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Management Science
Volumn 44, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 730-737
On the equivalence of general and specific control in organizations
Author keywords

Design of Control in Organizations; Incentive Schemes; Multitask Principal Agent Problems; Risk Diversification and Incentives
Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COSTS; DECISION THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; WAGES;
EID: 0032074190     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.44.5.730     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (11)
References (10)
  • 1
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    • Berger, P.D.1    Jaffe, L.J.2
  • 2
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    • Arm's Length Relationships
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  • 3
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    • Dye, R.1
  • 4
    • 0000871877 scopus 로고
    • Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
    • Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom, "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, 55 (1987), 303-328.
    • (1987) Econometrica , vol.55 , pp. 303-328
    • Holmström, B.1    Milgrom, P.2
  • 5
    • 0002430504 scopus 로고
    • Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
    • _ and _, "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," J. Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1991), 24-52.
    • (1991) J. Law, Economics, and Organization , vol.7 , pp. 24-52
  • 6
    • 0030079283 scopus 로고
    • On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal
    • Jost, P., "On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal," J. Economic Theory, 68 (1995), 510-530.
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    • Jost, P.1
  • 7
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    • Compensation Plans for Single- And Multi-Product Salesforces: An Application of the Holmström-Milgrom Model
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    • (1993) Management Sci. , vol.39 , pp. 777-793
    • Lal, R.1    Srinivasan, V.2
  • 8
    • 0011589208 scopus 로고
    • An Investigation of the Equal Commission Rate Policy for a Multiproduct Salesforce
    • Srinivasan, V., "An Investigation of the Equal Commission Rate Policy for a Multiproduct Salesforce," Management Sci., 27 (1981), 731-756.
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    • Srinivasan, V.1
  • 9
    • 0009424011 scopus 로고
    • Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification
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  • 10
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    • An Optimal Commission Plan for Salesmen's Control over Price
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    • Weinberg, C.B.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.