "A Sure Road Back to Hell," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 26. By comparison, the $3.4 billion total cost of all UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world during the 1994 peak looks modest. See United Nations Peace Missions: Year in Review 1996 (New York: United Nations, December 1996), p. 15. More than 60,000 IFOR troops were in Bosnia alone. Compare that figure with the peak total number of about 70,000 military and civilian personnel deployed with UN peacekeeping missions around the globe in 1995. See United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, DPI/1827, August 1996), p. 6.
52. Interestingly enough, the cost to maintain IFOR in Bosnia for twelve months has been estimated at more than $8 billion. See Jan Urban, "A Sure Road Back to Hell," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 26. By comparison, the $3.4 billion total cost of all UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world during the 1994 peak looks modest. See United Nations Peace Missions: Year in Review 1996 (New York: United Nations, December 1996), p. 15. More than 60,000 IFOR troops were in Bosnia alone. Compare that figure with the peak total number of about 70,000 military and civilian personnel deployed with UN peacekeeping missions around the globe in 1995. See United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, DPI/1827, August 1996), p. 6.
53. Interestingly enough, the cost to maintain IFOR in Bosnia for twelve months has been estimated at more than $8 billion. See Jan Urban, "A Sure Road Back to Hell," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 26. By comparison, the $3.4 billion total cost of all UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world during the 1994 peak looks modest. See United Nations Peace Missions: Year in Review 1996 (New York: United Nations, December 1996), p. 15. More than 60,000 IFOR troops were in Bosnia alone. Compare that figure with the peak total number of about 70,000 military and civilian personnel deployed with UN peacekeeping missions around the globe in 1995. See United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, DPI/1827, August 1996), p. 6.
54. Mihalka, "Cauldron of the Emerging Security Order," p. 45.
55. See acknowledgment of the responsibility of "the various Western governments and international organizations charged with providing $5.1 billion of external assistance by 1998" for "the delays and difficulty in implementing the civilian provisions of the Dayton Accords." It is noted that "the delays in the delivery of the American commitment are particularly unfortunate." Bosnia's Security and US Policy in the Next Phase, 2d ed., Atlantic Council of the United States, East European Studies/Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), released November 14, 1996, p. 13.
56. See Jane M. O. Sharp, "Doing Better in Bosnia," The World Today 53, no. 2 (February 1997): 37-39.
57. See Susan Woodward, "America's Bosnia Policy: The Work Ahead," Brookings Policy Brief, no. 2, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., July 1996, pp. 4-5; Woodward, "The United States Leads, Europe Pays," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 12-17, 71. Interestingly enough, transatlantic divisions resurfaced at the time when the nature, composition, and duration of a follow-on force to IFOR (finally to be known as "SFOR") were being discussed; see Bugajski, "Stabilizing Partition with SFOR," p. 41.
58. See Susan Woodward, "America's Bosnia Policy: The Work Ahead," Brookings Policy Brief, no. 2, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., July 1996, pp. 4-5; Woodward, "The United States Leads, Europe Pays," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 12-17, 71. Interestingly enough, transatlantic divisions resurfaced at the time when the nature, composition, and duration of a follow-on force to IFOR (finally to be known as "SFOR") were being discussed; see Bugajski, "Stabilizing Partition with SFOR," p. 41.
59. See Susan Woodward, "America's Bosnia Policy: The Work Ahead," Brookings Policy Brief, no. 2, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., July 1996, pp. 4-5; Woodward, "The United States Leads, Europe Pays," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 12-17, 71. Interestingly enough, transatlantic divisions resurfaced at the time when the nature, composition, and duration of a follow-on force to IFOR (finally to be known as "SFOR") were being discussed; see Bugajski, "Stabilizing Partition with SFOR," p. 41.
60. Patrick Moore, "Revealing Dayton's Fatal Flaws," Transition 2, no. 14 (12 July 1996): 5.
61. See Richard Holbrooke, "Backsliding in Bosnia: Some of Those Pledged to Make the Dayton Accords Succeed Are Faltering," Time (20 May 1996): 24; Pauline Neville-Jones, "Don't Blame the Europeans: Claims from the U.S. That Europe Is Moving Toward Partition in Bosnia Are Offensive," Financial Times, 17 May 1996; David Owen, "Buck-Passing in Bosnia: Accusations of European Backsliding Are Undeserved and Unconstructive," Time (27 May 1996): 80. The titles and subtitles of the articles are indicative of the stand taken by the respective authors.
62. See Richard Holbrooke, "Backsliding in Bosnia: Some of Those Pledged to Make the Dayton Accords Succeed Are Faltering," Time (20 May 1996): 24; Pauline Neville-Jones, "Don't Blame the Europeans: Claims from the U.S. That Europe Is Moving Toward Partition in Bosnia Are Offensive," Financial Times, 17 May 1996; David Owen, "Buck-Passing in Bosnia: Accusations of European Backsliding Are Undeserved and Unconstructive," Time (27 May 1996): 80. The titles and subtitles of the articles are indicative of the stand taken by the respective authors.
63. See Richard Holbrooke, "Backsliding in Bosnia: Some of Those Pledged to Make the Dayton Accords Succeed Are Faltering," Time (20 May 1996): 24; Pauline Neville-Jones, "Don't Blame the Europeans: Claims from the U.S. That Europe Is Moving Toward Partition in Bosnia Are Offensive," Financial Times, 17 May 1996; David Owen, "Buck-Passing in Bosnia: Accusations of European Backsliding Are Undeserved and Unconstructive," Time (27 May 1996): 80. The titles and subtitles of the articles are indicative of the stand taken by the respective authors.
64. Woodward, "The United States Leads, Europe Pays," p. 71.
65. This latter obligation, embedded in Security Council resolutions, increases transparency and openness to public scrutiny of actions that otherwise might be shrouded in secrecy; and it is of great help to researchers, including me. See, for example, reports from NATO on IFOR/SFOR activities contained, among others, in UN Docs. S/1996/970, S/1996/1066, S/1997/81, S/1997/193. Reports from the high representative can be found, among others, in UN Docs. S/1996/190, S/1996/1024, S/1997/126, S/1997/310.
66. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace - 1995 (New York: United Nations, 1995).
67. See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 47/120B of 20 September 1993 and statement by the president of the Security Council on 28 January 1993 (S/25184).
68. See UN Doc. A/51/950, par. 116.
69. See Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantonis, "Innovations in Peacekeeping: The Case of Albania," Security Dialogue 29, no. 1 (March 1998): 49-58.
70. A similar structure could be established in Asia and Oceania, taken together or divided up continentally or in some other way.
71. But see UN interaction with a subregional organization in the case of Liberia. The ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which intervened militarily in the conflict at an early stage, was later supplemented with the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), in an effort to satisfy the demands for evenhanded international intervention by some of the numerous Liberian factions. Under the Cotonu accord, ECOMOG continued to field the main peacekeeping mission, but its activities were now monitored, and overall compliance with the agreement was verified by the UN observers. The relationship proved to be neither cordial nor smooth, for various reasons, including unclear lines of authority, ECOMOG's responsibility for UNOMIL's security, and ECOMOG troop resentment of being monitored by a force that was better paid but came in late, after they had allegedly done most of the "dirty job." See Funmi Olonisakin, "UN Cooperation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia," International Peacekeeping 3, no. 3 (autumn 1996): 38-51.
72. See disagreements on the time frame for a complete withdrawal of forces from Bosnia within the U.S. administration in "Bosnia: Now It's Cohen Vs. Albright," Newsweek (9 June 1997): 18. Finally, President Clinton announced in late December 1997 that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline, without setting any new pullout date this time; see The Guardian, 23 December 1997, p. 7.
73. See disagreements on the time frame for a complete withdrawal of forces from Bosnia within the U.S. administration in "Bosnia: Now It's Cohen Vs. Albright," Newsweek (9 June 1997): 18. Finally, President Clinton announced in late December 1997 that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline, without setting any new pullout date this time; see The Guardian, 23 December 1997, p. 7.