Rational agents, contract curves, and inefficient compromises

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A:Systems and Humans.

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 326-338

  Kersten, Gregory E ^b,c   Noronha, Sunil J ^a,d  

^a IEEE

^b CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

^d IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Conflict analysis; Decision and negotiation support; Efficiency; Negotiation analysis; Negotiations; Opposition; Rationality; Utility

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING; DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS; PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS;

BARGAINING; CONFLICT ANALYSIS; NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 0032074124     PISSN: 10834427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/3468.668964     Document Type: Article

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