Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

Research in Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 217-232

  Freixas, Xavier ^a   Rochet, Jean Charles ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Cross subsidies; Deposit insurance; Incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032163856     PISSN: 10909443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/reec.1998.0164     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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