Payment ceilings in cost-plus contracting

Management Accounting Research

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 311-327

  Loeb, Martin P ^a   Surysekar, Krishnamurthy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032164103     PISSN: 10445005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/mare.1998.0068     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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