Partial-Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence

Issues in Law and Medicine

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 3-56

  Bopp Jr , James ^c   Cook, Curtis R ^a,b  

^a SPECTRUM HEALTH   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABORTION; ABORTION LAW; ABORTION, INDUCED--LEGAL ASPECTS; AGE; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS; ARTICLE; CIVIL RIGHTS; DELIVERY--LEGAL ASPECTS; DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS; DEVELOPED COUNTRY; ETHICS; EVANS V. KELLEY; FAMILY PLANNING; FEMALE; FERTILITY CONTROL, POSTCONCEPTION; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; GOVERNMENT; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HUMAN; HUMAN RIGHTS; INDUCED ABORTION; INFANT; JURISPRUDENCE; JUVENILE; LAW; LEGAL APPROACH; LEGAL ASPECT; MEDICAL SOCIETY; MEDICOLEGAL ASPECT; METHODOLOGY; NOMENCLATURE; NORTH AMERICA; NORTHERN AMERICA; PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT (1995 BILL); PERSONHOOD; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY; POPULATION; POPULATION AND POPULATION RELATED PHENOMENA; PREGNANCY; PREGNANCY OUTCOMES; PREGNANT WOMAN; REPRODUCTION; ROE V. WADE; THERAPEUTIC ABORTION; THIRD TRIMESTER PREGNANCY; U.S. CONGRESS; UNITED STATES; WESTERN HEMISPHERE;

ABORTION LAW; ABORTION, INDUCED--LEGAL ASPECTS; AGE FACTORS; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS; AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION; AMERICAS; DELIVERY--LEGAL ASPECTS; DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS; DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; ETHICS; EVANS V. KELLEY; FAMILY PLANNING; FERTILITY CONTROL, POSTCONCEPTION; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; HUMAN RIGHTS; INFANT; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGAL APPROACH; LEGISLATION; NORTH AMERICA; NORTHERN AMERICA; PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT (1995 BILL); PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY; POPULATION; POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS; PREGNANCY; PREGNANCY OUTCOMES; REPRODUCTION; ROE V. WADE; U.S. CONGRESS; UNITED STATES; YOUTH;

ABORTION, EUGENIC; ABORTION, INDUCED; ABORTION, LEGAL; CIVIL RIGHTS; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; FEMALE; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HUMANS; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGISLATION, MEDICAL; PERSONHOOD; PREGNANCY; PREGNANCY TRIMESTER, THIRD; PREGNANT WOMEN; SUPREME COURT DECISIONS; TERMINOLOGY; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032092622     PISSN: 87568160     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (223)

1. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-267 (1995).
2. As of 4/29/98 on Lexis/Nexis, the states that have passed partial birth abortion bans are: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 26:23:1-6 (1997)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie 1997)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3603.01 (1997)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5:61:201-204 (Michie 1997)); Florida (1998 Fla. Laws ch. 1, HB 1227, Reg. Sess., Fla. Adv. Legis. Serv. Statenet); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1997)); Idaho (1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 34, HB 576, 54th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess., Idaho Adv. Legis. Serv. Statenet); Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 99 (West 1997)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1,7 (Michie 1997)); Iowa (1998 Iowa Senate File 2073, 77th Gen. Assembly, 2nd Sess., Iowa Adv. Legis. Serv. Statenet); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. § 14:32.9 & 40:1299.35.16 (West 1998)); Michigan (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (17016), (17516) (Law. Co-op. 1997)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41:41:71,73 (1997)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN § 28:326, 328 (Michie 1997)); New Jersey (1997 N.J. Laws 262, AB 2049, 207th Leg. N.J. Adv. Legis. Serv. Statenet); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23:4.12:1-6 (1997)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (Law Co-op. 1997)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34:23A:28-32 (Michie 1997)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997)); Virginia (1998 Va. Acts 448, SB 552, & 1998 Va. Acts 579, HB 1154, Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. Statenet); West Virginia (1998 W. Va. SB 25, 73rd Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess., W. Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. Statenet). On April 30, 1998, Wisconsin also passed a partial birth abortion ban (WISC. STATS. 940.16 (1998)). As of 4/29/98 on Lexis/Nexis, the states that have partial birth abortion bans and regulations pending in their legislatures are: California (S. 102, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997-98)); Colorado (H.R. 1136, 61st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997)); Connecticut (H.R. 5566, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997)); Delaware (H.R. 211, 139th Gen. Assembly (Del. 1997)); Hawaii (H.R. 1460, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997)); Kansas (H.R. 2336, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997), S. 234, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997)); Kentucky (B.R. 963, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1997)); Maine (H.R. 390, 118th Leg., 1st. Reg. Sess. (Me. 1997)); Maryland (H.R. 426, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997), S. 493, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997)); Massachusetts (H.R. 2889, 181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997), S. 875, 181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997)); Minnesota (H.R. 77, 150, 202, 233, 397, 558, 1447, 1654, 80th Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997), S. 49, 381, 1502, 80th Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997)); Missouri (H.R. 937, 154, 514, 545, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998), S. 8b, 9b, 275, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997); S. 586, 89th Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998)); New Hampshire (H.R. 768, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997)); New Mexico (H.J.M.2 78, 43rd Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997), S.J.M. 47, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997)); New York (A.B. 5463, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997), S. 1800, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997)); North Carolina (H.R. 303 (N.C. 1997), S. 536, 1482 (N.C. 1997)); Oklahoma (H.R. 1617, 2175, 2201, 46th Leg. Sess, 1st. Sess. (Okla. 1997)); Oregon (S. 1132, 69th Leg. (Or. 1997)); Vermont (H.R. 470, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997)); Washington (H.R. 1031, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997), S. 5541, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997)); and Wyoming (S. 27, 54th Leg. Budget Sess. (Wyo. 1998)). Ohio passed a bill that is not a partial-birth abortion ban patterned on the federal model, but has sometimes erroneously been labelled a partial-birth abortion ban (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.51, § 2919.15 (Anderson 1997)). Utah also has an unsatisfactorily-worded ban, which does not follow the federal model (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1997)).
3. Preliminary or permanent injunctions against enforcement of partial-birth abortion bans have been entered in the following states: Alaska: Planned Parenthood v. State, No. 3AN-97-6019 (Super. Ct. Alaska Mar. 13, 1998)(permanent injunction); Arizona: Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997)(permanent injunction); Arkansas: Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Jegley, No. LR-C-97-581 (E.D. Ark. July 31, 1997)(temporary restraining order); Georgia: Midtown Hospital v. Miller, No. 1:97-CV-1786-JOF (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 1998)(preliminary injunction); Idaho: Wehrich v. Lance, No. CIV 98-0117-S-BLW (D. Idaho Mar. 27, 1998)(temporary restraining order); Illinois: The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, No. 97 C 8702, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2245 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 1998)(permanent injunction); Louisiana: Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster, No. 97-2211 (E.D. La. July 21, 1997)(preliminary injunction); Michigan: Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997)(permanent injunction); Montana: Intermountain Planned Parenthood v. State, No. BVD 97-477 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Oct. 1, 1997)(preliminary injunction); Nebraska: Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997)(preliminary injunction); New Jersey: Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. 97-6170 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1997)(temporary restraining order); Rhode Island: Rhode Island Medical Society v. Pine, No. 97-416L (D.R.I. July 11, 1997)(temporary restraining order). A preliminary injunction was denied in Wisconsin. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, No. 98-C-305 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 1998). Injunctive relief was denied in Alabama. Summit Medical Associates v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Lawsuits have also been filed in Iowa (Planned Parenthood v. Miller, No. 4-98-CV-90149 (S.D. Iowa) and Florida. Partial-birth abortion bans are unchallenged in Indiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah.
4. 977 F.Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (Granted an injunction against the partial-birth abortion statute holding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of due process and imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion). An earlier decision is Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (granting preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the statute on vagueness grounds); aff'd 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997). But that decision is irrelevant here because it predated the concept of partial birth abortion. The Ohio statute banned an abortion procedure known as "dilation and extraction procedure" or "D&X." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.11, 2307.51-.52, 2919.15-.18 (Banks-Baldwin 1995). It targeted Dr. Haskell's D&X procedure, but the statute did not encompass the concept of partial birth abortion. Its definition of the abortion procedure banned predated the federal model and is significantly different. As argued by the abortion providers that opposed the Ohio ban: "This case does not involve a 'partial birth abortion law.'" Respondents' Brief in Opposition on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof. Corp., at 1 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1998) (No. 97-934).
5. 977 F.Supp. at 1284.
6. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. REP. 105-24 (1997).
7. 977 F.Supp. at 1311.
8. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1833 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Nov. 17, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Senate Hearings].
9. Id. at 7-8 (Haskell Monograph).
10. Id. at 11 (Haskell Monograph).
11. Id. at 6-7 (Haskell Monograph).
12. Id. at 8-9 (Haskell Monograph).
13. Second Trimester Abortion: An Interview With W. Martin Haskell, M.D., 16 CINCINNATI MED. 18, 19 (1993).
14. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 22-24 (Letter from Barbara Bolsen (Editor of American Medical News) to the Hon. Charles T. Canady (Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary) (July 11, 1995) (attaching a transcript of an interview with Dr. Haskell from which the quotation is taken)).
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 28 (Transcript of testimony of Dr. Haskell on Nov. 8, 1995, in Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995)(No. C-3-95-414)).
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 109 (statement of Nancy G. Romer, M.D.).
20. Id. at 18-19 (statement of Brenda Pratt Shafer, R.N.).
21. Id. at 18.
22. Diane Gianelli, Shock Tactic Ads Target Late-Term Abortion Procedure: Foes Hope Campaign Will Sink Federal Abortion Rights Legislation, AM. MED. NEWS, July 5, 1993, at 3, 16.
23. Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 110-15 (June 15, 1995) [hereinafter Partial-Birth Abortion] (Appendix 3 - Letter from Jim McMahon, M.D., to Keri Folmar (assistant counsel, Subcommittee on the Constitution) (June 8, 1995) (attaching charts of "Fetal Indications" for abortions he performed)).
24. Id.
25. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 82 (prepared statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.).
26. Partial-Birth Abortion, supra note 23, at 110-15.
27. Katherine Dowling, What Constitutes A Quality of Life?: Neither Treatable Conditions Nor Permanent Handicaps Mean People Can't Live Useful, Happy Lives, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at B9.
28. Partial-Birth Abortion, supra note 23, at 110-15.
29. Gianelli, supra note 22, at 16.
30. Partial-Birth Abortion, supra note 23.
31. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-267 (Sept. 27, 1995).
32. CONG. REC. S18228, roll call #596 (Dec. 7, 1995).
33. CONG. REC. H2929, roll call #94 (Mar. 28, 1996).
34. CONG. REC. H3338-3339, H. Doc. 104-198 (Apr. 10, 1996).
35. CONG. REC. H10642, roll call #422 (votes: 285-137) (Sept. 19, 1996); CONG. REC. S11337-11361, roll call #301 (votes: 57-41) (Sept. 26, 1996).
36. Diane M. Gianelli, Medicine Adds to Debate on Late-Term Abortion: Abortion Rights Leader Urges End to 'Half Truths,' AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3, 28; Ruth Padawer, Pro-Choice Advocates Admit to Deception, SUNDAY RECORD, Feb. 27, 1997; David Stout, An Abortion Rights Advocate Says He Lied About Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at A12.
37. Diane M. Gianelli, Medicine Adds to Debate on Late-Term Abortion: Abortion Rights Leader Urges End to 'Half Truths,' AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3, 28; Ruth Padawer, Pro-Choice Advocates Admit to Deception, SUNDAY RECORD, Feb. 27, 1997; David Stout, An Abortion Rights Advocate Says He Lied About Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at A12.
38. Diane M. Gianelli, Medicine Adds to Debate on Late-Term Abortion: Abortion Rights Leader Urges End to 'Half Truths,' AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3, 28; Ruth Padawer, Pro-Choice Advocates Admit to Deception, SUNDAY RECORD, Feb. 27, 1997; David Stout, An Abortion Rights Advocate Says He Lied About Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at A12.
39. CONG. REC. H1231, roll call #65 (votes: 295-136) (Mar. 20, 1997); CONG. REC. S4715, roll call #71 (May 20, 1997). The bill was vetoed by the President. CONG. REC. H8891-8892, H.Doc. 105-158 (Oct. 10, 1997).
40. Media Matters describes itself as "a series that looks critically at news media performance." The program is hosted by executive editor Alex Jones, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who also hosts National Public Radio's weekly show On the Media. The investigation of partial-birth abortion coverage was reported by Terry Eastland, editor of Forbes MediaCritic Online, and produced by two-time Emmy documentary nominee Joseph Dorman.
41. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, Late-Term Abortion Ban Vetoed, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1996, at A1.
42. See supra text and accompanying footnotes 8-30 concerning McMahon and Haskell.
43. Letter from P. John Seward, M.D., Executive Vice President, American Medical Association, to U.S. Sen. Rick Santorum (May 19, 1997) ("The American Medical Association (AMA) is writing to support H.R. 1122, 'The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997.' Although our general policy is to oppose legislation criminalizing medical practice or procedure, the AMA has supported such legislation where the procedure was narrowly defined and not medically indicated. . . . Thank you for the opportunity to work with you toward restricting a procedure we all agree is not good medicine.").
44. Kate Michelman, President of the abortion-rights group NARAL insisted this in numerous fora, including comments on KMOX-AM radio, St. Louis, Mo., on Nov. 2, 1995. This claim was widely accepted and reported as fact in news stories and editorial commentaries (e.g., by Ellen Goodman). Likewise, Planned Parenthood Federation of America distributed to Congress a "fact sheet" signed by Dr. Mary Campbell, Medical Director of Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, DC, which asserted the claim. Mary Campbell, H.R. 1833: Medical Questions and Answers (October, 1995).
45. Diane M. Gianelli, Anesthesiologists Question Claims in Abortion Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 1, 1996, at 4; 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 225-26 (Letter from Norig Ellison, M.D. (American Society of Anesthesiologists) to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (Nov. 22, 1995)).
46. Diane M. Gianelli, Anesthesiologists Question Claims in Abortion Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 1, 1996, at 4; 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 225-26 (Letter from Norig Ellison, M.D. (American Society of Anesthesiologists) to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (Nov. 22, 1995)).
47. Partial-Birth Abortion, supra note 23 at 67.
48. Id.
49. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong., § 1531 (a) & (b) (Oct. 9, 1997).
50. MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NURSING DICTIONARY 326 (parenthetical text in original).
51. The following discussion of statutory construction is taken in large part from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Right to Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for Reversal 3 BYUJ PUB. L. 181, 315-27 (1989).
52. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
53. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466.
54. See, e.g., Redding v. C.I.R., 630 F.2d 1169, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
55. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
56. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1974).
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)) (emphasis added).
58. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41.
59. Id. at 42 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
60. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973).
62. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (joined by Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, JJ.).
63. Id. at 347.
64. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983).
65. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954) (Harriss was decided under the Fifth Amendment due process clause, but the principle is applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 n.3 (1972)).
66. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).
67. United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). In the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (HR 1122) as passed by the Senate on May 20, 1997, there is not only a scienter requirement, but there is also a provision for hearing before the State Medical Board, with finding admissible at any trial testing whether a partial-birth procedure fit the life preservation exception. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § (d)(1) & (2) (1997).
69. Maude, 481 F.2d at 1068 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 17-8 (1947))
70. 413 U.S. at 608.
71. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
72. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
73. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
74. Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
75. See supra, note 2.
76. See supra, notes 32-33, 37.
77. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (Haskell Monograph).
78. The American Medical Association summarized the changes as follows: The changed language in the bill now: (a) makes it clear beyond any question that the accepted abortion procedure known as dilation and evacuation (also referred to as 'D&E') is not covered by the bill, (b) permits the procedure to save the life of the mother without any obligation to show that 'no other procedure would suffice,' and (c) does not restrict use of the procedure for physicians intending a delivery at the outset, i.e., it can be done as necessary in their best medical judgment. In addition, as also required by our legislative criteria letter, a physician will be entitled to stay any criminal proceeding in order to obtain expert review by the state medical board of any questioned conduct under the bill for use at trial. Nancy W. Dickey, American Medical Association Statement: AMA Supports HR 1122 As Amended (May, 1997); see also Letter from P. John Seward, M.D. (Executive Vice President, American Medical Association) to U.S. Sen. Rick Santorum (May 19, 1997) ("The American Medical Association (AMA) is writing to support H.R. 1122, 'The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997.' Although our general policy is to oppose legislation criminalizing medical practice or procedure, the AMA has supported such legislation where the procedure was narrowly defined and not medically indicated. . . . Thank you for the opportunity to work with you toward restricting a procedure we all agree is not good medicine.").
79. PHACT includes former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop. The organization has taken on the mission of providing the public and legislators with medically-correct information to counter the disinformation campaign of the pro-abortion rights lobby groups.
80. See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 61 (1993).
81. ACOG Executive Board, ACOG Statement of Policy: Statement on Intact Dilatation and Extraction at 1 (Jan. 12, 1997) (emphasis added).
82. Dave Daley, Late Abortion Pushes Medicine to Edge, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 10, 1989, at 9A.
83. This bullet list is printed with permission from Keri Folmar, unpublished memo, chief counsel, House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 1997 (on file with the Subcommittee on the Constitution, 362 Ford HOB, Washington, DC 20516).
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. Id. at 153.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 154.
88. 422 F.Supp. 934, 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 556 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1977) (abortionist found guilty of negligent homicide of fully delivered previable child).
89. 410 U.S. at 166.
90. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
92. 410 U.S. at 118 n.1.
93. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 859 (1985).
94. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/1(5) (West 1997) (live birth defined); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.002(10) (West 1998) (live birth defined).
95. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (West 1996).
96. Tex. Att'y Gen. Opinion H-369 (Aug. 13, 1974) (The statute "is not, in truth, an abortion statute." Id. at 3).
97. Showery v. Texas, 690 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App. 8 Dist. 1985).
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 156-57.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
101. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 173 (written Testimony of Prof. Douglas W. Kmiec).
102. Id. at 173-74.
103. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW at 30 (2d ed. 1969) (citation omitted).
104. People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 625-26 (1947).
105. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 637 (1970).
106. See Limon, supra note 77, at 47-49 (citations omitted).
107. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971).
108. Linton, supra note 77, at 51 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
109. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
110. See Linton, supra note 77, at 46-64.
111. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
112. This is especially evident in Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court struck down a spousal veto provision, stating that as between the husband and wife "it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy." Id. at 71.
113. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
114. Showery v. Texas, 690 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App. 8 Dist. 1985).
115. It is not relevant whether the child is viable. While it is true that the removal of a previable child from the womb may at present result in its death, this does not mean that one has a right to a dead child. If medical technology develops an artificial womb or perfects the transplantation of developing humans into the wombs of surrogate mothers, this distinction will come even more sharply into focus. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, For Babies, 'Liquid Air' May Spare Fragile Lungs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1989, at C3; Jay S. Greenspan et al., Partial Liquid Ventilation in Critically Ill Infants Receiving Extracorporeal Life Support, 99 PEDIATRICS No. 1, electronic pages at e2 (1997) (The article reports success in the use of partial liquid ventilation to improve the functioning of infants with acute respiratory distress syndrome. Earlier efforts at supplying oxygen in a liquid suspension to premature sheep with underdeveloped lungs have been successful.). At such a point a woman could readily be freed of the burdens of pregnancy without destruction of the child. But even absent such technological advances, a nonviable child who is partially born has passed over the threshold into constitutional protection.
116. It is not relevant whether the child is viable. While it is true that the removal of a previable child from the womb may at present result in its death, this does not mean that one has a right to a dead child. If medical technology develops an artificial womb or perfects the transplantation of developing humans into the wombs of surrogate mothers, this distinction will come even more sharply into focus. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, For Babies, 'Liquid Air' May Spare Fragile Lungs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1989, at C3; Jay S. Greenspan et al., Partial Liquid Ventilation in Critically Ill Infants Receiving Extracorporeal Life Support, 99 PEDIATRICS No. 1, electronic pages at e2 (1997) (The article reports success in the use of partial liquid ventilation to improve the functioning of infants with acute respiratory distress syndrome. Earlier efforts at supplying oxygen in a liquid suspension to premature sheep with underdeveloped lungs have been successful.). At such a point a woman could readily be freed of the burdens of pregnancy without destruction of the child. But even absent such technological advances, a nonviable child who is partially born has passed over the threshold into constitutional protection.
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
118. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76.
119. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
120. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Cf. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (stating the conceptually identical, deferential, rational basis standard in the equal protection context).
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76.
122. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.50 (West 1997) (barring various forms of cruelty to animals).
123. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 50 (transcript of testimony of Martin Haskell on Nov. 8, 1995, in Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (No. C-3-95-414).
124. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (Haskell monograph).
125. 12/8/95 TR at 6, Voinovich.
126. 12/8/95 TR at 25-29 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
127. Primate experiments are the only available source of data, as human experimentation would be unethical.
128. 12/8/95 TR at 26 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
129. K.J.S. Anand & P.R. Hickey, Pain and its Effects in the Human Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321 (1987); 11/13/95 TR at 248-49 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
130. 12/7/95 TR at 126 (testimony of Robert White), Voinovich.
131. Id. at 127.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 128.
134. Xenophon Giannakoulopoulos et al., Fetal Plasma Cortisol and B-endorphin Response to Intrauterine Needling, 344 LANCET 77 (1994).
135. K.J.S. ANAND & MCGRATH, PAIN IN NEONATES (1993).
136. Tessa Richards, Can a Fetus Feel Pain? 291 BRIT. MED. J. 1220 (1985).
137. 12/7/95 TR at 126 (testimony of Robert White), Voinovich.
138. Id.
139. Id.; "Incomplete myelination merely implies a slower conduction velocity in the nerves or central nerve tracts of neonates, which is offset completely by the shorter interneuron and neuromuscular distances traveled by the impulse." Anand & Hickey, supra note 125, at 1322.
140. 12/7/95 TR at 126 (testimony of Robert White), Voinovich.
141. Maria Fitzgerald et al., Postnatal Development of the Cutaneous Flexor Reflex: Comparative Study of Preterm Infants and Newborn Rat Pups, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 520 (1988); C.J. Woolf & P.D. Wall, Endogenous Opioid Peptides and Pain Mechanisms: A Complex Relationship, 306 NATURE 739 (1983).
142. Maria Fitzgerald et al., Postnatal Development of the Cutaneous Flexor Reflex: Comparative Study of Preterm Infants and Newborn Rat Pups, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 520 (1988); C.J. Woolf & P.D. Wall, Endogenous Opioid Peptides and Pain Mechanisms: A Complex Relationship, 306 NATURE 739 (1983).
143. Anand & Hickey, supra note 125, at 1322.
144. K.J.S. Anand & D.B. Carr, The Neuroanatomy, Neurophysiology, and Neurochemistry of Pain, Stress and Analgesia in Newborns and Children, 36 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 795 (1989).
145. Anand & Hickey, supra note 125, at 1322.
146. H.-C. Kinney & W.F. White, Opioid Receptors Localize to the External Granular Cell Layer of the Developing Human Cerebellum, 45 NEUROSCIENCE 13 (1990).
147. K.J.S. Anand et al., Randomized Trial of Fentanyl Anaesthesia in Preterm Babies Undergoing Surgery: Effects on the Stress Response, 1 LANCET 243 (1987).
148. Kanwal J.S. Anand et al., Studies on the Hormonal Regulation of Fuel Metabolism in the Human Newborn Infant Undergoing Anaesthesia and Surgery, 22 HORMONE RES. 115 (1985).
149. Kanwal J.S. Anand & A. Aynsley-Green, Measuring the Severity of Surgical Stress in Newborn Infants, 23 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 297 (1988).
150. K.J.S. Anand & A. Aynsley-Green, Metabolic and Endocrine Effects of Surgical Ligation of PDA in the Human Preterm Neonate: Are There Implications for Further Improvement of Postoperative Outcome? 23 MOD. PROBS. PEDIATRICS 143 (1985).
151. Myron Yaster, Analgesia and Anesthesia in Neonates, 111 J. PEDIATRICS 394 (1987).
152. M. Fitzgerald, Cutaneous Primary Afferem Properties in the Hindlimb of the Neonatal Rat, 383 J. PHYSIOLOGY 79 (1978).
153. 11/13/95 TR at 228-31, 288-89 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
154. See, supra note 43, at 226 (Letter from Norig Ellison).
155. Hearing on the Effects of Anesthesia During a Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 21, 1996) (unrevised and unedited transcript).
156. See, supra note 14, at 22-23 (Letter from Barbara Bolsen).
157. 12/8/95 TR at 6, Voinovich.
158. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
159. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
160. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance - United States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 29, 31 (Dec. 17, 1993) (approximately one percent of abortions performed at or after 21 weeks; four percent performed at 16 to 20 weeks);
161. see 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (Haskell monograph).
162. 5/7/97 TR at 107 (testimony of Dr. Harlan Giles), Evans v. Kelley, 977 F.Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (No. 97-CV-71246) (hereinafter Kelley).
163. This is the number now conceded by Ron Fitzsimmons, supra note 36.
164. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
165. Id. at 77.
166. Id. at 79.
167. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 5 (Haskell Monograph).
168. Id. at 5-6.
169. Id. at 6.
170. WARREN HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 127, 144-46 (1990) (cited in Haskell Monograph, 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 6).
171. WARREN HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 127, 144-46 (1990) (cited in Haskell Monograph, 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 6).
172. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 5-6, 11.
173. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
174. Id. at 513-20.
175. Id. at 525-31.
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
177. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (if no opinion commands a majority, the 'lowest common denominator' analysis governs).
178. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (joint opinion; emphasis added).
179. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875.
180. Id. at 878.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 876, 878.
183. A partial-birth abortion ban would also apply, for example, to a procedure in which a living baby is partly delivered head first, and then killed while a foot remains within the uterus. But, the usual procedure of Haskell, McMahon, et al. is to extract the child feet first until only the head remains, so this will be the focus of the analysis.
184. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 80 (prepared statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.).
185. Id. (Dr. Smith testified that often the abortionist has to keep a firm grip on the fetus to keep it from falling out.)
186. See, e.g., 5/7/97 TR at 238-45 (testimony of Dr. Cook), Kelley.
187. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87.
188. THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 9 (Alan F. Guttmacher ed., 1967).
189. 11/13/95 TR at 240 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
190. 11/13/95 TR at 241-42 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
191. See, supra note 14, at 22-23 (Letter from Barbara Bolsen).
192. Partial-Birth Abortion, supra note 23, at 110-15.
193. While the present authors do not condone these practices - believing that personhood should be recognized from conception - from a constitutional perspective these alternatives do not involve the killing of a human being who is mostly over the personhood line and so are constitutionally acceptable under the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence.
194. See, e.g., 5/5/97 TR at 206-07 (testimony of Dr. Evans), Kelley.
195. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 79 (prepared statement of Pamela Smith, M.D.).
196. Id. at 81 (quoting interview with Dr. Hern in AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 20, 1995 ("I have very serious reservations about this procedure." "You really can't defend it." "I'm not going to do it.")).
197. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 179 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas W. Kmiec) (brackets in original).
198. Id. at 179.
199. Id. (brackets in original).
200. The authors in no way support any killing of unborn or partially delivered babies (except where tragically necessary to save the mother's life), believing unborn members of the human family to be entitled to full legal protection as persons. But the purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how weightless the burden is on any abortionist who believes that some sort of cranial decompression extraction procedure is required or desirable.
201. See, e.g., 5/5/97 TR at 74-75 (testimony of Dr. Doe), Kelley ("Q . . . The risk of assuring fetal demise prior to doing an intact D&E would be no greater than the risk with an amniocentesis; correct? A Correct."); 5/5/97 TR at 168-69 (testimony of Dr. Evans), Kelley (retrieving umbilical cord into the birth canal is relatively simple before extracting body of fetus and cord can be easily injected at that point, with resulting fetal demise).
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (joint opinion; quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).
203. 12/8/95 TR at 23 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
204. Id. at 17-24.
205. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 5.
206. 11/13/95 TR at 234, 280-83 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
207. 11/8/95 TR at 149-51 (testimony of Martin Haskell), Voinovich.
208. 11/13/95 TR at 245 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
209. Id.
210. 11/8/95 TR at 182 (testimony of Martin Haskell), Voinovich.
211. 11/13/95 TR at 244-45 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
212. See 12/8/95 TR at 17-24 (testimony of Harlan Giles), Voinovich.
213. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 589 (19th ed. 1993).
214. Id. at 680-83.
215. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 1 (ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 109, Oct. 1987).
216. David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Morbidity and Mortality from Second Trimester Abortions, 30 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 505 (1985); W.M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 122-37 (1990); Warren M. Hern et al., Outpatient Abortion for Fetal Anomaly and Fetal Death From 15-34 Menstrual Weeks' Gestation; Techniques and Clinical Management, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 301 (1993).
217. David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Morbidity and Mortality from Second Trimester Abortions, 30 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 505 (1985); W.M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 122-37 (1990); Warren M. Hern et al., Outpatient Abortion for Fetal Anomaly and Fetal Death From 15-34 Menstrual Weeks' Gestation; Techniques and Clinical Management, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 301 (1993).
218. David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, Morbidity and Mortality from Second Trimester Abortions, 30 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 505 (1985); W.M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 122-37 (1990); Warren M. Hern et al., Outpatient Abortion for Fetal Anomaly and Fetal Death From 15-34 Menstrual Weeks' Gestation; Techniques and Clinical Management, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 301 (1993).
219. WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 125 (1990); Warren M. Hern et al., Outpatient Abortion for Fetal Anomaly and Fetal Death From 15-34 Menstrual Weeks' Gestation; Techniques and Clinical Management, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 301, 302 (1993).
220. WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 125 (1990); Warren M. Hern et al., Outpatient Abortion for Fetal Anomaly and Fetal Death From 15-34 Menstrual Weeks' Gestation; Techniques and Clinical Management, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 301, 302 (1993).
221. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. The facial challenge rule was established by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739: A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [an] Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. Id. at 745. This facial challenge rule has also been employed in well-known abortion cases by the Supreme Court as recently as 1991 in the case of Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). In Rust, the Supreme Court quoted and employed the Salerno analysis in rejecting a facial challenge to regulations prohibiting the use of public funds (in the Title X family planning program) for abortion counseling and referral, as well as activities advocating abortion as a method of birth control. Id. at 1767. The Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), however, has contributed to some confusion in facial challenge suits. The Casey decision involved a challenge to the federal constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute requiring certain information to be communicated to a woman seeking an abortion 24 hours before she could consent to an abortion. 112 S. Ct. at 2803. It also required that a married woman seeking an abortion must notify her spouse (with certain exceptions designed to avoid abusive situations) before obtaining an abortion. Id. The Casey complaint was a facial challenge, initiated before the law's provisions had taken effect. Id. The Casey Court applied the Salerno facial challenge test when considering the twenty-four-hour waiting period. The majority upholding the twenty-four-hour waiting period consisted of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, id. at 2826 (joint opinion), and Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 2868 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). While the Casey Court applied the facial challenge test in considering the twenty-four-hour waiting period, a different majority used a different standard in its treatment of the spousal notice provision. The joint opinion, speaking also for Justices Blackmun and Stevens, took note of Pennsylvania's assertion that the spousal notice provision must be upheld because this was a facial challenge and less than one percent of the women seeking abortion would be even affected by the spousal notice provision. Id. at 2892. The Court did not say that the facial challenge rule was inapplicable or altered, but rather "disagree[d] with [Pennsylvania's] basic method of analysis." Id. The Court stated that the "controlling class" was not all women who wished to obtain abortions, but rather "married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions in the notice requirement." Id. at 2829-30. The Court held that the spousal notice provision was invalid because it would be an "undue burden" on a "large fraction" of these women. Under the facial challenge analysis, if only a "large fraction" of this one percent of women would experience an undue burden, then the statute should survive a facial challenge because the Salerno/Rust rule requires that the statute have no constitutional applications before succumbing to a facial challenge. As a result, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent that the joint opinion "appears to ignore" the facial challenge standard of review. Id. at 2870 & n.2. Due to this confusion, federal courts have struggled to determine the applicable standard in abortion cases. The following federal court decisions have rejected the view that Casey overruled the facial challenge doctrine in the field of abortion jurisprudence. See, e.g., Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668 (1993); Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1997); Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1997); Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992). Other federal courts have accepted the Casey standard for abortion cases. See, e.g., Women's Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Leavitt v. Jane L., 117 S. Ct. 2453 (1997);.
222. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
223. Id.