The effect of property rights and audit information quality on team incentives for inventory reduction

Management Science

Volumn 44, Issue 9, 1998, Pages 1193-1204

  Balakrishnan, Ramji ^a   Nagarajan, Nandu J ^a   Sivaramakrishnan, K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Agency Models; Inventory Reduction; Teams

Indexed keywords

MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROCESS CONTROL; PRODUCTION CONTROL; PRODUCTIVITY; QUALITY ASSURANCE; RISK MANAGEMENT; SCHEDULING; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

TEAM INCENTIVES; TWO-PERIOD AGENCY MODELS;

INVENTORY CONTROL;

EID: 0032154805     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.44.9.1193     Document Type: Article

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