Combining agoric and genetic methods in stochastic design

Nanotechnology

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 274-284

  Hall, J Storrs ^a   Steinberg, Louis ^b   Davison, Brian D ^b  

^a Inst for Molecular Manufacturing   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GENETIC ALGORITHMS; MOLECULAR STRUCTURE; RANDOM PROCESSES; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

AGORIC ALGORITHMS;

NANOTECHNOLOGY;

EID: 0032156295     PISSN: 09574484     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1088/0957-4484/9/3/019     Document Type: Article

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