Endogenous mergers and size asymmetry of merger participants

Economics Letters

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 113-119

  Barros, Pedro Pita ^a  

^a NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Endogenous mergers; L11; L41; Merger participants; Size assymmetry

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032117015     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00082-2     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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3. Farrell J., Shapiro C. Horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review. 80:1990;107-126.
4. Horn, H., Persson, L., 1996. Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets. CEPR Discussion Paper 1544, December.
5. Lopes, M., 1996. Stable mergers and cartels involving asymmetric firms. Universidade Nova de Lisboa, mimeo.
6. Perry M., Porter R. Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger. American Economic Review. 75:1985;219-227.
7. Salant S., Switzer S., Reynolds R. Loss due to merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98:1983;185-199.