Star wars at the bottom line: The accounting forum for defense contractors

Accounting, Organizations and Society

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 343-360

  Chwastiak, M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032063524     PISSN: 03613682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0361-3682(97)00011-1     Document Type: Article

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