Representativeness and counterfactual thinking: The principle that antecedent and outcome correspond in magnitude

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Volumn 24, Issue 6, 1998, Pages 595-609

  Sim, Damien L H ^b   Morris, Michael W ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032093095     PISSN: 01461672     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0146167298246004     Document Type: Article

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