Dynamic capacity choice in a Bertrand-Edgeworth framework

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 135-160

  Kovenock, Dan ^a,b   Roy, Suddhasatwa ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bertrand edgeworth; Capacity best response; Subgame perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032016860     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00006-2     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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4. Faith, T., 1992. Essays in Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition. Ph.D. Dissertation, Purdue University.
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