Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 67, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 349-367

  Naegelen, Florence ^a   Mougeot, Michel ^a  

^a University of Besançon ^*  (France)

Author keywords

Auctions; D44; D82; Discrimination; H57; Moral hazard; Procurement

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032016160     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00068-6     Document Type: Article

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