Motivating subcontractors to perform development and design tasks

Management Accounting Research

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 285-309

  Gietzmann, Miles B ^a   Larsen, Jytte G ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Holdup problem; Japanese subcontracting; Skills investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032164082     PISSN: 10445005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/mare.1998.0082     Document Type: Article

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