James and the early Laski: The ambiguous legacy of pragmatism

History of Political Thought

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 265-292

  Pemberton, Jo Anne Claire ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032093302     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (421)

1. 1 Justice Holmes made this claim in a letter to the philosopher Morris R. Cohen (21 July 1920). See the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), edited with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen, pp. 3-52, p. 19. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: II', The New Republic (1 October 1919), pp. 255-27, p. 255. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: III', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 82. W.Y. Elliott, 'The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H.J. Laski', The American Political Science Review, XVIII (1924), pp. 251-75, p. 252. Horace Meyer Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1915), pp. 10 f., 105. The Letters of William, James, ed. Henry James (2 vols., Boston, 1920), Vol. II, p. 271.
2. 1 Justice Holmes made this claim in a letter to the philosopher Morris R. Cohen (21 July 1920). See the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), edited with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen, pp. 3-52, p. 19. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: II', The New Republic (1 October 1919), pp. 255-27, p. 255. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: III', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 82. W.Y. Elliott, 'The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H.J. Laski', The American Political Science Review, XVIII (1924), pp. 251-75, p. 252. Horace Meyer Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1915), pp. 10 f., 105. The Letters of William, James, ed. Henry James (2 vols., Boston, 1920), Vol. II, p. 271.
3. 1 Justice Holmes made this claim in a letter to the philosopher Morris R. Cohen (21 July 1920). See the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), edited with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen, pp. 3-52, p. 19. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: II', The New Republic (1 October 1919), pp. 255-27, p. 255. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: III', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 82. W.Y. Elliott, 'The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H.J. Laski', The American Political Science Review, XVIII (1924), pp. 251-75, p. 252. Horace Meyer Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1915), pp. 10 f., 105. The Letters of William, James, ed. Henry James (2 vols., Boston, 1920), Vol. II, p. 271.
4. 1 Justice Holmes made this claim in a letter to the philosopher Morris R. Cohen (21 July 1920). See the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), edited with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen, pp. 3-52, p. 19. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: II', The New Republic (1 October 1919), pp. 255-27, p. 255. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: III', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 82. W.Y. Elliott, 'The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H.J. Laski', The American Political Science Review, XVIII (1924), pp. 251-75, p. 252. Horace Meyer Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1915), pp. 10 f., 105. The Letters of William, James, ed. Henry James (2 vols., Boston, 1920), Vol. II, p. 271.
5. 1 Justice Holmes made this claim in a letter to the philosopher Morris R. Cohen (21 July 1920). See the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), edited with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen, pp. 3-52, p. 19. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: II', The New Republic (1 October 1919), pp. 255-27, p. 255. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: III', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 82. W.Y. Elliott, 'The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H.J. Laski', The American Political Science Review, XVIII (1924), pp. 251-75, p. 252. Horace Meyer Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1915), pp. 10 f., 105. The Letters of William, James, ed. Henry James (2 vols., Boston, 1920), Vol. II, p. 271.
6. 1 Justice Holmes made this claim in a letter to the philosopher Morris R. Cohen (21 July 1920). See the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), edited with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen, pp. 3-52, p. 19. Cf. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: II', The New Republic (1 October 1919), pp. 255-27, p. 255. Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy: III', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 82. W.Y. Elliott, 'The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H.J. Laski', The American Political Science Review, XVIII (1924), pp. 251-75, p. 252. Horace Meyer Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1915), pp. 10 f., 105. The Letters of William, James, ed. Henry James (2 vols., Boston, 1920), Vol. II, p. 271.
7. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
8. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
9. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
10. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
11. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
12. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
13. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
14. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
15. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
16. 2 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword by Felix Frankfurter (2 vols., London, 1953) (hereafter Letters), Vol. I, p. 571 (13 December 1923); see also ibid. (10 February 1918). Laski declared himself to be 'all for the aperçu'. See H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', The Nation (22 July 1915), pp. 115-17, p. 116. H.J. Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', Harvard Law Review, XXIX (1916), pp. 404-26, p. 425. Reprinted in H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (New York, 1938; 1st published 1921) (hereafter Foundations). H.J. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', New Republic (22 July 1919), pp. 302-4, pp. 303-4. H.J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (London, 1968) (hereafter Studies), pp. 10, 23, 18. H.J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Hamden, Connecticut, 1968) (hereafter Authority), p. 313. H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, 1925) (hereafter Grammar), pp. 23, 261, 400, 544. H.J. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 267, 294.
17. 3 Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', p. 252.
18. 4 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425 n. Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (10 February 1918). Cf. William James, Pragmatism (London, 1907), pp. 6-8. See also Laski's allusion to James's description of philosophy as our 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos', Grammar, p. 544. See James, Pragmatism, p. 4. On the matter of James's projection of experience onto the cosmos see Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Vol. II (Boston, 1958), pp. 75-80. Charles Morris also commented on the relation between James's empiricism and his metaphysics: 'The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of "pure experience" ', C. Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York, 1970), pp. 112-13.
19. 4 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425 n. Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (10 February 1918). Cf. William James, Pragmatism (London, 1907), pp. 6-8. See also Laski's allusion to James's description of philosophy as our 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos', Grammar, p. 544. See James, Pragmatism, p. 4. On the matter of James's projection of experience onto the cosmos see Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Vol. II (Boston, 1958), pp. 75-80. Charles Morris also commented on the relation between James's empiricism and his metaphysics: 'The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of "pure experience" ', C. Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York, 1970), pp. 112-13.
20. 4 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425 n. Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (10 February 1918). Cf. William James, Pragmatism (London, 1907), pp. 6-8. See also Laski's allusion to James's description of philosophy as our 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos', Grammar, p. 544. See James, Pragmatism, p. 4. On the matter of James's projection of experience onto the cosmos see Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Vol. II (Boston, 1958), pp. 75-80. Charles Morris also commented on the relation between James's empiricism and his metaphysics: 'The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of "pure experience" ', C. Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York, 1970), pp. 112-13.
21. 4 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425 n. Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (10 February 1918). Cf. William James, Pragmatism (London, 1907), pp. 6-8. See also Laski's allusion to James's description of philosophy as our 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos', Grammar, p. 544. See James, Pragmatism, p. 4. On the matter of James's projection of experience onto the cosmos see Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Vol. II (Boston, 1958), pp. 75-80. Charles Morris also commented on the relation between James's empiricism and his metaphysics: 'The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of "pure experience" ', C. Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York, 1970), pp. 112-13.
22. 4 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425 n. Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (10 February 1918). Cf. William James, Pragmatism (London, 1907), pp. 6-8. See also Laski's allusion to James's description of philosophy as our 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos', Grammar, p. 544. See James, Pragmatism, p. 4. On the matter of James's projection of experience onto the cosmos see Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Vol. II (Boston, 1958), pp. 75-80. Charles Morris also commented on the relation between James's empiricism and his metaphysics: 'The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of "pure experience" ', C. Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York, 1970), pp. 112-13.
23. 4 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425 n. Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (10 February 1918). Cf. William James, Pragmatism (London, 1907), pp. 6-8. See also Laski's allusion to James's description of philosophy as our 'individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos', Grammar, p. 544. See James, Pragmatism, p. 4. On the matter of James's projection of experience onto the cosmos see Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, Vol. II (Boston, 1958), pp. 75-80. Charles Morris also commented on the relation between James's empiricism and his metaphysics: 'The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of "pure experience" ', C. Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York, 1970), pp. 112-13.
24. 5 James, Pragmatism, p. 191. On the three main stages of James's philosophical development see Perry, Spirit of William James, p. 77.
25. 5 James, Pragmatism, p. 191. On the three main stages of James's philosophical development see Perry, Spirit of William James, p. 77.
26. 6 On James's use of fluid imagery see William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York, 1912) (hereafter Essays); and William James, A Pluralistic Universe, ed. Ralph Barton Perry with an introduction by Richard J. Bernstein (New York, 1971), pp. 50, 71, 237. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 254, 255, 260, 277.
27. 6 On James's use of fluid imagery see William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York, 1912) (hereafter Essays); and William James, A Pluralistic Universe, ed. Ralph Barton Perry with an introduction by Richard J. Bernstein (New York, 1971), pp. 50, 71, 237. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 254, 255, 260, 277.
28. 6 On James's use of fluid imagery see William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York, 1912) (hereafter Essays); and William James, A Pluralistic Universe, ed. Ralph Barton Perry with an introduction by Richard J. Bernstein (New York, 1971), pp. 50, 71, 237. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 254, 255, 260, 277.
29. 7 William James, Principles of Psychology (2 vols., Chicago, 1952) (hereafter Principles), Vol. I, p. 239. See also James, Pragmatism, pp. 53, 214.
30. 7 William James, Principles of Psychology (2 vols., Chicago, 1952) (hereafter Principles), Vol. I, p. 239. See also James, Pragmatism, pp. 53, 214.
31. 8 Principles, I, pp. 237-9, cf. p. 276. At this stage of his career, James believed that higher states of consciousness were distinct psychic units which grew out of, but did not 'contain', lower states of consciousness. James, cited in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (2 vols., Boston, 1935), Vol. II, p. 588.
32. 8 Principles, I, pp. 237-9, cf. p. 276. At this stage of his career, James believed that higher states of consciousness were distinct psychic units which grew out of, but did not 'contain', lower states of consciousness. James, cited in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (2 vols., Boston, 1935), Vol. II, p. 588.
33. 9 Principles, I, p. 245. On James's focus on the transitive aspect of thought see also Perry, Spirit of William James, p. 81.
34. 9 Principles, I, p. 245. On James's focus on the transitive aspect of thought see also Perry, Spirit of William James, p. 81.
35. 10 Principles, I, p. 226.
36. 11 Ibid.
37. 12 Ibid.
38. 13 Ibid., p. 237.
39. 14 Ibid., pp. 296-301; pp. 291-4.
40. 15 Ibid., p. 289, cf. p. 284.
41. 16 Ibid., pp. 239, 288.
42. 17 Ibid., p. 285, cf. p. 289.
43. 18 Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 76, 88; cf. Essays, p. 57.
44. 18 Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 76, 88; cf. Essays, p. 57.
45. 19 Essays, p. 50; cf. pp. 17, 22. See also Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 92 ff.
46. 19 Essays, p. 50; cf. pp. 17, 22. See also Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 92 ff.
47. 20 Essays, pp. 4-8, 11, 13. James wrote that pure experience, like the physical reality he described in his Principles, is undifferentiated. It is neither thought nor thing but an 'instant field of the present . . . only virtually classifiable as objective fact or someone's opinion about the fact'. Essays, pp. 40-1. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 274.
48. 20 Essays, pp. 4-8, 11, 13. James wrote that pure experience, like the physical reality he described in his Principles, is undifferentiated. It is neither thought nor thing but an 'instant field of the present . . . only virtually classifiable as objective fact or someone's opinion about the fact'. Essays, pp. 40-1. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 274.
49. 20 Essays, pp. 4-8, 11, 13. James wrote that pure experience, like the physical reality he described in his Principles, is undifferentiated. It is neither thought nor thing but an 'instant field of the present . . . only virtually classifiable as objective fact or someone's opinion about the fact'. Essays, pp. 40-1. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 274.
50. 21 Essays, p. 48 and James, Pragmatism, p. 131.
51. 21 Essays, p. 48 and James, Pragmatism, p. 131.
52. 22 On this point see Essays, pp. 25, 26, 46, 50; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Morris wrote that of all the pragmatists James was closest to the British empiricists; but he also differed from them because he saw in experience a 'much wider range of the contents' such that experience included 'relations as well as the particulars which are related, and continuities as well as discontinuities'. Morris, Pragmatic Movement, pp. 112-13.
53. 22 On this point see Essays, pp. 25, 26, 46, 50; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Morris wrote that of all the pragmatists James was closest to the British empiricists; but he also differed from them because he saw in experience a 'much wider range of the contents' such that experience included 'relations as well as the particulars which are related, and continuities as well as discontinuities'. Morris, Pragmatic Movement, pp. 112-13.
54. 22 On this point see Essays, pp. 25, 26, 46, 50; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Morris wrote that of all the pragmatists James was closest to the British empiricists; but he also differed from them because he saw in experience a 'much wider range of the contents' such that experience included 'relations as well as the particulars which are related, and continuities as well as discontinuities'. Morris, Pragmatic Movement, pp. 112-13.
55. 23 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 258-9; cf. p. 276. These points of connection are represented linguistically in the form of those prepositions, copulas and conjunctions which 'flower out of the stream of pure experience'. Essays, pp. 26-8, 42-3, 46, 51. Cf. Principles, I, p. 258.
56. 23 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 258-9; cf. p. 276. These points of connection are represented linguistically in the form of those prepositions, copulas and conjunctions which 'flower out of the stream of pure experience'. Essays, pp. 26-8, 42-3, 46, 51. Cf. Principles, I, p. 258.
57. 23 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 258-9; cf. p. 276. These points of connection are represented linguistically in the form of those prepositions, copulas and conjunctions which 'flower out of the stream of pure experience'. Essays, pp. 26-8, 42-3, 46, 51. Cf. Principles, I, p. 258.
58. 24 Principles, I, p. 289.
59. 25 Essays, pp. 24-6.
60. 26 Ibid., p. 102.
61. 27 James, Pragmatism, p. 57. For an account of Mach's views see Mach, 'The Analysis of Sensations: Anti-Metaphysical', Monist, 1 (1890-1), pp. 48-68. For Pearson's views on the meaning of empiricism see Karl Pearson, A Grammar of Science (London, 1937), pp. 18 f. See also Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 463.
62. 27 James, Pragmatism, p. 57. For an account of Mach's views see Mach, 'The Analysis of Sensations: Anti-Metaphysical', Monist, 1 (1890-1), pp. 48-68. For Pearson's views on the meaning of empiricism see Karl Pearson, A Grammar of Science (London, 1937), pp. 18 f. See also Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 463.
63. 27 James, Pragmatism, p. 57. For an account of Mach's views see Mach, 'The Analysis of Sensations: Anti-Metaphysical', Monist, 1 (1890-1), pp. 48-68. For Pearson's views on the meaning of empiricism see Karl Pearson, A Grammar of Science (London, 1937), pp. 18 f. See also Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 463.
64. 27 James, Pragmatism, p. 57. For an account of Mach's views see Mach, 'The Analysis of Sensations: Anti-Metaphysical', Monist, 1 (1890-1), pp. 48-68. For Pearson's views on the meaning of empiricism see Karl Pearson, A Grammar of Science (London, 1937), pp. 18 f. See also Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 463.
65. 28 John Dewey also was concerned about the 'currency of subjectivist interpretations'. J. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York, 1953). For a discussion of the solipsistic implications of the empiricism of James see Charles W. Morris, 'Pragmatism and Metaphysics', Philosophical Review, XLIII (1934), pp. 549-64, p. 563. John E. Russell 'Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 406-13, pp. 406 ff; John E. Russell, 'Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 606-13, pp. 606 ff. Cf. V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Peking, 1972). Lenin attacks the 'subjective idealism' of Mach and Pearson because of the implications this had for the materialist interpretation of history (pp. 99-103).
66. 28 John Dewey also was concerned about the 'currency of subjectivist interpretations'. J. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York, 1953). For a discussion of the solipsistic implications of the empiricism of James see Charles W. Morris, 'Pragmatism and Metaphysics', Philosophical Review, XLIII (1934), pp. 549-64, p. 563. John E. Russell 'Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 406-13, pp. 406 ff; John E. Russell, 'Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 606-13, pp. 606 ff. Cf. V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Peking, 1972). Lenin attacks the 'subjective idealism' of Mach and Pearson because of the implications this had for the materialist interpretation of history (pp. 99-103).
67. 28 John Dewey also was concerned about the 'currency of subjectivist interpretations'. J. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York, 1953). For a discussion of the solipsistic implications of the empiricism of James see Charles W. Morris, 'Pragmatism and Metaphysics', Philosophical Review, XLIII (1934), pp. 549-64, p. 563. John E. Russell 'Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 406-13, pp. 406 ff; John E. Russell, 'Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 606-13, pp. 606 ff. Cf. V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Peking, 1972). Lenin attacks the 'subjective idealism' of Mach and Pearson because of the implications this had for the materialist interpretation of history (pp. 99-103).
68. 28 John Dewey also was concerned about the 'currency of subjectivist interpretations'. J. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York, 1953). For a discussion of the solipsistic implications of the empiricism of James see Charles W. Morris, 'Pragmatism and Metaphysics', Philosophical Review, XLIII (1934), pp. 549-64, p. 563. John E. Russell 'Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 406-13, pp. 406 ff; John E. Russell, 'Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 606-13, pp. 606 ff. Cf. V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Peking, 1972). Lenin attacks the 'subjective idealism' of Mach and Pearson because of the implications this had for the materialist interpretation of history (pp. 99-103).
69. 28 John Dewey also was concerned about the 'currency of subjectivist interpretations'. J. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York, 1953). For a discussion of the solipsistic implications of the empiricism of James see Charles W. Morris, 'Pragmatism and Metaphysics', Philosophical Review, XLIII (1934), pp. 549-64, p. 563. John E. Russell 'Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 406-13, pp. 406 ff; John E. Russell, 'Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism', Philosophical Review, XV (1906), pp. 606-13, pp. 606 ff. Cf. V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Peking, 1972). Lenin attacks the 'subjective idealism' of Mach and Pearson because of the implications this had for the materialist interpretation of history (pp. 99-103).
70. 29 Essays, pp. 24, 42.
71. 30 cf. Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 100-1.
72. 31 Essays, p. 43.
73. 32 Ibid., p. 23.
74. 33 James expressed concern that neo-Hegelian thought was on the ascendant at both Oxford and Harvard. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 133; cf. p. 172. 'Unstiffen' was a word James borrowed from his follower, the Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini. James, Pragmatism, pp. 79, 54. Cf. G. Papini, 'What Pragmatism is Like', trans. Katherine Royce, Popular Science Monthly, 71 (1907-8), pp. 351-8.
75. 33 James expressed concern that neo-Hegelian thought was on the ascendant at both Oxford and Harvard. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 133; cf. p. 172. 'Unstiffen' was a word James borrowed from his follower, the Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini. James, Pragmatism, pp. 79, 54. Cf. G. Papini, 'What Pragmatism is Like', trans. Katherine Royce, Popular Science Monthly, 71 (1907-8), pp. 351-8.
76. 33 James expressed concern that neo-Hegelian thought was on the ascendant at both Oxford and Harvard. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 133; cf. p. 172. 'Unstiffen' was a word James borrowed from his follower, the Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini. James, Pragmatism, pp. 79, 54. Cf. G. Papini, 'What Pragmatism is Like', trans. Katherine Royce, Popular Science Monthly, 71 (1907-8), pp. 351-8.
77. 34 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 241-2.
78. 35 Ibid., pp. 258-64, 276.
79. 36 Ibid., p. 211; cf. p. 211 n.
80. 37 Ibid., pp. 222-4 ; cf. Essays, pp. 42-3.
81. 37 Ibid., pp. 222-4 ; cf. Essays, pp. 42-3.
82. 38 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 258-64, 276. Cf. Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism: A Study in Contemporary Thought (London, 1927), pp. 200-1.
83. 38 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 258-64, 276. Cf. Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism: A Study in Contemporary Thought (London, 1927), pp. 200-1.
84. 39 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 247, 263, 274-6, 283. This description of mental states is cited in Perry, Thought and Character, p. 589. See also James, Pragmatism, p. 156, where he wrote that the '. . . world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain'. Cf. ibid., pp. 79, 136-7. James also discusses the notion of manyness in oneness in Essays, pp. 50, 56-7. On the finitude of James's higher being also see Essays, p. 102.
85. 39 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 247, 263, 274-6, 283. This description of mental states is cited in Perry, Thought and Character, p. 58. See also James, Pragmatism, p. 156, where he wrote that the '. . . world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain'. Cf. ibid., pp. 79, 136-7. James also discusses the notion of manyness in oneness in Essays, pp. 50, 56-7. On the finitude of James's higher being also see Essays, p. 102.
86. 39 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 247, 263, 274-6, 283. This description of mental states is cited in Perry, Thought and Character, p. 589. See also James, Pragmatism, p. 156, where he wrote that the '. . . world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain'. Cf. ibid., pp. 79, 136-7. James also discusses the notion of manyness in oneness in Essays, pp. 50, 56-7. On the finitude of James's higher being also see Essays, p. 102.
87. 39 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 247, 263, 274-6, 283. This description of mental states is cited in Perry, Thought and Character, p. 589. See also James, Pragmatism, p. 156, where he wrote that the '. . . world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain'. Cf. ibid., pp. 79, 136-7. James also discusses the notion of manyness in oneness in Essays, pp. 50, 56-7. On the finitude of James's higher being also see Essays, p. 102.
88. 39 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 247, 263, 274-6, 283. This description of mental states is cited in Perry, Thought and Character, p. 589. See also James, Pragmatism, p. 156, where he wrote that the '. . . world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain'. Cf. ibid., pp. 79, 136-7. James also discusses the notion of manyness in oneness in Essays, pp. 50, 56-7. On the finitude of James's higher being also see Essays, p. 102.
89. 39 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 247, 263, 274-6, 283. This description of mental states is cited in Perry, Thought and Character, p. 589. See also James, Pragmatism, p. 156, where he wrote that the '. . . world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain'. Cf. ibid., pp. 79, 136-7. James also discusses the notion of manyness in oneness in Essays, pp. 50, 56-7. On the finitude of James's higher being also see Essays, p. 102.
90. 40 James, Pragmatism, pp. 250, 255-7, 286. See also Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, authorized trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, 1983), pp. 53-4. Cf. Kallen, James and Bergson, pp. 63, 241 ; and Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 602.
91. 40 James, Pragmatism, pp. 250, 255-7, 286. See also Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, authorized trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, 1983), pp. 53-4. Cf. Kallen, James and Bergson, pp. 63, 241 ; and Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 602.
92. 40 James, Pragmatism, pp. 250, 255-7, 286. See also Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, authorized trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, 1983), pp. 53-4. Cf. Kallen, James and Bergson, pp. 63, 241 ; and Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 602.
93. 40 James, Pragmatism, pp. 250, 255-7, 286. See also Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, authorized trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, 1983), pp. 53-4. Cf. Kallen, James and Bergson, pp. 63, 241 ; and Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 602.
94. 41 James, Pragmatism, p. 136. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 276, 283. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 292. cf. Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, pp. 373, 383 and James, Pragmatism, pp. 158-9, where James does hold up the logical possibility of a complete unity evolving in the universe.
95. 41 James, Pragmatism, p. 136. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 276, 283. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 292. cf. Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, pp. 373, 383 and James, Pragmatism, pp. 158-9, where James does hold up the logical possibility of a complete unity evolving in the universe.
96. 41 James, Pragmatism, p. 136. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 276, 283. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 292. cf. Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, pp. 373, 383 and James, Pragmatism, pp. 158-9, where James does hold up the logical possibility of a complete unity evolving in the universe.
97. 41 James, Pragmatism, p. 136. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 276, 283. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 292. cf. Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, pp. 373, 383 and James, Pragmatism, pp. 158-9, where James does hold up the logical possibility of a complete unity evolving in the universe.
98. 41 James, Pragmatism, p. 136. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 276, 283. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 292. cf. Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, pp. 373, 383 and James, Pragmatism, pp. 158-9, where James does hold up the logical possibility of a complete unity evolving in the universe.
99. 42 On tychism see James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 283.
100. 43 Ibid., pp. 274, 277; cf. Essays, pp. 57, 138.
101. 43 Ibid., pp. 274, 277; cf. Essays, pp. 57, 138.
102. 44 James, Pragmatism, pp. ix, 45; cf. Letters of William James, II, p. 267.
103. 44 James, Pragmatism, pp. ix, 45; cf. Letters of William James, II, p. 267.
104. 45 Essays, pp. 82-3. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 273. Note also that in the Essays James uses the expression 'radical empiricism' to denote both an epistemology and a type of ontology. Radical empiricism implicates the flux of life. But the term empiricism also implies a certain method of approach which roughly approximates pragmatism; that being, the test of experience. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 161, 278.
105. 45 Essays, pp. 82-3. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 273. Note also that in the Essays James uses the expression 'radical empiricism' to denote both an epistemology and a type of ontology. Radical empiricism implicates the flux of life. But the term empiricism also implies a certain method of approach which roughly approximates pragmatism; that being, the test of experience. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 161, 278.
106. 45 Essays, pp. 82-3. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 273. Note also that in the Essays James uses the expression 'radical empiricism' to denote both an epistemology and a type of ontology. Radical empiricism implicates the flux of life. But the term empiricism also implies a certain method of approach which roughly approximates pragmatism; that being, the test of experience. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 161, 278.
107. 46 James, Pragmatism, p. 79; cf. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Synechism was a word which James obtained from Charles Sanders Peirce and it was a notion he also attributed to Bergson. On this point see Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 108, 109 n. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 283; and Essays, p. 26.
108. 46 James, Pragmatism, p. 79; cf. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Synechism was a word which James obtained from Charles Sanders Peirce and it was a notion he also attributed to Bergson. On this point see Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 108, 109 n. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 283; and Essays, p. 26.
109. 46 James, Pragmatism, p. 79; cf. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Synechism was a word which James obtained from Charles Sanders Peirce and it was a notion he also attributed to Bergson. On this point see Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 108, 109 n. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 283; and Essays, p. 26.
110. 46 James, Pragmatism, p. 79; cf. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Synechism was a word which James obtained from Charles Sanders Peirce and it was a notion he also attributed to Bergson. On this point see Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 108, 109 n. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 283; and Essays, p. 26.
111. 46 James, Pragmatism, p. 79; cf. James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 276. Synechism was a word which James obtained from Charles Sanders Peirce and it was a notion he also attributed to Bergson. On this point see Perry, Spirit of William James, pp. 108, 109 n. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 283; and Essays, p. 26.
112. 47 See James, Pragmatism, pp. 119, 254. James also wrote that since 'absolute monism forbids' the idea that the world is only partially unified 'pragmatism must turn its back on absolute monism, and follow pluralism's more empirical path', ibid., p. 161.
113. 47 See James, Pragmatism, pp. 119, 254. James also wrote that since 'absolute monism forbids' the idea that the world is only partially unified 'pragmatism must turn its back on absolute monism, and follow pluralism's more empirical path', ibid., p. 161.
114. 48 James, Pragmatism, pp. 254-5, 283. Cf. William James, The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York, 1897), p. 177. See also Antonio Aliotta who wrote that for the pragmatist the element of plasticity in things ensures that mind can 'reorganise and reconstruct' reality. A. Aliotta, The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, trans. Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914), p. 179. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 242-3.
115. 48 James, Pragmatism, pp. 254-5, 283. Cf. William James, The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York, 1897), p. 177. See also Antonio Aliotta who wrote that for the pragmatist the element of plasticity in things ensures that mind can 'reorganise and reconstruct' reality. A. Aliotta, The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, trans. Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914), p. 179. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 242-3.
116. 48 James, Pragmatism, pp. 254-5, 283. Cf. William James, The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York, 1897), p. 177. See also Antonio Aliotta who wrote that for the pragmatist the element of plasticity in things ensures that mind can 'reorganise and reconstruct' reality. A. Aliotta, The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, trans. Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914), p. 179. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 242-3.
117. 48 James, Pragmatism, pp. 254-5, 283. Cf. William James, The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York, 1897), p. 177. See also Antonio Aliotta who wrote that for the pragmatist the element of plasticity in things ensures that mind can 'reorganise and reconstruct' reality. A. Aliotta, The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, trans. Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914), p. 179. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 242-3.
118. 49 James, Pragmatism, pp. 244-8.
119. 50 See Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 585.
120. 51 James, Pragmatism, p. 81. On the democratic character of pragmatism see A. Eustace Haydon, 'The Theological Trend of Pragmatism', The American Journal of Theology, XXIII (1919), pp. 401-16; and A.K. Rogers, English and American Philosophy since 1800: A Critical Survey (New York, 1922), p. 360. Cited in Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 176 n.
121. 51 James, Pragmatism, p. 81. On the democratic character of pragmatism see A. Eustace Haydon, 'The Theological Trend of Pragmatism', The American Journal of Theology, XXIII (1919), pp. 401-16; and A.K. Rogers, English and American Philosophy since 1800: A Critical Survey (New York, 1922), p. 360. Cited in Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 176 n.
122. 51 James, Pragmatism, p. 81. On the democratic character of pragmatism see A. Eustace Haydon, 'The Theological Trend of Pragmatism', The American Journal of Theology, XXIII (1919), pp. 401-16; and A.K. Rogers, English and American Philosophy since 1800: A Critical Survey (New York, 1922), p. 360. Cited in Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 176 n.
123. 51 James, Pragmatism, p. 81. On the democratic character of pragmatism see A. Eustace Haydon, 'The Theological Trend of Pragmatism', The American Journal of Theology, XXIII (1919), pp. 401-16; and A.K. Rogers, English and American Philosophy since 1800: A Critical Survey (New York, 1922), p. 360. Cited in Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 176 n.
124. 52 James wrote: 'There is no point of view absolutely public and universal . . . The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.' See James, Talks to Teachers (New York, 1899), p. v. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 265-6. See also Hsiao who wrote that the 'real motive behind James's vehement protest against the "block universe" . . . is not so much logical or metaphysical as ethical'. Hsiao argued this because, as he rightly points out, James does concede that from the point of view of logic the notion of the absolute is not objectionable. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 187. James called his pluralism 'humanism in the widest sense', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 272; cf. Essays, pp. 48, 100 ff.; and James, Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.
125. 52 James wrote: 'There is no point of view absolutely public and universal . . . The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.' See James, Talks to Teachers (New York, 1899), p. v. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 265-6. See also Hsiao who wrote that the 'real motive behind James's vehement protest against the "block universe" . . . is not so much logical or metaphysical as ethical'. Hsiao argued this because, as he rightly points out, James does concede that from the point of view of logic the notion of the absolute is not objectionable. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 187. James called his pluralism 'humanism in the widest sense', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 272; cf. Essays, pp. 48, 100 ff.; and James, Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.
126. 52 James wrote: 'There is no point of view absolutely public and universal . . . The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.' See James, Talks to Teachers (New York, 1899), p. v. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 265-6. See also Hsiao who wrote that the 'real motive behind James's vehement protest against the "block universe" . . . is not so much logical or metaphysical as ethical'. Hsiao argued this because, as he rightly points out, James does concede that from the point of view of logic the notion of the absolute is not objectionable. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 187. James called his pluralism 'humanism in the widest sense', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 272; cf. Essays, pp. 48, 100 ff.; and James, Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.
127. 52 James wrote: 'There is no point of view absolutely public and universal . . . The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.' See James, Talks to Teachers (New York, 1899), p. v. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 265-6. See also Hsiao who wrote that the 'real motive behind James's vehement protest against the "block universe" . . . is not so much logical or metaphysical as ethical'. Hsiao argued this because, as he rightly points out, James does concede that from the point of view of logic the notion of the absolute is not objectionable. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 187. James called his pluralism 'humanism in the widest sense', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 272; cf. Essays, pp. 48, 100 ff.; and James, Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.
128. 52 James wrote: 'There is no point of view absolutely public and universal . . . The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.' See James, Talks to Teachers (New York, 1899), p. v. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 265-6. See also Hsiao who wrote that the 'real motive behind James's vehement protest against the "block universe" . . . is not so much logical or metaphysical as ethical'. Hsiao argued this because, as he rightly points out, James does concede that from the point of view of logic the notion of the absolute is not objectionable. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 187. James called his pluralism 'humanism in the widest sense', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 272; cf. Essays, pp. 48, 100 ff.; and James, Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.
129. 52 James wrote: 'There is no point of view absolutely public and universal . . . The practical consequence of such a philosophy is the well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.' See James, Talks to Teachers (New York, 1899), p. v. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 265-6. See also Hsiao who wrote that the 'real motive behind James's vehement protest against the "block universe" . . . is not so much logical or metaphysical as ethical'. Hsiao argued this because, as he rightly points out, James does concede that from the point of view of logic the notion of the absolute is not objectionable. Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 187. James called his pluralism 'humanism in the widest sense', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 272; cf. Essays, pp. 48, 100 ff.; and James, Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.
130. 53 James, Pragmatism, p. 261.
131. 54 Cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 315. Perry argued that James's views on international polities reflected his individualist stance and his belief in the toleration and enjoyment of 'differences'. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 267; cf. p. 90. James wrote: 'I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, and yet rending the hardest monuments of man's pride, if you give them time. The bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed. So I am against all big organizations as such, national ones first and foremost; against all big successes and big results; and in favor of the eternal forces of truth which always work in the individual and immediately unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, till history comes, after they are long dead, and puts them on the top.'
132. 54 Cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 315. Perry argued that James's views on international polities reflected his individualist stance and his belief in the toleration and enjoyment of 'differences'. See also Letters of William James, II, p. 267; cf. p. 90. James wrote: 'I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, and yet rending the hardest monuments of man's pride, if you give them time. The bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed. So I am against all big organizations as such, national ones first and foremost; against all big successes and big results; and in favor of the eternal forces of truth which always work in the individual and immediately unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, till history comes, after they are long dead, and puts them on the top.'
133. 55 James, Pragmatism, pp. 81, 259. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
134. 55 James, Pragmatism, pp. 81, 259. See also James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
135. 56 Letters, I, p. 321 (13 March 1921); cf. pp. 71 (24 March 1917), 75 (5 April 1917), 507 (6 June 1923), 551 (13 October 1923), 634 (15 July 1924).
136. 56 Letters, I, p. 321 (13 March 1921); cf. pp. 71 (24 March 1917), 75 (5 April 1917), 507 (6 June 1923), 551 (13 October 1923), 634 (15 July 1924).
137. 56 Letters, I, p. 321 (13 March 1921); cf. pp. 71 (24 March 1917), 75 (5 April 1917), 507 (6 June 1923), 551 (13 October 1923), 634 (15 July 1924).
138. 56 Letters, I, p. 321 (13 March 1921); cf. pp. 71 (24 March 1917), 75 (5 April 1917), 507 (6 June 1923), 551 (13 October 1923), 634 (15 July 1924).
139. 56 Letters, I, p. 321 (13 March 1921); cf. pp. 71 (24 March 1917), 75 (5 April 1917), 507 (6 June 1923), 551 (13 October 1923), 634 (15 July 1924).
140. 56 Letters, I, p. 321 (13 March 1921); cf. pp. 71 (24 March 1917), 75 (5 April 1917), 507 (6 June 1923), 551 (13 October 1923), 634 (15 July 1924).
141. 57 Authority, p. 312. On Laski's fundamental liberalism see Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163 n. See also Max Beloff, 'The Age of Laski', The Fortnightly, CLXVII (1950), p. 380; and Carroll Hawkins, 'Harold J. Laski: A Preliminary Analysis', Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950), pp. 376-92, p. 392.
142. 57 Authority, p. 312. On Laski's fundamental liberalism see Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163 n. See also Max Beloff, 'The Age of Laski', The Fortnightly, CLXVII (1950), p. 380; and Carroll Hawkins, 'Harold J. Laski: A Preliminary Analysis', Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950), pp. 376-92, p. 392.
143. 57 Authority, p. 312. On Laski's fundamental liberalism see Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163 n. See also Max Beloff, 'The Age of Laski', The Fortnightly, CLXVII (1950), p. 380; and Carroll Hawkins, 'Harold J. Laski: A Preliminary Analysis', Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950), pp. 376-92, p. 392.
144. 57 Authority, p. 312. On Laski's fundamental liberalism see Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163 n. See also Max Beloff, 'The Age of Laski', The Fortnightly, CLXVII (1950), p. 380; and Carroll Hawkins, 'Harold J. Laski: A Preliminary Analysis', Political Science Quarterly, LXV (1950), pp. 376-92, p. 392.
145. 58 Note that political monism for Laski referred, not only to theories of the general will, but also to positivistic arguments in favour of the unity of the state, Austin's theory of parliamentary sovereignty being one example. See Laski, 'The Pluralistic State', p. 563.
146. 59 Studies, p. 6. Laski argued that just as Hegel led to Bismarck the absolute in metaphysics led to the absolute State in political theory. Laski wrote of the role played by a 'certain grim Hegelianism' in producing the authoritarian German state and thereby bringing about the Great War. See also Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', pp. 302-4; and Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115. Laski wrote that the conception of the state as all-encompassing was highly significant: 'The result of it is the intense unity
147. 59 Studies, p. 6. Laski argued that just as Hegel led to Bismarck the absolute in metaphysics led to the absolute State in political theory. Laski wrote of the role played by a 'certain grim Hegelianism' in producing the authoritarian German state and thereby bringing about the Great War. See also Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', pp. 302-4; and Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115. Laski wrote that the conception of the state as all-encompassing was highly significant: 'The result of it is the intense unity of modern Germany, a unity philosophically justified by Hegel and politically exalted by Treitszchke.'
148. 59 Studies, p. 6. Laski argued that just as Hegel led to Bismarck the absolute in metaphysics led to the absolute State in political theory. Laski wrote of the role played by a 'certain grim Hegelianism' in producing the authoritarian German state and thereby bringing about the Great War. See also Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', pp. 302-4; and Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115. Laski wrote that the conception of the state as all-encompassing was highly significant: 'The result of it is the intense unity of modern Germany, a unity philosophically justified by Hegel and politically exalted by Treitszchke.'
149. 60 John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics (New York, rev. edn., 1942). L.T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State (London, 1918), pp. 134-6.
150. 60 John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics (New York, rev. edn., 1942). L.T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State (London, 1918), pp. 134-6.
151. 61 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 126 n. John Dewey, cited in G.N. Sarma, 'Harold J. Laski', The Indian Journal of Political Science, XI (1950), pp. 133-44, p. 137. No reference is given for this citation. For historical and contemporary examples of the use of the terms pluralism and monism and manyness and oneness see Laski, 'The Sovereignty of the State', Journal of Philosophy, XIII (1916), pp. 85-97. Laski's article would seem to indicate that the political application of these terms was well entrenched, although George Sabine could write in 1923 as if the words monism and pluralism had only recently been injected into the area of political theory. See Sabine, 'Pluralism: A Point of View', American Political Science Review, XXIX (1923), pp. 34-50.
152. 61 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 126 n. John Dewey, cited in G.N. Sarma, 'Harold J. Laski', The Indian Journal of Political Science, XI (1950), pp. 133-44, p. 137. No reference is given for this citation. For historical and contemporary examples of the use of the terms pluralism and monism and manyness and oneness see Laski, 'The Sovereignty of the State', Journal of Philosophy, XIII (1916), pp. 85-97. Laski's article would seem to indicate that the political application of these terms was well entrenched, although George Sabine could write in 1923 as if the words monism and pluralism had only recently been injected into the area of political theory. See Sabine, 'Pluralism: A Point of View', American Political Science Review, XXIX (1923), pp. 34-50.
153. 61 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 126 n. John Dewey, cited in G.N. Sarma, 'Harold J. Laski', The Indian Journal of Political Science, XI (1950), pp. 133-44, p. 137. No reference is given for this citation. For historical and contemporary examples of the use of the terms pluralism and monism and manyness and oneness see Laski, 'The Sovereignty of the State', Journal of Philosophy, XIII (1916), pp. 85-97. Laski's article would seem to indicate that the political application of these terms was well entrenched, although George Sabine could write in 1923 as if the words monism and pluralism had only recently been injected into the area of political theory. See Sabine, 'Pluralism: A Point of View', American Political Science Review, XXIX (1923), pp. 34-50.
154. 61 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 126 n. John Dewey, cited in G.N. Sarma, 'Harold J. Laski', The Indian Journal of Political Science, XI (1950), pp. 133-44, p. 137. No reference is given for this citation. For historical and contemporary examples of the use of the terms pluralism and monism and manyness and oneness see Laski, 'The Sovereignty of the State', Journal of Philosophy, XIII (1916), pp. 85-97. Laski's article would seem to indicate that the political application of these terms was well entrenched, although George Sabine could write in 1923 as if the words monism and pluralism had only recently been injected into the area of political theory. See Sabine, 'Pluralism: A Point of View', American Political Science Review, XXIX (1923), pp. 34-50.
155. 62 Holmes cited in Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, pp. 457-9.
156. 63 Ibid., pp. 458-60.
157. 64 Letters, I, pp. 20 (15 September 1916), 69-70 (23 March 1917). Holmes was referring to Laski's article 'The Political Theory of the Disruption', American Political Science Review, X (1916), pp. 437-64, pp. 462-4; reprinted in Studies.
158. 64 Letters, I, pp. 20 (15 September 1916), 69-70 (23 March 1917). Holmes was referring to Laski's article 'The Political Theory of the Disruption', American Political Science Review, X (1916), pp. 437-64, pp. 462-4; reprinted in Studies.
159. 64 Letters, I, pp. 20 (15 September 1916), 69-70 (23 March 1917). Holmes was referring to Laski's article 'The Political Theory of the Disruption', American Political Science Review, X (1916), pp. 437-64, pp. 462-4; reprinted in Studies.
160. 65 Letters, p. 71 (24 March 1917).
161. 66 cf. Studies, p. 68. 'The division of power may connote a pluralistic world. It may throw to the winds that omnicompetent State for which Hegel in Germany and Austin in England have long and firmly stood the sponsors.'
162. 67 Letters, I, p. 22 (16 September 1916). See also Laski, 'The Temper of the Present Time', The New Republic (18 February 1920), pp. 335-8, p. 336.
163. 67 Letters, I, p. 22 (16 September 1916). See also Laski, 'The Temper of the Present Time', The New Republic (18 February 1920), pp. 335-8, p. 336.
164. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true'. James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
165. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true'. James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
166. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true'. James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
167. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true'. James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
168. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true'. James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
169. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true', James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
170. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true', James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
171. 68 Letters, I, p. 75 (5 April 1917). See James, Pragmatism, p. 288-9: '. . . the only real reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to he here'. Cf. James, Will to Believe, p. 59, where he wrote: '. . . often enough our faith before hand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come true', James was aware of criticisms like those of Holmes. He noted in his Pragmatism, p. 258, that a less misleading title for his Will to Believe might be the 'right to believe'. James meant by this that as science gave only a partial account of the universe, individuals had a 'right to supplement' this knowledge with faith in an 'unseen spiritual order'. James, Will to Believe, p. 52. For an account of the misinterpretations surrounding James's will to believe see Cohen, 'on American Philosophy', II, p. 257. For Laski's comments on the notion of the will to believe see Letters, I, pp. 575 (28 July 1923), 725 (22 March 1925).
172. 69 Foundations, p. 261; cf. Studies, p. 23. See also Authority, p. 51: '. . . it is in events alone that we must search for our truths'. For James's discussion of the test of events see James, Pragmatism, p. 201; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 277.
173. 69 Foundations, p. 261; cf. Studies, p. 23. See also Authority, p. 51: '. . . it is in events alone that we must search for our truths'. For James's discussion of the test of events see James, Pragmatism, p. 201; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 277.
174. 69 Foundations, p. 261; cf. Studies, p. 23. See also Authority, p. 51: '. . . it is in events alone that we must search for our truths'. For James's discussion of the test of events see James, Pragmatism, p. 201; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 277.
175. 69 Foundations, p. 261; cf. Studies, p. 23. See also Authority, p. 51: '. . . it is in events alone that we must search for our truths'. For James's discussion of the test of events see James, Pragmatism, p. 201; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 277.
176. 69 Foundations, p. 261; cf. Studies, p. 23. See also Authority, p. 51: '. . . it is in events alone that we must search for our truths'. For James's discussion of the test of events see James, Pragmatism, p. 201; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 277.
177. 70 Laski, 'The Temper of the Present Time', p. 338. Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 72. 'In this real world of sweat and dirt.'
178. 70 Laski, 'The Temper of the Present Time', p. 338. Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 72. 'In this real world of sweat and dirt.'
179. 71 There is no need to assume that Laski derived this description of the self exclusively from James. On the one hand he thought highly of James's Principles, and on rereading it thought that it was 'a great book and full of the happy guesses so characteristic of his mind', Letters, I, p. 571 (13 December 1923). Later, in the Grammar, p. 23, he cited James on the importance of instinctive propensities in order to explain social motives. Yet he also could use and adapt others to similar affect. See the social psychological studies of William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1936), pp. 7-10, 13. McDougall wanted psychologists to move beyond introspective examinations of the stream of consciousness and begin to concentrate on outward forms of social behaviour. In his reply to Lippmann, Laski adapts McDougall's argument that economic or political theories which ascribe uniform motives to men and uphold the commanding power of reason in human affairs are bound to prove inadequate. Cf. Laski, 'Note: A Reply to Walter Lippmann's Review of Laski', Authority (31 May 1919), pp. 149-50; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425.
180. 71 There is no need to assume that Laski derived this description of the self exclusively from James. On the one hand he thought highly of James's Principles, and on rereading it thought that it was 'a great book and full of the happy guesses so characteristic of his mind', Letters, I, p. 571 (13 December 1923). Later, in the Grammar, p. 23, he cited James on the importance of instinctive propensities in order to explain social motives. Yet he also could use and adapt others to similar affect. See the social psychological studies of William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1936), pp. 7-10, 13. McDougall wanted psychologists to move beyond introspective examinations of the stream of consciousness and begin to concentrate on outward forms of social behaviour. In his reply to Lippmann, Laski adapts McDougall's argument that economic or political theories which ascribe uniform motives to men and uphold the commanding power of reason in human affairs are bound to prove inadequate. Cf. Laski, 'Note: A Reply to Walter Lippmann's Review of Laski', Authority (31 May 1919), pp. 149-50; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425.
181. 71 There is no need to assume that Laski derived this description of the self exclusively from James. On the one hand he thought highly of James's Principles, and on rereading it thought that it was 'a great book and full of the happy guesses so characteristic of his mind', Letters, I, p. 571 (13 December 1923). Later, in the Grammar, p. 23, he cited James on the importance of instinctive propensities in order to explain social motives. Yet he also could use and adapt others to similar affect. See the social psychological studies of William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1936), pp. 7-10, 13. McDougall wanted psychologists to move beyond introspective examinations of the stream of consciousness and begin to concentrate on outward forms of social behaviour. In his reply to Lippmann, Laski adapts McDougall's argument that economic or political theories which ascribe uniform motives to men and uphold the commanding power of reason in human affairs are bound to prove inadequate. Cf. Laski, 'Note: A Reply to Walter Lippmann's Review of Laski', Authority (31 May 1919), pp. 149-50; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425.
182. 71 There is no need to assume that Laski derived this description of the self exclusively from James. On the one hand he thought highly of James's Principles, and on rereading it thought that it was 'a great book and full of the happy guesses so characteristic of his mind', Letters, I, p. 571 (13 December 1923). Later, in the Grammar, p. 23, he cited James on the importance of instinctive propensities in order to explain social motives. Yet he also could use and adapt others to similar affect. See the social psychological studies of William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1936), pp. 7-10, 13. McDougall wanted psychologists to move beyond introspective examinations of the stream of consciousness and begin to concentrate on outward forms of social behaviour. In his reply to Lippmann, Laski adapts McDougall's argument that economic or political theories which ascribe uniform motives to men and uphold the commanding power of reason in human affairs are bound to prove inadequate. Cf. Laski, 'Note: A Reply to Walter Lippmann's Review of Laski', Authority (31 May 1919), pp. 149-50; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425.
183. 71 There is no need to assume that Laski derived this description of the self exclusively from James. On the one hand he thought highly of James's Principles, and on rereading it thought that it was 'a great book and full of the happy guesses so characteristic of his mind', Letters, I, p. 571 (13 December 1923). Later, in the Grammar, p. 23, he cited James on the importance of instinctive propensities in order to explain social motives. Yet he also could use and adapt others to similar affect. See the social psychological studies of William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology (London, 1936), pp. 7-10, 13. McDougall wanted psychologists to move beyond introspective examinations of the stream of consciousness and begin to concentrate on outward forms of social behaviour. In his reply to Lippmann, Laski adapts McDougall's argument that economic or political theories which ascribe uniform motives to men and uphold the commanding power of reason in human affairs are bound to prove inadequate. Cf. Laski, 'Note: A Reply to Walter Lippmann's Review of Laski', Authority (31 May 1919), pp. 149-50; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425.
184. 72 Walter Lippmann, Review of Laski's Authority in the Modern State, The New Republic (31 May 1919), p. 149.
185. 73 Laski, 'A Reply to Walter Lippmann', p. 149. Note that Laski's federalism is not geographical but is based on function. See Laski, 'The Pluralistic State', Philosophical Review, 28 (1919), pp. 562-75. 'We believe that this can best be achieved in a state of which the structure is not hierarchical but coördinate, in which, that is to say, sovereignty is partitioned upon some basis of function.' (Ibid., pp. 569-70.) See also Laski, 'Law in the State', p. 294. Laski argued that given that social facts are anarchical the law must be pluralistic.
186. 73 Laski, 'A Reply to Walter Lippmann', p. 149. Note that Laski's federalism is not geographical but is based on function. See Laski, 'The Pluralistic State', Philosophical Review, 28 (1919), pp. 562-75. 'We believe that this can best be achieved in a state of which the structure is not hierarchical but coördinate, in which, that is to say, sovereignty is partitioned upon some basis of function.' (Ibid., pp. 569-70.) See also Laski, 'Law in the State', p. 294. Laski argued that given that social facts are anarchical the law must be pluralistic.
187. 73 Laski, 'A Reply to Walter Lippmann', p. 149. Note that Laski's federalism is not geographical but is based on function. See Laski, 'The Pluralistic State', Philosophical Review, 28 (1919), pp. 562-75. 'We believe that this can best be achieved in a state of which the structure is not hierarchical but coördinate, in which, that is to say, sovereignty is partitioned upon some basis of function.' (Ibid., pp. 569-70.) See also Laski, 'Law in the State', p. 294. Laski argued that given that social facts are anarchical the law must be pluralistic.
188. 73 Laski, 'A Reply to Walter Lippmann', p. 149. Note that Laski's federalism is not geographical but is based on function. See Laski, 'The Pluralistic State', Philosophical Review, 28 (1919), pp. 562-75. 'We believe that this can best be achieved in a state of which the structure is not hierarchical but coördinate, in which, that is to say, sovereignty is partitioned upon some basis of function.' (Ibid., pp. 569-70.) See also Laski, 'Law in the State', p. 294. Laski argued that given that social facts are anarchical the law must be pluralistic.
189. 74 See Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 116, where he wrote the will of the state 'is a will largely competing with other wills, and Darwin-wise, surviving only by its ability to cope with its environment . . . Again and again my allegiance may be divided between the different groups to which I belong. The state has to fight hard to maintain my allegiance.' See also Laski, 'Rousseau', New Republic (16 July 1919), pp. 363-4, p. 364; and Studies, p. 23.
190. 74 See Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 116, where he wrote the will of the state 'is a will largely competing with other wills, and Darwin-wise, surviving only by its ability to cope with its environment . . . Again and again my allegiance may be divided between the different groups to which I belong. The state has to fight hard to maintain my allegiance.' See also Laski, 'Rousseau', New Republic (16 July 1919), pp. 363-4, p. 364; and Studies, p. 23.
191. 74 See Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 116, where he wrote the will of the state 'is a will largely competing with other wills, and Darwin-wise, surviving only by its ability to cope with its environment . . . Again and again my allegiance may be divided between the different groups to which I belong. The state has to fight hard to maintain my allegiance.' See also Laski, 'Rousseau', New Republic (16 July 1919), pp. 363-4, p. 364; and Studies, p. 23.
192. 75 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 116. James, The Will to Believe, p. 61.
193. 75 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 116. James, The Will to Believe, p. 61.
194. 76 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425. Dewey cited in Sarma, 'Harold J. Laski', p. 137.
195. 76 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 425. Dewey cited in Sarma, 'Harold J. Laski', p. 137.
196. 77 Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, p. 315. James noted: 'the smaller and more intimate is the truer, - the man more than the home, the home more than the state or the church'. Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383.
197. 77 Perry, Thought and Character, Vol. II, p. 315. James noted: 'the smaller and more intimate is the truer, - the man more than the home, the home more than the state or the church'. Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383.
198. 78 See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. and intro. Frederic William Maitland (London, 1900), pp. xxx, xl. John Neville Figgis, 'Churches in the Modern State', in The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski, ed. John Q. Hirst (London, 1989), pp. 111, 114.
199. 78 See Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. and intro. Frederic William Maitland (London, 1900), pp. xxx, xl. John Neville Figgis, 'Churches in the Modern State', in The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis and H.J. Laski, ed. John Q. Hirst (London, 1989), pp. 111, 114.
200. 79 Studies, p. 272; cf. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', pp. 418-19.
201. 79 Studies, p. 272; cf. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', pp. 418-19.
202. 79 Studies, p. 272; cf. Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; and Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', pp. 418-19.
203. 80 Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 405.
204. 81 James, Pragmatism, pp. 80, 299.
205. 82 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115. Laski wrote that the 'personality is real for us; for when we assume its truth, the assumption leads to concrete differences'. See also Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 424; cf. p. 405. Laski wrote that there is a 'compulsion in our personalising. We do it because we must. We do it because we feel in these things the red blood of a living personality. Here are no mere abstractions of an over-exuberant imagination. The need is so apparent as to make plain the reality beneath.' Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 200. James wrote that the pragmatist asks 'what concrete difference will its [a belief] being true make in any one's actual life?'.
206. 82 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115. Laski wrote that the 'personality is real for us; for when we assume its truth, the assumption leads to concrete differences'. See also Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 424; cf. p. 405. Laski wrote that there is a 'compulsion in our personalising. We do it because we must. We do it because we feel in these things the red blood of a living personality. Here are no mere abstractions of an over-exuberant imagination. The need is so apparent as to make plain the reality beneath.' Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 200. James wrote that the pragmatist asks 'what concrete difference will its [a belief] being true make in any one's actual life?'.
207. 82 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', p. 115. Laski wrote that the 'personality is real for us; for when we assume its truth, the assumption leads to concrete differences'. See also Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 424; cf. p. 405. Laski wrote that there is a 'compulsion in our personalising. We do it because we must. We do it because we feel in these things the red blood of a living personality. Here are no mere abstractions of an over-exuberant imagination. The need is so apparent as to make plain the reality beneath.' Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 200. James wrote that the pragmatist asks 'what concrete difference will its [a belief] being true make in any one's actual life?'.
208. 83 In 1911, before going up to Oxford (first to study zoology and then history), Laski spent several months working in Karl Pearson's eugenics laboratory at University College, London, and would have been versed in James's empiricism. See Harold J. Laski, Karl Pearson et al., 'On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value', Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, XVIII (1913), pp. 1-72. Cf. Roger Soltau, 'Professor Laski and Political Science', Political Quarterly, XXII (1950), pp. 301-10, p. 301; and Herbert Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York, 1955), p. 5. Laski wrote 'If we become inductive-minded, and look at the facts of social life . . .', 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; cf. Laski, 'Rousseau', p. 364; and Grammar, pp. 29, 91.
209. 83 In 1911, before going up to Oxford (first to study zoology and then history), Laski spent several months working in Karl Pearson's eugenics laboratory at University College, London, and would have been versed in James's empiricism. See Harold J. Laski, Karl Pearson et al., 'On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value', Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, XVIII (1913), pp. 1-72. Cf. Roger Soltau, 'Professor Laski and Political Science', Political Quarterly, XXII (1950), pp. 301-10, p. 301; and Herbert Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York, 1955), p. 5. Laski wrote 'If we become inductive-minded, and look at the facts of social life . . .', 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; cf. Laski, 'Rousseau', p. 364; and Grammar, pp. 29, 91.
210. 83 In 1911, before going up to Oxford (first to study zoology and then history), Laski spent several months working in Karl Pearson's eugenics laboratory at University College, London, and would have been versed in James's empiricism. See Harold J. Laski, Karl Pearson et al., 'On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value', Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, XVIII (1913), pp. 1-72. Cf. Roger Soltau, 'Professor Laski and Political Science', Political Quarterly, XXII (1950), pp. 301-10, p. 301; and Herbert Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York, 1955), p. 5. Laski wrote 'If we become inductive-minded, and look at the facts of social life . . .', 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; cf. Laski, 'Rousseau', p. 364; and Grammar, pp. 29, 91.
211. 83 In 1911, before going up to Oxford (first to study zoology and then history), Laski spent several months working in Karl Pearson's eugenics laboratory at University College, London, and would have been versed in James's empiricism. See Harold J. Laski, Karl Pearson et al., 'On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value', Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, XVIII (1913), pp. 1-72. Cf. Roger Soltau, 'Professor Laski and Political Science', Political Quarterly, XXII (1950), pp. 301-10, p. 301; and Herbert Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York, 1955), p. 5. Laski wrote 'If we become inductive-minded, and look at the facts of social life . . .', 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; cf. Laski, 'Rousseau', p. 364; and Grammar, pp. 29, 91.
212. 83 In 1911, before going up to Oxford (first to study zoology and then history), Laski spent several months working in Karl Pearson's eugenics laboratory at University College, London, and would have been versed in James's empiricism. See Harold J. Laski, Karl Pearson et al., 'On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value', Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, XVIII (1913), pp. 1-72. Cf. Roger Soltau, 'Professor Laski and Political Science', Political Quarterly, XXII (1950), pp. 301-10, p. 301; and Herbert Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York, 1955), p. 5. Laski wrote 'If we become inductive-minded, and look at the facts of social life . . .', 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; cf. Laski, 'Rousseau', p. 364; and Grammar, pp. 29, 91.
213. 83 In 1911, before going up to Oxford (first to study zoology and then history), Laski spent several months working in Karl Pearson's eugenics laboratory at University College, London, and would have been versed in James's empiricism. See Harold J. Laski, Karl Pearson et al., 'On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value', Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, XVIII (1913), pp. 1-72. Cf. Roger Soltau, 'Professor Laski and Political Science', Political Quarterly, XXII (1950), pp. 301-10, p. 301; and Herbert Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York, 1955), p. 5. Laski wrote 'If we become inductive-minded, and look at the facts of social life . . .', 'The Personality of the State', p. 115; cf. Laski, 'Rousseau', p. 364; and Grammar, pp. 29, 91.
214. 84 This tendency was indeed apparent in Laski's own work as evidenced by his comment that law is not 'the result of one man's will, but of a complex fusion of wills. It distils the quintessence of an infinite number of personalities. It displays the character not of a Many, but of One, - it becomes, in fact, unified and coherent. Ultimately pluralistic, the interactions of its diversities make it essentially, within the sphere of its operations, a single thing. Men obey its commands. It acts. It influences.' Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 417. Cf. M.P. Follett, The New State: Group Organisation the Solution of Popular Government (New York, 1918), p. 283. Follett, drawing on James's philosophy, asks why pluraliste who follow Gierke and Maitland accept that a group personality can evolve but do not allow for a similar compounding of consciousness at the level of the state.
215. 84 This tendency was indeed apparent in Laski's own work as evidenced by his comment that law is not 'the result of one man's will, but of a complex fusion of wills. It distils the quintessence of an infinite number of personalities. It displays the character not of a Many, but of One, - it becomes, in fact, unified and coherent. Ultimately pluralistic, the interactions of its diversities make it essentially, within the sphere of its operations, a single thing. Men obey its commands. It acts. It influences.' Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 417. Cf. M.P. Follett, The New State: Group Organisation the Solution of Popular Government (New York, 1918), p. 283. Follett, drawing on James's philosophy, asks why pluraliste who follow Gierke and Maitland accept that a group personality can evolve but do not allow for a similar compounding of consciousness at the level of the state.
216. 85 Laski was criticizing Figgis for failing to recognize that religious groups fighting for their freedom may in turn oppress others. Letters, I (28 February 1920), pp. 246-7.
217. 86 Morris Cohen, 'Communal Ghosts and other Perils in Social Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1919), pp. 673-90, p. 678. Laski later wrote that Cohen's essay showed him that 'he had lain under a dangerous spell woven, above all, by the exquisite charm of Maitland . . . and that bottomless pit of Gierke's learning.' Laski, 'Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy', University of Chicago Law Review, 15 (1948), pp. 577-82, p. 574 ; cited in Letters, I, p. 223 n.
218. 86 Morris Cohen, 'Communal Ghosts and other Perils in Social Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1919), pp. 673-90, p. 678. Laski later wrote that Cohen's essay showed him that 'he had lain under a dangerous spell woven, above all, by the exquisite charm of Maitland . . . and that bottomless pit of Gierke's learning.' Laski, 'Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy', University of Chicago Law Review, 15 (1948), pp. 577-82, p. 574 ; cited in Letters, I, p. 223 n.
219. 86 Morris Cohen, 'Communal Ghosts and other Perils in Social Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1919), pp. 673-90, p. 678. Laski later wrote that Cohen's essay showed him that 'he had lain under a dangerous spell woven, above all, by the exquisite charm of Maitland . . . and that bottomless pit of Gierke's learning.' Laski, 'Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy', University of Chicago Law Review, 15 (1948), pp. 577-82, p. 574 ; cited in Letters, I, p. 223 n.
220. 87 See Holmes's letter to Morris Cohen (23 November 1919), in the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', p. 17; Cohen, 'Communal Ghosts', pp. 676-9.
221. 87 See Holmes's letter to Morris Cohen (23 November 1919), in the 'Holmes-Cohen Correspondence', p. 17; Cohen, 'Communal Ghosts', pp. 676-9.
222. 88 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 274. See also Authority, p. 313.
223. 88 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 274. See also Authority, p. 313.
224. 89 Authority, pp. 67-8; cf. Grammar, pp. 29, 67, 260.
225. 89 Authority, pp. 67-8; cf. Grammar, pp. 29, 67, 260.
226. 90 Léon Duguit, 'Law and the State', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917), pp. 1-185, pp. 184-5. See also Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 186-92, p. 189; and Laski, 'A Note on M. Hariou', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 875-6, p. 876. I owe the ascription of this article on Hariou to Bernard Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought (Assen, 1968), p. 222. As well as including an extensive bibliography of Laski's works Zylstra's study, to which I am indebted, is also very illuminating on the question of Laski's engagement with James's thought. Laski wrote the introduction to Duguit's Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida and Harold Laski (New York, 1970), originally published as Les Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913).
227. 90 Léon Duguit, 'Law and the State', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917), pp. 1-185, pp. 184-5. See also Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 186-92, p. 189; and Laski, 'A Note on M. Hariou', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 875-6, p. 876. I owe the ascription of this article on Hariou to Bernard Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought (Assen, 1968), p. 222. As well as including an extensive bibliography of Laski's works Zylstra's study, to which I am indebted, is also very illuminating on the question of Laski's engagement with James's thought. Laski wrote the introduction to Duguit's Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida and Harold Laski (New York, 1970), originally published as Les Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913).
228. 90 Léon Duguit, 'Law and the State', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917), pp. 1-185, pp. 184-5. See also Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 186-92, p. 189; and Laski, 'A Note on M. Hariou', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 875-6, p. 876. I owe the ascription of this article on Hariou to Bernard Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought (Assen, 1968), p. 222. As well as including an extensive bibliography of Laski's works Zylstra's study, to which I am indebted, is also very illuminating on the question of Laski's engagement with James's thought. Laski wrote the introduction to Duguit's Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida and Harold Laski (New York, 1970), originally published as Les Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913).
229. 90 Léon Duguit, 'Law and the State', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917), pp. 1-185, pp. 184-5. See also Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 186-92, p. 189; and Laski, 'A Note on M. Hariou', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 875-6, p. 876. I owe the ascription of this article on Hariou to Bernard Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought (Assen, 1968), p. 222. As well as including an extensive bibliography of Laski's works Zylstra's study, to which I am indebted, is also very illuminating on the question of Laski's engagement with James's thought. Laski wrote the introduction to Duguit's Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida and Harold Laski (New York, 1970), originally published as Les Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913).
230. 90 Léon Duguit, 'Law and the State', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917), pp. 1-185, pp. 184-5. See also Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 186-92, p. 189; and Laski, 'A Note on M. Hariou', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 875-6, p. 876. I owe the ascription of this article on Hariou to Bernard Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought (Assen, 1968), p. 222. As well as including an extensive bibliography of Laski's works Zylstra's study, to which I am indebted, is also very illuminating on the question of Laski's engagement with James's thought. Laski wrote the introduction to Duguit's Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida and Harold Laski (New York, 1970), originally published as Les Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913).
231. 90 Léon Duguit, 'Law and the State', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917), pp. 1-185, pp. 184-5. See also Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 186-92, p. 189; and Laski, 'A Note on M. Hariou', Harvard Law Review, XXXI (1917-18), pp. 875-6, p. 876. I owe the ascription of this article on Hariou to Bernard Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism: The Development of Harold Laski's Political Thought (Assen, 1968), p. 222. As well as including an extensive bibliography of Laski's works Zylstra's study, to which I am indebted, is also very illuminating on the question of Laski's engagement with James's thought. Laski wrote the introduction to Duguit's Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida and Harold Laski (New York, 1970), originally published as Les Transformations du droit public (Paris, 1913).
232. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
233. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
234. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
235. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
236. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
237. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
238. 91 Laski, 'The Personality of the State', pp. 116-17. See also Grammar, p. 256, where Laski wrote that the group is 'real in the same sense as the State is real. It has . . . an interest to promote'; cf. Foundations, p. 62. On Duguit's pragmatism see Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 192; cf. Grammar, p. 577. For a further discussion of Duguit in the light of pragmatism see W. Y. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt in Politics: Syndicalism, Fascism and the Constitutional State (New York, 1928), pp. 251 ff.; cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
239. 92 See Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 426, where he wrote of the state: 'We make it justify itself by its consequences . . . Like any other group, what it is and what it will be, it can be only by virtue of its achievement. So only can it hope to hand down undimmed the torch of its conscious life.' Cf. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', p. 304; Authority, p. 69; and Grammar, pp. 39, 283.
240. 92 See Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 426, where he wrote of the state: 'We make it justify itself by its consequences . . . Like any other group, what it is and what it will be, it can be only by virtue of its achievement. So only can it hope to hand down undimmed the torch of its conscious life.' Cf. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', p. 304; Authority, p. 69; and Grammar, pp. 39, 283.
241. 92 See Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 426, where he wrote of the state: 'We make it justify itself by its consequences . . . Like any other group, what it is and what it will be, it can be only by virtue of its achievement. So only can it hope to hand down undimmed the torch of its conscious life.' Cf. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', p. 304; Authority, p. 69; and Grammar, pp. 39, 283.
242. 92 See Laski, 'The Personality of Associations', p. 426, where he wrote of the state: 'We make it justify itself by its consequences . . . Like any other group, what it is and what it will be, it can be only by virtue of its achievement. So only can it hope to hand down undimmed the torch of its conscious life.' Cf. Laski, 'The Apotheosis of the State', p. 304; Authority, p. 69; and Grammar, pp. 39, 283.
243. 93 Laski, Studies, p. 18; and Grammar, p. 35. On the decline of groups see Laski, 'Political Science In Great Britain', American Political Science Review, XIX (1925), pp. 96-9, p. 99. For Laski's comments on the value of the state see Letters, I, pp. 246-7 (28 February 1920).
244. 93 Laski, Studies, p. 18; and Grammar, p. 35. On the decline of groups see Laski, 'Political Science In Great Britain', American Political Science Review, XIX (1925), pp. 96-9, p. 99. For Laski's comments on the value of the state see Letters, I, pp. 246-7 (28 February 1920).
245. 93 Laski, Studies, p. 18; and Grammar, p. 35. On the decline of groups see Laski, 'Political Science In Great Britain', American Political Science Review, XIX (1925), pp. 96-9, p. 99. For Laski's comments on the value of the state see Letters, I, pp. 246-7 (28 February 1920).
246. 93 Laski, Studies, p. 18; and Grammar, p. 35. On the decline of groups see Laski, 'Political Science In Great Britain', American Political Science Review, XIX (1925), pp. 96-9, p. 99. For Laski's comments on the value of the state see Letters, I, pp. 246-7 (28 February 1920).
247. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
248. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
249. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
250. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
251. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
252. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
253. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was
254. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
255. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
256. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
257. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
258. 94 See Authority, p. 123. 'For no theory can now hope for survival which is not based upon the changing necessities of social life. The obvious generalisation that the creation of dogma carries with it . . . its own negation'. See also his comment on the 'relativity of ideas', ibid., p. 124. For further comments on the changeful nature of the human world see Grammar, p. 90: 'Our natural order is, at any moment, a problem of pragmatic analysis. Its only permanence lies in the certainty that it will change.' See also ibid., pp. 24, 101. Laski cited Dewey in Studies, p. 23. No reference for this expression was given but Laski had read and enjoyed Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic. See Letters, I, p. 25 (24 September 1916). For Dewey's comments on the experimental method see Dewey, Essays, pp. 100-2, 241, 306, 332, 442. Note that Dewey's view of experimentation was more scientific and less voluntaristic than that of James. See Dewey, Essays, p. 347. On this point see also Morris R. Cohen, 'On American Philosophy', The New Republic (17 March 1920), pp. 82-6, p. 83; and Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (New York, 1927), pp. 6-9. On Laski's experimental attitude towards political theory and the state see also Authority, p. 34; and Grammar, pp. 21, 100.
259. 95 John Dewey, 'Social Absolutism', The New Republic (9 February 1921), pp. 315-18, pp. 316-17. Laski, 'The Value and Defects of the Marxist Philosophy', Current History (October 1928), pp. 23-9, p. 29. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 282, 288, 292-3. Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', Atlantic Monthly, CLIII (1934), pp. 143-53, pp. 143-4. Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', in Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays prepared for the Fabian Society (London, 1943), p. 114. For Laski's thoughts on world government see Grammar, pp. 588 f.
260. 95 John Dewey, 'Social Absolutism', The New Republic (9 February 1921), pp. 315-18, pp. 316-17. Laski, 'The Value and Defects of the Marxist Philosophy', Current History (October 1928), pp. 23-9, p. 29. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 282, 288, 292-3. Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', Atlantic Monthly, CLIII (1934), pp. 143-53, pp. 143-4. Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', in Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays prepared for the Fabian Society (London, 1943), p. 114. For Laski's thoughts on world government see Grammar, pp. 588 f.
261. 95 John Dewey, 'Social Absolutism', The New Republic (9 February 1921), pp. 315-18, pp. 316-17. Laski, 'The Value and Defects of the Marxist Philosophy', Current History (October 1928), pp. 23-9, p. 29. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 282, 288, 292-3. Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', Atlantic Monthly, CLIII (1934), pp. 143-53, pp. 143-4. Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', in Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays prepared for the Fabian Society (London, 1943), p. 114. For Laski's thoughts on world government see Grammar, pp. 588 f.
262. 95 John Dewey, 'Social Absolutism', The New Republic (9 February 1921), pp. 315-18, pp. 316-17. Laski, 'The Value and Defects of the Marxist Philosophy', Current History (October 1928), pp. 23-9, p. 29. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 282, 288, 292-3. Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', Atlantic Monthly, CLIII (1934), pp. 143-53, pp. 143-4. Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', in Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays prepared for the Fabian Society (London, 1943), p. 114. For Laski's thoughts on world government see Grammar, pp. 588 f.
263. 95 John Dewey, 'Social Absolutism', The New Republic (9 February 1921), pp. 315-18, pp. 316-17. Laski, 'The Value and Defects of the Marxist Philosophy', Current History (October 1928), pp. 23-9, p. 29. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 282, 288, 292-3. Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', Atlantic Monthly, CLIII (1934), pp. 143-53, pp. 143-4. Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', in Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays prepared for the Fabian Society (London, 1943), p. 114. For Laski's thoughts on world government see Grammar, pp. 588 f.
264. 95 John Dewey, 'Social Absolutism', The New Republic (9 February 1921), pp. 315-18, pp. 316-17. Laski, 'The Value and Defects of the Marxist Philosophy', Current History (October 1928), pp. 23-9, p. 29. Laski, 'Law and the State', Economica, 27 (1929), pp. 267-95, pp. 282, 288, 292-3. Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', Atlantic Monthly, CLIII (1934), pp. 143-53, pp. 143-4. Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', in Plan for Britain: A Collection of Essays prepared for the Fabian Society (London, 1943), p. 114. For Laski's thoughts on world government see Grammar, pp. 588 f.
265. 96 Grammar, p. 250. For further comments on anarchy see ibid., pp. 39, 289. 'Every government is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree that they maintain rights.' Ibid., p. 57. For his comments on how the state is judged by members see ibid., p. 37. For similar remarks see Authority, p. 35; and Studies, pp. 18 f.
266. 96 Grammar, p. 250. For further comments on anarchy see ibid., pp. 39, 289. 'Every government is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree that they maintain rights.' Ibid., p. 57. For his comments on how the state is judged by members see ibid., p. 37. For similar remarks see Authority, p. 35; and Studies, pp. 18 f.
267. 96 Grammar, p. 250. For further comments on anarchy see ibid., pp. 39, 289. 'Every government is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree that they maintain rights.' Ibid., p. 57. For his comments on how the state is judged by members see ibid., p. 37. For similar remarks see Authority, p. 35; and Studies, pp. 18 f.
268. 96 Grammar, p. 250. For further comments on anarchy see ibid., pp. 39, 289. 'Every government is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree that they maintain rights.' Ibid., p. 57. For his comments on how the state is judged by members see ibid., p. 37. For similar remarks see Authority, p. 35; and Studies, pp. 18 f.
269. 96 Grammar, p. 250. For further comments on anarchy see ibid., pp. 39, 289. 'Every government is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree that they maintain rights.' Ibid., p. 57. For his comments on how the state is judged by members see ibid., p. 37. For similar remarks see Authority, p. 35; and Studies, pp. 18 f.
270. 96 Grammar, p. 250. For further comments on anarchy see ibid., pp. 39, 289. 'Every government is thus built upon a contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree that they maintain rights.' Ibid., p. 57. For his comments on how the state is judged by members see ibid., p. 37. For similar remarks see Authority, p. 35; and Studies, pp. 18 f.
271. 97 Letters, II, p. 1025. Laski wrote that he always had a 'sneaking sympathy for James's definition of good as the satisfaction of demand' (7 February 1927). James wrote that the 'essence of good is simply to satisfy demand', James, The Will to Believe, p. 201.
272. 97 Letters, II, p. 1025. Laski wrote that he always had a 'sneaking sympathy for James's definition of good as the satisfaction of demand' (7 February 1927). James wrote that the 'essence of good is simply to satisfy demand', James, The Will to Believe, p. 201.
273. 98 cf. James, The Will to Believe, p. 51, where he wrote: 'Thus, then, we see that mere instinctive curiosity, pugnacity, and honor may make life on a purely naturalistic basis seem worth living from day to day to men who have cast away all metaphysics in order to get rid of hypochondria, but who are resolved to owe nothing as yet to religion and its more positive gifts. A poor half-way stage, some of you may be inclined to say; but at least you must grant it to be an honest stage; and no man should dare to speak meanly of these instincts which are our nature's best equipment, and to which religion herself must in the last resort address her own peculiar appeals.' See also ibid., p. 47: 'Need and struggle are what excite and inspire us'.
274. 98 cf. James, The Will to Believe, p. 51, where he wrote: 'Thus, then, we see that mere instinctive curiosity, pugnacity, and honor may make life on a purely naturalistic basis seem worth living from day to day to men who have cast away all metaphysics in order to get rid of hypochondria, but who are resolved to owe nothing as yet to religion and its more positive gifts. A poor half-way stage, some of you may be inclined to say; but at least you must grant it to be an honest stage; and no man should dare to speak meanly of these instincts which are our nature's best equipment, and to which religion herself must in the last resort address her own peculiar appeals.' See also ibid., p. 47: 'Need and struggle are what excite and inspire us'.
275. 99 'the veto . . . which the strict positivist pronounces upon our faith - sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth', James, Will to Believe, p. 62. Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 268, where he rejects the view that pragmatism implies materialism, agnosticism and naturalism.
276. 99 'the veto . . . which the strict positivist pronounces upon our faith - sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth', James, Will to Believe, p. 62. Cf. James, Pragmatism, p. 268, where he rejects the view that pragmatism implies materialism, agnosticism and naturalism.
277. 100 On the scientific and romantic sides of pragmatism see Perry, Thought and Character, pp. 581-2; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, p. 7.
278. 100 On the scientific and romantic sides of pragmatism see Perry, Thought and Character, pp. 581-2; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, p. 7.
279. 101 Grammar, pp. 22-3.
280. 102 Ibid., p. 260. See also ibid., p. 141, where Laski wrote of the 'ultimate isolation of the self'. For similar remarks on 'ultimately unassimilable' character of the self see ibid., pp. 29-31, 247, 261. Many of these ideas are repeated in Laski's Liberty in the Modern State (Harmondsworth, 1930). Laski wrote therein (pp. 58-9) that the real self is the 'self that is isolated from his fellows'. It is 'all that I am and do. It is the total impression produced by the bewildering variety of my acts, good and bad and indifferent.'
281. 102 Ibid., p. 260. See also ibid., p. 141, where Laski wrote of the 'ultimate isolation of the self'. For similar remarks on 'ultimately unassimilable' character of the self see ibid., pp. 29-31, 247, 261. Many of these ideas are repeated in Laski's Liberty in the Modern State (Harmondsworth, 1930). Laski wrote therein (pp. 58-9) that the real self is the 'self that is isolated from his fellows'. It is 'all that I am and do. It is the total impression produced by the bewildering variety of my acts, good and bad and indifferent.'
282. 102 Ibid., p. 260. See also ibid., p. 141, where Laski wrote of the 'ultimate isolation of the self'. For similar remarks on 'ultimately unassimilable' character of the self see ibid., pp. 29-31, 247, 261. Many of these ideas are repeated in Laski's Liberty in the Modern State (Harmondsworth, 1930). Laski wrote therein (pp. 58-9) that the real self is the 'self that is isolated from his fellows'. It is 'all that I am and do. It is the total impression produced by the bewildering variety of my acts, good and bad and indifferent.'
283. 102 Ibid., p. 260. See also ibid., p. 141, where Laski wrote of the 'ultimate isolation of the self'. For similar remarks on 'ultimately unassimilable' character of the self see ibid., pp. 29-31, 247, 261. Many of these ideas are repeated in Laski's Liberty in the Modern State (Harmondsworth, 1930). Laski wrote therein (pp. 58-9) that the real self is the 'self that is isolated from his fellows'. It is 'all that I am and do. It is the total impression produced by the bewildering variety of my acts, good and bad and indifferent.'
284. 103 Grammar, pp. 142, 273, 289. Cf. p. 57: 'Each individual . . . is entitled to expect from the performance of the State an environment in which, at least potentially, he can hope to realise the best of himself.' Cf. Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 190.
285. 103 Grammar, pp. 142, 273, 289. Cf. p. 57: 'Each individual . . . is entitled to expect from the performance of the State an environment in which, at least potentially, he can hope to realise the best of himself.' Cf. Laski, 'A Note on M. Duguit', p. 190.
286. 104 On the importance of freedom of speech see Grammar, pp. 118, 272-3, 283. On the notion that rights grow out of experience see ibid., pp. 91-2.
287. 104 On the importance of freedom of speech see Grammar, pp. 118, 272-3, 283. On the notion that rights grow out of experience see ibid., pp. 91-2.
288. 105 Grammar, pp. 260-1.
289. 106 See Laski's comment that: 'The will of the State, in short, is the will which is adopted out of the conflict of myriad wills which contend with each other for the mastery of social forces.' Grammar, p. 35. See also ibid., p. 279: 'the social order means not one only, but the whole of the myriad forces in our midst which are striving to fulfil their wants'.
290. 106 See Laski's comment that: 'The will of the State, in short, is the will which is adopted out of the conflict of myriad wills which contend with each other for the mastery of social forces.' Grammar, p. 35. See also ibid., p. 279: 'the social order means not one only, but the whole of the myriad forces in our midst which are striving to fulfil their wants'.
291. 107 See James, Pragmatism, p. 218. James wrote in Pragmatism, p. 222: '"The true", to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.' See also Essays, p. 109.
292. 107 See James, Pragmatism, p. 218. James wrote in Pragmatism, p. 222: '"The true", to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.' See also Essays, p. 109.
293. 107 See James, Pragmatism, p. 218. James wrote in Pragmatism, p. 222: '"The true", to put it briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.' See also Essays, p. 109.
294. 108 James, Pragmatism, pp. 214-17.
295. 109 Ibid., p. 76.
296. 110 Grammar, p. 263. Cf. Studies, p. 18: 'What I mean by "right" is something the pragmatist will understand. It is something the individual ought to concede because experience has proved it to be good.'
297. 110 Grammar, p. 263. Cf. Studies, p. 18: 'What I mean by "right" is something the pragmatist will understand. It is something the individual ought to concede because experience has proved it to be good.'
298. 111 Grammar, pp. 278, 288.
299. 112 Ibid., pp. 33, 142.
300. 113 Ibid., pp. 23-4. Cf. ibid., p. 100: 'Men must learn to subordinate their self-interest to the common welfare.'
301. 113 Ibid., pp. 23-4. Cf. ibid., p. 100: 'Men must learn to subordinate their self-interest to the common welfare.'
302. 114 Ibid., p. 39. Cf. ibid., p. 130: 'No man . . . has the right to own property beyond that extent which enables the decent satisfaction of impulse.'
303. 114 Ibid., p. 39. Cf. ibid., p. 130: 'No man . . . has the right to own property beyond that extent which enables the decent satisfaction of impulse.'
304. 115 See for instance Dewey, 'Authority and Social Change', Authority and the Individual (Harvard, 1937), pp. 171-90. Cf. Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London, 1940), pp. 263-4.
305. 115 See for instance Dewey, 'Authority and Social Change', Authority and the Individual (Harvard, 1937), pp. 171-90. Cf. Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London, 1940), pp. 263-4.
306. 116 Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', p. 114. See also Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom? (Aberdeen, 1944). Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', pp. 143-5, 153. Cf. Charles W. Morris, Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 12 (Chicago, 1934), pp. 8, 12, 19-21.
307. 116 Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', p. 114. See also Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom? (Aberdeen, 1944). Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', pp. 143-5, 153. Cf. Charles W. Morris, Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 12 (Chicago, 1934), pp. 8, 12, 19-21.
308. 116 Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', p. 114. See also Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom? (Aberdeen, 1944). Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', pp. 143-5, 153. Cf. Charles W. Morris, Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 12 (Chicago, 1934), pp. 8, 12, 19-21.
309. 116 Laski, 'Choosing the Planners', p. 114. See also Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom? (Aberdeen, 1944). Laski, 'The Roosevelt Experiment', pp. 143-5, 153. Cf. Charles W. Morris, Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 12 (Chicago, 1934), pp. 8, 12, 19-21.
310. 117 See Letters, I, pp. 691 (22 December 1924), 697 (6 January 1925), for comments by Laski on his definition of the good in terms of social utility. Cf. Grammar, p. 62.
311. 117 See Letters, I, pp. 691 (22 December 1924), 697 (6 January 1925), for comments by Laski on his definition of the good in terms of social utility. Cf. Grammar, p. 62.
312. 117 See Letters, I, pp. 691 (22 December 1924), 697 (6 January 1925), for comments by Laski on his definition of the good in terms of social utility. Cf. Grammar, p. 62.
313. 118 Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50. Note James's comment (Essays, p. 159) that some people assumed that: '. . . whatever the socialist postulates as desirable is wanted without limit of qualification, - for socialist read pluralist and the parallel holds good, - it is to imagine that whatever proposal is made by him is to be carried out by uncontrolled monomaniacs, and so to make a picture of the socialist dream which can be presented to the simpleminded person in doubt - "This is socialism" - or pluralism, as the case may be. "Surely! - surely! you don't want this!".'
314. 118 Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50. Note James's comment (Essays, p. 159) that some people assumed that: '. . . whatever the socialist postulates as desirable is wanted without limit of qualification, - for socialist read pluralist and the parallel holds good, - it is to imagine that whatever proposal is made by him is to be carried out by uncontrolled monomaniacs, and so to make a picture of the socialist dream which can be presented to the simpleminded person in doubt - "This is socialism" - or pluralism, as the case may be. "Surely! - surely! you don't want this!".'
315. 119 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 193. Hsiao wrote that pragmatism declares the 'independence of the pragmatic-humanist spirit against all reality, claiming for men the natural right to take the government of the universe into their own hands'. In this revolutionary analogy Hsiao cast James as the 'prophetic Rousseau' and Laski as the 'irresistible Danton'. For Laski's comments on Hsiao's work see Letters, II, p. 982 (24 September 1927); and Laski, 'Political Pluralism', The New Republic (28 March 1928), pp. 197-8.
316. 119 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 193. Hsiao wrote that pragmatism declares the 'independence of the pragmatic-humanist spirit against all reality, claiming for men the natural right to take the government of the universe into their own hands'. In this revolutionary analogy Hsiao cast James as the 'prophetic Rousseau' and Laski as the 'irresistible Danton'. For Laski's comments on Hsiao's work see Letters, II, p. 982 (24 September 1927); and Laski, 'Political Pluralism', The New Republic (28 March 1928), pp. 197-8.
317. 119 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 193. Hsiao wrote that pragmatism declares the 'independence of the pragmatic-humanist spirit against all reality, claiming for men the natural right to take the government of the universe into their own hands'. In this revolutionary analogy Hsiao cast James as the 'prophetic Rousseau' and Laski as the 'irresistible Danton'. For Laski's comments on Hsiao's work see Letters, II, p. 982 (24 September 1927); and Laski, 'Political Pluralism', The New Republic (28 March 1928), pp. 197-8.
318. 120 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 206-7 ; and Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', p. 252. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 10-11, 55-6.
319. 120 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 206-7 ; and Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', p. 252. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 10-11, 55-6.
320. 120 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 126, 206-7 ; and Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', p. 252. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 10-11, 55-6.
321. 121 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 166-8, 192-3. Hsiao wrote that pragmatic, pluralist politics would degenerate into 'anarchism and irresponsibility', ibid., p. 204. On this point see also Elliott, 'Pragmatic Polities', p. 257. See also Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 83, 90, 103-4, 119. Elliott wrote that Laski's doctrine of contingent anarchy would beget Fascism (Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50).
322. 121 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 166-8, 192-3. Hsiao wrote that pragmatic, pluralist politics would degenerate into 'anarchism and irresponsibility', ibid., p. 204. On this point see also Elliott, 'Pragmatic Polities', p. 257. See also Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 83, 90, 103-4, 119. Elliott wrote that Laski's doctrine of contingent anarchy would beget Fascism (Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50).
323. 121 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 166-8, 192-3. Hsiao wrote that pragmatic, pluralist politics would degenerate into 'anarchism and irresponsibility', ibid., p. 204. On this point see also Elliott, 'Pragmatic Polities', p. 257. See also Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 83, 90, 103-4, 119. Elliott wrote that Laski's doctrine of contingent anarchy would beget Fascism (Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50).
324. 121 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 166-8, 192-3. Hsiao wrote that pragmatic, pluralist politics would degenerate into 'anarchism and irresponsibility', ibid., p. 204. On this point see also Elliott, 'Pragmatic Polities', p. 257. See also Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 83, 90, 103-4, 119. Elliott wrote that Laski's doctrine of contingent anarchy would beget Fascism (Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50).
325. 121 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 166-8, 192-3. Hsiao wrote that pragmatic, pluralist politics would degenerate into 'anarchism and irresponsibility', ibid., p. 204. On this point see also Elliott, 'Pragmatic Polities', p. 257. See also Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 83, 90, 103-4, 119. Elliott wrote that Laski's doctrine of contingent anarchy would beget Fascism (Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 149-50).
326. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
327. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
328. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
329. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
330. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
331. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
332. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
333. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
334. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
335. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
336. 122 On the 'pragmatist' aspects of Sorel's and Mussolini's thought see Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 257, 274-5; and Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 111-13, 116, 120, 316, 323, 324. Sorel's interest in James, which seems to have been both intellectual and political, is reflected in the 1920 edition of his Illusions of Progress, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley, 1969). See also Sorel's De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme (Librairie des Sciences Sociales et Politiques, 2nd edn., 1928). Mussolini's alleged interest in James came to public attention in an interview with Dr André Révesz in The Sunday Times (11 April 1926), p. 15. Mussolini cited James, along with Sorel and Nietzsche, as a formative influence. 'The pragmatism of William James was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to life and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success.' Cf. William Kinbourne Stewart, 'The Mentors of Mussolini', American Political Science Review, XXXII (1928), pp. 843-69. For a dispassionate analysis of the connections between James's thought and the ideas of Sorel and Mussolini see Perry, Thought and Character, II, pp. 575-9. For later comments on this topic see V.J. McGill, 'Pragmatism Reconsidered: An Aspect of John Dewey's Philosophy', Science and Society, III (1939), pp. 289-322, p. 314. Thomas P. Neill, 'Democracy's Intellectual "Fifth Column"', Catholic World, CLV (1942), pp. 151-5, p. 151. Bertrand Russell, 'The Revolt Against Reason', in Political Quarterly in the 1930s, ed. W.A. Robson (London, 1971), pp. 155-6. Cf. Horace M. Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', Antioch Review, XXX (1959), pp. 299-314, p. 307. Kallen disparaged those who attempted to associate pragmatism with fascism or nazism.
337. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
338. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
339. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
340. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
341. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
342. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
343. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the
344. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
345. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
346. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
347. 123 Grammar, p. 272. For Laski's depiction of community members as consumers and for his functionalist and instrumentalist account of the state and rights see ibid., pp. 39, 69, 130; cf. ibid., p. 24. Laski described his theory as a 'special adaptation of the Benthamite theory to the special needs of the time'. Laski's use of expressions such as 'effective demand gave rise to economistic interpretations of his idea of the good. Laski, 'Law and the State', p. 294. See Foundations, pp. 244-5: 'Law apart, every community is a congeries of men and associations seeking the satisfaction of wants . . . [the state] . . . entrusted with power in order that it may satisfy, or organize the satisfaction of, the wants of men on the largest possible scale.' Cf. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 51: 'A compulsory training of the mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.' For criticisms of the collectivist aspects of the Grammar see Zylstra, From Political Pluralism to Collectivism, pp. 189-202. See also Deane, Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski, pp. 333 ff. Cf. Elliott, Pragmatic Revolt, pp. 363-4; and Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 207. See also Alan Shaw, 'Liberty and Happiness', Australian Quarterly (1942), pp. 86-95, p. 88.
348. 124 The collectivist implications of Laski's functionalist interpretation of law and the state were discussed also by Elliott in relation to Duguit's influence. Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 253-4. For Elliott's comments on the practical implications of Dewey's political thought see ibid., pp. 225-9. See also Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163. He described Duguit's notion of the social good as 'Rousseau's general will in a strange garb'. Cf. Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom?, p. 10.
349. 124 The collectivist implications of Laski's functionalist interpretation of law and the state were discussed also by Elliott in relation to Duguit's influence. Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 253-4. For Elliott's comments on the practical implications of Dewey's political thought see ibid., pp. 225-9. See also Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163. He described Duguit's notion of the social good as 'Rousseau's general will in a strange garb'. Cf. Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom?, p. 10.
350. 124 The collectivist implications of Laski's functionalist interpretation of law and the state were discussed also by Elliott in relation to Duguit's influence. Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 253-4. For Elliott's comments on the practical implications of Dewey's political thought see ibid., pp. 225-9. See also Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163. He described Duguit's notion of the social good as 'Rousseau's general will in a strange garb'. Cf. Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom?, p. 10.
351. 124 The collectivist implications of Laski's functionalist interpretation of law and the state were discussed also by Elliott in relation to Duguit's influence. Elliott, 'Pragmatic Politics', pp. 253-4. For Elliott's comments on the practical implications of Dewey's political thought see ibid., pp. 225-9. See also Hsiao, Political Pluralism, p. 163. He described Duguit's notion of the social good as 'Rousseau's general will in a strange garb'. Cf. Laski, Will Planning Restrict Freedom?, p. 10.
352. 125 For Laski's comments on Elliott see Grammar, pp. 249 n, 282. For further background on Elliott see Isaac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left (London, 1993), pp. 234, 359, 404. Follett, The New State, p. 84. Drawing upon James, Follett seeks to reconcile '"irreducible pluralism" and the self-unifying principle'. For references to James see ibid., pp. 34 n, 60, 264-7, 302, 314, 318-19, 334. See also M.P. Follett, Creative Experience (New York, 1924), p. 114.
353. 125 For Laski's comments on Elliott see Grammar, pp. 249 n, 282. For further background on Elliott see Isaac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left (London, 1993), pp. 234, 359, 404. Follett, The New State, p. 84. Drawing upon James, Follett seeks to reconcile '"irreducible pluralism" and the self-unifying principle'. For references to James see ibid., pp. 34 n, 60, 264-7, 302, 314, 318-19, 334. See also M.P. Follett, Creative Experience (New York, 1924), p. 114.
354. 125 For Laski's comments on Elliott see Grammar, pp. 249 n, 282. For further background on Elliott see Isaac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left (London, 1993), pp. 234, 359, 404. Follett, The New State, p. 84. Drawing upon James, Follett seeks to reconcile '"irreducible pluralism" and the self-unifying principle'. For references to James see ibid., pp. 34 n, 60, 264-7, 302, 314, 318-19, 334. See also M.P. Follett, Creative Experience (New York, 1924), p. 114.
355. 125 For Laski's comments on Elliott see Grammar, pp. 249 n, 282. For further background on Elliott see Isaac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left (London, 1993), pp. 234, 359, 404. Follett, The New State, p. 84. Drawing upon James, Follett seeks to reconcile '"irreducible pluralism" and the self-unifying principle'. For references to James see ibid., pp. 34 n, 60, 264-7, 302, 314, 318-19, 334. See also M.P. Follett, Creative Experience (New York, 1924), p. 114.
356. 125 For Laski's comments on Elliott see Grammar, pp. 249 n, 282. For further background on Elliott see Isaac Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left (London, 1993), pp. 234, 359, 404. Follett, The New State, p. 84. Drawing upon James, Follett seeks to reconcile '"irreducible pluralism" and the self-unifying principle'. For references to James see ibid., pp. 34 n, 60, 264-7, 302, 314, 318-19, 334. See also M.P. Follett, Creative Experience (New York, 1924), p. 114.
357. 126 Follett, The New State, pp. 10, 263-6.
358. 127 Ibid., p. 304 n. Follett wrote (ibid., p. 315) that the 'great lesson of Mr. Laski's book is in its implication that we do not have a sovereign state until we make one. Political theory will not create sovereignty, acts of Parliament cannot confer sovereignty, only living the life will turn us, subjects indeed at present, into kings of our own destiny.'
359. 127 Ibid., p. 304 n. Follett wrote (ibid., p. 315) that the 'great lesson of Mr. Laski's book is in its implication that we do not have a sovereign state until we make one. Political theory will not create sovereignty, acts of Parliament cannot confer sovereignty, only living the life will turn us, subjects indeed at present, into kings of our own destiny.'
360. 128 See Studies, p. 23. Laski wrote that we achieve order 'by being able to convince men that some unity we make means added richness to their lives. We encounter everywhere not allegiance, but allegiances in men.' Grammar, p. 287.
361. 128 See Studies, p. 23. Laski wrote that we achieve order 'by being able to convince men that some unity we make means added richness to their lives. We encounter everywhere not allegiance, but allegiances in men.' Grammar, p. 287.
362. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
363. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
364. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
365. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
366. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
367. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
368. 129 Grammar, p. 287. Laski wrote that loyalty 'cannot be imposed upon us. It must grow spontaneously out of our experience'; cf. ibid., p. 263. See also Follett, The New State, p. 69, on the possibility of 'interweaving' wills. For Laski's citation of Follett see Grammar, p. 276. This definition was taken from Follett, Creative Experience, p. 264. James also wrote of the need to grow unity. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 382. See also Essays, pp. 42-3.
369. 130 Dewey cited in Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', p. 301. Follett, The New State, pp. 266-7. Bernard Bosanquet in the 1919 edition of the Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp. xiii, liv, described Follett's work as the 'most sane and brilliant of recent works in political theory'. See ibid., p. xl for Bosanquet's comment on James's anti-intellectualism. Note that while James gives a sympathetic hearing to Hegel the general tenor of his philosophy is closer to pluralism than monism. See Essays, p. 29; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
370. 130 Dewey cited in Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', p. 301. Follett, The New State, pp. 266-7. Bernard Bosanquet in the 1919 edition of the Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp. xiii, liv, described Follett's work as the 'most sane and brilliant of recent works in political theory'. See ibid., p. xl for Bosanquet's comment on James's anti-intellectualism. Note that while James gives a sympathetic hearing to Hegel the general tenor of his philosophy is closer to pluralism than monism. See Essays, p. 29; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
371. 130 Dewey cited in Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', p. 301. Follett, The New State, pp. 266-7. Bernard Bosanquet in the 1919 edition of the Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp. xiii, liv, described Follett's work as the 'most sane and brilliant of recent works in political theory'. See ibid., p. xl for Bosanquet's comment on James's anti-intellectualism. Note that while James gives a sympathetic hearing to Hegel the general tenor of his philosophy is closer to pluralism than monism. See Essays, p. 29; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
372. 130 Dewey cited in Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', p. 301. Follett, The New State, pp. 266-7. Bernard Bosanquet in the 1919 edition of the Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp. xiii, liv, described Follett's work as the 'most sane and brilliant of recent works in political theory'. See ibid., p. xl for Bosanquet's comment on James's anti-intellectualism. Note that while James gives a sympathetic hearing to Hegel the general tenor of his philosophy is closer to pluralism than monism. See Essays, p. 29; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
373. 130 Dewey cited in Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', p. 301. Follett, The New State, pp. 266-7. Bernard Bosanquet in the 1919 edition of the Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp. xiii, liv, described Follett's work as the 'most sane and brilliant of recent works in political theory'. See ibid., p. xl for Bosanquet's comment on James's anti-intellectualism. Note that while James gives a sympathetic hearing to Hegel the general tenor of his philosophy is closer to pluralism than monism. See Essays, p. 29; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
374. 130 Dewey cited in Kallen, 'Individuality, Individualism and John Dewey', p. 301. Follett, The New State, pp. 266-7. Bernard Bosanquet in the 1919 edition of the Philosophical Theory of the State (London, 1965), pp. xiii, liv, described Follett's work as the 'most sane and brilliant of recent works in political theory'. See ibid., p. xl for Bosanquet's comment on James's anti-intellectualism. Note that while James gives a sympathetic hearing to Hegel the general tenor of his philosophy is closer to pluralism than monism. See Essays, p. 29; and James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 273-4.
375. 131 Follett, The New State, pp. xxx, 11, 344 ff. On the notion of the self as a self-unifying centre see ibid., p. 76. On the psychological nature of her notion of manyness in oneness see Follett, The New State, pp. 14 n, 65, 158, 272. See also Follett, 'Community is a Process', Philosophical Review, XXVIII (1919), pp. 576-88, pp. 576-9.
376. 131 Follett, The New State, pp. xxx, 11, 344 ff. On the notion of the self as a self-unifying centre see ibid., p. 76. On the psychological nature of her notion of manyness in oneness see Follett, The New State, pp. 14 n, 65, 158, 272. See also Follett, 'Community is a Process', Philosophical Review, XXVIII (1919), pp. 576-88, pp. 576-9.
377. 131 Follett, The New State, pp. xxx, 11, 344 ff. On the notion of the self as a self-unifying centre see ibid., p. 76. On the psychological nature of her notion of manyness in oneness see Follett, The New State, pp. 14 n, 65, 158, 272. See also Follett, 'Community is a Process', Philosophical Review, XXVIII (1919), pp. 576-88, pp. 576-9.
378. 131 Follett, The New State, pp. xxx, 11, 344 ff. On the notion of the self as a self-unifying centre see ibid., p. 76. On the psychological nature of her notion of manyness in oneness see Follett, The New State, pp. 14 n, 65, 158, 272. See also Follett, 'Community is a Process', Philosophical Review, XXVIII (1919), pp. 576-88, pp. 576-9.
379. 132 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 274.
380. 133 On Laski's syndicalism see Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left, pp. 91-2. Grammar, pp. 256, 262, 263. See also on this idea Follett, 'Community is a Process', pp. 576-88. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 251-2. See also Grammar, pp. 260, 270; cf. ibid., p. 264.
381. 133 On Laski's syndicalism see Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left, pp. 91-2. Grammar, pp. 256, 262, 263. See also on this idea Follett, 'Community is a Process', pp. 576-88. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 251-2. See also Grammar, pp. 260, 270; cf. ibid., p. 264.
382. 133 On Laski's syndicalism see Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left, pp. 91-2. Grammar, pp. 256, 262, 263. See also on this idea Follett, 'Community is a Process', pp. 576-88. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 251-2. See also Grammar, pp. 260, 270; cf. ibid., p. 264.
383. 133 On Laski's syndicalism see Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left, pp. 91-2. Grammar, pp. 256, 262, 263. See also on this idea Follett, 'Community is a Process', pp. 576-88. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 251-2. See also Grammar, pp. 260, 270; cf. ibid., p. 264.
384. 133 On Laski's syndicalism see Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left, pp. 91-2. Grammar, pp. 256, 262, 263. See also on this idea Follett, 'Community is a Process', pp. 576-88. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 251-2. See also Grammar, pp. 260, 270; cf. ibid., p. 264.
385. 133 On Laski's syndicalism see Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life and the Left, pp. 91-2. Grammar, pp. 256, 262, 263. See also on this idea Follett, 'Community is a Process', pp. 576-88. James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 251-2. See also Grammar, pp. 260, 270; cf. ibid., p. 264.
386. 134 On social integration as an enriching process see Grammar, pp. 29, 32, 37, 261-2, 282. For Follett's comments on this matter see 'Community is a Process', p. 587. Cf. James, Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383. See also Essays, pp. 7, 119; and James, Pragmatism, p. 166.
387. 134 On social integration as an enriching process see Grammar, pp. 29, 32, 37, 261-2, 282. For Follett's comments on this matter see 'Community is a Process', p. 587. Cf. James, Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383. See also Essays, pp. 7, 119; and James, Pragmatism, p. 166.
388. 134 On social integration as an enriching process see Grammar, pp. 29, 32, 37, 261-2, 282. For Follett's comments on this matter see 'Community is a Process', p. 587. Cf. James, Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383. See also Essays, pp. 7, 119; and James, Pragmatism, p. 166.
389. 134 On social integration as an enriching process see Grammar, pp. 29, 32, 37, 261-2, 282. For Follett's comments on this matter see 'Community is a Process', p. 587. Cf. James, Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383. See also Essays, pp. 7, 119; and James, Pragmatism, p. 166.
390. 134 On social integration as an enriching process see Grammar, pp. 29, 32, 37, 261-2, 282. For Follett's comments on this matter see 'Community is a Process', p. 587. Cf. James, Notes for Metaphysical Seminary (1903-4), cited in Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 383. See also Essays, pp. 7, 119; and James, Pragmatism, p. 166.
391. 135 Grammar, p. 260; cf. pp. 263-5.
392. 136 Grammar, pp. 260, 262. James wrote that the transcendentalists believed that 'Most of us are . . . mere syllables in the mouth of Allah', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 212.
393. 136 Grammar, pp. 260, 262. James wrote that the transcendentalists believed that 'Most of us are . . . mere syllables in the mouth of Allah', James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 212.
394. 137 Grammar, pp. 26, 29-34, 68.
395. 138 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 205-6, 208. Hsiao regarded James's failure to achieve a comprehension of the whole as revealing a fundamental weakness in his philosophy, adding that pragmatism did not give enough credit to its monistic or rationalist opponents. Cf. Follett, The New State, pp. 265-72. It is important to note that both Hsiao and Follett used the words pragmatism to refer to all the major aspects of James's thought.
396. 138 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 205-6, 208. Hsiao regarded James's failure to achieve a comprehension of the whole as revealing a fundamental weakness in his philosophy, adding that pragmatism did not give enough credit to its monistic or rationalist opponents. Cf. Follett, The New State, pp. 265-72. It is important to note that both Hsiao and Follett used the words pragmatism to refer to all the major aspects of James's thought.
397. 139 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 165-6. Cf. Grammar, pp. 270-1.
398. 139 Hsiao, Political Pluralism, pp. 165-6. Cf. Grammar, pp. 270-1.
399. 140 Grammar, p. 261. For James's comments on the distributive and the collective see James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 275 ff. Cf. Authority, p. 68. Laski wrote, again borrowing from James, that while in theory all our actions 'move in unity down the endless stream of time' in practice it is the discontinuous action that proves 'vital'. For Laski's review of Hsiao's book see the New Republic (28 March 1928), p. 197.
400. 140 Grammar, p. 261. For James's comments on the distributive and the collective see James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 275 ff. Cf. Authority, p. 68. Laski wrote, again borrowing from James, that while in theory all our actions 'move in unity down the endless stream of time' in practice it is the discontinuous action that proves 'vital'. For Laski's review of Hsiao's book see the New Republic (28 March 1928), p. 197.
401. 140 Grammar, p. 261. For James's comments on the distributive and the collective see James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 275 ff. Cf. Authority, p. 68. Laski wrote, again borrowing from James, that while in theory all our actions 'move in unity down the endless stream of time' in practice it is the discontinuous action that proves 'vital'. For Laski's review of Hsiao's book see the New Republic (28 March 1928), p. 197.
402. 140 Grammar, p. 261. For James's comments on the distributive and the collective see James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 275 ff. Cf. Authority, p. 68. Laski wrote, again borrowing from James, that while in theory all our actions 'move in unity down the endless stream of time' in practice it is the discontinuous action that proves 'vital'. For Laski's review of Hsiao's book see the New Republic (28 March 1928), p. 197.
403. 141 James, Will to Believe, p. 61. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 282, 286.
404. 141 James, Will to Believe, p. 61. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 282, 286.
405. 142 Letters, I, p. 633 (15 July 1924).
406. 143 Grammar, p. 260. See also Foundations, p. 169: 'we are forced to the admission that the parts are as real, as primary, and as sell-sufficing as the whole'. Cf. James, The Will to Believe, pp. viii, 46. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 271.
407. 143 Grammar, p. 260. See also Foundations, p. 169: 'we are forced to the admission that the parts are as real, as primary, and as sell-sufficing as the whole'. Cf. James, The Will to Believe, pp. viii, 46. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 271.
408. 143 Grammar, p. 260. See also Foundations, p. 169: 'we are forced to the admission that the parts are as real, as primary, and as sell-sufficing as the whole'. Cf. James, The Will to Believe, pp. viii, 46. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 271.
409. 143 Grammar, p. 260. See also Foundations, p. 169: 'we are forced to the admission that the parts are as real, as primary, and as sell-sufficing as the whole'. Cf. James, The Will to Believe, pp. viii, 46. Cf. Perry, Thought and Character, II, p. 271.
410. 144 Letters, I, p. 633 (15 July 1924).
411. 145 Laski, The American Democracy (London, 1949), p. 448.
412. 146 Laski wrote that James and Dewey had failed to make their meaning clear for fear of being misunderstood, and as a result pragmatism became 'part of the defensive mechanism of a privileged order'. Laski, The American Democracy, pp. 726-7.
413. 147 James, Pragmatism, pp. 53, 199, 207, 209, 218. See also Dewey, Essays, pp. 306, 347.
414. 147 James, Pragmatism, pp. 53, 199, 207, 209, 218. See also Dewey, Essays, pp. 306, 347.
415. 148 For criticisms of pragmatist philosophy on this and related scores see: Albert Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism (Boston, 1909). For James's dismissal of Schinz's argument see Letters of William James, II, pp. 319, 337. Cf. Charles Morris who noted that pragmatism was dismissed as the 'philosophy of the business man'; and 'the reductio ad absurdum of empiricism'. With pragmatism, some had argued, true philosophy had 'vanished'; philosophy was now brought to the 'brink of comedy, if not downright charlatanism'. C. Morris, 'Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing', Monist, XXXVII (1928), pp. 494-510. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 198-9. See also Benjamin Stolberg, 'Degradation of American Psychology', The Nation (15 October 1930), pp. 395-8.
416. 148 For criticisms of pragmatist philosophy on this and related scores see: Albert Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism (Boston, 1909). For James's dismissal of Schinz's argument see Letters of William James, II, pp. 319, 337. Cf. Charles Morris who noted that pragmatism was dismissed as the 'philosophy of the business man'; and 'the reductio ad absurdum of empiricism'. With pragmatism, some had argued, true philosophy had 'vanished'; philosophy was now brought to the 'brink of comedy, if not downright charlatanism'. C. Morris, 'Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing', Monist, XXXVII (1928), pp. 494-510. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 198-9. See also Benjamin Stolberg, 'Degradation of American Psychology', The Nation (15 October 1930), pp. 395-8.
417. 148 For criticisms of pragmatist philosophy on this and related scores see: Albert Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism (Boston, 1909). For James's dismissal of Schinz's argument see Letters of William James, II, pp. 319, 337. Cf. Charles Morris who noted that pragmatism was dismissed as the 'philosophy of the business man'; and 'the reductio ad absurdum of empiricism'. With pragmatism, some had argued, true philosophy had 'vanished'; philosophy was now brought to the 'brink of comedy, if not downright charlatanism'. C. Morris, 'Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing', Monist, XXXVII (1928), pp. 494-510. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 198-9. See also Benjamin Stolberg, 'Degradation of American Psychology', The Nation (15 October 1930), pp. 395-8.
418. 148 For criticisms of pragmatist philosophy on this and related scores see: Albert Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism (Boston, 1909). For James's dismissal of Schinz's argument see Letters of William James, II, pp. 319, 337. Cf. Charles Morris who noted that pragmatism was dismissed as the 'philosophy of the business man'; and 'the reductio ad absurdum of empiricism'. With pragmatism, some had argued, true philosophy had 'vanished'; philosophy was now brought to the 'brink of comedy, if not downright charlatanism'. C. Morris, 'Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing', Monist, XXXVII (1928), pp. 494-510. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 198-9. See also Benjamin Stolberg, 'Degradation of American Psychology', The Nation (15 October 1930), pp. 395-8.
419. 148 For criticisms of pragmatist philosophy on this and related scores see: Albert Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism (Boston, 1909). For James's dismissal of Schinz's argument see Letters of William James, II, pp. 319, 337. Cf. Charles Morris who noted that pragmatism was dismissed as the 'philosophy of the business man'; and 'the reductio ad absurdum of empiricism'. With pragmatism, some had argued, true philosophy had 'vanished'; philosophy was now brought to the 'brink of comedy, if not downright charlatanism'. C. Morris, 'Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing', Monist, XXXVII (1928), pp. 494-510. Cf. James, Pragmatism, pp. 198-9. See also Benjamin Stolberg, 'Degradation of American Psychology', The Nation (15 October 1930), pp. 395-8.
420. 149 Laski, 'Law and the State', pp. 267, 294.
421. 150 Letters, I, p. 364 (25 August 1921).