Lessons in electricity market reform: Regulatory processes and performance

Electricity Journal

Volumn 11, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 13-20

  Berg, Sanford V ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; INVESTMENTS;

ELECTRIC POWER; ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORMS; GLOBAL INVESTMENTS; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES; INVESTMENT RISKS; PRICE RETURNS; REGULATORY PERFORMANCE; REGULATORY PROCESS; REGULATORY REGIME;

POWER MARKETS;

EID: 0032092211     PISSN: 10406190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1040-6190(98)00048-7     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. 1. Bernard Tenenbaum, Regulation: What the Prime Minister Needs to Know, ELEC. J., Mar. 1996, at 28-36.
2. 2. S. Berg, Priorities in Market Reform: Regulatory Structures and Performance, PACIFIC AND ASIAN J. OF ENERGY, Dec. 1997.
3. 3. Levy and Spiller document the importance of these and other institutional differences among countries. The authors also provide useful guidance on how to measure these differences. B. Levy and P. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, J. LAW, ECON. AND ORG. Vol. 10, No. 2, at 201-46 (1994); B. LEVY AND P. SPILLER, REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1996). In a quantitative study based on 87 countries, Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller show that "well defined and credible political institutions are significantly correlated with national electricity capacity." Mario E. Bergara, Withold J. Henisz and Pablo T. Spiller, Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation Analysis, CALIF. MGT. REV., Winter 1998, 18, 24.
4. 3. Levy and Spiller document the importance of these and other institutional differences among countries. The authors also provide useful guidance on how to measure these differences. B. Levy and P. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, J. LAW, ECON. AND ORG. Vol. 10, No. 2, at 201-46 (1994); B. LEVY AND P. SPILLER, REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1996). In a quantitative study based on 87 countries, Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller show that "well defined and credible political institutions are significantly correlated with national electricity capacity." Mario E. Bergara, Withold J. Henisz and Pablo T. Spiller, Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation Analysis, CALIF. MGT. REV., Winter 1998, 18, 24.
5. 3. Levy and Spiller document the importance of these and other institutional differences among countries. The authors also provide useful guidance on how to measure these differences. B. Levy and P. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, J. LAW, ECON. AND ORG. Vol. 10, No. 2, at 201-46 (1994); B. LEVY AND P. SPILLER, REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1996). In a quantitative study based on 87 countries, Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller show that "well defined and credible political institutions are significantly correlated with national electricity capacity." Mario E. Bergara, Withold J. Henisz and Pablo T. Spiller, Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation Analysis, CALIF. MGT. REV., Winter 1998, 18, 24.
6. 4. R. Peter Lalor and Hernan Garcia, Restructuring Here and There: Lessons for the U.S. and Far South of the Border, ELEC. J., June 1996, at 66-73; R. Peter Lalor and Hernan Garcia, Reshaping Power Markets: Lessons from South America, ELEC.J., March 1996, at 63-71.
7. 4. R. Peter Lalor and Hernan Garcia, Restructuring Here and There: Lessons for the U.S. and Far South of the Border, ELEC. J., June 1996, at 66-73; R. Peter Lalor and Hernan Garcia, Reshaping Power Markets: Lessons from South America, ELEC.J., March 1996, at 63-71.
8. 5. Id.
9. 6. W. Smith, Utility Regulators - Roles and Responsibilities, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 25-27 (The World Bank Press, 1997); W Smith, Utility Regulators - Decision Making Structures, Resources, and Start-up Strategy, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 29-32 (The World Bank Press, 1997); W Smith, Utility Regulators - The Independence Debate, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 21-24 (The World Bank Press, 1997).
10. 6. W. Smith, Utility Regulators - Roles and Responsibilities, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 25-27 (The World Bank Press, 1997); W Smith, Utility Regulators - Decision Making Structures, Resources, and Start-up Strategy, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 29-32 (The World Bank Press, 1997); W Smith, Utility Regulators - The Independence Debate, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 21-24 (The World Bank Press, 1997).
11. 6. W. Smith, Utility Regulators - Roles and Responsibilities, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 25-27 (The World Bank Press, 1997); W Smith, Utility Regulators - Decision Making Structures, Resources, and Start-up Strategy, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 29-32 (The World Bank Press, 1997); W Smith, Utility Regulators - The Independence Debate, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN INFRASTRUCTURE: STRATEGY, REGULATION, AND RISK 21-24 (The World Bank Press, 1997).
12. 7. W Smith. Managing the Regulatory Process: An Overview (1997) (presentation at the June 1997 PURC/World Bank International Training Course on Utility Regulation and Strategy, Gainesville, Fla.).
13. 8. Reinier Lock, Liberalization of India's Electric Power Sector: Evolution or Anarchy? ELEC. J., Mar. 1996, at 78.